



U.S. Department of Justice

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
Washington, D.C. 20535

October 15, 2018

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR.  
SUITE 1203  
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD  
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1417688-000  
Subject: ACHESON, DEAN GOODERHAM

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

Records responsive to your request were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Below you will find informational paragraphs relevant to your request. Please read each item carefully.

- A search of the Central Records System maintained at FBI Headquarters indicated that records responsive to your request have been sent to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Since these records were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, we are providing you a copy of the previously processed documents.

Please be advised if this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your information needs for this request, you may make a request to NARA at the following address, using file number 100-HQ-30850 as a reference:

National Archives and Records Administration  
8601 Adelphi Road  
College Park, MD 20740-6001

- A search of the Central Records System maintained at FBI Headquarters indicated that records responsive to your request were destroyed on 6/27/1978 and 12/01/1994. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10. Since these records were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, we are providing you a copy of the previously processed documents.

Enclosed are 574 pages of previously processed documents and a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions. This release is being provided to you at no charge.

Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please be advised that additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your information needs for this request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail or fax to – Work Process Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification

that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov). Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy  
Section Chief,  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 10 1949

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	.....
Mr. Ladd	.....
Mr. Clegg	.....
Mr. Glavin	.....
Mr. Nichols	.....
Mr. Rosen	.....
Mr. Tracy	.....
Mr. Harbo	.....
Tele. Room	.....
Mr. Nease	.....
Miss Gandy	.....

10:15 PM  
Patricia Lusk  
LSK 6

Mr 1-1  
dy-1

WA 7 BS 1 FROM BA 10 5-15 PM

DIRECTOR AND SAC BOSTON

UNSUB, WA QUOTE MILLARD UNQUOTE, SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON, VICTIM.

EXTORTION. REBUTEL OCT SEVEN LAST. AUSA BALTO ADVISES INSTANT  
LETTER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF EXTORTION STATUTE AND FOR  
THIS REASON DOES NOT FEEL FURTHER INVESTIGATION WARRANTED. CASE  
BEING CLOSED.

MC FARLIN

END

BA R 1 BS

WA R7 WA

RECORDED - 9

19-17892-12

3 OCT 13 1949

cc Mr. Balto

103  
OCT 24 1949

*Handwritten notes:*  
10-12-49  
JEB

EL

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: October 7, 1949

FROM : J. T. Batts

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa "Millard";  
SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM  
EXTORTION

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

*Handwritten:* 10-1  
10-1

PURPOSE:

To advise investigation to date has failed to identify subject:

BACKGROUND:

This case involves an extortion letter dated August 13, 1949, which was mailed to "Secretary of State Acheson," signed "Millard" which reads "I could kill one of you. I would die for my principles". The envelope was postmarked Cumberland, Maryland, August 13, 1949. The original letter was received from the Department of State through Liaison channels on August 24, 1949.

The Department of State had no logical suspects. FBI Laboratory conducted an examination on August 31, 1949 and effected no identification.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The Baltimore office was unable to identify the subject through investigation. The Baltimore office has requested Boston to contact the Eaton Paper Corporation, Pittsfield, Massachusetts for the purpose of ascertaining the names of distributors at Cumberland, Maryland of the type of paper and envelope used by "Millard" in order that an inquiry may be made of distributors at Cumberland in a further effort to identify the unknown subject. The original extortion letter has not been presented to the USA at Baltimore.

ACTION:

Attached is a teletype to Baltimore with a request that the facts of this case be presented to the USA immediately for an opinion as to whether or not instant letter is a violation of the Extortion Statute.

JTB:mw  
Attachment

*Handwritten:* G. I. R. - 1

*Handwritten:* H  
Sent 10/7/49  
JTB

RECORDED - 35

19-17892-11  
F B I  
34 OCT 11 1949

523  
61 OCT 23 1949

*Handwritten:* JTB

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BALTIMORE**

FILE NO. 9-403

REPORT MADE AT <b>BALTIMORE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/10/49</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/10/49</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>ALLEN J. ANDREWS / mt</b>
TITLE <b>UNKNOWN SUBJECT; wa. "Millard" SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM</b> <i>DEAN</i>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>EXTORTION</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

AUSA Baltimore advises instant letter does not constitute a threat to any particular person and for this reason does not feel further investigation warranted.

- C -

**REFERENCE:**

Bureau file 9-17892.  
Report of SA [redacted] Baltimore, Md. dated 9/28/49.

**DETAILS: AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND**

The facts of this case were discussed with Assistant United States Attorney [redacted], who advised that a review of instant letter reflects that it does not constitute a threat as to any particular person and for this reason does not feel further investigation is warranted. [redacted] stated that inasmuch as instant letter does not constitute a violation of the Extortion Statute, that investigation should be discontinued.

- C -

EIP  
R

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>[Signature]</i> SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 2 - Bureau 1 - USA, Baltimore 2 - Baltimore	9-17892-10
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">             RECORDED 97              3 OCT 11 1949              STAT. SECT. 4           </div>

**56 OCT 24 1949**

b6  
b7c





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

OCTOBER 3, 1949

URGENT

Transmit the following message to: SAC, BALTIMORE

UNKNOWN SUBJECT, WA QUOTE MILLARD UNQUOTE; SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON DASH  
VIKEX. THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO YOUR OFFICE FOR INVESTIGATION BY BUREAU  
LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER ONE, LAST. BY BUREAU LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER TWENTY,  
LAST, YOU WERE REQUESTED TO ADVISE BY RETURN MAIL RE THE RESULTS OF INSTANT  
INVESTIGATION AND TO FURNISH AN OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY RELATIVE  
TO PROSECUTION. SUTEL THIS INFORMATION IMMEDIATELY.

HOOVER

9-17892

JTB:IGE

*af*

RECORDED - 127

19-17892-8  
F B I  
31 OCT 5 1949

COPIES DESTROYED  
168 MAY 24 1965

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT - 3 1949

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
F B I  
OCT 3 3 16 PM '49  
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

*af*  
*R*

60 OCT 12 1949 TELETYPE

SENT VIA

9-396

Per

*ll*

JTB

OCTOBER 7, 1949

ROUTINE

SAC, BALTIMORE

UNSUB, WA QUOTE MULLARD UNQUOTE, SECRETARY OF STATE ACHISON, VICTIM, EXTORTION.

LEAD SA [REDACTED] DATED SEPTEMBER TWENTYEIGHT LAST AT BALTIMORE. PRESENT

b6  
b7C

FACTS TO USA IMMEDIATELY AND OBTAIN AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER THE LETTER SIGNED  
BY QUOTE MULLARD UNQUOTE IS A VIOLATION OF THE EXTORTION STATUTE AND IF FURTHER  
INVESTIGATION IS DESIRED. ADVISE THE BUREAU IMMEDIATELY OF THE USA'S OPINION.

HOOVER

JTB:100

RECORDED - 102

9-17892 - 7

cc: Boston (Regular Mail)

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

COPIES DESTROYED  
168 MAY 21 1965

OCT - 7 1949

190  
OCT 13 1949 TELETYPE

9:48 [Handwritten signature]

R [Handwritten initials] 7B

[Handwritten mark]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

B-7-1  
B-8-1

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BALTIMORE**

FILE NO. 9-403

REPORT MADE AT <b>BALTIMORE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>9/28/49</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>9/12, 13/49</b>	REPORT MADE BY <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> / mt
TITLE <b>UNKNOWN SUBJECT; WA. "Millard"; SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>EXTORTION</b>

b6  
b7c

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Threatening letter directed to Secretary of State ACHESON, Washington, D.C. by writer who signed his name as "MILLARD." Letter postmarked Cumberland, Md., 1:00PM., August 13, 1949. "MILLARD", or any logical suspect, unknown to State Department. Results of FBI Laboratory examination of letter and envelope set out. Investigation at Cumberland, Md. to identify subject negative.

- P -

**REFERENCE:** Bufile 9-17892.  
Bulet to Baltimore dated 9/1/49.

**DETAILS:**

Investigation in this case was initiated upon the basis of referenced Bureau letter enclosing two copies of a threatening letter signed "MILLARD", which was directed to Secretary of State ACHESON at Washington, D.C. The envelope containing the threatening letter was postmarked Cumberland, Md., August 13, 1 P.M., 1949. The letter was received by the Bureau from the State Department through Bureau liaison channels on August 24, 1949. Inquiry at the Department of State reflected that "MILLARD", or any logical suspect is unknown to that Department. Instant letter is set out as follows:

"State Department Building,  
Washington, D.C.,  
Secretary of State Acheson

August 13, 1949

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>Mrs. McTack</i> SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
COPIES DESTROYED COPIES OF THIS REPORT 2 - Bureau 2 - Boston 3 - Baltimore COPY IN FILE	9-17892-7 34 SEP 29 1949 ST. SECT.	RECORDED - 124

"I could kill one of you. I would die for my principles.

/s/ Millard"

The following FBI Laboratory examination was made of the above mentioned threatening letter:

- Q1 Envelope bearing typewritten address "Secretary of State ACHESON, State Department Building, Washington, D.C." postmarked "Cumberland, Md. August 13, 1949, 1-PM"
- Q2 Accompanying typewritten letter dated August 13, 1949, beginning "I could kill one of you...."

An examination was made of the typewriting on specimens Q1 and Q2 and it was concluded that this typewriting was prepared on a typewriter equipped with Underwood Pica style of type, spaced ten letters per inch.

Specimens Q1 and Q2 were treated for the development of latent fingerprints but none of value were found.

The questioned typewriting was compared with the appropriate sections of the Anonymous Letter File without effecting any identification.

Specimen Q1 is a white bond envelope measuring approximately 8.9" in length by 4" in width. This envelope contains the watermark "Eaton's Corrasable Bond, USA, Berkshire, 113".

Specimen Q2 is a white sheet of bond paper measuring approximately 11" in length by 8.5" in width. This specimen contains the watermark "Eaton's Eminence Bond, USA, Berkshire, 117".

The FBI Laboratory report reflected that the watermarks which appear in specimens Q1 and Q2 are registered for the Eaton Paper Corporation, Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

The original of the above mentioned letter and the envelope were retained by the Bureau at Washington, D.C.

AT CUMBERLAND, MARYLAND

The Cumberland Telephone Directory and Cumberland City Directory failed to reveal anyone listed therein by the surname "MILLARD." No effort was made to ascertain the identities of everyone having "MILLARD" as a given

BA 9-403

or middle name inasmuch as this was deemed to be impractical.

The records of the organizations listed below failed to reveal anyone using the surname "MILLARD":

Cumberland Credit Bureau  
Cumberland Police Department  
Maryland State Police, Barracks C, Cumberland, Md.  
Potomac Edison Light & Power Company  
Cumberland and Allegheny Gas Company  
Western Maryland Railway Company  
B & O Railroad  
Celanese Corporation of America  
Kelly-Springfield Tire & Rubber Company  
L. Bernstein Furniture Company

Mr. RICHARD JOHNSON, Post Office Inspector, and Mr. RUSSELL THAYER, Superintendent of Mails, Cumberland, Maryland, both advised that they had received no complaints regarding any threatening letters written by a person using the name "MILLARD." Both stated they knew of no crank letter writers who might have written instant letter.

- P E N D I N G -

BA 9-403

LEAD

THE BOSTON FIELD DIVISION:

AT PITTSFIELD, MASS.

At the Eaton Paper Corporation will obtain the name and address of the Cumberland, Md. distributor, or any individual purchasers, of the type stationery used by the unknown subject, description of which stationery can be found in the details of this report.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: September 28, 1949

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

*fw*

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; WA. "MILLARD";  
 SECRETARY OF STATE <sup>W</sup>ACHESON - VICTIM  
 EXTORTION *Dean*  
 (Bufile 9-17892)

Rebuletts 9/1/49 and 9/20/49.

Extensive investigation has been conducted at Cumberland, Md. to identify the writer of the letter in the above captioned case, with negative results. A report will be submitted in the immediate future setting out a lead for the Boston Division to contact the Eaton Paper Corporation, Pittsfield, Mass., for the purpose of ascertaining the names of the distributors at Cumberland, Md. of the type paper and envelope used in this case, in order that inquiry may be made of the distributors in a further effort to identify the unknown subject.

RMJ: mt  
9-403

G. I. R. - 7

RECORDED - 93

19-17892-6  
 24 SEP 29 1949

67  
OCT 14 1949

~~31~~  
 FID

September 20, 1949

SAC, Baltimore

Director, FBI

UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa. "Millard";  
SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM  
EXTORTION

ReBulet 9-1-49.

Advise the Bureau by return mail regarding the results of the investigation of instant matter and of the opinion of the USA relative to prosecution.

9-17892

*uf*

RECORDED - 2

9-17892-5  
F B I

JTB:mw

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 11  
★ SEP 20 1949 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

70 SEP 21 1949

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E.A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

*John R...*

57 SEP 30 1949

*JK*

015



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

9  
 TO : H. B. Fletcher *HRF*  
 FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*  
 SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT, with alias "Millard"  
 SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM  
 EXTORTION *10/11/49*

DATE: September 6, 1949

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_

*Run  
 Acheson - 1  
 @1*

*6  
 V. Batts  
 J.B.*

Reference is made to the memorandum from Supervisor Batts to Mr. Rosen dated August 30, 1949, requesting that the Liaison Section determine from Secretary of State Dean Acheson whether or not he, Acheson, knew of any logical suspects with reference to the threatening letter that was sent to him.

This is to advise that neither Mr. Acheson nor members of his staff had any idea as to the identity of "Millard". The Secretary's Office points out that Mr. Acheson gets approximately two thousand letters a day, a large portion of them written by anonymous writers.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to the Investigative Division for its information.

*RRR:jam*

*Handled  
 see file 9-2-49*

<sup>13</sup>  
 SE 28

*9-17892-4*

RECORDED - 116

*SEP 10 1949  
 103*

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RHS*

FROM : Mr. Sizoo *Sizoo*

SUBJECT: Unknown subject, with alias  
MILLARD,  
Secretary of State ACHESON  
Victim  
Extortion

DATE: September 1, 1949

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Reference is made to the evidence which is listed below. This evidence was received for examination from the Liaison Section with a routing slip under date of August 29, 1949. *Batts*

- Q1 Envelope bearing typewritten address "Secretary of State ACHESON, State Department Building, Washington, D. C." postmarked "Cumberland, Md. Aug 13 1949, 1-PM".
- Q2 Accompanying typewritten letter dated August 13, 1949, beginning "I could kill one of you....".

An examination was made of the typewriting on specimens Q1 and Q2 and it was concluded that this typewriting was prepared on a typewriter equipped with Underwood Pica style of type, spaced 10 letters per inch.

Specimens Q1 and Q2 were treated for the development of latent fingerprints but none of value was found.

The questioned typewriting was compared with the appropriate sections of the Anonymous Letter File without effecting any identification. Appropriate copies of this typewriting will be added to the file for future reference.

The submitted evidence is attached.

Specimen Q1 is a white bond envelope measuring approximately 8.9" in length by 4" in width. This envelope contains the watermark "Eaton's Corrasable Bond, USA, Berkshire, 113".

Specimen Q2 is a white sheet of bond paper measuring approximately 11" in length by 8.5" in width. This specimen contains the watermark "Eaton's Eminence Bond, USA, Berkshire, 117".

The watermarks which appear in specimens Q1 and Q2 are registered for the Eaton Paper Corporation, Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum and the attached evidence be forwarded to Mr. J. T. Batts in room 4746 in order that appropriate action can be taken in connection with the information set forth herein.

Attachment  
D-104379 EG  
EWS:PJR

*19-17892-3*

**F B I**

**23 SEP 14 1949**

*6-205*

*7-7*

**60 SEP 27 1949**

August 22, 1949

SY - Mr. Hemelt

C O F Y

SY - Mr. Blevins

Threatening Letter signed "Millard"

The subject letter, addressed to the Secretary, dated August 13, 1949, is transmitted herewith for such attention as may be found warranted.

It will be noted that a possible violation of the Postal Laws is involved. However, since the threat is one of bodily injury, investigation would come under the jurisdiction of the FBI, rather than the postal Inspectors.

It may be that you will prefer to have the matter given attention by a special agent of the Department of State.

Please return the attached for our files when it has served its purpose.

Attachment:

As stated.

CON:SY:TJHarte:caf

9-17897-3

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Recorded 8-31-49  
cek

L A T E N T

Re: UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa.  
MILLARD;  
Secretary of State ACHESON  
Victim  
EXTORTION

File # 9-17892-3  
Lab. # D-104379 EG  
NO LAB FILE

Examination requested by: Department of State

Date of reference communication: Memo 8-22-49

Date received: 8-29-49

Examination requested: Document - Fingerprint

Result of Examination:

Examination by: *[Signature]*  
L A T E N T

*TW Q1-2 is und. pica (650A)  
No latents  
NI - ALF*

*8.31.49*

Specimens submitted for examination

- Q1 Envelope bearing typewritten address "Secretary of State ACHESON, State Department Building, Washington, D.C." postmarked "Cumberland, Md. Aug 13 1949, 1-PM".
- Q2 Accompanying typewritten letter dated August 13, 1949, beginning "I could kill one of you...".

Return evidence....

*9-1-49*

SEP 27 1949

Q1. White bond envelope.

$8.92 \times 4 \times .0046$

wm = Eaton's Corrasable Bond, USA, Berkshire, 113.

wt = 3.775

Q2. White sheet bond paper.

$10.95 \times 8.52 \times .0045$

wm = Eaton's Eminence Bond USA, Berkshire, 117.

wt = 4.835



9-17592-3

Encl. returned.

cc-Rosen  
McC  
Bat

SAC, Baltimore

September 1, 1949

Director, FBI

9-17892-2  
UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa "Millard";  
SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM  
EXTORTION

RECORDED - 10

Attached are two copies of a threatening letter signed "Millard" which was directed to Secretary of State Acheson at Washington, D. C. The envelope containing the threatening letter was postmarked Cumberland, Md., August 13, 1 P. M., 1949. The letter was received from the State Department through Bureau Liaison channels on August 24, 1949. Inquiry at the Department of State by our liaison representative reflected that "Millard" or any logical suspect are unknown to that Department.

The following FBI Laboratory examination was made of the above mentioned threatening letter:

- Q1 Envelope bearing typewritten address "Secretary of State Acheson, State Department Building, Washington, D. C." postmarked "Cumberland, Md. Aug 13 1949, 1-PM".
- Q2 Accompanying typewritten letter dated August 13, 1949, beginning "I could kill one of you....".

An examination was made of the typewriting on specimens Q1 and Q2 and it was concluded that this typewriting was prepared on a typewriter equipped with Underwood Pica style of type, spaced 10 letters per inch.

Specimens Q1 and Q2 were treated for the development of latent fingerprints but none of value was found.

The questioned typewriting was compared with the appropriate sections of the Anonymous Letter File without effecting any identification. Appropriate copies of this typewriting will be added to the file for future reference.

Specimen Q1 is a white bond envelope measuring approximately 8.9" in length by 4" in width. This envelope contains the watermark "Eaton's Corrasable Bond, USA, Berkshire, 113".

Specimen Q2 is a white sheet of bond paper measuring approximately 11" in length by 8.5" in width. This specimen contains the watermark "Eaton's Eminence Bond, USA, Berkshire, 117".

The watermarks which appear in specimens Q1 and Q2 are registered for the Lath Paper Corporation, Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

MAILED 8  
SEP 2 1949 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
JTB: [unclear]

RECEIVED  
SEP 1 1949  
[Handwritten initials and signatures]



SAC, Baltimore

It is requested that an investigation be immediately instituted at Cumberland, Md. to establish the identity of the writer of the threatening letter. Thereafter the facts should be presented to the U. S. Attorney for an opinion re prosecution. Advise Bureau promptly of developments.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *R* Mr. Rosen

DATE: September 1, 1949

FROM : Mr. Batts

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT, WA, "Millard";  
SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON - VICTIM  
EXTORTION

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE:

To advise you a threatening letter has been received by Secretary of State Acheson.

BACKGROUND:

An extortion letter dated August 13, 1949 was sent through the mail to "State Department Building, Washington, D. C., Secretary of State Acheson" signed "Millard" which reads as follows: "I could kill one of you. I would die for my principles". The envelope was postmarked Cumberland, Maryland, August 13, 1:00 P. M., 1949. The original letter was received from the Department of State through Bureau liaison channels on August 24, 1949.

Inquiry was made at the Department of State by our liaison representative which reflected "Millard" or any logical suspect are not known to that Department.

The FBI Laboratory conducted an examination of the threatening letter on August 31, 1949 without effecting any identification.

ACTION:

Attached is a letter to the Baltimore Office requesting an investigation be immediately instituted at Cumberland, Md. to establish the identity of the writer of the threatening letter and thereafter the facts should be presented to the U. S. Attorney for an opinion re prosecution.

Attachment

*JTB*  
JTB:bls

RECORDED - 16

64-17742-2  
23 SEP 14 1949

SIX

SEP 22 1949  
103



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet Recorded 9-6-49 1:00 PM amb

Recorded 8-31-49  
cak

L A T E N T

Re: UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa.  
HILLARD;  
Secretary of State ACHESON  
Victim  
EXTORTION

File # 9-17892-1  
Lab. # D-104379 EG  
NO LAB FILE

Examination requested by: Department of State

Date of reference communication: Memo 8-22-49

Date received: ??

Examination requested: Document - Fingerprint

Result of Examination:

Examination by: Slayton  
HENDERSON  
L A T E N T

*No latent  
Lab will ans  
8-31-49  
Jaw*

Specimens submitted for examination

- Q1 Envelope bearing typewritten address "Secretary of State ACHESON, State Department Building, Washington, D.C. postmarked "Cumberland, Md. Aug 13 1949, 1-PM".
- Q2 Accompanying typewritten letter dated August 13, 1949, beginning "I could kill one of you...".

Return evidence....

*9-6*

*1-10-49*

*2000-10-19*



Secretary of State Acheson,  
State Department Building,  
Washington, D. C.

Q2 D-104379

Q2 D-104379

~~113~~  
S9 TJH

DIV. OF PUBLIC LIAISON  
PVI

1949 AUG 16 AM 9 23

DEPART. OF STATE

State Department Building,  
Washington, D. C.,  
Secretary of State Acheson.

August 13, 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AUG 13 1949  
DIVISION OF SECURITY

I could kill one of you. I would die for my principles.

Millard.

1000-1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1417688-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 6  
Page 19 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 23 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 59 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 69 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 70 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
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X For this Page X  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1266233-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 6  
Page 19 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 23 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 59 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 69 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 70 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
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X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SAC, Washington Field (46-New)

November 25, 1953

Director, FBI (46-New)

RECORDED-37

DEAN ACHESON, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; ADRIAN S. FISHER, FORMER COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT  
EAG - CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Attached is a copy of a memorandum dated November 23, 1953, from the Criminal Division requesting that Oscar H. Davis, Office of the Solicitor General, Room 5611, Justice Building, be interviewed regarding the above-captioned individuals.

Prior to such interview it is desired that the Agents to whom this case is assigned contact Departmental attorney [redacted] Room 2316, Justice Building, and review the file regarding this matter as set forth in the attached memorandum.

b6  
b7c

You are instructed to assign this investigation to experienced and mature Special Agent personnel and to submit a report reflecting results of the file review and the interview with Mr. Davis to reach the Bureau not later than December 4, 1953. In your December 4, 1953, report the necessary leads should be set forth so that this investigation may be pursued in a logical manner.

Attachment

WAH:dejl

Note: SA [redacted] telephonically contacted Departmental attorney [redacted] office and ascertained that the file will be made available to Agents in his office.

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

COMM - FBI  
NOV 25 1953  
MAILED 10

63 DEC 8 1953

RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

RECEIVED

46 20919

*WAH*

Mr. Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Ladd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Clegg	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Glavin	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Harbo	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Rosen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Tracy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Egan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Gurnea	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Hendon	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Pennington	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Quinn	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nease	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Miss Gandy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: November 21, 1953

FROM : Warren Olney III, Assistant Attorney General,  
Criminal Division

WO:HP:man

SUBJECT: Alleged conflict of interests by  
Dean Acheson, former Secretary of  
State and by Adrian S. Fisher, former  
counselor at the State Department.

51-16-369

CLASSIFIED

*NOTE*  
*11/23*  
*see serial*  
*4 for caption*  
*re this index*  
*11-24-53*

It is requested that Oscar H. Davis, Esq., Office of the Solicitor General, Room 5611, extension 31, be interviewed with respect to the subject allegation.

It is further requested that such further investigation developing all logical leads with respect to the information furnished by Mr. Davis be conducted.

The Special Agent assigned to interview Mr. Davis may wish to review departmental file 51-16-369 and enclosures thereto prior to such interview.

**EXP. PROC.**

NOV 24 1953

*SC*  
**SE-36**  
**RECORDED-37**  
12-1 1953

46 20819

IL

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

FBI WASH. FIELD

11/30/53

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

DEAR ACHESON, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; ADRIAN S. FISHER, FORMER COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT. ~~PAG-CONFLICT OF INTEREST.~~

REBULET 11/25/53. [REDACTED] CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPT.

b6  
b7c

OF JUSTICE, ADVISED AIG OLNEY DECIDED ON 11/27/53 THAT DEAN ACHESON SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, ALTHOUGH INVESTIGATION AS TO FISHER STILL DESIRED. HE SAID MEMO BEING PREPARED TO BUREAU SETTING FORTH ABOVE AND INCLUDING WRITTEN SUGGESTIONS AS TO INVESTIGATION. [REDACTED] FILE CONSISTED ONLY OF MEMO OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH OSCAR H. DAVIS, OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND COPY OF MOTION AND BRIEF FILED 9/26/53 IN SUPREME COURT IN CASE OF STATE OF ALABAMA V. STATES OF TEXAS, LOUISIANA, CALIFORNIA, FLORIDA, AND GOVT OFFICIALS GEORGE M. HUMPHREY, DOUGLAS MCKAY, ROBERT B. ANDERSON, AND IVY BAKER PRIEST ADRIAN S. FISHER OF LAW FIRM OF COVINGTON AND BURLING, IS ATTORNEY FOR ALABAMA. HE ALLEGEDLY GAINED KNOWLEDGE WHILE IN STATE DEPT. THAT IS NOW USEFUL TO HIM IN ABOVE ACTION. WFO NOW STUDYING MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM DAVIS AND WILL SUBMIT FOR BUREAU DETERMINATION QUESTIONS OF POLICY AND EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION NECESSARY IN THIS CASE.

RECORDED - 1

LAUGHLIN

HHH:LN

*JFL*  
*JH*

45-31969-1953

46-20919

Mr. Rosen

2



Best  
copy  
available

10 16-1973

RE: ALABAMA SUECTION, S.C.

The following letter originally indicated that  
in 1950, former Secretary of State, now Ambassador  
to the United Kingdom, advised that he had been  
dropped from the case.

This case is based on a memorandum dated November 23,  
1953, from HONORABLE CHARLES HALL, Assistant Secretary General,  
Criminal Division, to the Director as follows:

"Alleged conflict of interests by  
[redacted], former Secretary of  
State, who was [redacted], former  
Ambassador to the State Department.

CLASSIFIED

The following letter dated October 13, 1953, Office  
of the Solicitor General, Room 5611, Washington 25, DC,  
indicated that the case was subject to litigation.

As the Bureau requested the Special Agent in  
charge to develop all logical leads with respect  
to the information furnished by Mr. [redacted] be contacted.

The Special Agent [redacted] be interviewed.  
It is suggested to review departmental file 44-16-349 and  
enclosures as reference to such interview.

Mr. [redacted], Attorney in the Criminal  
Division, Room 2316, Department of Justice Building, made  
available for review departmental file 44-16-349 and the  
enclosures thereto. The file consisted only of a memorandum  
dated October 14, 1953, reflecting the results of an inter-  
view between HONORABLE CHARLES HALL, Assistant Secretary General,  
Criminal Division, Room 5611. The enclosures consisted of  
three documents as follows:

1. Motion for Leave to File Complaint  
and Complaint Filed September 26, 1953  
in the Supreme Court of the United States,  
October Term, 1953. The case is entitled  
State of Alabama, Complainant, v. State of  
Texas; State of Louisiana; State of Florida;  
State of California; GEORGE M. HUMPHREY;  
DOUGLAS MCKAY; ROBERT B. ANDERSON; IVY

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WFO 46-3116

The attorneys for the complainant, and even Counselor of the State Department are aware in this connection, participated in the preparation of a memorial for the Department of Justice for the San Antonio case involving the purchase of the rights in the land. The memorial mentions the coastal waters. It is a copy of the memorial which is being made available to the three individuals listed above, when the same were given to the Attorney General.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Police Department, San Antonio, Justice Building, has commented on November 30, 1951, at which time he had available copies of the memorial to the Attorney General. He said that the memorial involves the rights of the subject in such connection as litigation during the past several years; that there were three separate separate claims on which the memorial rights to the lands were declared, the lands are the property of the United States and not the property of the individual adjacent states.

It is stated that Public Law 21, 74 C. S., 133, which was enacted by Congress on April 22, 1953, gave the right to the States, the San Antonio is being given to have the law declared unconstitutional. He stated that he is presently engaged on behalf of the United States in opposing the complaint.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Police Department for Alaska, has Counselor of the Department of State until about January, 1952; that when in San Antonio the law firm of Covington and Burlingame; that the Attorney General Secretary of State, had been in the law firm and subsequently has rejoined the firm since leaving the State Department.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Police Department for Alaska, has Counselor of the Department of State until about January, 1952; that when in San Antonio the law firm of Covington and Burlingame; that the Attorney General Secretary of State, had been in the law firm and subsequently has rejoined the firm since leaving the State Department.

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copy  
available

WFO 44-3116

in his opinion, the United States is on principles and policies which govern the delimitation of the territorial waters of the United States. He said that in connection with the matter, he had conferred with the State and Justice Department attorneys on the matter and later approved the two letters written by the State Department setting forth the information requested. He said one letter was dated November 13, 1951, and was over the signature of WILLIS L. TOLSON, Acting Secretary of State, while the second letter was dated February 12, 1952, and over the signature of DANIEL A. BRON. Mr. DANIEL said the letters were properly prepared by subordinates of WILLIS L.

He stated that in his opinion any special knowledge gained by WILLIS L. in the preparation of the material requested by the Justice Department would be helpful to him in prosecuting the suit now pending in the Supreme Court.

A review of the brief filed by the complainant disclosed a State and pertaining to set forth the facts of the letter in which the State of Alaska filed its suit. This State and its agents are conducting investigation and guidance of agents conducting investigation in this case:

"This is an action by the State of Alaska against the States of Texas, Louisiana, Florida and California, and against the following individuals: WILLIS L. TOLSON, acting under color of authority as Secretary of the Treasury, DANIEL A. BRON, acting under color of authority as Secretary of the Interior, ROBERT A. HENNING, acting under color of authority as Secretary of the Navy, and WILLIAM H. WELLS, acting under color of authority as Treasurer of the United States.

"The purpose of this suit is twofold: first, to protect the interests of Alaska and its citizens in the natural resources of the waters and submerged lands off the coast of the United States, and to prevent irreparable damage to these interests resulting from the unilateral appropriation of these resources. The interests of Alaska and its citizens are the consequence of the federal dominion of these lands and resources, recently delineated by this Court in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19

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available

NO 47-3116

(1957), United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1951),  
and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).

This suit is also the result of proceedings, begun by an appeal on behalf of its citizens, the State of Alabama to be treated on an equal footing with the defendant states with respect to the counties conferred upon them by Public Law 31, both as that law may attempt to extend the maritime boundaries of certain of the defendant states and as that law attempts to grant valuable lands and natural resources to the defendant states without conferring similar benefits on Alabama.

The facts, as set forth in the Complaint, are as follows: In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), this Court held that the submerged lands and natural resources lying seaward of the ordinary low water mark (or seaward limit of inland waters) off the coast of California were not the property of California, but were subject to the paramount jurisdiction and control of the Federal Government. This decision held that the Federal Government has the right to license the development of these natural resources. Thus the Federal Government seems obligated to apply the royalties for the benefit of all the States and citizens of the United States, including, of course, that including Alabama and the citizens thereof. In United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), there were similar decisions as to the submerged lands and natural resources off the coasts of Louisiana and Texas, respectively. These decisions made it clear that the holding in United States v. California applied to all the coastal areas off the shores of the United States and that the United States, and not the coastal states, had the right to license the development of natural resources off the coastline of the United States lying seaward of the normal low water mark or from the seaward boundary of inland waters. According to these decisions natural resources estimated to have a value of at least fifty billions of dollars are under the control and paramount jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The Federal Government was obligated to use the funds obtained from the development of these resources for the benefit of all the United States, including Alabama and its citizens.

46 20919

"With a few exceptions, the States of California, Louisiana and Texas have unilaterally entered upon the seabed and subsoil and have unilaterally asserted the right to

the royalties to the exclusive benefit of their own citizens. After decisions of the Court in the California, Louisiana and Texas cases, leases issued by these states were continued in effect but the royalties derived from them were either impounded or held in escrow. As a result, a fund of over \$62,000,000 was accumulated in which the Federal Government, acting as trustee for all the United States, has the legal interest and in which the defendant states have no beneficial interest other than that which they share in common with all the other states of the Union.

On May 22, 1953, the Congress enacted Public Law 31. This law purports to declare that the coastal states, and not the Federal Government, own and have the right to develop the subsoil and the natural resources of the submerged lands seaward of the ordinary low water mark off their coasts or the seaward limit of inland waters. This law also attempts to release to the coastal states (with certain exceptions) all right, title or interest in the subsoil and natural resources in these areas and to include in these natural resources fish and other marine animal and plant life. The law also purports to direct the individual defendants to pay or release to the defendant States of California, Louisiana and Texas the \$62,000,000 which had accrued as a result of the continued operations under the state licenses.

"Alabama citizens have long enjoyed a privilege under the Constitution of fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. Beyond three miles from the shore they are entitled to exercise this privilege without restrictions or prohibitions -- including onerous excises -- by other states of the Union. In fishing on the high seas they are subject only to regulation and licensing imposed by authority of their own state or their own national government. Moreover, even when fishing within three miles of the shore, they may not be subjected to discriminatory regulation by reason of their Alabama residence, and certainly may not be excluded altogether. As a result of the exercise of these privileges,

a fishing industry has developed in Alabama bringing in a gross annual revenue of over \$15,000,000 and providing a livelihood for thousands of Alabama citizens.

'Public Law 31, however, purports to define the boundaries of the various coastal states. It does so in a way which limits the boundaries of Alabama to a belt of three geographic miles lying seaward from the ordinary low water mark lying off its coasts or of the seaward limit of its inland waters. The defendants Texas, Louisiana and Florida, however, have interpreted the law in a manner which permits them to claim as within their boundaries a corresponding belt nine nautical miles in width and to claim exclusive ownership and control of the natural resources found within such a belt. The individual defendants, moreover, have indicated their acquiescence in such a claim. As described in more detail below, such action would have an adverse effect upon the fishing industry of Alabama, and would greatly increase the value of the assets held in trust for all the United States which the individual defendants threaten to turn over solely to the defendant states.

"The acquiescence by the individual defendants in the "historic claims" of Texas, Louisiana and Florida to a belt of territorial waters nine nautical miles in width is unlawful. None of these three defendant states was entitled to such a territorial belt at the time it entered the Union, and none of these "historic claims" has been recognized by the Congress since their admission. Indeed, it has been the consistent policy of the United States that the permissible width of the belt of territorial waters is three nautical miles. Therefore the assertions of these three defendant states are not justified by the terms of Public Law 31.

"With the exception of the portion dealing with the states which are entitled to a three to nine mile belt of territorial waters, Public Law 31, on its face, purports to apply equally to all coastal states. However, in fact, the most valuable natural resources now known to exist in the submerged land areas off the coasts of the United States are located off the coasts of the defendant states. Hence the appearance of uniformity of treatment among the coastal states is unreal; in fact, the four defendant states are the true beneficiaries of Public Law 31 and are put into a quite

WFO 46-3116

different and favored category from the other coastal states.

~~The actions threatened to be taken by the defendant states and by the individual defendants will, unless restrained by this Court, cause irreparable injury to the State of Alabama in the following particulars:~~

"1. Alabama and its citizens will be deprived of their equitable interest in the immensely valuable resources of the marginal seas and the royalties which will accrue from the development of these resources;

"2. Alabama and its citizens will be deprived of their equitable interest in the fund of \$62,000,000 now subject to the control of the Federal Government and held by the individual defendants in trust for all the United States, including Alabama and the citizens thereof;

"3. Alabama will be reduced to a status of inferior sovereignty with respect to the defendant states because of the granting to these states of immensely valuable property interests which have been held to be an attribute of sovereignty;

"4. Alabama will be reduced to a status of inferior sovereignty with respect to the defendant States of Texas, Louisiana and Florida because those states will be permitted to extend their territorial boundaries to include a belt nine nautical miles in width off their coasts and given ownership of the natural resources in such a belt while Alabama is permitted to extend its own territorial boundaries only to include a corresponding belt three nautical miles in width.

"5. Alabama and its citizens will be injured because the defendant States of Texas, Louisiana and Florida now have and will put into effect regulations which require Alabama fishermen to pay license fees to these defendant states for the privilege of fishing on the high seas more than three miles from their shores and because these defendant states will assert the right to discriminate against Alabama fishermen or to exclude them altogether from the entire area nine miles from their shores.

"Alabama contends that Public Law 31 as interpreted and applied by the defendants, is unconstitutional for the reasons which are set forth in detail in this brief. Alabama therefore asks for injunctive relief against the action taken and proposed to be taken by the defendants under color of Public Law 31."

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46 20919

WFO 46-3116

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

The Bureau has instructed that this case be assigned to experienced and mature Special Agent personnel. In view of the public prominence of the subject of this case and the public interest in the suit involved in this matter, the investigation should be handled immediately and with great care.

When Department Attorney [redacted] was contacted the question was raised as to whether it would be necessary to establish by investigation that the suit in which FISHER is now acting as attorney constitutes a claim against the United States. He said it appears to be a legal problem rather than a problem of investigation. He also cited Attorney General memorandum No. 40 dated August 27, 1953, which sets forth the Attorney General's construction of 18 U.S.C. 284. He said it is the position of the Attorney General that the language of the statute is broad enough to encompass representation in any matter in which the United States has any interest whatever and it is the position of the Department that the statute prohibits any former employee for a period of two years after leaving Government service from representing any non-Governmental interest in any matter whatsoever, "involving any subject matter directly connected with which such person was so employed and performed duty," in which the United States is interested, directly or indirectly, whether as a party, as an enforcement agent, or otherwise.

In view of the Attorney General's construction, no investigation will be conducted to determine whether the case constitutes a claim against the United States.

The Bureau's attention is also directed to that part of 18 Sec. 284 reading "Any claims against the United States involving any subject matter directly connected with which such person was so employed or performed duty."

The question may arise as to whether the case recently filed by Alabama (The "claim" against the United

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b7c

WFO 46-3116

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

States) is actually the subject matter directly connected with the California case (with which FISHER was "so employed or performed duty").

During interviews with Justice Department attorneys this point will be raised, but it now appears to be a purely legal question and it is not contemplated that any active investigation will be conducted for the purpose of establishing that fact.

It is also pointed out to the Bureau that in the absence of specific instructions the WFO does not contemplate interviewing ADRIAN S. FISHER during this investigation.

LEADS

THE BIRMINGHAM DIVISION:

AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA:

THE FOLLOWING LEAD SHOULD BE HELD IN  
ABEYANCE PENDING BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS

Will contact the office of SI GARRETT, Attorney General of Alabama, and determine the circumstances and reasons why the law firm of Covington and Burling, Union Trust Building, Washington, D.C., or ADRIAN S. FISHER of that firm, was selected to handle their suit in the Supreme Court.



ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE:

AT WASH HOTEL, D.C.:

Will check the records of the Supreme Court to verify the official participation of ADRIAN S. FISHER as attorney for the Complainant in the suit brought by the State of Alabama against the States and Government Officials previously mentioned.

Will interview OSCAR L. DAVIS, Attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, to ascertain the details of the meetings in the United States v. California case which were attended by FISHER.

Will attempt to determine from DAVIS and other attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor General the extent of FISHER's personal activity and knowledge of the issues involved in the California case.

At the Office of the Counselor, Department of State, will locate any files available on the United States v. California case and review same to determine the extent of activity and knowledge of FISHER.

Will identify and locate any subordinate employees of the State Department who also worked on the matter and interview them relative to FISHER's activity in and knowledge of the case.

46 20919

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WFO 46-3116

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

Will also attempt to determine to what extent the information developed by the State Department and furnished to the Justice Department was already available to the public.

REFERENCE

Bureau letter dated November 25, 1953.

46 20919

SAC, Washington Field Office (46-3113)

December 7, 1953

Director, FBI

RECORDED-34 46-20919-4  
ADRIAN S. FISHER,  
FORMER COUNSELOR,  
STATE DEPARTMENT  
FAG - CONFLICT OF INTEREST


G. L. R. 10

Attached is a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum dated December 3, 1953, from the Criminal Division regarding the requested investigation of this matter.

This investigation must continue to receive preferred attention by your office. A report reflecting the completion of the investigation in this case must be submitted to reach the Bureau not later than December 21, 1953.

Attachment  
*W*

RE: de j



52 DEC 29 1953

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AIRTEL

DECEMBER 7, 1953

SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (BCS)  
(46-3113)


RECORDED-92

*W.H.*  
BRIAN S. FISHER, FORMER COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT, FAG -  
CONFLICT OF INTEREST. RE WASHINGTON FIELD MEMO DATED DECEMBER 4,  
1953, AND REPORT OF SA HAROLD H. HAIR OF THE SAME DATE. **I.R.-6** LEAD  
FOR BIRMINGHAM DIVISION SHOULD BE HANDLED IMMEDIATELY BY EXPERIENCED  
AND MATURE PERSONNEL. ALL PERSONS INTERVIEWED SHOULD BE ADVISED  
THIS INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED AT SPECIFIC REQUEST OF CRIMINAL  
DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. BIRMINGHAM WILL SUREP TO REACH  
BUREAU WITHIN SEVEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS COMMUNICATION.  
CC: 2-BIRMINGHAM (46-NEW) HOOVER

W.H.:de j.

Note: Instructions re telling Attorney General  
State of Alabama interview at request of  
Criminal Division due to political aspects of  
inquiry into retention of Fisher by state  
with reference to tidelands oil suit.

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Starnes  
Miss Gandy



46 20919

2/5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: December 4, 1953

FROM : *JJ*  
*W* /SAG/WFO (46-3116)

SUBJECT: ADRIAN S. FISHER  
FORMER COUNSELOR,  
STATE DEPARTMENT  
FAG - CONFLICT OF INTEREST

*Q-1-1*

Enclosed for the Bureau and the Birmingham Office are appropriate copies of the report of Special Agent HAROLD H. HAIR dated 12/4/53 at Washington Field Office in captioned case.

The Bureau will note the lead for the Birmingham Office which is believed necessary for the proper development of this case. However, the Birmingham Office has been requested to hold the lead in abeyance pending Bureau approval.

HHH:JAG  
Enclosures (5) - *1-cc returned by [unclear] 4712*  
2 - Birmingham (2)

*2-cc RAB*  
*and returned by [unclear]*

RECORDED-92

DEC 15 1953

*46 20-117*

*5*  
*WAF*

*5*

SAC, Washington Field (46-3116)

December 15, 1953

RECORDED-1

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
BY COURIER SERVICE

ADRIAN S. FISHER  
FORMER COUNSELLOR  
STATE DEPARTMENT  
FAG - CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Re Bureau memorandum dated December 7, 1953.

Attached is a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum from the Criminal Division dated December 11, 1953, confirming an oral request made by Departmental attorney Lawrence F. Regan to SA Harold H. Hair of your office.

This additional investigation must be reported in accordance with the Bureau deadline in this case of December 21, 1953.

Attachment

SAF:mjl

COMM - FBI  
DEC 18 1953  
MAILED 31

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Tolson  
Ladd  
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Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
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Gearty  
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Winterrowd  
Tele. Rm.  
Holloman  
Miss Gandy

58 DEC 18

H. R. 3

Let  
e/Reg

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FBI BIRMINGHAM

12-9-53

46-0

ATP:T

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

DIRECTOR, FBI

AIRTEL

SAC, MOBILE (ENCLS.)

ADRIAN S. FISHER, FORMER COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT, FAG - CONFLICT OF INTEREST.  
REBUAIRTEL DECEMBER SEVEN LAST, WFO LETTER TO BUREAU DECEMBER FOUR, AND REPORT  
SA HAROLD H. HAIR, WFO, DECEMBER FOUR LAST, COPIES REPORT RECEIVED TODAY.  
LEAD FOR BH IS AT MONTGOMERY WHICH IS IN TERRITORY OF MOBILE OFFICE. ACCORDING-  
LY ALL COPIES ABOVE AIRTEL, LETTER AND REPORT BEING IMMEDIATELY FORWARDED  
MOBILE FOR HANDLING. MOBILE WILL NOTE BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN ABOVE AIRTEL,  
PARTICULARLY AS TO EXPEDITE NATURE REQUESTED INVESTIGATION.

E.I.R.-3

POTTER, ACTING

2 WFO (46-3116)

RECORDED-92

DEC 10 1953  
27

46 20919

7

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT

WASHINGTON FIELD

REPORT MADE AT <b>MOBILE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>12/16/53</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>12/11,14/53</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>SPENCER H. ROBB - iwh</b>
TITLE <b>ADRIAN S. FISHER, FORMER COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - CONFLICT OF INTEREST</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

SI GARRETT, Alabama Attorney General, Montgomery, Ala., advises Ass't. Attorney General M. ROLAND NACHMAN, JR., had full authority in handling Tidelands Oil Suit for Alabama. NACHMAN advises FISHER brought into suit at suggestion of JAMES ROWE, of Washington Legal firm of CORCORAN, YOUNGMAN, and ROWE, to which firm he had been directed by Senator LISTER HILL; states ROWE a close friend of FISHER, and suggested he might be helpful in preparing suit, as he held same point of view in matter as Alabama representatives. NACHMAN states had no knowledge of any work done on Tidelands Oil by subject FISHER while FISHER employed with Government; states any previous knowledge of this matter, acquired while in Government employ, would not have been of any assistance in any event, as suit was brought to test the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act. NACHMAN states FISHER employed only for purpose of having Washington counsel in suit, and services of firm of COVINGTON and BURLING gratis, as Alabama unable to pay any legal services fee in connection with suit.

*2 - cc Lawrence F. Rizer - Criminal Div. Nov 23/6  
by Special Agent - RUC - 12/20/53*

**DETAILS: AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA**

The following investigation was conducted by SA  and the reporting agent:

*1 - cc retained by Hamilton 4712*

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>Jose</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
<b>COPIES DESTROYED</b>		46-20919	RECORDED - 60
COPIES OF THIS REPORT (5) - Bureau (AMSD) 2 - Washington Field (46-2116) 1 - Mobile (46-272)		46-20919 [Handwritten initials and stamps]	8

b6  
b7c



SI GARRETT, Alabama Attorney General, advised that he was ill during most of the period of planning and preparing the Tidelands Oil Suit, and that he vested full authority in Assistant Attorney General M. ROLAND NACHMAN, JR., for the handling of Alabama interests in this matter.

GARRETT stated that he met FISHER at a conference in connection with the planning of the suit on July 10, 1953, but he is certain the master of FISHER's having ever participated in any inquiry in connection with Tideland Oil or related matters did not come up during this conference or at any other time to his knowledge. He stated that the entire matter of obtaining assistance of Washington attorneys in this matter was left in the hands of NACHMAN, and that he alone will be able to give the reasons for employing FISHER or the firm of COVINGTON and BURLING.

M. ROLAND NACHMAN, JR., Assistant Alabama Attorney General, advised that he handled practically all matters pertaining to the planning and preparation of the suit to test the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act, particularly all of the Washington, D. C. end of the matter.

NACHMAN advised that in June, 1953, he and MR. GARRETT went to Washington and had a conference with Senator LISTER HILL in which they set forth their plans to file a suit in the Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of the above act; Senator HILL was in complete accord with their ideas on the matter, and suggested that the Washington legal firm of CORCORAN, YOUNGMAN, and ROWE, whom he, Senator HILL, knew to be in accord with their ideas on Tideland Oil, could assist them in planning the suit.

NACHMAN continued that, with the knowledge that assistance of Washington Attorneys would be almost essential in the suit, he had a conference with JAMES ROWE and THOMAS CORCORAN; at this conference ROWE stated that close friend of his, ADRIAN S. FISHER, was also in complete accord with their ideas, and would be an excellent man to assist in the planning and preparation of the suit. Two days later, ROWE, FISHER, DAVID C. ACHESON, who is a member of the same legal firm as FISHER, and he, NACHMAN, discussed the possibilities of a suit in this matter, and FISHER stated at this time he would be delighted to assist in planning and preparing the suit.

On July 10, 1953, a meeting was held in Washington, of Attorney Generals from several states, as well as several Washington attorneys. **45-2013-18**

MO-46-272

interested in the matter. At this meeting it was decided that Alabama should be the state to enter suit. Subsequently, NACHMAN had several meetings with FISHER and ROWE in order to get the suit under way, and lay the groundwork for final preparations.

NACHMAN stated that at none of the meetings with FISHER or others connected with the suit, did the subject come up of FISHER having worked at one time on a project involving the submerged lands issue. NACHMAN stated that he knew FISHER had at one time been employed with the State Department, but that this fact did not in any way influence his obtaining FISHER's assistance in this suit.

NACHMAN continued that by September, 1953, the preparation of the suit had reached a point where it was almost ready to be filed in the SUPREME COURT, so it was decided that the relationship between the State of Alabama and the firm of COVINGTON and BURLING should be formalized. He told FISHER that Alabama was unable to pay a fee for legal assistance in connection with the suit, but would like to have his firm represent the State in the suit, with the State paying all court costs. An agreement was reached on this basis and the firm was officially employed.

NACHMAN further stated that in his opinion, even though FISHER had previous knowledge concerning Submerged Lands Matters, as a result of employment with the Government, this knowledge would be of no value whatever in this suit, as the suit is brought for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act, and required only the legal knowledge of FISHER, together with his familiarity with handling cases before the SUPREME COURT.

- RUC -

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- ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE -

REFERENCE: Report of SA HAROLD H. HAIR, 12/4/53,  
Washington Field Office.

46 20919

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (File — ) DATE: 12/18/53

FROM : SAC, WFO (File 46-3116 )

SUBJECT: ADIRIAN S. FISHER  
FAG

This case will be delinquent.

Date of Bureau deadline: DEC. 21, 1953

Reason for the delinquency: NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS +  
AMOUNT OF MATERIAL TO BE REVIEWED  
TOO GREAT TO COMPLETE WITHIN TIMEDate the report or necessary communication  
will reach the Bureau: LIMIT SET BY BUREAU12/24/53  
AEC zone designation, e.g., OR, CH, etc.:  
(This applies only to 116 cases.)11 11 14  
Jan 6 1954

46 20915

G.I.R.-10

FBI WASH FIELD

12/29/53

DIRECTOR

AIRTEL

ADRIAN S. FISHER, FAG, COI. REPORT COVERING THIS MATTER HAS BEEN  
DICTATED, WILL BE TYPED PROMPTLY. CONTAINS LEAD AT NYC TO INTER-  
VIEW A FORMER DEPUTY TO FISHER. LEAD NOT SENT BY TELETYPE AS IT  
IS BELIEVED COMPLETE BACKGROUND AS REFLECTED IN THE REPORT IS  
NECESSARY FOR PROPER INTERVIEW. ANOTHER LEAD FOR WFO MAY BE  
NECESSARY AS A RECENT DEVELOPMENT REQUIRES THE LOCATION OF ANOTHER  
FILE AT STATE DEPT. PERSON WHO FURNISHED FILES PREVIOUSLY NOW ON  
LEAVE, THIS MAY DELAY LOCATION OF FILE AND INCLUSION OF INFORMATION  
IN REPORT NOW BEING PREPARED. REPORT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED JAN. 4  
OR 5.

LAUGHLIN *LH*

HHH:VIM  
46-3116

G. I. R. -7

RECORDED-123

46-20919-9  
JAN 4 1954

46 20919

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FORM NO. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT WASHINGTON FIELD

FILE NO.

REPORT MADE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.	DATE WHEN MADE JAN 5 1954	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 12/4-23/53	REPORT MADE BY HAROLD W. HAIR MAK
TITLE CHANGED: ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, aka Butch Fisher, Former Legal Adviser, State Department		CHARACTER OF CASE FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - CONFLICT OF INTEREST	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

*2 cc Lawrence F. Ryan Room 2316 1/6/54  
1-cc retained by Hinkle 4712*

Name of ADRIAN S. FISHER on brief filed with Supreme Court, constitutes his entry as attorney in Alabama Case, as no formal statement of entry required. OSCAR H. DAVIS, JOHN F. DAVIS and ROBERT M. VAUGHAN state FISHER attended conference to discuss Justice Department request for expression of State Department position on delimitation of territorial waters of United States. Further contacts were held on same subject with RAYMUND I. YINGLING, Assistant Legal Adviser and JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, Attorney. FISHER was Legal Adviser at State Department 6/28/49 to 1/27/53, with authority and responsibility of an Assistant Secretary of State. Job description set out. Review of State Department files indicates FISHER did not participate in preparation of technical reviews on questions re territorial waters, but reviewed some material on policy level. File indicates letter of 11/13/51 to Attorney General was prepared by SWEENEY, approved by YINGLING and JACK B. TATE, Deputy Legal Adviser, and was not handled by FISHER. Letter of 2/12/52 was prepared by SWEENEY, approved by A.W. BOGGS and FISHER. YINGLING and SWEENEY state they handled technical details of questions on territorial waters, while FISHER as head of office, handled matters on policy level and left technical details to others. They state FISHER did not participate in preparation of either letter to Attorney General although second letter routed through him and received his approval before going

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
COPIES DESTROYED		SER 3	
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5 - Bureau 101 JUN 2 1970 2 - New York City (1-Encl.) 3 - Washington Field (46-3116)		RECORDED	
COPY IN FILE		EX-127 10	

WFO 46-3116

to Secretary ACHESON for signature. State Department Bulletin No. 725 was published 5/18/53, after FISHER left State Department. Telephone records do not reflect any long distance calls by FISHER to Attorney General of Alabama. Examination of material obtained from House Committee on the Judiciary and Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reflects no testimony by FISHER or material prepared by him for use of committees. Royalties on oil leases on submerged lands totaling \$69,773,577.95, have been impounded from 1947 to date by State of California and by Federal Government. Disbursement of impounded money awaiting definite settlement of boundaries of territorial waters.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

The title of this report has been changed to reflect the full name of the subject as reflected in his personnel file, also to reflect his nickname BUTCH as determined from HAROLD B. WILLEY and RAYMUND T. YINGLING. It is further noted that although prior reports described FISHER as having been a Counsellor of the State Department, he was actually the Legal Adviser.

Mr. HAROLD B. WILLEY, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, advised that the Alabama Case, filed on September 26, 1953, has not yet been formally docketed and does not yet have a docket number. He explained that it is not the practice of the Supreme Court to require attorneys to submit formal statements entering their appearance, as the Court assumes that the attorneys appearing on motions and briefs are authorized to represent the parties to the litigation and, at the same time, the Court holds such attorneys responsible for the statements appearing in documents filed in their name. Mr. WILLEY exhibited what he called memorandum entries in a book showing all activity in the Alabama Case to date and said that when the court agrees to hear the Case it will be docketed and given a number. He furnished a copy of the Complaint and the Brief filed with the Supreme Court on September 26, 1953, both of which reflect

WFO 46-3116

COVINGTON and BURLING of Counsel for the Complainant and  
ADRIAN S. FISHER and DAVID C. ACHESON, Attorneys for Complainant.

Mr. OSCAR H. DAVIS, 5611 Justice Building, was interviewed on December 14, 1953. He advised that he is an attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General and has held that position since 1949. He stated he has participated in the supplementary proceedings of the California Tidelands Case and he participated all the way through in the Texas and Louisiana Tidelands Cases. He stated he did this work in association with JOHN F. DAVIS, another attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General and ROBERT M. VAUGHAN, an attorney who was assigned to the Lands Division and who has since resigned from the Department of Justice.

DAVIS advised that the supplementary proceedings in the California Case dealt with a dispute over the limits of inland waters, with California claiming ownership of all waters between the mainland and the islands off the coast, while the United States contended the inland waters should follow the sinuosities of the coastline. Since Catalina and some other islands were up to sixty miles off shore the dispute was quite important. During the case a Special Master was appointed by the Supreme Court to take testimony and make recommendations. During this period it was decided that the Justice Department would see whether the position taken by the State Department in connection with boundaries of territorial waters would agree with the position of the Department of Justice, and if so, they would secure a letter from the State Department setting forth the position of the United States Government in past dealings with other governments in the fixing of territorial limits of inland waters.

In carrying out this idea, a conference was held in the office of PHILIP B. PERLMAN, Solicitor General, for the purpose of determining whether the State Department could furnish a letter that would be helpful to the United States in its dispute with California. Attending the conference were PERLMAN, OSCAR DAVIS, JOHN DAVIS and VAUGHAN for the Justice Department and ADRIAN S. FISHER, Legal Adviser, JACK B. TATE, Deputy Legal Adviser, and RAYMUND T. YINGLING, Assistant Legal Adviser, of the State Department. DAVIS stated they advised the State Department representatives they wanted to take the position that the Supreme Court should use the



same rules and criteria that the United States had used historically in dealing with foreign powers, such rules and criteria having been expressed by the State Department from time to time.

DAVIS stated his memory on how prominently FISHER took part in the discussion is now hazy, but it is his impression that TATE and YINGLING were more familiar with the details of the points under discussion; that FISHER probably attended the meeting as a matter of courtesy because his position in the State Department was comparable to Mr. PERLMAN's position in the Justice Department, while the work level of the State Department was represented by YINGLING. He said that subsequent to the first meeting he had perhaps half a dozen contacts with the State Department on this same subject and all his later contacts were with YINGLING and JOSEPH M. SWEENEY. He stated they were on the staff level and undoubtedly did most of the work in the State Department in locating and correlating the material incorporated in the two letters sent to the Attorney General by the State Department on November 13, 1951, and February 12, 1952. He said he felt that FISHER, as their superior, undoubtedly had to read and approve the letters. He further said he believes the contents of one of the letters, probably the second one, were actually discussed with FISHER on one occasion when he was in FISHER's office. He said he believes he went to the State Department on at least one other occasion and talked with YINGLING and SWEENEY and that JOHN DAVIS and VAUGHAN probably went to the State Department on the same matter on other occasions.

Mr. DAVIS was asked if he could fix the dates and times he saw FISHER on this matter by referring to any records. He said he kept no personal records that would assist and he doubted that the file would contain memoranda of the meetings. He was requested to check his file on this matter.

Mr. JOHN F. DAVIS, 5613 Justice Building, was interviewed on December 14, 1953. He advised that he has been an attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General since August, 1950, and as such has worked on the so-called tidelands

WFO 46-3116

cases since that time although the Supreme Court decisions had already been handed down. He stated he keeps a personal diary in which he records some of the events taking place in connection with his work. He consulted this diary and found the following two entries:

June 15, 1951 -

"FISHER, TATE and YINGLING in from State Dept. re submerged lands."

Jan. 23, 1952 -

"Hearing before Special Master in U.S. v. Calif. Conference with A. FISHER, SWEENEY re State Dept. letter."

DAVIS stated the conference of June 15, 1951, was in Mr. PERLMAN's office with OSCAR DAVIS and VAUGHAN of the Justice Department also present; that it was an exploratory conference to let the State Department know what their problem was so that they could see whether they could be of help. He said that following the conference there were a dozen or so contacts altogether between the Justice Department and the State Department, but except for the two meetings mentioned in his diary, he believes the contacts were on a staff level with YINGLING and SWEENEY, the two attorneys in FISHER's office who did the work in connection with the preparation of the letters. He said the purpose of the conferences was to see what the State Department had and to see whether it fitted the needs of the Justice Department. He said that when the Justice Department wrote its letter to the State Department on October 30, 1951, requesting the letter from the State Department it was already known almost exactly what the State Department letter would be, and the same thing applied to the second letter. JOHN DAVIS advised that he does not know to what extent ADRIAN FISHER personally participated in the preparation of the material requested from the State Department.

Mr. ROBERT M. VAUGHAN, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, was interviewed on December 15, 1953. He is an attorney in the offices of King, Noble, and Sonosky. He stated he was an attorney in the Lands Division of the Department of Justice in 1940 when a matter involving submerged lands came in and was handled by him. He was thereafter in the Navy for four years and on his return to the Department of Justice in December, 1945, was still attached to the Lands Division, but because of his previous experience he was assigned to help handle the Justice Department's interest in the California Tidelands Case. Due to his experience in the California Tidelands Case he was also assigned to the Texas and Louisiana cases. He remarked that his work from December, 1945, until his resignation on October 1, 1952, dealt almost exclusively with submerged lands questions.

VAUGHAN advised that in the Summer of 1950 he attended a conference in the office of ADRIAN FISHER at the State Department during which the subject of discussion was the position the United States should take in the determination of the boundaries of its territorial waters. He said this conference was held as a preliminary step in a meeting to be held with the British at the latter's request. He said twenty-five or thirty men were in attendance with representatives from the Navy, Commerce Department, Interior Department, Justice Department, and the Coast Guard being present. He said he and JOHN F. DAVIS, because of their intimate knowledge of the question of oil leases in submerged lands carried on a great deal of the discussion. He said FISHER presided at the meeting primarily because he was the ranking government official present, but he let YINGLING "carry the ball" for the State Department. VAUGHAN said that it is his recollection that FISHER did not actually meet with the British, but had YINGLING and Dr. EDWIN D. DICKINSON, Professor of International Law at the University of Pennsylvania, represent the United States in the meeting with the British.

VAUGHAN advised that the issue in the supplementary proceedings in the California Case was the establishment of the seaward boundaries of the California waters. The United States contended the boundary line should follow the sinuosities of

WFO 46-3116

the coastline while California contended that in certain areas the boundary should be a straight line between certain projecting points. He said the method proposed by California would make inland (belonging to California), out of large areas containing valuable mineral deposits while the method proposed by the United States would make such areas a part of the open sea and not belonging to California.

VAUGHAN stated he felt that the historical expression of policy by the State Department was along the line taken by the United States in the California Case and he also felt the Supreme Court would be bound to follow the State Department policy in its findings. Therefore, it was decided to see if they could get a letter from the State Department in regard to the position of the United States as to the principles of criteria which govern the delimitation of the territorial waters of the United States. He said he was in Mr. PERLMAN's office when PERLMAN called FISHER and arranged a conference in PERLMAN's office. He said at this time he cannot remember the date of the conference and has no records whereby he could establish the date. He advised that during the conference which was attended by FISHER, TATE and YINGLING of the State Department, he spread a map of the coast of California on the floor and pointed out the problems involved and the areas of the problems. Thereafter a discussion was had as to how the State Department could answer the Justice Department query. He said FISHER had very little to say during the conference; that TATE expressed the opinion that the State Department could write a letter that would be helpful to the Justice Department and otherwise indicated considerable personal knowledge of the technical details involved. He said YINGLING also entered into the discussion and exhibited considerable knowledge on the subject.

VAUGHAN said he had approximately a dozen conferences with YINGLING and his assistant SWEENEY, following the conference in PERLMAN's Office, and by the time the Department of Justice wrote its letter to the State Department on October 30, 1951, formally asking for the State Department's position, he already knew what the reply would be. VAUGHAN advised that following receipt of the State Department letter of November 13, 1951, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case was decided by the International Court of Justice. That case held

WFO 46-3116

that Norway, due to unique circumstances, did not have to follow the sinuosities of its very irregular coastline in determining its seaward boundaries. It was felt that California might attempt to use that decision to its own advantage and it was, therefore, deemed advisable to get a letter from the State Department saying that decision did not alter the position of the State Department as expressed in its letter of November 13, 1951. Accordingly, VAUGHAN said he got in touch with YINGLING and SWEENEY and asked them to prepare such a letter. The State Department was slow in preparing the letter and finally he and the two DAVISES went to FISHER's office to expedite the letter. It was his recollection that YINGLING was in Japan at that time and when they explained the matter to FISHER he telephoned SWEENEY and told him to prepare the letter requested by VAUGHAN and he, FISHER, would get it signed.

VAUGHAN said that in his opinion FISHER's activities in connection with the two State Department letters were administrative in nature rather than technical. He further stated he has no recollection of any contacts with FISHER other than the two times herein described.

A review of the personnel file of ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER at the Department of State was made in the office of Mr. ROBERT F. CARTWRIGHT, Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs and Personnel. This file reflects that FISHER was Legal Adviser of the State Department from June 28, 1949, to January 27, 1953, when he resigned. The file reflects that he was a member of the following:

- American Bar Association
- Federal Bar Association
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Council of the Harvard Law School Association
- American Society of International Law

The file reflects that FISHER graduated from Princeton University in 1934 and from the Harvard Law School in 1937. His employment record was as follows:

WFO 46-3116

- September, 1938 to June, 1939 - Law Clerk to Justice BRANDEIS and Justice FRANKFURTER
- June, 1939 to October, 1939 - Booneville Project, Portland - Attorney
- October, 1939 to October, 1940 - SEC, Washington, D. C. - Attorney
- October, 1940 to May, 1941 - TVA, Knoxville - Attorney
- May, 1941 to March, 1942 - State Department, Washington, D. C. - Assistant to Legal Adviser, Assistant Chief Foreign Funds Control Division, (Assistant to Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State).
- March, 1942 to November, 1942 - Pan-American Air Ferries, Miami
- November, 1942 to July, 1946 - U.S. Army, Captain, Navigator
- July, 1946 to October, 1946 - Justice (assigned to International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany)
- October, 1946, to February, 1948 - Commerce, Solicitor
- February, 1948, to June, 1949 - AEC, General Counsel
- June, 1949, to January, 1953 - State - The Legal Adviser, Presidential appointee - GS-18, \$14,800 - resigned 1/27/53.

There follows a copy of the official job description for the position of legal adviser in the Department of State, as of April 26, 1950.

"Subject to the executive direction of the Secretary of State, serves as the Legal Adviser for the Department with authority and responsibility of an Assistant Secretary of State. (Public Law 73, 81st Congress, provides that the Legal Adviser shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate).

"Serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and through him to the President and the Department on all legal aspects of the foreign affairs of this country which involves the planning, coordination, and direction of all international legal activities of this Government and the solution of major problems of international significance arising out of the Department's broad responsibilities in the field of international affairs. Such problems relate to political affairs, economic affairs, legislative and administrative matters, international organization affairs, problems in connection with occupied areas, international claims, information and cultural relations, treaty matters, and the personal and private rights of aliens in the United States and of American citizens in foreign countries, as well as numerous other important legal questions. Advises the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and other officers of the Government in regard to the legal implications of all contemplated actions in unprecedented and unprecedented situations indicating, for example, how far any proposal under consideration will depart from recognized practice and what consequences may result in our relations with other states.

"Participates with the Secretary and other ranking officers of the Government in over-all policy formulation and program planning and in the consideration and development of basic policies wherein the authority of the Constitution, treaties, and domestic laws and regulations of this and other countries are involved and new legal principles are evolved in the conduct of United States foreign relations with other countries, international organizations, and other international bodies in which the United States participates.

"Acts for the Secretary and the Department or serves as principal adviser to the Secretary in international meetings and conferences, represents the Department before other federal

agencies with respect to legal and quasi-legal matters, and participates for the Secretary and the United States in the negotiation and implementation of international treaties and agreements."

"Qualification Requirements

for the position of

Legal Adviser, GS-18

1. "Outstanding legal experience which demonstrates marked ability to plan, direct, and coordinate the work of large staffs of professional personnel engaged in international legal work of great scope and complexity.
2. "Outstanding ability to negotiate effectively with high ranking representatives of foreign governments on legal matters of great importance.
3. "Exceptional ability to present, discuss, and negotiate the views and positions of the Department in high level inter-agency committees and conferences, including the ability to preside at such meetings and conferences; and to represent the Department in the conduct of official business with representatives of the political or business community and others concerned with United States foreign policy.
4. "Marked ability to exercise independent judgment and to make or advise on important decisions with respect to legal aspects of our foreign relations."

Mr. RAYMUND T. YINGLING, Assistant Legal Adviser, Room 4258, New State Building, was first contacted on December 14, 1953. He advised that he is the Assistant Legal Adviser in charge of European Affairs. He advised that his symbol used on all State Department correspondence is L/EUR. He said he is also considered the specialist in the Office of



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the Legal Adviser in connection with submerged lands and territorial waters and all questions or problems relative to these subjects are handled by him or his assistant JOSEPH M. SWEENEY. He said he maintains working files on all matters handled in his office; that although they are not the official State Department files, they do contain copies of just about all the information and documents that would be in the central files of the State Department. He said he keeps these working files for his ready reference in connection with his routine work. Mr. YINGLING was requested to examine his files and make available for review all files which he believed pertain to submerged lands and territorial waters. Mr. YINGLING thereafter provided fourteen folders which he said contained substantially all the material he had on the subject and he advised he was not aware of any other pertinent material being either in his files or in the central files. Examination of these folders reflected each one had a label indicating the general subject matter. The following information was obtained:

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case

This file contains copies of correspondence between the American Embassy in London and L/EUR in which the State Department was following the progress of the case. It was noted that everything written by the State Department bore the initials of JOSEPH M. SWEENEY.

Yorty Bills - Baselines of California

It was noted this file contains carbon copies of the two letters written by the State Department to the Attorney General, however, since the official file copies are described elsewhere, no additional comment is made at this point. It was noted that a rough draft of the first letter was prepared by SWEENEY on June 26, 1951. It was further noted that as of June 19, 1951, PERLMAN sent FISHER copies of a proposed letter "raising the questions we discussed the other day".

Inland Waters and Marginal Sea

This file contains a circular letter written in August, 1950, to certain American diplomatic and consular officers asking for information on laws, regulations, etc., of other countries relative to inland waters and marginal seas. This letter appears to have been written by S. W. BOGGS, who was a Special Adviser on Geography in the Department of State. This file also contains material reflecting an Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Waters. A meeting was held by this Committee on April 25, 1952, at which S. W. BOGGS acted as Chairman. R.T. YINGLING was the only representative of the Legal Adviser. YINGLING subsequently advised that FISHER definitely did not attend the meeting. It was noted that the meeting was attended by representatives of the Commerce Department, the Navy Department, the Air Force, Justice Department, the Interior Department as well as ten representatives of the State Department.

Conversations with United Kingdom

This file reflects meetings between the State Department and the British for the purpose of informal talks on the laws pertaining to coastal waters. A lengthy memorandum setting forth the discussions of the meetings was prepared by Sir ERIC BECKETT, the British counterpart of ADRIAN FISHER. The memorandum reflects that FISHER, TATE, and YINGLING were present at the meetings but does not indicate that FISHER participated in the technical discussions.

Second File on Conversations with United Kingdom

This was another file containing material on the conversations with the British in 1951, but has no material reflecting that FISHER participated on a technical level.

Tidelands Oil Legislation - 1953

This file covers activity in February, 1953, after FISHER resigned his position. It was noted that on February 16,

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1953, YINGLING conferred with Attorney General BROWNELL, Assistant Attorney General J. LEE RANKIN, Secretary of Interior MCKAY and Secretary of Navy ANDERSON, presenting the State Department's position that this government should maintain a three mile limit on territorial waters

#### Three Mile U.S. Position

This file deals with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and was compiled after FISHER's resignation.

#### Submerged Lands Act

This file was compiled after FISHER's resignation. Among other things it contains a copy of a complaint dated July 8, 1953, in the case of Arkansas v. Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Interior and the Treasurer of the United States, No. 3109-53 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. This was a suit enjoining the defendants from paying out the impounded monies collected by the State of California, the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy.

#### Outer Continental Shelf Act

There were two folders bearing this heading, both pertaining to the Outer Continental Shelf Act, which was passed in August, 1953, several months after FISHER's resignation.

#### U. K. v. Norway Fisheries Case

This file reflects that in June, 1951, ROBERT VAUGHAN called YINGLING to see whether the State Department could get copies of the pleadings in this case for use by the Department of Justice in the California Case. YINGLING handled the matter by telephone. There is a letter in the file from Solicitor General PERLMAN to ADRIAN FISHER confirming the request.

Territorial Waters - Korea

This file contains a memorandum dated February 5, 1952, prepared by SWENEY relative to a question arising in the Korean truce talks. It appears that the Communists wanted to extend the demarcation line twelve miles into the coastal waters of Korea while the United States contended the demarcation line should be three miles only. A copy of this memorandum was designated for Mr. FISHER for his information.

Territorial waters - miscellaneous

This file contains a short memorandum dated December 15, 1952, written by SWENEY indicating that in preparation for testimony before the House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, SWENEY devoted a good deal of time to getting material available for Mr. FISHER's testimony but the hearings were cancelled. This file also contains an article dated November 15, 1950, in the Harvard Law School Record, reviewing the Supreme Court decision in the Texas Case and holding that the Supreme Court was wrong and claiming the submerged lands belonged to Texas. This article was referred to Mr. YINGLING for his information but there is no indication that he referred it to FISHER. This file contains other individual papers relative to claims of other countries to territorial waters, but there is no indication that YINGLING referred the papers to FISHER for his information or action.

Territorial Waters - California Case

This file contains the original of a letter from PERLMAN to FISHER dated June 19, 1951, submitting his proposed letter for comment. The file does not indicate whether FISHER actually handled or saw the letter. This file also reflects that PERLMAN sent YINGLING a copy of a letter he wrote Senator O'MAHONEY, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in which PERLMAN opposed H.R. 4484. There is no indication that this letter was referred to FISHER for his information.

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It was specifically noted that the files reviewed did not reflect any correspondence between the Legal Adviser and officials of the State of Alabama.

At agent's request Mr. YINGLING secured the official copies of the State Department letters, dated November 13, 1951, and February 12, 1952. The first letter bears the typed name of J. M. SWEENEY, which, according to SWEENEY, indicates he dictated the letter. The letter also bears the initials of SWEENEY and YINGLING. Attached to the letter was a memorandum dated November 7, 1951, prepared by SWEENEY from Mr. TATE to The Acting Secretary, recommending that he sign the attached letter to the Attorney General. This memorandum bears the initials of JACK B. TATE. There is no indication that FISHER saw the letter or the recommendation.

The official files of the State Department reflect that the second letter to the Attorney General, dated February 12, 1952, was based on a letter from the Attorney General dated January 22, 1952. The incoming letter bears the name "SWEENEY" at the top. On January 30, 1952, SWEENEY prepared a reply. This reply contains initials indicating the approval of F. E. TAYLOR, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wild Life, and S. W. BOGGS, Special Adviser on Geography. The documents reflect that the second page of the reply prepared by SWEENEY was changed and the changed page does not have any handwritten initials, but refers to initials on the second page of the first draft. The amended letter was submitted with a memorandum dated February 11, 1952, prepared by SWEENEY from "Mr. FISHER", to The Secretary, recommending that the letter be signed. This memorandum was signed "A. S. FISHER".

RAYMUND T. YINGLING advised that he has been in the Office of the Legal Adviser since 1922 and has been an Assistant Legal Adviser since February 3, 1947. He stated that although the work is now divided geographically and he is supposed to be the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, the work used to be divided by subject matter and they still retain to some extent the subject matter breakdown. He said territorial waters is one of the subject matters he handles, and he has been assisted in

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this subject by JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, who has been with him since 1950. He said the State Department has been interested only in the international law aspects of tidelands cases; that it is primarily interested in keeping the marginal belt three miles, with proper exceptions. He said it has been the policy of the United States to protest attempts by other nations to claim territory beyond three miles.

YINGLING advised that ADRIAN S. FISHER was not what he considered an international lawyer when FISHER became Legal Adviser in June, 1949. He said all the time FISHER was there he relied primarily on the working level for the technical aspects of problems handled in the office. YINGLING said he could use his own judgment and when he thought he needed technical advice he went to JACK B. TATE the Deputy Legal Adviser because TATE knew more about the technical aspects than FISHER did.

YINGLING said that FISHER did not have anything to do with the preparation of either of the State Department letters to the Justice Department. He recalled that FISHER, TATE, and himself went to PERLMAN's office when the matter was first presented to the State Department, but he does not recall any other meetings between FISHER and Justice Department representatives. He said FISHER could have had such meetings, however, between January 21, 1952, and March 1, 1952, while he, YINGLING, was in Japan.

YINGLING said the actual preparation of the letters was handled by SWEENEY and himself; that SWEENEY prepared a rough draft, he looked it over and made some suggestions and SWEENEY then prepared the finished product. He said the final draft was then taken to TATE for his approval and he does not know whether FISHER saw the letter at all. YINGLING advised that the fact that the cover memorandum was in TATE's name rather than FISHER's did not necessarily indicate that FISHER was not at his desk. He said he could use his own judgment in such matters as to whether he wanted to send such documents through TATE or FISHER, and since TATE had more experience he generally preferred to deal with TATE if the problem were primarily a technical one rather than one of policy.

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YINGLING stated that he was out of the country when the second letter was prepared although he had previous knowledge that the Justice Department intended to ask the State Department whether the decision in the Fisheries Case altered the position set forth in the first letter.

Mr. YINGLING was asked whether FISHER had ever testified before any congressional committees. His attention was called to his folder on territorial waters - Misc., which indicated that SWEENEY prepared considerable material for FISHER's use in testifying in December, 1952. YINGLING said that on that occasion he himself went to the House Office Building, intending to give testimony, but Congressman YORTY, the sponsor of the legislation, talked at great length and did not leave enough time for him to testify. He said FISHER did not go to the Capitol on that occasion and he has no recollection of FISHER intending to testify on that subject.

YINGLING was asked about his policy in advising FISHER of matters coming to his attention. He stated this was a matter for his own personal judgment and that he would not advise the front office unless the information was extremely important, or unless it might require action on his part that would have to be approved by the front office.

JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser, Room 4259, New State Building, was interviewed on December 18, 1953. He stated he has been in that office since January, 1949, and since July, 1950, has worked under Mr. YINGLING. At the outset of the interview SWEENEY advised that he and ADRIAN S. FISHER are good friends. He said he had lunch with FISHER sometime in November, 1953, at which time the Alabama Case was mentioned. He said FISHER remarked that there was a possibility of SWEENEY having an official interest in the case that would be adverse to FISHER's interest and he, therefore, suggested that they should not discuss the case. He said FISHER remarked that he had considered the matter of a possible conflict of interest prior to accepting the case, but had concluded in his own mind that it would be proper for him to handle it. FISHER told SWEENEY that he learned th

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was some talk that he should not have entered the case and that he was surprised to learn of such talk.

SWEENEY advised that in the early part of 1950 he prepared a paper reflecting research on baselines of inland waters. About the same time YINGLING's office became the center of all legal problems on territorial waters so all the work on such problems was concentrated in YINGLING and SWEENEY and as far as he knows all problems of that sort have cleared through their offices since 1950.

SWEENEY said he did not attend the meeting at the Department of Justice when the State Department was requested to give the Justice Department a letter on territorial waters. However, YINGLING gave him the job of drafting the paper. SWEENEY said the paper he had prepared a few months earlier touched on subject matter and he was able to abstract from the earlier paper all material he felt applied to the California Case. He said it was a relatively easy task because of his earlier research.

SWEENEY advised that OSCAR DAVIS, JOHN DAVIS, and ROBERT VAUGHAN came over to his office on several occasions to discuss the matter. He said their first reaction to his proposed draft was not favorable but they later decided that the material they objected to was advantageous to the Justice Department and phrased their request to fit the paper he and YINGLING had prepared.

SWEENEY advised that both letters and both memoranda recommending that the letters be signed were prepared by him. He said he has no recollection of conferring with Mr. FISHER on the first letter and he pointed out that the official copy of the letter and the memorandum of recommendation indicate it went through TATE rather than FISHER. He said he feels that he may have had some discussion with FISHER about the wording of the second letter, but he is not sure that he discussed the matter although he does know that the second letter received FISHER's personal approval.



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SWEENEY stated that in his opinion FISHER was not skilled in international law when he became Legal Adviser. Accordingly, he believes that any technical discussions about the letters to the Attorney General would have been had with Mr. TATE rather than Mr. FISHER since TATE was more experienced in such matters. SWEENEY also commented that in his opinion Mr. YINGLING knew a great deal more about this phase of international law than TATE or FISHER.

The memorandum of Assistant Attorney General OLNEY dated December 11, 1953, requested information pertaining to State Department Bulletin XXVIII, No. 725, dated May 18, 1953. A copy of this bulletin was secured from JOSEPH M. SWEENEY. It is noted on the inside cover that this document is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents. It is stated to be a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, for the purpose of providing the public with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. It was noted that page 721 is a copy of or an excerpt from press release 211 dated April 24, 1953, pertaining to "Notification Regarding Pre-war Agreements with Japan".

Inquiry of [redacted] Building Operations Section, Central Services Division, State Department, Room 2308, State Annex 9, reflected that the State Department maintains bills from the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, reflecting charges to the State Department on all domestic long distance telephone calls; said bills covering the period from December, 1951, to date. [redacted] advised that she has no record of incoming long distance telephone calls.

The bills mentioned reflect the date of the call, the city called, the duration and the charge. [redacted] advised she also maintains individual tickets showing details of each call and these tickets may be destroyed after a period of six months, however, on examination of her files she found that she has such tickets going back to May 15, 1952.

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Agent made an examination of the telephone bills and the individual tickets in the custody of [REDACTED] and found that nine long distance telephone calls were made to Montgomery, the capital of Alabama, but the tickets indicated none of the calls were made by ADRIAN S. FISHER or anyone else in the Office of the Legal Adviser.

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[redacted] of the Department requested that an attempt be made to determine whether FISHER participated in the preparation of any material or information for use of the House of Representatives or the Senate in connection with any proposed legislation dealing with submerged lands. Since FISHER first became Legal Adviser at the Department of State on June 28, 1949, and resigned January 27, 1953, this phase was limited to bills considered by the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congress. It was determined that such bills were considered by Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, while in the Senate such matters came under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

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Inquiries at these two Committees disclosed there have been a large number of bills proposed and considered since 1949. Copies of all available reports and printed hearings were secured and examined for the purpose of locating all material or statements originating in the Department of State which were submitted for use in considering such bills. There were four statements or documents noted in the material which were originally prepared either before or after FISHER was in office. The only document noted which was prepared while FISHER was Legal Adviser was a letter dated December 30, 1949 to Senator TOM CONNALLY, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, from JAMES E. WEBB, Under Secretary of State. This was in response to a letter from Senator CONNALLY dated October 12, 1949, requesting the views of the State Department with respect to a number of questions concerning the extent of the territorial waters of the United States and of the State of Texas in the Gulf of Mexico.

J. M. SWANEY was requested to locate the official file copies of the correspondence between the State Department and Senator CONNALLY. He later advised the material was charged out of the file and could not be located immediately.

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[redacted] requested information relative to the fund mentioned in the Alabama brief on page two, to see whether the existence of the fund and the action sought by Alabama would constitute a possible claim against the United States. In this regard he suggested that preliminary inquiries on this point would be sufficient at this time. The Alabama brief, on page seven, has the following statement concerning the fund:

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"After Decisions of the Court in the California, Louisiana and Texas cases, leases issued by these states were continued in effect but the royalties derived from them were either impounded or held in escrow. As a result, a fund of over \$62,000,000 was accumulated in which the Federal Government, acting as trustee for all the United States, has the legal interest and in which the defendant states have no beneficial interest other than that which they share in common with all the other states of the Union."

Mr. EDWARD THOMASSON, Oil and Gas Leasing Branch, Conservation Division, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, Room 3235, General Services Administration Building, advised that at the present time there is a fund of \$69,773,577.95 which has been collected during the period from 1947 to 1953 and impounded, awaiting appropriate court action to determine the proper boundaries of the off shore submerged lands. THOMASSON stated that prior to 1950, the Attorney Generals of the United States and the State of California entered into stipulation wherein the State of California collected royalties on oil and gas leases on submerged lands and retained the money in a special fund pending final adjudication of the boundary dispute. In 1950 the agreement between the United States and California was changed in that California continued to collect the money, but paid it on a quarterly basis to the Department of Interior to hold pending adjudication of the boundary dispute. The Department of the Interior turned this money over to a special fund in the Treasury Department.

THOMASSON advised that following the decisions in the Texas and Louisiana cases in 1950, the Secretary of the Interior published a notice in the Federal Register (15 FR 8835) allowing existing oil and gas operations in coastal waters to continue, subject to payments of rentals and royalties to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. After one month it was directed that the payments be made to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior in charge of the Office of Administration. The money thus paid to the Department of the Interior was impounded in a special Treasury Department fund.

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THOMASSON advised that following the President's proclamation in January 1953, holding that the oil reserves in submerged lands were to be considered naval petroleum reserves, the oil companies paid their royalties and rentals to the Navy Department. In the Navy this was handled by the Office of the Naval Petroleum Reserves with headquarters at Denver, Colorado. THOMASSON pointed out that the Submerged Lands Act of May 1953 meant that moneys collected and impounded on leases located within areas belonging to the states will have to be returned to the states while the Outer Continental Shelf Act of August 1953 means that royalties on leases located on the Outer Continental Shelf will continue to be paid to the Federal Government. He said the entire fund collected by the state of California, Department of Interior, and the Navy Department is still being held and the distribution of same must wait for a final determination by the courts of the coastal boundaries of the various states. He said that until it is known exactly where the marginal belt ends, it will not be possible to know exactly what portion of the impounded fund will have to be returned to the states.

Mr. RAYMUND T. YINGLING advised that JACK B. TATE has just resigned as Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department and is going to teach law at New York University, New York City. Telephonic inquiry at Mr. TATE's home in Washington disclosed that he moved to New York City on the morning of December 18, 1953, and that he will be located at apartment 5B, 33 Washington Square, New York City.

The following physical description of ADRIAN S. FISHER was obtained from his personnel file at the State Department:

Name: ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, nickname BUTCH  
Age: 40  
Born: January 21, 1914, Memphis, Tennessee  
Height: 6'1"  
Weight: 220 pounds  
Hair: Brown  
Eyes: Hazel  
Army Serial No.: 0501968  
Social Security No.: 266-28-6557  
Marital Status: Married to [REDACTED]  
Occupation: Attorney with Law Firm of Covington and Burling, Washington, D. C.  
Residence: 3013 Dumoarton Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

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ENCLOSURE

TO NEW YORK CITY

Report of Special Agent HAROLD H. HAIR dated  
December 4, 1953, at Washington, D. C.

- P -

Addendum

Subsequent to the dictation of this report Mr. OSCAR H. DAVIS advised he had checked his file and did not find a written record of the conference in Mr. PERLMAN'S office, but he said it must have taken place a few days before June 19, 1951, as he found a letter from Mr. PERLMAN to Mr. FISHER of that date "raising the questions were discussed the other day".

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ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

The attention of the Bureau is called to the fact that information relative to the funds of approximately \$70,000,000 was obtained at the specific request of [redacted] of the Criminal Division. He stated he wanted this information for consideration in determining whether the Alabama suit is a "claim" against the United States. He advised Agent HAIR it would not be necessary to get complete details relative to the fund, but he merely desired confirmation of its existence. Accordingly the information obtained at the Department of the Interior was not enlarged upon nor verified by additional investigation.

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For the information of the New York Office the Bureau has instructed that this case be assigned to experienced and mature special agent personnel. In view of the public prominence of the subject and the public interest in the suit involved in this case the investigation should be handled immediately and with care. It should also be noted that [redacted] advised that Assistant Attorney General WARREN OLNEY III has stated this is a case of prime importance in the Criminal Division.

LEADS

THE NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK CITY

Will interview JACK B. TATE, Apartment 5B, 33 Washington Square, for the purpose of determining to what extent ADRIAN S. FISHER was personally engaged in the legal aspects of the handling of questions pertaining to submerged lands and territorial waters while he was Legal Adviser in the Department of State.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will keep in touch with JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, Office of the Legal Adviser, State Department, and when he has located same, review the official file copies of the correspondence between the State Department and Senator TOM CONNALLY in 1946 for the purpose of determining whether FISHER had anything to do with the letter to Senator CONNALLY.

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HHH:dr

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE CONTINUED

REFERENCE: Report of Special Agent HAROLD H. HAIR, Washington,  
D.C., December 4, 1953.



G.I.R.-7

JANUARY 6, 1954

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SAC, NEW YORK

MAIL

ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, FORMER LEGAL ADVISOR, STATE DEPARTMENT, PAG - CONFLICT OF INTEREST. RE REP SA HAROLD H. WAIP DATED JANUARY 5, 1954, AT WASHINGTON FIELD. THE LEAD FOR YOUR OFFICE MUST BE ASSIGNED TO EXPERIENCED AND MATURE PERSONNEL AND HANDLED IMMEDIATELY. A REPORT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO REACH THE BUREAU NOT LATER THAN JANUARY 14, 1954.

HOOVER

cc: -2- WASHINGTON FIELD (46-3116)  
(BCS)

WAH:mrs

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT WASHINGTON FIELD

10/1/54

REPORT MADE AT NEW YORK	DATE WHEN MADE 1/13/54	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 1/8,11,12/54	REPORT MADE BY JOHN J. RYAN (A)
SUBJECT: <b>ERIAN SALFORD FISHER, wa: Butch Fisher Former Legal Adviser, State Department</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - CONFLICT OF INTEREST</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

JACK B. TATE advises he held position as Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, from fall of 1947 to December, 1953. States FISHER never personally engaged in legal aspects of questions pertaining to submerged lands and territorial waters while he was Legal Adviser. TATE advises YINGLING and SWEENEY conducted research re such questions and would refer drafts to him for comments and suggestions; states he would refer matters to FISHER if policy involved or if he felt matters should be brought to his attention. TATE states Department of State letters re California Case prepared by YINGLING and SWEENEY; cannot recall whether letters discussed with FISHER, but undoubtedly did discuss California Case with FISHER.

*2:00* *Always by memo 1/20/54*  
- RUC -

**DETAILS:**

**G.I.R.**

On January 11, 1954, JACK B. TATE, Apartment 5-B, 33 Washington Square West, New York, New York, was interviewed at his office, Room 322, 40 Washington Square South, New York, New York, by SA CERRIL F. BUSCH (A) and the writer. Mr. TATE advised that he is now teaching Law at the New York University School of Law.

TATE advised that he was employed as Deputy Legal Adviser by the Department of State from the fall of 1947 to December, 1953. He first met FISHER during June, 1949, when the latter received his appointment as Legal Adviser, Department of State.

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
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TATE advised that FISHER, at times, personally handled various types of State Department matters. However, FISHER was never personally engaged in the legal aspects of the handling of questions pertaining to submerged lands and territorial waters while he was Legal Adviser. The research pertaining to such questions would be conducted by YINGLING and YINGLING'S assistant, SWEENEY. YINGLING would then present a draft of a report or letter to him (TATE) for any comments or suggestions he might have.

If TATE considered that a question of policy was involved or the matter should be brought to FISHER'S attention for any reason, he would then discuss same with FISHER.

TATE stated that he recalls the California Case and also recalls attending a conference in the office of PHILIP PERLMAN, Solicitor General, regarding this matter. He cannot recall whether FISHER attended this conference, but believes he may have as a matter of courtesy since the Solicitor General attended instant conference. However, he advised that he undoubtedly did discuss the case with FISHER sometime during the course of the discussions with the Justice Department.

TATE said that he recalls that two letters pertaining to the California Case were prepared by the Department of State for the Justice Department, by YINGLING and SWEENEY. The first letter set out the position of the United States regarding territorial waters in dealing with foreign powers and the second letter indicated that the position of the United States was not changed in this matter as a result of the Norway Fisheries decision. TATE stated it is possible that other letters may have been written by the Department of State to the Justice Department regarding the California Case. He advised that to the best of his recollection YINGLING and SWEENEY discussed the drafts of these letters with him. TATE cannot recall whether he discussed these letters with FISHER.

Upon being advised that the second letter was dated February 12, 1952, and approved by FISHER, TATE said that he was quite certain he was attending a conference at Paris, France, at that time.

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TATE advised that conferences pertaining to boundaries of territorial waters were held with the British in 1951. These conferences were handled by YINGLING and Doctor DICKINSON of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. To his knowledge FISHER did not participate in these conferences except possibly to attend the initial meeting as a matter of protocol.

TATE advised that to the best of his recollection FISHER did not testify before the Yorty Committee. He stated that he does not believe that FISHER familiarized himself with the data prepared for this committee.

- RUC -

NY 46-2932

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

MISCELLANEOUS

The following information pertaining to JACK B. TATE is contained in a case entitled, "JACK B. TATE, Deputy Legal Adviser, State Department, Washington, D. C.; LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES", NY file 121-3636.

By teletype dated June 1, 1948, the Washington Field Office referred to Bureau letter dated May 12, 1948, and advised that JACK B. TATE is the President of the Washington Chapter, National Lawyers Guild.

On June 9, 1948, Mrs. ANNA M. ROSENBERG, 444 Madison Avenue, New York City, advised SA JOSEPH M. KELLY that she became acquainted with TATE in the early months of the first administration of the late President FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT when they both were associated in Washington with the National Recovery Administration. She recalled that TATE was assigned to the Graphic Arts Code of the National Recovery Administration in a legal capacity. Mrs. ROSENBERG mentioned that she became an official of the Social Security Board two or three years later and that the employee also transferred to that agency; afterward both were employees of the Federal Security Agency. She explained that throughout her twelve years' service with the United States Government, she had frequent conversations with TATE and considers herself very well acquainted with him.

Mrs. ROSENBERG declared that TATE, in her opinion, is a highly capable individual who is a most desirable public servant and whose loyalty is unquestionable. She stated that she does not recall having seen the employee since she resigned from Government service and established her Labor Relations Counseling Office in New York City. Furthermore, she said that she has no knowledge of the employee's possible affiliations with any groups of any type, but reiterated her opinion that he is completely loyal to the United States.

On June 9, 1948, Mr. PAUL V. McNUTT, former U. S. Government official, and now a Practicing Attorney at 84 William Street, New York City, advised SA JOSEPH M. KELLY

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ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE (Cont'd)

MISCELLANEOUS (Cont'd)

that he became acquainted with JACK B. TATE in 1939, when Mr. McNUTT was appointed Administrator of the Federal Security Agency and in turn appointed Mr. TATE General Counsel for that Agency. Mr. McNUTT further related that he was in frequent and close association with TATE until 1945, at which time Mr. McNUTT proceeded to the Phillipine Islands as U.S. High Commissioner; he pointed out, however, that in the last year since establishing his law office in New York City, he has spoken to TATE on two or three occasions.

Mr. McNUTT characterized TATE as a very capable and high type individual whom he regards very highly. He declared emphatically that he "would underwrite TATE 100% in all respects;" that TATE is "the type of Government official you need never worry about," and that his loyalty to this government, in Mr. McNUTT'S opinion, is unquestionable.

It was learned from Mr. McNUTT that he has no knowledge of any groups or organizations with which TATE is now or has been associated.

REFERENCE: Reports of SA HAROLD H. HAIR, Washington Field, 12/4/53 and 1/5/54.

Bureau air-tel to New York, 1/6/54.

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **WASHINGTON FIELD**

REPORT MADE AT <b>WASHINGTON, D. C.</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>1-8-54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>1/6/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>HAROLD H. H. IR</b> pm
TITLE <b>ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, aka Butch Fisher, Former Legal Adviser, State Department</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - CONFLICT OF INTEREST</b>	

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SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: *2 cc [redacted] Room 2314*  
*Justice [redacted]*  
*1-cc retained by Hamilton 4-7-54*  
 Correspondence between State Department and Senator TOM CONNALLY in 1949 and 1950 handled primarily by WARREN F. LOONEY, Office of Fisheries and Wildlife. *1-13-54 WAT*  
 No indication that FISHER participated in or supervised preparation of letter.

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DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

On January 6, 1954, JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, Office of the Legal Adviser, stated he had made an exhaustive search of the official file copies of the correspondence between the State Department and Senator TOM CONNALLY, but could not locate them. He said he had located other copies of the correspondence, however, and produced this material for review. It was noted that there was a series of letters between Senator CONNALLY and the State Department. In addition to the letters of October 12, 1949, and December 30, 1949, between the State Department and Senator CONNALLY, the State Department wrote another letter on February 13, 1950, and then Senator CONNALLY, on March 6, 1950, wrote to the State Department requesting that he be furnished

E. J. PROCC.

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>L. J. [signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
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<b>58 JAN 19 1954</b>		

WFO 46-3116

copies of all material the State Department had on the subject of Territorial Waters as it affected Texas and Mexico. SWENNEY advised the last request was never complied with due to doubt within the State Department as to advisability of giving the Senator copies of the controversial matter.

The available copies of the correspondence and memoranda did not reflect any personal participation or supervision by ADRIAN S. FISHER. The two letters actually written to the Senator were drafted by Mr. WARREN F. LOONLY, who is in the Office of the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife. In addition to LOONLY's name and initials the carbon copies of the letters indicate they were referred for approval to the Assistant Legal Advisers for Treaty Affairs and Public Affairs, the Office of Middle American Affairs, the Office of Special Adviser on Geography and the Office of Congressional Relations.

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ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE

This completes all investigation now contemplated in this case with the exception of the interview of JACK B. TATE, Former Deputy Legal Adviser, by the New York Office.

REFERENCE

Report of Special Agent HAROLD H. HAIR, Washington, D.C., dated January 5, 1954

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SAC, Washington Field (46-3116)

February 18, 1954

Director, FBI (46-20919)

ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, WITH ALIAS,  
FORMER LEGAL ADVISOR, STATE DEPARTMENT  
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - CONFLICT OF  
INTEREST

Attached for your office and copies designated  
for the Mobile Division is a copy of a self-explanatory  
memorandum dated February 15, 1954, from the Criminal  
Division requesting additional inquiry in this matter.

This investigation must be assigned to experienced  
personnel and all persons interviewed should be informed that  
this investigation is being conducted at the specific request  
of Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III, Criminal  
Division, Department of Justice. However, your report should  
not reflect this advice.

It is desired that reports reflecting the completion  
of this inquiry be submitted to reach the Bureau by March 5,  
1954.

Attachment

cc: 2-Mobile (Attachment)

Note: Inasmuch as Fisher was former counsellor for the  
State Department and in view of the legal question raised  
in the recent District Court decision regarding the  
Conflict of Interest case involving former Assistant  
Attorney General Bergson, it is deemed desirable  
to inform the individuals interviewed as requested  
in Olney's memorandum, be informed that this  
investigating is being conducted at his specific  
request.

WAH:dej

46-20919-10

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT WASHINGTON FIELD

REPORT MADE AT <b>MOBILE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>3/2/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>2/24/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>SPENCER E. ROBE</b> -dm
TITLE <b>ADRIAN SAMPSON FISHER, Jr. Former Legal Advisor State Department</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - CONFLICT OF INTEREST</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Alabama Attorney General SI GARRETT and Assistant Attorney General H. ROLAND MACHEN, JR., Montgomery, Ala., state they have no knowledge of any payment of any kind having been made or promised the firm of Covington and Burling for services in connection with suit brought by Alabama in Submerged Lands Act matter. Mr. GARRETT states there have been no court costs paid to date. Mr. GARRETT exhibited letter from MACHEN to him dated 9/18/53 setting forth agreement reached with firm of Covington and Burling that they would represent Alabama in suit, and that no fee for services would be paid; exhibited letter from FISHER to him under date of 9/18/53 on letterhead of firm of Covington and Burling, confirming agreement of that firm to represent Alabama in this matter; this letter did not mention matter of fee; also exhibited copy of letter from him to Covington and Burling, attention FISHER, dated 9/21/53, officially appointing that firm special counsel for Alabama in this matter; this letter did not mention fee. Mr. GARRETT declined to make copies of letters available.

*see to RAB attention of Atty [redacted] Room 2316*  
- RUC -

**DETAILS: AT MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA:**

On February 24, 1954, the writer and SA [redacted] contacted H. ROLAND MACHEN, JR., Assistant Alabama Attorney General, to obtain a copy of the agreement between the State of Alabama and the law firm of Covington and Burling; to obtain verification of the payment or

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non-payment of court costs to the law firm of Covington and Burling; and to reinterrogate NACHMAN with respect to ascertaining whether or not any person or corporate body was by agreement or understanding, formal or informal, to pay Covington and Burling for legal services (as distinct from expenses) which the State of Alabama was assertedly unable to pay.

With reference to obtaining a copy of instant agreement and verification of payment or non-payment of court costs, NACHMAN advised that since this request involved official State correspondence, he would prefer that the request be made directly to Alabama Attorney General SI GARRETT, who was not available at that time for interview.

With reference to payment to the firm of Covington and Burling, NACHMAN advised that to his knowledge there was no agreement of any kind for any person or corporate body to pay Covington and Burling for legal services in connection with that firm acting as special counsel for the State of Alabama in its suit to test the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act.

Subsequently on the same date, the writer interviewed Alabama Attorney General SI GARRETT in the presence of Mr. NACHMAN. Mr. GARRETT made the following oral statement, which is set forth verbatim:

"I state categorically that I have no knowledge whatsoever of any agreement or understanding, formal or informal, for any person or corporate body to pay Covington and Burling for the legal services (as distinct from expenses) rendered by that firm to the State of Alabama in State of Alabama, v. State of Texas; Et al., No. \_\_\_\_\_, Original, in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1953, which is the suit filed by the State of Alabama, designed to contest the validity of the Submerged Lands Act, Public Law 31, 83rd Congress, First Session, C. 65. No such matter was ever discussed by me with anyone or by anyone in my presence.

"To date, no court costs have been paid on behalf of the State of Alabama in this case. If and when a bill for costs is submitted to the State of Alabama, it will be paid by the State of Alabama out of funds of the Office of the Attorney General. The State of Alabama does not have and has never had any agreement or understanding with any person or corporate body as to the payment of the costs in this suit in any other manner or from any other source than indicated above.

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"The cost of printing the motion, complaint, and brief in support thereof and the reply brief which were filed in this case by the State of Alabama were paid directly to the printer by State of Alabama warrants drawn against the funds of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, all of which appears as a matter of public record in the Office of the State Comptroller of the State of Alabama.

"The State of Alabama has not at anytime paid the firm of Covington and Burling any amount, for any purpose whatsoever, in connection with this case. Prior to the time that the firm of Covington and Burling was appointed as Special Counsel for the State of Alabama in this matter, which was done by letter, dated September 21, 1953, that firm was definitely advised that the State of Alabama, and more specifically the Office of the Attorney General of Alabama, had no funds whatsoever available for the payment of any fee or fees to that firm, or any other firm, for legal services rendered to the State of Alabama in this case. The appointment of the firm of Covington and Burling as Special Counsel for the State of Alabama in this case was on the basis and with the distinct understanding that the firm would receive no compensation whatsoever from the State of Alabama for legal services rendered to the State of Alabama in this case."

In connection with the request that a copy of the agreement between the State of Alabama and the law firm of Covington and Burling be furnished, Mr. GARRETT stated that he desired the following statement by him be made a matter of record: "I bitterly resent, both officially, as Attorney General for the State of Alabama, and personally, the Department of Justice asking for documentation of previous statements made by me and by Assistant Attorney General M. FOLAND NACHMAN, JR., that the law firm of Covington and Burling was employed by the State of Alabama as Special Counsel in this case, and accepted such employment with the distinct understanding that said firm would receive no compensation whatsoever from the State of Alabama for its services. However, I have such documentation, and readily exhibit it to Mr. ROBB, but decline to furnish copies of the same to him."

Mr. GARRETT then exhibited to the writer a letter to him from Assistant Attorney General NACHMAN, written in Washington, D. C., dated September 18, 1953. In this letter Mr. NACHMAN stated that the law firm of Covington and Burling had agreed to act as Special Counsel

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for the State of Alabama in the Submerged Lands Act suit, and that this agreement was on the understanding that the State of Alabama could pay no fee for such services, but would pay court costs. This letter also stated that a letter of confirmation would be forthcoming from Covington and Burling.

Mr. GARRETT also exhibited to the writer a letter to him from ADRIAN S. FISHER, written in Washington, D. C., on a letterhead of Covington and Burling, dated September 13, 1953. This letter acknowledged that the firm of Covington and Burling would represent the State of Alabama in this matter; the letter made no mention of fees.

Mr. GARRETT exhibited a copy of a letter written by him under date of September 21, 1953, to Covington and Burling, attention Mr. FISHER, which letter formally appointed that firm as Special Counsel for the State of Alabama in this matter; no mention was made in this letter of fees.

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ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

REFERENCE

Bulet to Washington Field dated 2/18/54.

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Winterrowd  
Mr. Holloman  
Mr. Casper  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Gale  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Mr. Tele. Room  
Miss Gandy

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FBI WASH FIELD

3-4-54

DIRECTOR (46-20919)

DEFERRED

ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, WA, ET AL, FAG - CONFLICT OF INTER ST. REPUERT  
2/18/54. ADRIAN FISHER TODAY ADVISED HE WILL CONSULT WITH NEWELL ELLISON,  
SR MEMBER OF COVINGTON & BURLING LAW FIRM, FOR DECISION AS TO WHETHER HE  
OR THE FIRM WILL FURNISH INFO REQUESTED BY DEPARTMENT. ELLISON IS OUT OF  
CITY BUT EXPECTED BACK 3/5/54. OTHER INVESTIGATION COMPLETED. OSCAR H.  
DAVIS FURNISHED INFORMAL OPINION THAT MOST OF FUNDS NOW HELD BY TREASURY  
FROM TIDELANDS LEASES BELONGED TO CERTAIN STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBMERGED  
LANDS ACT OF 1953, AND THE ALABAMA CASE CONSTITUTES AN EFFORT TO SAVE SAID  
FUNDS FOR THE FED GOVT RATHER THAN TO GIVE THE FUNDS TO THE THREE DEFENDANT  
STATES. HE SAID IF A FORMAL OPINION IS WANTED IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REQUESTED  
OF THE DEPT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL. JAMES H. ROWE, JR., OF LAW FIRM OF  
CORCORAN YOUNGMAN & ROWE, A FORMER ASSISTANT AG, STATES FISHER WAS SELECTED  
AS ATTORNEY FOR ALABAMA WITH THOUGHT IN MIND THAT DEAN ACHESON WOULD HANDLE  
ORAL ARGUMENTS, BUT BECAUSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION, FISHER FELT HIS USEFULNESS  
TO CASE WAS IMPAIRED AND COVINGTON & BURLING FIRM CEASED PARTICIPATION, WITH  
CASE NOW BEING HANDLED BY ATTORNEY [REDACTED] ROWE CONSIDERS IT AN OUTRAGE  
FOR AG OR AAG TO ORDER THIS INVESTIGATION WHILE CASE STILL BEFORE THE COURT.  
HE SAID HIS FIRM IS REPRESENTING STATE OF RHODE ISLAND IN SIMILAR SUIT WITHOUT  
PRESENT OR ANTICIPATED COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES FROM ANY SOURCE AND HE IS  
SURE COVINGTON & BURLING (AND FISHER) HAD THE ALABAMA CASE ON THE SAME BASIS,  
STATING THEY WERE DOING SO AS A PUBLIC SERVICE. WFO WILL SUREP WHEN DECISION  
MADE BY ELLISON.

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Assistant Attorney General  
Warren Olney III

March 11, 1954

Director, FBI

ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, WITH ALIAS,  
FORMER LEGAL ADVISER, STATE DEPARTMENT  
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -  
CONFLICT OF INTEREST  
(Your file 51-16-369, WO:LFR:gmk)

Reference is made to your memorandum dated  
February 15, 1954, in the above-captioned matter.

There are attached two copies of the report of  
Special Agent Harold H. Hair, dated March 8, 1954, at  
Washington, D. C.

The attached report of Special Agent Hair completes  
the Bureau's investigation in this matter.

Your early advice will be appreciated as to what  
further action your Division contemplates taking in this  
case.

Attachment

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Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **WASHINGTON FIELD**

REPORT MADE AT <b>WASHINGTON, D. C.</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>3/8/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>2/26;3/3-5/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>HAROLD H. HAIR</b> <span style="float: right;">gjc</span>
TITLE <b>ALFIAN SANFORD FISHER, wa. Former Legal Adviser, State Department</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

OSCAR DAVIS gave informal opinion that as of 9-26-53, U. S. Government had no pecuniary interest in that part of fund that was derived from leases located in areas within the marginal belt defined in Submerged Lands Act of 1953, since said act gave such interests to the adjacent States. JAMES ROWE, of Corcoran, Youngman, and Fowe, states his firm represents Rhode Island without compensation and has no fee arrangement of any kind with Covington and Burling. ROWE states Covington and Burling getting no fee from Alabama. NEWELL ELLISON, senior partner of Covington and Burling, states FISHER is salaried associate and does not share in profits. ELLISON states his firm expected to receive a fee from Alabama for legal work performed in Alabama case although no discussion re fees took place until about 9-16-53, when Assistant Attorney General NACHMAN of Alabama advised FISHER that Alabama had no funds to pay a fee. Covington and Burling then agreed to complete case without compensation. Covington and Burling has withdrawn from Alabama case and has been succeeded by [redacted] of Fowler, Leva, Hawes, and Synington, Washington, D. C.

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		THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

WFO 46-3116

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. OSCAR H. DAVIS, Department of Justice, advised that he could furnish his personal, informal opinion as to the pecuniary interest of the United States Government in the \$70,000,000.00 fund which has been collected by the Department of Interior and is being held awaiting further decisions of the courts. He stated that as of September 26, 1953, the date the Alabama suit was filed, the United States Government had, in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, given to the adjacent States all rights to leases and other benefits derived within the marginal belt as defined in the Act. Also, in the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953, the United States Government claimed all rights to leases and other benefits derived in areas of the continental shelf outside the marginal belt. He said the exact boundaries have not yet been established by the courts, but he believes that most of the \$70,000,000.00 fund was derived from leases within the marginal belt and, therefore, belongs to the adjacent States. Mr. DAVIS also advised that the Alabama and Rhode Island suits are not asserting claims for themselves as to money belonging to the United States Government, but on the contrary, their suits seek to have the entire fund retained for the United States Government rather than being disbursed to the defendant States in accordance with the Submerged Lands Act.

Mr. DAVIS stated the above comments constitute his personal and unofficial opinions on the questions touched on and should not be construed as the official opinion of his office. He said if an official opinion is desired, an appropriate request should be directed to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

Mr. DAVIS further advised that the State of Rhode Island has filed a suit in the Supreme Court which is similar to the Alabama suit. He said that Rhode Island is represented by the law firm of Corcoran, Youngman, and Rowe and their arguments were handled by BENJAMIN COHEN. He also stated that ADRIAN FISHER is apparently out of the Alabama case since the Alabama arguments were handled by Attorney  of the law firm of Fowler, Leva, Hawes, and Symington, 1701 K Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

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JAMES H. ROWE, Jr., a member of the law firm of Corcoran, Youngman, and Rowe, 1016 Investment Building, was interviewed by Special Agent BERNETH T. DELAVIGNE and the writer on March 4, 1954. Mr. ROWE advised that he and THOMAS CORCORAN were friends of Senator LISTER HILL, of Alabama, who was interested in legislation which would provide that the Federal government set aside income derived from leases from tidelands oil to be used for educational purposes. He said they had conferred with the Senator from time to time about this legislation, and when the Submerged Lands Act was passed in May 1953, a rather large number of attorneys felt that the law was unconstitutional and a "giveaway." He said Attorney Generals from several states, including Alabama and Rhode Island, came to Washington in the summer of 1953 and held meetings as to what course to follow in attempting to have the Submerged Lands Act declared unconstitutional. He said that it is his recollection that Senator HILL put the Attorney General of Alabama, SI GARRETT, in touch with him and Mr. CORCORAN, and they had several discussions with GARRETT although most of their contacts were with GARRETT's assistant, M. ROLAND NACHMAN, Jr.,

Mr. ROWE stated it was decided that the first action to be taken was for the State of Alabama to file a suit in the Supreme Court. In their considerations as to which attorney should represent Alabama in Washington, ADRIAN S. FISHER was selected. ROWE stated he had known FISHER in 1946 when they both participated in the Nuremberg Trials. He said one of the considerations in selecting FISHER was that he was in the law firm of Covington and Burling and they had the thought in mind that the actual arguments before the Supreme Court would be made by DEAN ACHESON, who, before becoming Secretary of State, had a nation-wide reputation among attorneys as an advocate before the Supreme Court. ROWE stated his own firm is representing Rhode Island in the suit filed subsequent to the Alabama suit. He remarked that Mr. CORCORAN is a native of Rhode Island and is personally acquainted with Rhode Island Attorney General POWERS.

Mr. ROWE stated his own firm has no fee arrangement with Covington and Furling, his firm has received no fees from the States of Alabama and Rhode Island or any individuals or groups of individuals, and his firm has no present anticipation of receiving any fees or monetary benefits in any form for the work performed by them in the Rhode Island and Alabama cases. He said he is certain in his own mind that Covington and Furling were likewise performing the legal service without compensation. He said at the present time he represents only the State of Rhode Island but he indicated strongly that his firm may in the future act as attorney for other states or possibly individuals or groups of individuals in connection with efforts to have the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 declared unconstitutional. He indicated they did not intend to cease their efforts along this line in the event the Alabama and Rhode Island cases are unsuccessful. He further stated their efforts are in the nature of a public service and are being made without compensation because of their belief in the unconstitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act. In this connection he exhibited a clipping from an unidentified newspaper reflecting that Attorney General POWERS of Rhode Island announced that the Rhode Island suit in the Supreme Court was to be handled by the firm of Corcoran, Youngman, and Rowe without charge.

Mr. ROWE stated he considered the investigation of FISHER during the pendency of the Alabama case an outrage. He said the Department of Justice should have at least waited until court proceedings were completed before investigating FISHER and embarrassing him by the investigation. He said when FISHER learned of the investigation, he decided his value to the case was impaired and he, therefore, withdrew. On this basis he said the case is now being handled by [redacted] who, he understands, is a native of Alabama. He said he is confident that [redacted] is also handling the case as a public service and without compensation. He stated LEVA argued the Alabama case before the Supreme Court while the Rhode Island case was argued by BENJAMIN COHEN.

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ADRIAN S. FISHER was contacted on March 4, 1954, by Special Agent KENNETH L. DELAVIGNE and the writer. He advised that he is an associate in the law firm of Covington and Eurling and as a matter of policy he thought it best that he consult with the senior member of the firm, Mr. NEWELL ELLISON, to see whether the matter should be discussed. He said Mr. ELLISON was out of the city and would probably return the next day.

On March 5, 1954, Mr. NEWELL ELLISON was interviewed by Special Agent DELAVIGNE and the writer. Mr. ELLISON advised that neither the firm of Covington and Eurling nor its agents, partners, associates, or employees have received any compensation with respect to participation in the Alabama case. He advised that ADRIAN S. FISHER is an associate of the firm employed on a salary basis and does not share in fees received in individual cases.

Mr. ELLISON stated that when the firm first took the Alabama case in about July 1953, it was expected that the firm would receive a fee although they had no discussions with representatives of the State of Alabama respecting fees or compensation. He said he assumed their fee would be on the modest side because he did not think the State of Alabama would be in a position to pay a large fee. He advised that in the middle of September 1953, Mr. NACHMAN, who worked with Mr. FISHER on the case, had a conversation with Mr. FISHER and told him that Alabama was not in a position to pay anything to Covington and Eurling for handling the case. Since their work was substantially completed and the motion and brief were almost ready to be sent to the printer, it was agreed that Covington and Eurling would complete the case without a fee. Mr. ELLIS said the firm has no agreements in writing with Alabama pertaining to fees except the understandings set forth in the letter dated September 18, 1953, from NACHMAN to GARRETT, the letter dated September 18, 1953, from FISHER to GARRETT, and the letter dated September 21, 1953, from GARRETT to Covington and Eurling, attention of Mr. FISHER. He said that he has been advised that Mr. GARRETT has exhibited these letters to an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation but declined

WFO 46-3116

to furnish copies of the letters. Mr. ELLISON read them to Agents but declined to furnish copies or allow them to be copied. It was noted that Assistant Attorney General WACHMAN, in his letter dated September 18, 1953, advised Attorney General GARRETT that Covington and Burling had agreed to act as Special Counsel for Alabama in the suit involving the Submerged Lands Act, and had agreed to do so without compensation. Mr. FISHER's letter to GARRETT dated September 18, 1953, stated that the firm of Covington and Burling would represent Alabama in the same matter but made no mention of fees. Mr. GARRETT's letter dated September 21, 1953, to Covington and Burling appointed the firm as Special Counsel to represent Alabama in the suit, but made no mention of fees.

Mr. ELLISON advised that his firm and the individuals in it have represented no one in this matter except the State of Alabama and did not anticipate representing anyone else who might seek to intervene as a party plaintiff in the Alabama or Rhode Island cases. He further advised that his firm has no agreement, whatsoever, with the firm of Corcoran, Youngman, and Rowe with respect to fees in connection with the Alabama and Rhode Island cases.

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ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

LEADS

MOBILE (INFORMATION)

A copy of this report has been designated for the Mobile Division for information. Investigation has been conducted by that office and additional investigation might possibly be requested.

THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.:

Will conduct any other investigation requested by the Bureau.

REFERENCE: Bureau letter dated February 18, 1954.  
Report of Special Agent HAROLD H. HAIR dated January 5, 1954, at Washington, D. C.  
Report of Special Agent SPENCER H. ROBE dated March 2, 1954, at Mobile, Alabama.



Assistant Attorney General  
Warren Olney III

May 6, 1954

Director, FBI (46-20919)

ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, WITH ALIAS,  
FORMER LEGAL ADVISER, STATE DEPARTMENT  
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -  
CONFLICT OF INTEREST  
(Your file 51-16-369, WO:LFR:gmk)

Reference is made to our memorandum dated March 11,  
1954.

It would be appreciated if you would inform the Bureau  
at an early date as to what further action your division contemplates  
taking in this matter.

cc: 1-Washington Field Office (46-3116)

AM:dej

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Assistant Attorney General  
Warren Olney III

June 11, 1954

Director, FBI (46-20919)


ADRIAN SANFORD FISHER, WITH ALIAS,  
FORMER LEGAL ADVISER, STATE DEPARTMENT  
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -  
CONFLICT OF INTEREST  
(Your file 51-16-369, WO:LFR:gmk)

Reference is made to our memoranda of March 11  
and May 6, 1954.

Your early advice would be appreciated as to whether  
a decision has been reached by your division regarding this  
matter.

WAH:dem:mjp

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# Acheson Once Called Pro-Red

By HOWARD RUSHMORE

Accused of being head of the pro-Russian bloc in the State Department, Dean Acheson, new Secretary of State, also has been blasted by Russian publications for his attacks on Stalin.

The 55-year-old Harvard Law School graduate served throughout World War II as Assistant Secretary of State under Cordell Hull. He became Undersecretary in 1945. He held this post until his resignation July 1, 1947, was accepted with "great regret" by President Truman.

During the early period of his six-year service in the State Department, he was accused of heading a "clique" of Harvard graduates who demanded appeasement of Russia at any price.

Adolf A. Berle Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State, testified last year before the House Un-American Activities Committee that Acheson was among the department heads who espoused a "pro-Russian point of view."

One of the "Harvard crowd" who worked closely with Acheson, Berle charged, was Alger Hiss. Hiss, named as a Communist by

Whittaker Chambers, former courier for a Communist spy ring within the New Deal, was indicted here last month by a Federal grand jury on two counts of perjury.

In December, 1945, Acheson denied that the State Department refused to permit the FBI to arrest Arthur Adams and other members of a Soviet spy ring set up to steal atomic secrets in this country.

The New York Journal-American in its exclusive story on this spy ring, said that the State Department would not allow the arrests for fear of antagonizing Stalin.

However, Acheson became more anti-Russian during his last year in office, supported the Marshall plan, and condemned Communist efforts to expand in the Balkans and Western Europe.

In June, 1947, Pravda, official Russian organ, accused Acheson of "gross and rude slanders against the Soviet Union" after Acheson, in his final speech, criticized the Reds for retarding world recovery by their actions.

After he retired, Acheson resumed his law practice here and in Washington. The latter office

has figured twice in the news, the first time in 1947 when Rep. Shafer (R.-Mich.) accused Acheson of still being a member of a law firm engaged in foreign loans. Shafer accused Acheson of personal profit-taking.

According to Shafer, Acheson's name still appeared in January, 1947, on the door of the Washington law firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb.

Acheson stated he had severed connections with the firm when he entered the State Department in 1941.

This firm, according to Shafer, was engaged in swinging a huge loan for pro-Soviet Poland with legal fees allegedly amounting to \$1,000,000 involved.

Foreign loans were in Acheson's purview, as Undersecretary of State, Shafer charged.

Donald Hiss, brother of Alger, also was a member of the Acheson firm. The New York Journal-American revealed Donald Hiss was representing the Soviet-controlled Polish government in negotiations for a loan from the United States.

- Mr. Tolson .....
- Mr. Clegg .....
- Mr. Glavin .....
- Mr. Ladd .....
- Mr. Nichols .....
- Mr. Rosen .....
- Mr. Tracy .....
- Mr. Egan .....
- Mr. Gurnea .....
- Mr. Harbo .....
- Mr. Mohr .....
- Mr. Pennington .....
- Mr. Quinn Tamm .....
- Mr. Nease .....
- Miss Gandy .....

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 N. Y. Journal American  
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

More Blunt Talk Laid to Acheson

By Jack Anderson

FORMER SECRETARY of State Dean Acheson, as impeccable a diplomat as ever polished a phrase, has been flinging some unpolished prose at countries whose sensibilities no longer concern him.

He starchily told a group of Yale and Smith students the other day that England is "a second-class country," that Indian Prime Minister Nehru is "a pious old fraud" and that Brazilians are lazy and incapable of self government.

Acheson's remarks were supposed to be strictly off the record. However, here are excerpts that have leaked out:

On England—"England is nothing more than a second-class country. If you want to see the most empty display of military might in the world, go see the changing of the guards in London. They look as if they are about to defeat the entire Russian army when in reality they are a bunch of men in silly-looking costumes."

On India—"Let's face it, Nehru is a pious old fraud. It was a good event when the Communists invaded India, because this let the world know that Nehru didn't have the power or potential to do anything."

On Latin America—"All you have is one large conglomeration of weak and unstable countries. In Brazil, for example, the people are simply unenergetic. They also are not capable or competent enough to deal with the problems of self government."

Acheson had a good word only for West Germany.

"I believe the single most important country in Europe is Germany," he said, "and we should treat her like a 51st state. We should consult her on every move we make."

His parting advice: "We should stop worrying what other people think of the United States, and stop acting as if there is a presidential election being waged among the uncommitted nations of the world and we are running for the post."

Still a power behind the diplomatic scenes, Acheson has been consulted by President Kennedy and is a close confidant of Kennedy's chief foreign affairs adviser, McGeorge Bundy. This puts all the more bite into Acheson's comments.

Chinese Stir Trouble

THE OPTIMISM that followed the test-ban treaty with Soviet Russia has now given way to sober second thoughts about the other great Communist challenge: the menace of Red China.

From every Chinese pressure point, intelligence reports tell of ominous new military activity.

Mao Tse-tung's minions are waylaying GIs in South Korea, prodding the Pathet Lao into action in Laos, stepping up their agitation in South Viet-Nam. They also are massing ominously on the borders of India, Burma, and Thailand.

Though little has been said about it, Mao has been building a network of roads that point like daggers at all these targets. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese are engaged in this toil. Night and day, with muscle alone, they are hacking their way through jungles and over mountains. The old Burma road, famous in World War II, has been completely refurbished.

Elsewhere around the world, Mao's agents are working like hornets in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, where he has already eclipsed Soviet Premier Khrushchev as the arch-apostle of revolution.

His investment in trouble-

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Callahan
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Evans
Gale
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Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

Mr. Wannall

Mr. Branigan

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The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer
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making is modest. He offers little more than pamphlets on guerrilla tactics, sometimes sends "technicians" to the more promising trouble spots.

Those who have studied Mao's tactics, however, believe he will avoid an open confrontation with the United States. Though he jeers at the United States as a "paper tiger," he has always taken care to step back when the tiger bares its teeth.

IT IS ALSO possible that China and Russia now will be diverting more of their energies to fighting each other. The facts of geography, for instance, make China more a threat to Russia than to the West.

Both countries reportedly have shifted troops to patrol their common borders. And

Chinese students have taken to calling such Siberian cities as Vladivostok and Blagoveshensk by their old Chinese names.

The Chinese propaganda apparatus also appears intent on destroying the image of the Soviet Union with the same thoroughness that it has assailed the United States for the past 12 years.

At home, Mao is still plagued by the hunger of his people, the backwardness of his industry. The sudden recall of 10,000 Russian technicians, who walked out with all their blueprints, has hamstrung many of his programs.

He also fears revolts in Mongolia and Sinkiang, where the sturdy warrior nomads are restive under his rule.

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Central Research Section

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
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# 1950 Soviet War Scare Disclosed by Acheson

Former Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson yesterday told the story of a 45-minute war scare in 1950 when Soviet bombers were believed approaching the United States.

Asked at the National Strategy Seminar at Fort McNair in what circumstances the United States might attack an enemy first, Mr. Acheson said one "can hardly picture such a situation." There would have to be "almost complete certainty" the United States would be under attack, he added.

This is an experience "one has to live through," he observed, and recalled this story:

In 1950 British Prime Minister Attlee was staying at the

British Embassy while visiting President Truman.

At 9:45 a.m. Robert Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, telephoned Mr. Acheson. At the President's direction, Mr. Lovett said, he was asking Mr. Acheson to tell Mr. Attlee that Russian planes were approaching Canada and all American planes had been alerted. Those in Canada were ready to take off or already in the air. Mr. Lovett told Mr. Acheson he could say no more and would not have time to communicate with Mr. Acheson again for some time. The conversation ended there.

Mr. Acheson then telephoned the British Embassy and got British Ambassador Sir Oliver

Frank, who "was completely imperturbable."

"Oh, you don't say," Sir Oliver exclaimed.

"Yes, Oliver, I do," Mr. Acheson replied.

There was a short conversation about whether American Secretary of State to British Ambassador was a proper channel.

Then Sir Oliver said: "We shall see. I'll meet you at the White House at 10:30 (for a previously scheduled appointment with the President). Perhaps we will know then."

He then went to President Truman's White House office, where he learned that the war scare had been caused by "an atmospheric thing."

Secretary Acheson's moral of the story was that "it never occurred to Mr. Truman to send SAC (the Strategic Air Command with its bombers) over Russia."

*Handwritten notes:*  
K  
W. Acheson

*Handwritten initials:* WFB

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- Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
- The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
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- New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_
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# Rights Declarations Discounted by Acheson

By EARL H. VOSS  
 Star Staff Writer

WILLIAMSBURG, Va., May 15.—Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared today that human rights declarations might be considered "pernicious abstractions" because "by pretending, they deceive."

Noting that more than 50 nations have accepted the United Nations universal declaration of human rights and 77 countries have constitutional guarantees of natural rights, Mr. Acheson said individuals' rights have nevertheless failed "to become more secure and more respected as their verbal glorification has spread."

## Opens Independence Fete

He spoke today at colorful ceremonies opening the "Prelude to Independence" celebration at the Colonial capitol here. The period commemorated is from May 15, 1776, when Virginia's House of Burgesses declared its independence from the British Crown, to July 4 of that year, when the Continental Congress proclaimed all 13 colonies' freedom.

Mr. Acheson, the principal adviser to the Democratic Party on foreign affairs, also claimed his party had produced a greater social and economic revolution than the founding fathers.

## Preserving Old Rights

George Mason and Thomas Jefferson, authors of the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the Declaration of Independence, "were stating nothing new," Secretary Acheson said. "They were preserving old rights, not asserting new ones."

He continued: "The social and economic changes which, consciously or unconsciously, were being sought were not so great, I venture to say, conscious of my recklessness, as those

which led the American people in November, 1932, to turn from the hope of salvation by faith to the doctrine of salvation by works."

He was referring to the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt over Herbert Hoover and the birth of the New Deal.

Mr. Acheson, now a prominent Washington lawyer, read a scholarly analysis of the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia declaration of rights before a throng of distinguished guests at the Capitol Square.

## Red System Negates Rights

Further discounting formal human rights declaration, Secretary Acheson noted that "all the Communist peoples' republics, except China," list them in their basic law guarantees.

"The Reds' rights," he said, "on paper are more extensive than ours. For instance, they guarantee the natural right to family, health and motherhood which does not appear in the basic law of the United States or the countries of the British Commonwealth, except India, which is losing enthusiasm for motherhood."

But in the Communist system, Mr. Acheson pointed out, the human rights are negated by the overriding central power.

"Perhaps we are less conscious of the diffusion of power in our society until we compare ourselves with a Communist state," he said. "It is not merely the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, but the separation of the government and the sovereign, the official and the voter."

"The idea that the voter can turn out the government and install another is held in a comparatively small part of the world and is a tremendous limitation upon power. One has to experience it to realize just how great it is," Mr. Acheson observed.

*file*

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
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 W. Acheson  
 S. Blumenthal  
 J. M. [unclear]

- The Washington Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
- The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
- The Evening Star A-6
- New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_
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'POWER AND DIPLOMACY'

# Acheson Calls Dulles One of Worst Secretaries

By R. H. JACKSON Scripps-Howard Staff Writer  
Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles are about as friendly as a couple of scorpions in a bottle.

### SUEZ CRISIS

Mr. Acheson cites the Suez crisis as an example of British-French folly compounded by folly of the United States. He has no comment on Israel's role in that debacle. He accuses the British of being deceitful and the French of being only selfishly interested in their North African position. But for the United States he reserves the most severe indictment:

"There is hardly a more lethal blow to any alliance than to have one ally join the enemies of other allies"—a reference to the Russians and the Americans voting together against Britain and France on Suez.

Mr. Acheson makes claim that the Dulles formula of relying primarily upon "massive retaliation" at places of our own choosing, regardless of the location of the aggression, is nonsense.

First, Mr. Acheson said, we must not be inhibited in our military policy by the words of the UN Charter which do not inhibit our enemies—witness Korea and Hungary.

But he stressed we must be well prepared for all kinds of military action—"discussion must contemplate a wide range of violence—at one end, the destruction which one nuclear power may hurl at

another; then, the sort of hard and bitter fighting which occurred in Korea; finally, the force which might be used to deny our shipping the use of the Suez Canal. All of this is force which we should be in a position to better, or, if it is not deterred, to overcome."

Mr. Acheson believes we are not equipped physically or psychologically for this wide range.

### IDEAS

The book is not in any sense just a critique of Secretary Dulles. Much of it is devoted to carefully thought out and, at times, provocative ideas on power in the world today, the military requirements of a free world, the world, the need for more effective American leadership. But interwoven in it is subtle condemnation of Mr. Dulles.

"Perhaps what we do is less important than how we do it," Mr. Acheson says at one point. He is most critical of how Mr. Dulles does it—particularly the Secretary's penchant for what critics call his moralizing.

### INDICTMENT

Probably the sharpest indictment of Mr. Dulles pinned Mr. Acheson saved for his last paragraph. He denies claiming superior knowledge or wisdom in these difficult problems, or impatience with error, ignorance or limited outlook. These may destroy us, he concedes, but they are the normal frailties of man. But then he concludes:

"On one thing only I feel a measure of assurance—on the rightness of contempt for sanctimonious self-righteousness which, joined with a sly worldliness, beclouds the dangers and opportunities of our time with an unctuous film. For this is the ultimate sin."

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- Clayton
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy



MR. ACHESON

*Frankfort*  
*file*

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- Wash. News
- Wash. Star
- N. Y. Herald Tribune
- N. Y. Journal-American
- N. Y. Mirror
- N. Y. Daily News
- N. Y. Times
- Daily Worker
- The Worker
- New Leader

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# Today in World Affairs

## Acheson Article Is Seen As Hurting Foreign Policy

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, April 25.—Dean Acheson—the man who was responsible primarily for preventing Gen. MacArthur from bombing enemy bases in Manchuria—and thereby winning victory in the Korean War—now has begun to lecture President Eisenhower and to call him a “pacifist.”

In a cynical and sarcastic denunciation of “moral force” and a broadside attack on the United Nations, the former Secretary of State in the Truman administration has written a curious article for “Reporter” magazine which can do considerable damage to American policy abroad in these critical times.

### Accuses Own Government

Mr. Acheson today enjoys the doubtful distinction of being the first American Secretary of State in history to accuse his own government of “selfish ambitions” in another part of the world. He says this, too, in the face of a record of many decades of unselfishness by the United States in World Affairs. Mr. Acheson in commenting on the Middle Eastern situation wrote:

“President Eisenhower told us on Feb. 20 that ‘the United States has no selfish ambitions or desires in this region.’ I fear we must disagree. We have many.”

If Mr. Acheson had said merely that the United States has a deep interest in the Middle East it would have been understandable but to attribute “selfish ambitions” to the United States is to ascribe a mischievous motive to his own government. Undoubtedly the Communists will construe “ambitions” to mean territorial ambitions and will repeat it in their propaganda in the Middle East.

### Shows Greater act

What Mr. Acheson said later on about the “desires” of the United States in the Middle East is much more tactful. He wrote: “Perhaps our greatest interest and desire is that the Middle East shall remain in the political and economic system of a free world and shall not be engulfed by the closed Soviet-Communist system.”

“We desire, too, that it remain in such relationship with the rest of the free world that the fuel and sea routes essential to that world shall not be ruinously expensive, uncertain or hazardous. Should this be done, Europe might have to make such terms as it could. These might well be most unfavorable to the United States.”

But it is one thing for America to express broad “desires” for a peaceful world and quite another thing to harbor “selfish ambitions” as Mr. Acheson phrased it.



Lawrence

### His ‘Moral Force’ Stand

It is at the term “moral force,” however, that the former Secretary aims his shafts of ridicule and derision. Mr. Acheson says:

Mr. Eisenhower at the outset of his political career sought for and found a satisfyingly firm stance in what he has continually referred to as ‘moral and spiritual values.’ . . . an ebullient optimism gives expression in what Mr. Eisenhower has called man’s ‘God-given ability to be master of his own destin.’ . . .

“This belief in the supremacy and sole validity of moral power is reinforced by the profoundly pacifist conclusions that President Eisenhower has drawn from the development of Russian capacity for nuclear warfare might well be catastrophic beyond imagination, it is an easy step to the conclusion that

all force is immoral and that its use can only be justified to meet a greater immorality—some one else’s use of force against one’s own country.

“Now it would be quite a valid conclusion that the deterrence of nuclear warfare is one of the highest objectives of policy. But we must never forget that between an opponent who is prepared to use force to gain his end and one who is not prepared to use force to defend his interests—the former is usually the winner.”

### Record Backs President

One wonders by what stretch of the imagination Mr. Acheson can attribute pacifism to President Eisenhower who in 1955 sought and obtained from Congress authority to use force to defend Formosa and who in 1957 sought and obtained from Congress a resolution proclaiming that the United States is “prepared to use force” in the Middle East. There is certainly nothing in the record to indicate that the President “is not prepared to use

military force” to defend American interests when necessary.

Mr. Acheson incidentally will offend some of his worshippers in Britain and France because he says they were absolutely wrong in their action in Suez last October. He berates them for an “ill planned” and “weakly mounted” intervention. What is surprising, however, is that Mr. Acheson never seems to have read that the President denounced the use of force by the Soviets in Hungary. He intimates that the President condoned the use of force there by the Soviets.

### Favored a War

Not so long ago he was condemning Secretary Dulles for using phrases that the former Secretary interpreted as meaning liberation of satellite countries by force. Now he implies America should have favored a war with Russia over Hungary.

Mr. Acheson says, moreover, that he does not believe that “the purpose of American policy is to carry out a ‘crusade’ or ‘mission’ to bring about equal justice or to ‘vindicate’ international law.” Many people will be surprised at this any many other comments by Mr. Acheson in the same article.

Americans have not forgotten that had Mr. Acheson been as meticulous in his adherence to military force in his historic speech of January 1950 when—as was charged in Senate debates so often—he “invited” the Communists to invade Korea, the whole war in the Far East in June 1950 might never have happened and the lives of many American boys would have been spared.

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- N. Y. Herald Tribune 17
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Mr. Tolson ✓  
 Mr. Boardman ✓  
 Mr. Nichols ✓  
 Mr. Belmont ✓  
 Mr. Harbo ✓  
 Mr. Mohr ✓  
 Mr. Parsons ✓  
 Mr. Rosen ✓  
 Mr. Tamm ✓  
 Mr. Sizoo ✓  
 Mr. Winterrowd ✓  
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 Mr. Holloman ✓  
 Miss Gandy ✓

# Acheson Attacks GOP 'Indecision'

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (INS)—Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson predicted today that Republican "weakness and indecision" in administering American foreign policy would be a major issue in the 1956 presidential campaign.

In a filmed television interview, Acheson accused the Republican Administration of bringing:

1. "Weakness and division into the western camp."
2. "Weakness in our own military strength."
3. "Weakness in our unity with our allies."

"What the Republicans say they are doing is what the Democrats actually did," he said. "The difference is not in the words but in the action."

"I think the issue will turn upon the weakness, the false starts and stops which the Republicans have engaged in, in carrying out their policy."

Acheson, now practicing law in Washington, appeared on NBC-TV's "Today" program to mark the publication of his book, "A Democrat Looks at His Party."

In a question-and-answer exchange with master of ceremonies Dave Garroway, Acheson said:

- The Republicans were afraid of new ideas whereas the Democrats had achieved a "flexibility and freshness" through a willingness to experiment.

- The great hunt for subversives under the Government security program was "both wrong and foolish" since the Nation's real danger stems not from subversion, but from sabotage and espionage.

- Friendliness never would take the place of power or ideas in negotiating with the Russians.

"I think the Republican Party regards conventionality of thought much more highly than originality of thought," Acheson said. "And that's because I think they're afraid of

new ideas. They're more attracted to what they regard as the tried and true method."

The Democrats, he said, had been able to keep their "feet on the ground" while realizing that future problems would be different from those of the past.

"I feel more and more convinced that old methods will not solve new problems," he said.

Concerning a "workable" Government security program, the former Secretary said he felt strongly about "the evil which we have brought on ourselves by following a course which is both wrong and foolish." He added:

"What we have done . . . is try to police the thought, the minds, the associates of our 12 million people who are employed in Government and in private industry. This is destructive of the freedom of the American people. It is destructive of an effective check upon espionage and sabotage."

"What we must do is to watch with a professional counter-intelligence staff that small number of people from whom we may expect danger—and, as to the rest, let them go free the way they were created and the way they are supposed to be under our laws and our Constitution."

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# Acheson Tells State Employees They Are Entitled to Work Free From Slander and Charges of Disloyalty

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By the Associated Press  
 Dean Acheson told a cheering throng of State Department employes yesterday that they were entitled to work free from slander and charges of disloyalty.

The retiring Secretary of State said goodbye to several thousand employes and officials at an outdoor ceremony. He was presented with the White House chair he occupied as a member of President Truman's Cabinet.

The employes came to the ceremony from a score of State

Department buildings scattered throughout downtown Washington. They assembled in the triangular park across 21st st. from the new State Department building.

Acheson said in his farewell speech:

"You are entitled to ask that you should not be vilified; that your loyalty should not be brought in doubt and that slanders and libel should not be made against you.

"All of us are aware that in the times in which we live there

is a security problem before our country. We know that it is a problem which must be dealt with wisely and justly and quietly by people who are expert in dealing with it. It cannot be made the mere adjunct of something of which it is not a part.

"And I believe that the difficulties through which you have been will be temporary difficulties because they are not true to the great traditions of American life."

His remarks obviously were aimed at Congressional charges that communism had infiltrated the State Department.

After turning over direction of the Department to John Foster Dulles on Tuesday, Acheson and his wife plan to take a two-month vacation as guests of Archibald MacLeish, poet and former Librarian of Congress, at his home on Antigua, an island in the West Indies.

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- Times-Herald \_\_\_\_\_
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# 'THE PATTERN OF RESPONSIBILITY' DEFENDS BLOODY RECORD OF DEAN ACHESON

**THE PATTERN OF RESPONSIBILITY.** From the Record of Dean Acheson. Edited by McGeorge Bundy. With an introduction by Douglas Southall Freeman. Houghton Mifflin. Boston. \$4.

By ROBERT FRIEDMAN

The Pattern of Responsibility is a defense of a Democratic Party aristocrat, Dean Acheson, compiled by a GOP. aristocrat, McGeorge Bundy.

To complete the little ruling class, circle, Douglas Southall Freeman, official eulogist-historian of the Southern slavocracy, has provided an introduction which also pays tribute to Mr. Acheson and his works.

The main purpose of this book is to try to 'lift' the bipartisan foreign policy above the factional conflicts of this election year and to convince sober members of the bourgeoisie that the Acheson handling of foreign affairs has been wholly in their class interests, even if the Secretary of State is serving a Democratic or 'Fair Deal' administration.

The method the Republican, Bundy, has chosen, for his defense, is to plead not guilty to the tongue-in-cheek charge of the McCarthyite Republicans that Acheson's State Department has been 'soft' on the Communists everywhere in the world.

That it should seriously be considered necessary to 'defend' Wall Street's Acheson against the charge of pro-communism is a measure of the irrational hysteria in this country which Acheson's own boss, President Truman, has so assiduously spread via the loyalty program and the Smith and McCarran Act prosecutions.

The Pattern of Responsibility sets out to prove the wisdom and success of Acheson's foreign policy. Mr. Bundy does this by quoting extensively from Acheson's writings, speeches and official pronouncements. Forming the connective tissue for this diplomatic bag of bones is a series of interpolations by Bundy in which, in effect, he saga-

ciously keeps saying of the Secretary: How right he was!

It was necessary to write this kind of book, and this kind of book only. For no writer pretending to any seriousness and candor could catalogue the results of the Truman-Acheson policies without revealing an unbroken series of crimes, from Greece to Korea, which have bared before the whole world the sham of Washington propaganda.

To Mr. Bundy, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic treaty, the Korean intervention, the Washington role in Iran and Egypt are an unbroken series of triumphs.

But even the pro-war newspapers in this country have been forced repeatedly to admit that the Marshall Plan has solved no West European problems, nor has it succeeded in its prime task of crushing the Communist and labor movements of France and Italy; that the Marshall Plan has created a harvest of hate for Wall Street throughout Europe; that the destruction of Korea has created a revulsion of disgust the world over and has heightened the people's determination to avoid similar 'liberation' by courtesy of the Pentagon's bombers; that Acheson's policies in Iran and Indo-China, Malaya and Egypt have shown the world a government openly defending the imperialist status quo.

Only in the case of Franco fascism does Bundy show any qualms about an all-out defense of Acheson: So he weasels his way through a sentence which explains that "...there was still no thought of partnership with Franco; there was still American pressure for a change in his regime."

This characteristically dishonest word-juggling (Chiang isn't a partner either, he's a fascist stooge, too) ignores what the world knows, that Wall Street has underwritten Franco's regime, and that instead of pressing for "change," Washington's policy means putting guns in Franco's hands to prevent

any democratic revolt.

Bundy claims that Acheson must be disassociated from the extremists who want a shooting war with Russia, because "Acheson has consistently maintained that in the long run the Communist and non-Communist worlds may be able to live together in the same world, without war." But here as in every other case, Bundy does not test the word against the deed, or even against other words. He forgets that George Kennan, Acheson's top aide in the State Department, and ambassador-designate to Moscow, formulated the official "containment" policy on the Soviet Union, and the subsequent line that the prerequisite for world peace is the counter-revolutionary restoration of capitalism in Russia. Or that President Truman and other Washington officials have repeatedly insisted that agreements with the Soviet Union are "worthless" and that negotiations are "useless"—worthless and useless that is as long as the socialist state is in existence. Or that Acheson's State Department is behind the notorious Mutual Security Act to finance sabotage and subversion inside the Soviet Union.

No, such sordid realities do not intrude into the world of McGeorge Bundy. To the pure Mr. Bundy, there are no American oil companies lustful for profit out of the oppressed Iranian oil workers; there are no Wall Street sharpshooters edging their British cousins out of the drivers' seat in India and in one exploited colonial area after another.

No, in the mystical language which scholarly servants of capitalism use to veil the nasty facts of life, Mr. Bundy concludes with the exalted view that Acheson's "central faith" is that of "Christianity, patriotism and freedom."

News Item: Net working capital of corporations increased by \$200,000,000 during the third quarter of 1951 to a total of \$79,200,000,000, the Securities & Exchange Commission reported today (Jan. 17).

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(STASSEN)

HAROLD E. STASSEN JUMPED BACK INTO THE CHINA POLICY ROW TODAY WITH A STATEMENT SUGGESTING THAT SECRETARY ACHESON DOESN'T REMEMBER OR ISN'T TELLING ALL ABOUT HOW THAT POLICY WAS SETTLED IN 1949.

STASSEN DEMANDED FROM PHILADELPHIA THAT ACHESON CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGE HE (STASSEN) MADE BEFORE A SENATE COMMITTEE ON MONDAY--THAT ACHESON AT A WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE IN 1949 RECOMMENDED CUTTING OFF MILITARY AID TO NATIONALIST CHINA.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID YESTERDAY THAT ACHESON HAS NO RECOLLECTION OF ANY SUCH CONFERENCE AND THAT DEPARTMENT RECORDS GOING BACK THROUGH LATE 1949 DON'T SHOW IT EITHER.

DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN MICHAEL J. MCDERMOTT TOLD REPORTERS TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD GO STILL FARTHER BACK INTO THE RECORDS, TO DETERMINE THE TRUTH, IN VIEW OF STASSEN'S LATEST BLAST.

"WE WANT TO BE COMPLETELY HONEST WITH MR. STASSEN," MCDERMOTT SAID, "AND WHATEVER THE FACTS ARE, THEY WILL BE REVEALED."

STASSEN SAID HE GOT HIS INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING LAST NOVEMBER FROM THE LATE SEN. ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, R., MICH., WHO HE SAID WAS ONE OF THE CONFEREES.

VANDENBERG'S SON IN NEW YORK WAS ASKED WHETHER HIS FATHER'S MEMOIRS MADE ANY MENTION OF STASSEN'S MEETING WITH THE SENATOR. YOUNG VANDENBERG DECLINED TO COMMENT IMMEDIATELY.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO STASSEN YESTERDAY SAID ACHESON NEVER RECOMMENDED CUTTING OFF ECONOMIC AID TO NATIONALIST CHINA AND THAT THE DECISION NOT TO SEND AMERICAN TROOPS OR ADVISERS TO FORMOSA WAS MADE BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT, HOWEVER, DID NOT GO INTO THE QUESTION OF WHO RECOMMENDED CUTTING OFF ARMS AID TO THE NATIONALISTS--A STEP WHICH PRESIDENT TRUMAN TOOK IN JANUARY, 1950.

THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED AT THAT TIME THAT NO FURTHER MILITARY HELP WOULD BE SENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S NATIONALIST FORCES ON FORMOSA, ALTHOUGH HE SAID ARMS ALREADY PROMISED TO CHIANG WOULD BE DELIVERED.

AMERICAN ARMS AID TO CHIANG WAS RESUMED AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR LAST YEAR.

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# The Washington Merry-Go-Round

## 'Capt.' Truman, Meet 'Maj.' Attlee

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- Ladd ✓
- Clegg
- Glavin
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- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont ✓
- Mohr
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- Gandy

**By Drew Pearson**  
 The press of the world speculated last week about what President Truman was saying to Prime Minister Attlee during a highly secret stag dinner at the British Embassy.



The dinner lasted until 12:15 a. m.—unusually late for Truman to be out. At the dinner were some of the most important British-American advisers—Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, Secretary of Treasury Snyder, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Field Marshall Sir William Slim, Lord Tedder, Sir Roger Makins and Averell Harriman, special adviser to the White House.

After the dinner was over, those present greeted newspapermen with a blunt "no comment." However, here is what actually happened behind the sacrosanct doors of the British Embassy.

"Capt." Harry Truman, once of the United States Field Artillery, and "Maj." Clement Attlee, once of His Majesty's Infantry, spent most of the evening swapping stories about World War I. Truman served in the Missouri National Guard which was active in the campaign of the Vosges Mountains. Attlee enlisted in the British Army, was wounded at Gallipoli, reenlisted and came out with the rank of major.

Despite the presence of the top-ranking generals in the British and American Army, "Captain" Truman and "Major" Attlee devoted part of their time to cussing out generals.

### War on Acheson

Here is some of the closed-door Republican debate when GOP policy-makers haggled over the question of a formal resolution to remove Dean Acheson as Secretary of State.

Taft argued that any formal Republican statement should deal with policy not personalities. Millikin also doubted the wisdom of putting the Republican Party on record against Acheson; while even Wherry, who has never hesitated to raise his voice against the Secretary of State, preferred to keep hands off a formal resolution.

"Everybody knows how I feel," the Nebraskan shrugged. "If a resolution comes out with my blessing, it will hurt rather than help it."

Senator Ives of New York, who read the text of a proposed resolution, drew sharp attack in regard to one paragraph of his statement.

"We are compelled to point out," Ives read, "That unless this change in Administration personnel which we here recommend is made, our efforts to cooperate must prove futile and national disunity and lack of confidence are likely to increase."

Millikin protested that this was an "implied threat" that Truman must fire Acheson—or else. Taft also criticized the threatening tone, and Ives agreed it should be struck out.

Millikin then remarked that the resolution would probably make President Truman "more determined than ever" to keep Acheson.

"If we have to consider the President's backbone every time we make a decision, we better give up as a party," shot back Ives.

Massachusetts' Senator Leverett Saltonstall objected to the poor timing of the resolution, while President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee were making great policy decisions. A Republican pronouncement against Acheson at this time, warned Saltonstall, might undermine British confidence in the United States.

"Let me say this," retorted Ives. "The confidence of the American people is far more vital to us than the confidence of any other nation."

The New York Senator added that he had high regard for Acheson's intellectual capacity, but deplored his poor judgment. Ives cited Acheson's famous cracks that he would not turn his back on Alger Hiss and his description of Senator Taft as a "re-examinist."

Most rabid at the closed-door meeting was Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa, Senator McCarthy's Little Sir Echo, who not only wanted to purge Acheson but also to revamp the entire State Department.

"Getting rid of Acheson isn't enough," snorted Hickenlooper. "That wouldn't reach the fellows underneath who are responsible for most of Acheson's decisions."

New Jersey's Senator Alex Smith agreed with "Hick" and urged making the resolution bipartisan by soliciting some Democrats who think along the same

### Advice on Korea

Few Congressmen have carried greater weight at the White House in recent years than venerable, white-thatched Adolph Sabath of Illinois, dean of the House of Representatives. Sabath, who will be 84 in April, was a great favorite of Franklin Roosevelt, while Harry Truman has also left the White House door wide open to Sabath any time he wants to call.

It remains to be seen, however, whether Truman will follow the latest advice given him by his old friend.

"Mr. President," advised Congressman Sabath, "I hope everything possible will be done to bring about an adjustment of this war, even if we have to yield a little to restore peace. I get a great many letters from mothers and fathers of boys in the service and they do not want this great loss of life to continue."

Truman replied that while he could not condone the Chinese Communist aggression, he would do everything he could to bring about a settlement of the war. He said he knew how those fathers and mothers felt and he

wanted peace as much as the aid. The President told Sabath that if Russia felt the same way, there would be no war now, and that maybe we could still work it out.

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### Blow To Unity

The most critical aspect of the Republican vote of no confidence in Secretary Acheson is that it comes from a partisan source. It is undoubtedly true that a large segment of the American people would like to see Mr. Acheson replaced. The Republicans in Congress and many non-partisan observers have lost no opportunity to let the President know their attitude, and it is reasonable to assume that the President has been weighing the question of whether a change of leadership in the State Department would do more harm than good. But this in no way excuses the Republicans for making a partisan issue of a matter that is vital to our security at this critical moment.

Of course, the President does not need to take any notice of this minority protest from Capitol Hill. The anti-Acheson resolutions were adopted only by the Republican caucuses of the House and Senate, not by Congress itself. And even if Congress had presumed to urge the dismissal of a Cabinet member, the President would be under no obligation to heed it. The entire executive power is vested in the President, and members of the Cabinet are responsible only to him. Mr. Truman is likely to respond to this pressure much as Lincoln did when congressional critics demanded the resignation of Secretary of State Seward during the Civil War.

In many respects the campaign against Seward is comparable to that against Mr. Acheson. Seward was resisting the demands of the extremists in Congress for immediate abolition of slavery and a purge of all Democratic generals from the Army. For this he was denounced as "the evil genius" of the Administration—"the mesmerist" and the "unseen hand" who was preventing the President from doing his "duty." When a group of New York Republicans waited on Lincoln to demand Seward's dismissal, he told them fitly: "There is not one of you who would not see the country ruined if you could turn out Seward."

In December, 1862, shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg, the Republican Senators met secretly and adopted a resolution calling for "partial reconstruction of the Cabinet." But instead of broadcasting their lack of confidence in the Secretary of State at a critical moment, a committee went to the White House to present the senatorial view to the President. Learning the nature of the mission, Seward hastily sent his resignation to Lincoln, but, after a skillful maneuver that brought in also the resignation of Secretary of the Treasury Chase, a favorite of the Senators, the President declined to accept either of them. Seward's critics had overplayed their hand, and the net result was to strengthen both his position and that of the President before the country.

Whatever may be the effect of the present Republican gesture on the future of Mr. Acheson, it has certainly rendered a disservice to the country. Senator Alexander Smith hit the nail on the head when he declared that the action his fellow Republicans in the Senate were rushing toward might mislead the world as to "the fundamental unity of the American people." That demonstration of disunity was made worse by the fact that it came just before Secretary Acheson departs for Brussels to attend the meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

In a last-minute effort to avoid the inevitable interpretation that will be placed on the incident abroad, the Senate Republicans added to their resolution a paragraph by Senator Taft pledging "our fullest cooperation with the President and the Administration in a united effort to meet by the most effective means the present national crisis." If this stood by itself, it would be a commendable and patriotic expression. But as a postscript to the demand for the scalp of Mr. Acheson (who, of course, is part of the Administration) it seems to be meaningless, insincere and contradictory. An offer by the minority to cooperate with the party in power on condition that the minority be permitted to purge the President's Cabinet is not cooperation but the opposite. There is no way to disguise this blow to unity in a time of national peril, and it will be difficult indeed to undo the damage it has done.

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# Acheson Scored In Refusing Data For Senate Quiz

**DEAN**  
 State Secretary Acheson was chided yesterday for his department's "offensive" practice of refusing to give senators data they request while trusting pro-Communist employes with secret documents.

Sen. Millikin (R) Colorado, raised the issue during questioning of Acheson at a finance committee hearing on the Administration proposal to extend the reciprocal tariff-cutting program for three years.

Millikin noted that Alger Hiss, convicted of perjury to conceal espionage for Russia, and Henry Julian Wadleigh, confessed Communist spy courier, had been trusted with secret material when in the State department. By contrast, Millikin said, it was "damned offensive" to have the department deny his request to examine confidential minutes of trade agreements committees studying tariff cuts.

### Data Refused in 1943

The Colorado senator said he asked for the minutes in 1943, when the finance committee, which he then headed, was studying a measure to continue the trade program. Will L. Clayton, then a top department adviser, denied the request on the ground

the data had been obtained on a pledge it would not be disclosed.

Millikin told Acheson, who listened in silence that apparently the State department felt senators on the committee "could not be trusted with a secret" but that "Wadleigh and Hiss could be trusted."

"It was damned offensive," the senator told Acheson. Millikin then asked Acheson if he would trust senators with the trade data now, if the request is renewed.

### Promises "Consideration"

"It will be given every consideration," the secretary replied lily.

"How many times have I heard that one?" Millikin retorted with a grin.

Acheson urged that the tariff-cutting bill, giving the President power to negotiate tariff reductions with other nations, be extended without certain amendments approved by the House to safeguard American industry. The measure is now slated to expire June 12.

The secretary objected to House provisions that would require "escape clauses" in agreements to permit withdrawal if hardship results, and fix "periled points" below which tariffs should not be cut. Acheson said these provisions might be acceptable to him in some modified form.

He opposed outright House approved clauses to deny tariff concessions to certain Communist countries, and to cancel tariff concessions on farm imports whose prices, with duty, are below domestic support prices.

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## Pamphlet Condemns Acheson For State Dept. Pro-Red Policy

Author of Book on Hiss Case Reviews  
Secretary's Acts to Cite Commie Tings

*file 7*

NEW YORK, Nov. 22 (INS)—One of the most searing damnations of an American political figure is on the press. The pamphlet, "The Case Against Dean Acheson," was written by Victor  
 "The pamphlet will not accuse Acheson of being a Communist, of course. Its premise springs from this line: . . . on the basis of his nine-year record in and out of the State department he (Acheson) has been incapable of fully understanding the nature of the Communist conspiracy to conquer the world."

**Some Charges Listed**  
 Some of the charges and assertions in "The Case Against Dean Acheson" follow:  
 He approved a \$50 million loan to Soviet-controlled Poland, a loan negotiated by Donald Hiss, brother of Alger and a member of Acheson's law firm; over the bitter objections of U. S. Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane;  
 Acheson still believes we can do business with Stalin, and by his use of such expressions as "Soviet leaders" he, the pamphlet states, "presupposes they have a devoted following and are not cruel despots who rule with an iron hand";  
 He remains vigorously anti-McArthur, and for that reason was not taken along on the still somewhat mysterious pre-election trip to Wake;

**Cash For Tito, Not France**  
 He opposes a loan to Spain because of its totalitarian nature, but is willing to provide funds for the Communist Tito;  
 He has stated publicly that Alger Hiss, convicted inferentially of espionage, remains his friend;  
 He ignored a secret memo sent to the State department in 1947 by a Senate subcommittee, calling the attention of then Secretary of State Marshall to "a condition" that had developed under Acheson and stating "it is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity";  
 In July, 1946, he defended certain "progressives" serving under him. Though many of the associations with which they served have since been cited as subversive;

**Ward Case Contrasted**  
 Acheson protected John Stewart Service, career man arrested in the Amerasia case, and Service has since won consistent promotions in the State department;  
 "Compare this," the pamphlet will add, "with the treatment accorded Angus Ward, a courteous diplomat of the old school who was detained for 12 months by the Chinese Reds in Mukden, and who was finally 'rewarded' with an obscure consular post in British East Africa";  
 He will not "turn his back" on Hiss, the pamphlet continues, but seems to have done so on Robert A. Vorester, the American businessman sentenced to 15 years in Hungary after a mock trial;  
 In August 1949, Acheson scoffed at charges that Communist agents were filtering into this country through U.S. but a short time later came the arrests of Valentin Gubichev and Judith Conlon;  
 It was Acheson, the vivid paper will state, who "saw to it that no official U. S. representative attended the unveiling in Arlington cemetery of a headstone for the five young American fliers 'shot down over Yugoslavia'";  
 He is not a trained diplomat, and once was fired from the Junior Cabinet by F.D.R. as a "light weight";  
 In 1945 he spoke at a Madison Square Garden rally called by the National Conference of Soviet-American Friendship.

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# The Washington Merry-Go-Round

## Bungled Intelligence Is Charged

By Drew Pearson

In a highly secret conference with the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees, Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned that a third world war is "imminent," if not already in progress.



Acheson

The Korean conflict might spread to Yugoslavia and possibly other points in Europe and Asia "at any moment," Acheson declared.

Asked if there were still time to avoid another world-wide conflict, the Secretary of State replied that it could be avoided only by prompt and concerted action against the Russian-Chinese Communist entente by our friends in the United Nations.

He mentioned trade sanctions against the Chinese Communists as one possible solution.

But Acheson added that we must also get economic aid to Yugoslavia, as quickly as possible to stiffen the back of that drought-hit nation against Russia.

"All I can say now is that the situation is dangerous—very dangerous," Acheson asserted.

Under questioning by the House committee, Acheson bluntly charged that the Korean crisis is due in large part to General MacArthur's bungling military intelligence. He specifically mentioned that military intelligence officers had estimated that the Chinese army which invaded Korea would number at the most 60,000 or 65,000 troops; whereas the Chinese massed almost four times that number in the Korean offensive.

Acheson told the committee that this blunder might have been avoided if we had a strongly centralized and alert intelligence agency in Washington, instead of depending almost entirely on MacArthur's intelligence scouts.

### Post for Dewey

It's been a carefully hushed-up secret between the State Department and Albany, but last summer Governor Dewey discussed with Secretary of State Acheson the idea of becoming American Ambassador to Great Britain.

Although Governor Dewey's office refuses to discuss the matter, what happened was this. Early in the summer and before Dewey changed his mind about running for reelection, he asked for a meeting with Acheson. He specified that the meeting should be neither in the State Department nor in the Roosevelt Hotel, Dewey's New York City headquarters; so the two met in the home of Roger Straus, president of the American Smelting & Refining Co., whom Dewey had planned to make Secretary of Commerce if elected in 1948.

Dewey, long an admirer of Acheson, explained that he was becoming more and more worried about the bipartisan foreign policy which he felt was rapidly falling to pieces since the illness of Senator Vandenberg. And he said he would like to do something to help.

Dewey and Vandenberg have

been quite friendly since 1944, and while the Michigan Senator's health was good, he was in frequent telephone communication with the New York Governor. In fact, it was through Dewey that Vandenberg came to know and respect Dewey's foreign counselor, John Foster Dulles, now adviser to the State Department.

Dewey explained to Acheson, therefore, that with Vandenberg ill, he, Dewey, as titular leader of the Republican Party, felt responsibility for foreign policy and that he would like to do his part toward reestablishing the bipartisananship which had now gone to pot.

Acheson expressed his appreciation. And out of their conversation grew the idea that Dewey would become Ambassador to the Court of St. James, top diplomatic spot in the world; then, after acquiring experience in London, would return here to steer bipartisan foreign policy back on an even keel.

The Secretary of State made no actual promise of the London ambassadorship to Dewey. But he indicated he would talk things over at the White House and let him know.

### Gifford Named

Later, Dewey decided to run for a third term and the idea went up in smoke. However, the man who helped persuade Dewey to run for Governor again, the Chase Bank's Winthrop Aldrich, also knew of Dewey's foreign-policy plan, and out of this came the appointment of Walter Gifford, former head of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., to the post Dewey wanted—an appointment which has had all the politicians puzzled.

What most people don't know is that Acheson, despite the red label pinned on him by Republican Senators, had long been Washington attorney for J. P. Morgan and the various Wall Street interests. He has also known Winthrop Aldrich and the Rockefeller group which dominates the Chase Bank.

Therefore, when Dewey reneged on his budding ambassadorial career, he and his New York banking friends sold Acheson on Walter Gifford instead. That was how Truman happened to appoint a big money-raiser for Dewey to the most coveted of all diplomatic posts.

NOTE—Though Dewey wanted to promote the bipartisan foreign policy for his friend Acheson and though Gifford's appointment was sold to Truman with the understanding he would swing GOP support, it didn't work out that way at all. On the day before election, Dewey spent all day on the television vehemently denouncing his friend Acheson's foreign policy in China. It helped him clinch the election.

The Dewey-Gifford maneuvering for the London Embassy now explains why President Truman was so baffled when he called in James Bruce, of National Dairy Products, and asked Bruce to relieve him of an earlier commitment for the London Embassy.

### Brewster's Ambition

Owen Brewster, Maine Senator and friend of the wiretappers, is running a sly campaign to grab a prize plum—chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee.

The big hurdle is Robert Taft, present chairman, who shows no intention of stepping out. But Brewster figures that Taft, as leading claimant for the 1952 presidential nomination, can be persuaded to turn over the chairmanship to a more "neutral" Senator.

So Brewster has been tiptoeing around promoting a "draft Taft" movement.

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# Pamphlet Condemns Acheson For State Dept. Pro-Red Policy

Author of Book on Hiss Case Reviews Secretary's Acts to Cite Commie Tinge

By BOB CONSIDINE

NEW YORK, Nov. 21 (INS)—One of the most searing damnations of an American political figure is on the presses. The pamphlet, "The Case Against Dean

Acheson," was written by Victor Lasky, co-author of "Seeds of Treason," an inside look at the Hiss-Chambers case.

The pamphlet will not accuse Acheson of being a Communist, of course. Its premise springs from this line: "... on the basis of his nine-year record in and out of the State department he (Acheson) has been incapable of fully understanding the nature of the Communist conspiracy to conquer the world."

### Some Charges Listed

Some of the charges and assertions in "The Case Against Dean Acheson" follow:

He approved a \$90 million loan to Soviet-controlled Poland (a loan negotiated by Donald Hiss, brother of Alger and a member of Acheson's law firm) over the bitter objections of U. S. Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane;

Acheson still believes we can do business with Stalin, and by his use of such expressions as "Soviet leaders" he, the pamphlet states, "presupposes they have a devoted following and are not cruel despots who rule with an iron hand";

He remains vigorously anti-MacArthur, and for that reason was not taken along on the still somewhat mysterious pre-election trip to Wake;

### Cash For Tito, Not Franco

He opposes a loan to Spain because of its totalitarian nature, but is willing to provide funds for the Communist-Tito;

He has stated publicly that Alger Hiss, convicted inferentially of espionage, remains his friend;

He ignored a secret memo sent to the State department in 1947 by a Senate subcommittee, calling the attention of then Secretary of State Marshall to "a condition" that had developed under Acheson and stating "it is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried, but not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity";

In July, 1946, he defended certain "progressives" serving under him. Though many of the associations with which they served have since been cited as subversive;

### Ward Case Contrasted

Acheson protected John Stewart Service, career man arrested in the Amerasia case, and Service has since won consistent promotions in the State department;

"Compare this," this pamphlet will add, "with the treatment accorded Angus Ward, a courageous diplomat of the old school who was detained for 13 months by the Chinese Reds in Mukden, and who was finally 'rewarded' with an obscure consular post in British East Africa;"

He will not "turn his back" on Hiss, the pamphlet continues, but seems to have done so on Robert A. Vogeler, the American businessman sentenced to 15 years in Hungary after a mock trial;

In August 1949, Acheson scoffed at charges that Communist agents were filtering into this country through U.N., but a short time later came the arrests of Valentin Gubitchev and Judith Coplon;

It was Acheson, the vivid paper will state, who "saw to it that no official U. S. representative attended the unveiling in Arlington cemetery of a headstone for the five young American fliers shot down over Yugoslavia;"

He is not a trained diplomat, and once was fired from the junior cabinet by F.D.R. as a "light-weight;"

In 1945 he spoke at a Madison Square Garden rally called by the National Conference of Soviet-American Friendship.

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# THESE DAYS

By George Sokolsky

**IT CANNOT** be denied that the conduct of our foreign policy was a principal factor in the recent election. Thomas E. Dewey, Robert A. Taft, Eugene D. Millikin, Wallace F. Bennett, Richard Nixon, Everett M. Dirksen, and practically all others who were elected, devoted themselves to an analysis of the foreign policy with especial emphasis on Russia, China, Korea, and on communism. Mr. John M. Butler defeated Senator Tydings on that issue.

The arguments were devoted to the errors made at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam; the infiltration of Communists into the State department; the relationship between that department and the Institute of Pacific Relations; the tremendous authority of Alger Hiss and his Communist associates; the Amerasia case; the abuse of Gen. Pat Hurley; the Stilwell and Marshall mission to China; the abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek and our present war in Korea.

Also discussed was the curious phenomenon that while the Marshall plan made it possible for the United Kingdom to store up a dollar reserve of \$2,500,000,000, we are precariously devoid of friends and have only associates; that such countries as India and the Moslem states tend to be neutral as between the United States and Soviet Russia; and that Great Britain, which owes its continued existence to this country's aid, tends to pursue a violently separate course in the Far East, where our future is imperiled.

**IT IS** possible to go into further details on this subject: The above suffices to give a picture of an election campaign in which the Secretary of State, who was not a candidate for office, personally became an issue.

Mr. Acheson took no part in the campaign. He said nothing to defend his policies or his conduct of office. Had he done so, it might have led to a dangerous debate at a moment of international tension and might perhaps have defeated more Democrats.

The day after election day, newspapermen, with due propriety, asked Mr. Acheson if he intended to resign. He said that he had no such intentions. However, he did not say what were Mr. Truman's intentions. Nor could Mr. Acheson not have felt the sting in the question. No other member of the Cabinet was asked such a question.

**MR. TRUMAN** has pursued a most unusual course in relation to his Cabinet. In his two terms he has had about 30 changes; more if the non-Cabinet rank secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force are included in the figures.

He has had four Secretaries of state, Stettinius, Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson. He dismissed Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, to save Dean Acheson; yet, his personal indebtedness to Louis Johnson was very great, indeed.

Dean Acheson will face an extremely antagonistic Senate, more antagonistic to him personally than to his policies. No man, whatever the loftiness of his soul, could refuse to turn his back on the convicted Alger Hiss without actually turning his back on his country.

That is why men like Wallace Bennett, Richard Nixon, and John Butler were elected on the issue of communism and Communist infiltration into government.

**BY THE** rules of the game, to say nothing of principle, those Republicans, and some Democrats, who emphasized these issues, and were elected, will seek pre-eminence by their emphasis.

Senator Brien McMahon, in Connecticut, ingeniously cut himself loose from all suspicions of a soft spot for Reds and was given a good vote. William Benton, who stuck by the State department, had a narrow squeak through and is being subjected to a recount.

**TRUMAN** is, it is true, firm in his friendship and obstinate, but he did fire his friend and campaign collector, Louis Johnson when he became a political nuisance to him.

Certainly, Dean Acheson is now a political nuisance to a President who from now to 1952 will have a Congress that will seek to scalp him politically.

How long he will continue to be burdened by a Secretary of State who is so objectionable to a large part of the Senate, is anyone's guess.

**IT IS** no accident that he is grooming Averell Harriman as a successor. Harriman, however, is one of the "men of Yalta," and is not likely to be more acceptable politically than Dean Acheson.

The Democrats in the Senate would prefer that the Chief Justice of the United States, Fred Vinson, be appointed.

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## Hiding Their Hero

ONE OF THE FUNNY things about the campaign nationally is the way the boys seem to have swept the Dean, meaning Hon. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, under the rug.

The Dean has been very quiet—perhaps so that the country, about to cast its ballot in an election that means a great deal to the Great Deal, will forget what a soft, pro-Communist stupe he has been so often.

Considered a brilliant and finely-polished orator, he is making no speeches and no statements to "help" the cause. He is the Sheriff Finn of current national politics.

Neither the Dean nor his protector, President Truman, is running for anything.

But all Democratic members of the House and a sizeable number of their counterparts in the Senate—poor fellows—are having to run in the face of Acheson's record.

They want as little said about that record as possible, naturally.

They do not want the voters to turn their backs on them by being reminded that the top member of the Truman cabinet would not turn his back on his friend, Alger Hiss.

If the people will only forget, at least until after next Tuesday, that Acheson favors the admission of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations and has stated as U. S. policy that we will not use the veto to prevent that entrance!

The Chinese Communists have intervened in the Korean War now and are killing Americans.

This is not a pretty pre-election thought for the New Dealers.

It is not something easily explained to the voters, many of whom have sons in Korea.

Nor is the rest of the Acheson record of Red appeasement, including his policy of turning China and its 400,000,000 people over to the Communists.

Nor his implacable hatred of Chiang Kai-shek. Nor his catty, long-standing dislike of Gen. MacArthur.

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Nor his approval, as Undersecretary of State,  
of a \$90,000,000 postwar loan to Communist  
Poland.

Victor Lasky, co-author of "Seeds of Treason,"  
recalls in a compilation of "The Case Against Dean  
Acheson" that this loan was negotiated by Donald  
Hiss, Alger's brother, a member of Acheson's law  
firm.

It was negotiated, and approved, over the  
strenuous protests of Arthur Bliss Lane, former  
Ambassador to Poland, who warned it would be  
used only to strengthen the Red Polish dictatorship.  
It, of course, was.

Acheson wrote off Korea and would have let  
it fall, had not President Truman reversed him.

He has written off Formosa, though Gen.  
MacArthur regards it as of the utmost strategic  
importance.

No wonder the President left Acheson at home  
when he flew to Wake Island!

No wonder the New Deal political master-  
minds have swept the Dean under the rug for the  
campaign.

He is a failure—a liability to his party, as he  
is to his country.

# The Washington Merry Go-Round

## Acheson Uses TV as 'Intercom'

By Drew Pearson

THE GENERAL PUBLIC has the idea that Secretary of State Dean Acheson is an austere, sober individual. In his relaxed moments, however, Acheson is just the opposite. He has developed a whimsical humor that has helped him weather the storms that rage round his head.

"The Secretary of State," he told intimate friends the other day, "is always fair game. There is no use trying to argue with people like Senators Taft and Wherry. They don't want to learn."

Asked what he did to take his mind off official problems, Acheson replied:

"I worry about the oak plague attacking the leaves on my farm at Olney (Md.). The leaves are falling off now, and they usually do not fall until late autumn."

Acheson is probably the first Secretary of State to use television in his official business. When he is in Washington and when Ambassador Warren Austin is waging tough forensic battle with Soviet Delegate Malik before the Security Council in New York, the Secretary sits before his television set to watch the performance. Beside his chair, as he watches his Ambassador at Lake Success, is an open telephone line direct to Warren. And, as Warren debates with the Soviet delegate, the Secretary picks up the phone to suggest new answers to the stream of Russian abuse.

There was a time when an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and a foreign country required six weeks to two months. They had to be taken across the Atlantic by clipper ship. Later, the time of exchange was narrowed to a couple of days. But now, with television, it's instantaneous.

THE AMERICAN LEGION this week ends its first year under a veteran of World War II—dynamic Commander George N. Craig of Brazil, Ind.

The year marked a milestone in more ways than one. Hitherto, every commander during the Legion's 31 years had been a veteran of the First World War, and younger legionnaires were beginning to get restless. The Legion's king-makers, younger men said, were getting too old, too reactionary, too set in their ways.

Then along came George Craig, a forthright young country lawyer, who loved the Legion but believed it could play a part not only in protecting veterans but in building a better United States.

Some of the things he has done have left older legionnaires rubbing their eyes but, in the main, supporting him. Among other things, he stuck out his chin with a statement on tolerance and discrimination.

"Men who have faced death together on the field of battle," he said, "know that in the final showdown it isn't a man's color, place of birth, political belief or church affiliation that counts. It is only his courage to fight for God and country."

Carrying out his creed, Craig urged the Legion to campaign against the Ku Klux Klan. He also sponsored a "go-to-church" movement. "We need to get closer to God," he said. "Our first armament must be spiritual."

It was to be expected that Craig would crusade against communism, but he went further. He contended that the way to fight communism was not merely by condemning it but by building up a better country as a bulwark against it. And to that end he took the unusual step of calling an all-American Conference of 60 different groups—from the AFL to the United States Chamber of Commerce—to plan a constructive campaign against communism.

It will be interesting to see whether the World War II veteran who succeeds Craig as commander

will be able to keep up with the high standard he has set.

ONE REASON many GIs have been severely wounded in Korea is the poor quality of metal jacket on Communist bullets. Instead of making a clean hole, North Korean bullets shatter and cause nasty wounds. Though not actually dum-dum bullets, they're not far from it. Tough but mild-mannered Maj. Gen. John Church, who took over General Dean's 24th Division, is doing a magnificent job in Korea.... Guided missiles are becoming so important that their research may soon be made independent of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This guided-missile section could become the nucleus of a separate armed service in any Buck Rogers era of the future, just as the Air Force broke away from the Army... The Army is desperately short of doctors to handle wounded GIs returned from Korea. The situation is worse than the public realizes... With the Munitions Board stockpile of wool critically low, the Army's shopping for Australian wool. A lot of wool clothing will be needed for our men during the Korean winter.

HARRY BYRD and some of his Senate friends have directed so many barbs at "bureaucrats" that the public has the general idea every bureaucrat has horns.

Over in the Treasury Department, however, sits a big, balding bureaucrat who began his Government service as a typist 33 years ago and now has the unique distinction of being probably the only person able to get the Russians to cooperate in the dis-United Nations.

He is Harry Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics. Thanks to him, all nations, even including Russia, are limiting the manufacture and sale of narcotics to medical needs.

"Narcotics," says Anslinger, "are as dangerous to the human race as the atom bomb. We all recognize it, and there's even been complete cooperation behind the Iron Curtain."

Anslinger's formula, which may point the way for world atomic control, is an international monopoly to buy and distribute drugs. It sets production quotas, prices and consumer maximums. Russia at first was opposed, but was won over by Anslinger's fairness.

Anslinger's farsightedness has been responsible for several things the public doesn't know about. Four years before Pearl Harbor, he saw war coming and arranged to stockpile opium. As a result, it was the only critical material produced outside the United States which remained in abundant supply throughout the war.

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During the war, with Asia occupied by the Japanese, Anslinger also was farsighted enough to hold private talks with the British, Dutch and French with a view to stopping their notorious sale of opium to Orientals. Possibly because victory then seemed far away, they agreed. And the opium traffic has now been largely stopped.

Inside the United States, Anslinger has a force of agents not much larger than the FBI division in New York. He has also organized a secret panel of narcotics officers in London, Cairo, Ottawa, Rotterdam, Berlin and Paris to break international dope smuggling. It was the Narcotics Bureau that first broke Murder, Inc., by locking up Louis Lepke.

Anslinger's mode of operation is indicated by an incident of a few years ago, when a narcotics agent with a flair for publicity came to the Commissioner's office and proudly boasted he had two trunks full of clippings.

Gently, Anslinger said: "I don't see how those clippings are going to help you or the bureau. I think you'd be smarter if you concentrated on getting convictions instead of headlines."



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# The Mess MacArthur Inherited

The government has decided to negotiate a peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible. Long-term military rights for American forces in the Japanese home islands are to be asked.

The Korean war has indicated the advisability of these steps, which are said to have brought Gen. MacArthur, as supreme commander in Japan, into reasonably close agreement with the State department and the defense establishment for the first time in many months.

## Grew Is

## Let Out

When the Presidential decision was made to intervene in Korea, the whole job was wished upon MacArthur. The general is believed to have viewed the successive retreats before communism in Asia with grave misgivings, but he had nothing to do with them. He was not given any voice in higher policy until the State department had made an egregious mess of everything in the Orient. Then, in effect, he was given a mop and told to clean up.

A little history on the relationship between Gen. MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson is illuminating. In the summer of 1945 Acheson had been assistant secretary of state for four and one-half years. On June 7 of that year six persons, two of them State department officials, were arrested for espionage in the theft of 1,700 secret government documents for the pro-Soviet magazine Amerasia. By coincidence, the New York Communist newspaper, the Daily Worker, praised Acheson on that day as "forward looking."

Joseph C. Grew, Acheson's immediate superior as undersecretary of state, was in favor of vigorous prosecution of the document thieves, but forces were at work to render the prosecution a dud. The Communists yelled for Grew's scalp. On Aug. 14 James Byrnes succeeded Edward R. Stettinius as secretary of state, and both Grew and Acheson tendered their resignations, as was customary.

Former ambassador Joseph E. Davies, Russophile author of "Mission to Moscow," is said to have related that Acheson had made Grew's resignation a condition for staying on himself. On Aug. 27 Acheson was appointed undersecretary, and Grew was out. Philip Jaffe, central figure in the Amerasia case, confided to one of the other defendants, "Well, we've suffered a lot, but anyhow, we got Grew out."

On Oct. 7, 1945, the leftist New York paper, PM, remarked editorially, "Now State department policy has a better appreciation of what Soviet Russia wants." On Nov. 14 Acheson appeared at Madison Square Garden on the same platform with such well-known Stalinists as Davies, Corliss Lamont, Paul Robeson and Albert Fitzgerald, president of the Communist-dominated ITO United Electrical Workers, at a mass meeting in honor of Dr. Hewlett Johnson, the "Red Dean" of Canterbury.

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Almost immediately upon his assumption of the post of undersecretary, Acheson set about putting Gen. MacArthur, the hero of the Pacific war, in his place. Gen. MacArthur had stated that Japan was docile under American occupation and that 200,000 American troops were all that were needed. On Sept. 19 Acheson, acting secretary of state in Byrnes' absence, snapped back in a statement the Associated Press called "more pugnacious than diplomatic."

### Acheson's

### About Face

Among other things, he said that "the United States government, not the occupation force under Gen. MacArthur, is determining American policy toward Japan," and that the policy laid down by "the government"—*i.e.*, the State department—"would not be changed and would be carried out regardless of cost."

Some senators, among them Wherry of Nebraska and Chandler of Kentucky, said the Acheson statement was a deliberate insult to MacArthur. Whatever it was, it indicated that Acheson intended to call the signals on the Far Eastern policy, and that MacArthur's role was to be confined to doing as he was told.

With the exception of the year and a half between July 1, 1947, and Jan. 8, 1949, when he was out of the department, Acheson called the signals. In his tenure as secretary, Nationalist China was conquered by the Communists.

America's trained forces were withdrawn from the republic of South Korea. Acheson announced that surviving Nationalist Chinese forces in Formosa had been written off. In statements before closed senatorial committee meetings, he accepted Communist conquest of all of East Asia, even the Philippines, and, ultimately, Japan. His open-ended policy envisioned only the "containment" of Soviet Russia in Europe.

Up to June 27, when the President abruptly reversed the whole policy and ordered American forces into Korea, MacArthur sat on the side lines while Acheson ran a losing show. Communists and the leftist press never ceased sniping at MacArthur's occupation policy in Japan, which was a brilliant success compared to every one of Acheson's successive nose dives.

Only when the hands of the clock stood at one minute to midnight, when the knell was about to sound on Acheson's policy in the Orient, did the secretary of state step back while an all but hopeless job of retrieving what could be saved was thrust upon MacArthur with the equivalent of some such phrase as "It's all yours, general."

The American people should remember that it was Acheson who five years ago snapped that he, not Gen. MacArthur, would make America's policy for the Far East. The words return to haunt him.

JUL 14 1950

# Ex-State Aide Calls Acheson Menace to U. S.

EVANSTON, Ill. (AP) April 6 (CTPS)—Dr. Kenneth Colgrove, Northwestern university political scientist, today assailed State Secretary Acheson as a menace to the security of the United States and urged that Acheson be dismissed from his post.

Colgrove spoke scathingly of Acheson's "insolent defense of (Alger) Hiss," of the 91 homosexuals discovered in the State department by loyalty investigators, and of "pro-Communists in the State department . . . who were the architects of victory of the Chinese Communists."

The indictment of Acheson, his policies, and his staff, was based partly upon information Colgrove collected while he was a consultant on Far Eastern policy for the State department during the last war.

## First Lecture in Series

The political scientist's speech was the first of a series of six public lectures on power politics in international affairs.

"The United States," said Colgrove, "is now engaged in a cold war in which the very existence of democratic institutions is seriously threatened. In such a crisis it is imperative that only men of greatest integrity, wisdom, and foresight should guide American foreign policy. The Secretary of State has amply demonstrated his lack of all these qualities."

The expert on international affairs cited Acheson's refusal to renounce his friendship with Hiss as evidence of unfitness for his office.

He denounced Acheson's new policy of "total diplomacy," outlined recently in speeches in California, as "inadequate" and "too late."

## Praises Sen. McCarthy

"The fact that it took drastic means such as the loyalty investigations to rid the State department of 91 homosexuals indicates how lax the discipline of this department has been," said Colgrove.

"Even if homosexuals might be tolerated in other departments of government, they cannot be tolerated in a department which conducts foreign relations

inasmuch as such individuals are so easily the victims of blackmail. The Communist party thrives upon blackmail."

Colgrove asserted that Sen. McCarthy (R) of Wisconsin had performed a "real service to the American people" by precipitating the investigation of a "corrupt department."

"There are numerous pro-Communists, if not actual fellow travelers, serving in the department or as consultants in the department," he said. "These were the men who were really responsible for the policy of forcing Chiang Kai-shek in 1943-46 to accept Chinese Communists in his government."

"They know or should have known that Communists enter any government only to destroy it. These were the men who were chiefly responsible for the collapse of the Nationalist government. They were the architects of the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949."

"Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup

has correctly said that the charges of Sen. McCarthy have seriously hurt the influence of several American diplomats. He neglected to say that, because of their bad advice these diplomats should long since have been removed from public service."

Dr. Colgrove outlined a 12-point program for reform of our Far Eastern policy. It calls for continued recognition of Nationalist China and economic aid to non-Communist governments in Asia.

- Tolson
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*Louis C. Wickham*

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# ~~If Acheson's Red,~~ ~~Moscow's Color Blind~~

How does the Kremlin feel about Secretary of State Acheson, the man who these days is being described as pro-Communist by certain of our Republican legislators?

On Monday, Moscow Radio's "home service" devoted considerable time to a critique of Mr. Acheson and his recent foreign policy speech at Berkeley, Cal. Here is some of what the Kremlin Reds had to say:

THE day before yesterday, a demagogical attempt to win public opinion was launched by Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State. He delivered a long speech in the town of Berkeley on the subject, "The Friction Between the United States and the Soviet Union." This is the first of a series of speeches by the United States Secretary of State in the course of his peculiar tour over California. The many failures which overcame American diplomacy in the course of the recent months have taught the Secretary nothing.

Once more he submitted to his audience a considerable agglomeration of fantastic lies. Acheson, too, made frequent use of the word "peace" and embroidered a great deal on the fact that he "strives for peace." These phrases, however, only proved that open appeals for war are anything but popular among the American people. The entire speech, abundantly interspersed with anti-Soviet slander, revealing the speaker as a truly incorrigible liar, leaves no doubt as to the true intentions of this fascist-like diplomat.

Obviously envying Ribbentrop his laurels, Mr. Acheson declared: "Our time requires total diplomacy." In order to find out what this total diplomacy means, it is by no means necessary to turn to the initial sources and worry the dead—Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, Ribbentrop, and the rest of Acheson's political ancestors.

It suffices to hear him speaking. Repeating the hackneyed inventions about "Russian imperialism," about the "designs of the Kremlin," about Marx's teaching having allegedly "become obsolete," about "Soviet expansion," and so on and so forth, Acheson informed his audience that he sees no way for a moral compromise with the thesis of international Communism.

You see, he doubts that two systems—



SECRETARY ACHESON.  
—Harris-Ewing Photo.

theirs and ours—can really exist side by side. Finally, he called upon the Americans to nurse no hopes as regards peace or the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.

Having pronounced these words, Acheson evidently felt that he is beating his own lying records and that he is at a rapid pace approaching the state of the mad Forrestal, who finished his career so sadly and significantly. But the American liar was carried away by his own eloquence.

Everybody knows that in January, 1949, the Soviet Union through its leader, J. V. Stalin, had stated: "The Soviet Government could, of course, cooperate with the United States Government in the carrying out of measures aiming at the realization of a pact of peace and leading to a gradual disarmament." In spite of

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~~The~~ Dean Acheson declares that the Russians have thwarted the talks about a pact of peace. The entire speech by the way, is built on such swindler's tricks.

Who does not know that the American plan for the control over atomic energy means the transfer of all sources of atom production to the sole disposal of the American imperialists? It is known to one and all—except Acheson, who assures us that there will be found in America scientists worthy of trust, allegedly capable of governing this lethal power without politics proceeding from human considerations. Yet the Soviet proposal providing for a mutual and effective control is not liked by Acheson. Therefore, he once more reproaches the Soviet Union for intractability.

The meaning of the numerous reproaches and slanderous attacks of which the speech of the United States Secretary was composed is very simple. It contains a ludicrous and impudent ultimatum: Let the Russians open all the roads to war, and then, well, then we shall talk about peace.

"Our representatives are treated like criminals," complains Acheson, remembering recent events which have taken place in Sofia and Budapest. If you listen to Acheson, you begin to think that ring-leaders of espionage gangs, saboteurs and the hired murderers are not criminals but decent diplomats, gentle doves. Why, then, does Acheson preach total diplomacy?

"We don't want and don't intend to set up satellites; we actually don't know how to go about it," hypocritically assures Acheson. "We have no satellites whose votes we control."

What, then, is the notorious Marshall Plan, if not a tool for the enslavement of the peoples? Why, then, at international conferences, at the sign of Acheson's conductor's baton, are the representatives of the countries enslaved by this plan obediently raising and putting down their hands?

Innocent, gentle Acheson! Thus writhing in mud of his own inventions, entangled in absurd assurances, choking with slander, Acheson crawls to the end of his speech like a snake:

"We must admit that our ability to reach our aim cannot be determined by aspirations for peace alone, but that it must be supported by force in order to solve the tasks fate may place before us."

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## G.O.P. Lawmaker Hits Acheson as Socialist

By the Associated Press

AUGUSTA, Me., Feb. 25.—“If Stalin were to give an award to an American man for the greatest benefit to Russia,” a Michigan member of Congress said today, “he couldn't have found a better man than Dean Acheson.”

Representative Potter, speaking to a convention of Maine's Young Republicans, declared: “We have Socialists in high places in our Government who are just as socialistic as the Fabian Socialists in England.” The Fabian Society, he said, was the forerunner of the present British Labor Party.

Mr. Potter characterized Federal Security Administrator Oscar Ewing, Secretary of Agriculture Brannan and Secretary of State Acheson as “American Socialists.”

He defined an American Socialist as “any person who advocates unnecessary Government control and operation.”

“Harry Truman is not a Socialist,” he said. “No. He is just a cunning, conniving Pendergast politician. . . . But he is advised by what I would call American Socialists.”

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# Acheson Not Up on Aggression Says Judd

Rep. Walter H. Judd (R., Minn.), today assailed State Secretary Dean Acheson as "a man who hasn't yet discovered that Communist aggression is by infiltration."

Commenting on Scripps-Howard Reporter Clyde Farnsworth's interview with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, (published exclusively in The News in Washington yesterday), in which Chiang said the Chinese Reds already were putting pressure on French Indo-China, Mr. Judd said the move was "an obvious one."

"That's the way Communist imperialism has to operate," said the former missionary in China. "It would fall apart if it didn't continue to expand."

But he added, "What can you do with people like our Secretary of State who persist in thinking of aggression in out-moded terms? Mr. Acheson, playing with his legalistic terms, is at the mercy of smart, clever, ruthless men like the Chinese Red leaders."

## CAN'T BE MUCH

A spokesman said the State Department had had no reports indicating, as Chiang told Mr. Farnsworth, that the Chinese Reds were sending arms, ammunition, guerrillas and fifth-column agents to aid the Indo-Chinese Communists. The spokesman said the French government had moved troops "right up to the border," and that "if anything's going thru there, it can't be much."

Furthermore, he said, even if the Chinese Reds do carry on aggression among their neighbors, the primary responsibility for calling such aggression to the attention of the United Nations would belong to the country involved.

"We can't assist any nation until it indicates it wants us to assist it," the spokesman said. But he added that if any country appealed to the UN for help, it would have the support of the United States.

## WHAT WAS MEANT

That, he said, was what was meant by Secretary Acheson's statement last July in his letter of transmittal submitting the State Department's White Paper on China to the President.

At that time Mr. Acheson said that if the Communist regime in China attempted to engage in ag-

gression against China's neighbors, "we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted by a situation violative of the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatening international peace and security."

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# Our First Pro-British Secretary Of State

Demands are being heard in the senate that Secretary of State Acheson resign over the China fiasco. Mr. Acheson has been playing the British line in his policy, which is not unnatural, his parents, **Webster** both having been born British subjects. **Helped** There was a time when Britain had to lay out hard cash to buy up a secretary of state. Now the British get them for nothing.

In his biography of John Quincy Adams, Prof. Samuel Flagg Bemis of Yale recalls how Daniel Webster, as secretary of state in 1842, served as disbursing agent for the British foreign office in settling the northeast boundary to the disadvantage of the state of Maine.

Webster and a Harvard professor, Jared Sparks, used a spurious map to sacrifice to the British some 5,000 square miles belonging to Maine.

Under the treaty of Ghent in 1814 Britain had the right to insist on arbitration of the boundary. Matters dragged along, with relations becoming very strained during the administration of President Van Buren.

When some American state stocks went into default with the panic of 1837, British investors with heavy holdings were resentful. Relations were further strained by American support of border revolts in Canada. Relations approached the breaking point when Alexander McLeod, a Canadian, was tried in New York courts for killing an American citizen who had been aboard an American steamer in the service of Canadian rebels. McLeod's acquittal averted the possibility of serious difficulties.

Van Buren toyed with the idea of a special mission to Britain, and his political opponent, Webster, angled for the assignment. When the plan was abandoned, Webster privately visited England in 1839, apparently financed by American and British banking and trading concerns.

He reassured British investors about the future of their American investments, in return for which the great British banking house of Barings is said to have paid him \$5,000. On this trip Webster met and became a fast friend of Lord Ashburton, who had been head of Barings and was a member of the Baring family.

This was the state of affairs when Tyler succeeded as President in 1841, with Webster as secretary of state. In the preceding year Maine's restlessness over the boundary had brought British regulars into the disputed area. Webster installed his intimate, Edward Everett of Massachusetts, as ambassador to Britain, and immediately started overtures to settle the boundary question.

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Of his motives, Bemis says, "Constantly carried by his careless personal economy into impecunious circumstances, he craved to fill a very expensive public post, that of minister of the United States to the Court of St. James. A big step toward his ambition might be to clear up the most grievous disputes with England."

Maine was unwilling to compromise its claims. Prof. Sparks came to Webster's assistance with a map drawn from notes and memory purporting to show what Benjamin Franklin had represented to

### **Maine Fought**

### **Compromise**

the French minister of foreign affairs in 1782 as being the agreed boundary.

The Sparks drawing confirmed the British boundary claims. It was completely spurious, as Sparks and Everett in London both knew. Both had seen the papers of Lord Shelburne, prime minister in 1782, showing that the American claim was right.

Webster's private agent on the boundary question in London was F. C. Gray, who was socially aided by the Barings. Not unnaturally, the British government decided that Lord Ashburton, as a Baring and a friend of Webster, was the man to go to Washington to negotiate.

Becoming acquainted in Washington with Sparks' worthless map, Ashburton paid somebody, presumably Webster, 2,998 pounds sterling and 1 shilling to "compensate" Sparks for going to Maine, and with this "stimulant," defeating the objections of the governor, John Fairfield, and the "honest" but "obstinate" Maine commissioner in Washington, William Pitt Preble.

Lord Aberdeen, British minister of foreign affairs, apprised of this intrigue, informed Ashburton he was prepared to employ "the same means to a greater extent in any quarter." But no more outlays were necessary.

The objections of Maine were beaten down by means of the spurious map and Webster settled the boundary at the sacrifice of millions of good American acres, and even for less than George Canning, the British foreign secretary, had offered in 1824. Canning, at least, had been willing to grant free American navigation of the St. Lawrence river.

Eleven days after Webster and Ashburton signed the contract, it was, as the saying goes, "floated thru the senate on a sea of champagne." The vote of 39 to 9 was better than even Webster expected, altho he had at his disposal not only British money but the secret service funds which Tyler had put in his hand.

The British government knowingly engaged not only in bribery but in a fraud, for all along it had possessed George III's own copy of the map of 1782 confirming the American claim. Webster never did get the London ministerial assignment he hankered for. Bemis says it is well he did not, for "he would have been ready to trade away most of the Oregon country." He used "questionable evidence . . . to the prejudice of his native land" to achieve "a diplomatic triumph—against his own country."

As we say, American secretaries of state come cheaper these days. The British don't have to give them any British secret service money to betray America's interests.

# Unwise to Discredit Acheson For Indiscretion on Hiss

The Republican party has apparently found in the policies and the somewhat unfortunate utterances of Secretary of State Acheson acceptable material for political capital. Before they go far with their obvious purpose of trying to discredit Mr. Acheson in the eyes of the American people they should give thoughtful consideration to the political consequences of their attack and also to its international implications. It is conceivable that the reaction in both instances may be harmful.

Regardless of the violence with which he is being assailed by Republicans in Congress and the strange reluctance of Democrats to come to his defense, Secretary Acheson's policies with respect to China and Spain reflect practical wisdom and courage. It is significant that informed opinion generally is coming to recognize both the futility and the danger of our deepened involvement in the lost cause of the Chinese Nationalists. They have shown themselves through the years as unworthy of the confidence of their own people and of help from outside. The Administration's willingness to restore diplomatic relations with Franco's Spain is a retreat from a policy which, Mr. Acheson frankly concedes, has failed. Nothing is to be gained and advantages may be lost by continuing it.

Unquestionably, Mr. Acheson has played into the hands of his political enemies by reiterating his support of Alger Hiss, the former official of the State Department who is under a sentence of five years for perjury. Although there is reason to admire his loyalty to a friend, his discretion must be questioned for taking a position which implicitly expresses a lack of confidence in the government which prosecuted Hiss and the court and jury which passed judgment upon him. There is good reason to criticize Mr. Acheson's utterance but not to make it a political issue.

The loyalty of Mr. Acheson is not open to question. His conduct of foreign relations and his general administration of his office have been marked consistently by sound judgment and fine ability. Yet, Republicans in Congress are raising a cry for his resignation.

A logical consequence of this aggressive movement against Secretary of State Acheson is a partisan assault upon the Administration's foreign policy. This possibility is cause for deep concern among the American people. It might well be the beginning of a national disunity which would give infinite comfort to the Kremlin and to Communists at home.

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CLIPPING FROM THE

*William L. ...*

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F. V. ...

## In Defense of Friendship

"My friendship is not easily given and not easily withdrawn," said Dean Acheson many months ago when a Senate committee, reviewing his nomination as Secretary of State, questioned him about Alger Hiss. Under fire he has now demonstrated the depth of feeling contained in that statement. Men may disagree with the confidence he has voiced in Hiss or wonder at the source of his seeming certitude; but there is a quiet magnificence in his act of which every American should be proud. There are values in the democratic tradition that need constant affirmation amid the bitter political struggles of our time; one of them is loyalty to friends in a time of adversity and another is the right of the individual to resist the momentary pressures of the mob. These are expressed in Acheson's act.

Whether Acheson spoke out of tenacious belief in Hiss' innocence or simple compassion for a fallen friend is not entirely clear nor is it crucial; the nobility of his gesture stands. All the dictates of expediency counselled him to run for cover; all the pressures of political "realism" advised him to recant, or at least to evade the inquiry. Instead he risked his public life on "a decision of conscience." Is the sacrifice justified? No other man can answer that for him, Acheson is saying. But this much is certain: if Hiss lied, as a jury of his countrymen found, he can be suffering no greater punishment than the knowledge of the peril to which he has exposed a friend.

It was inevitable that Acheson's statement would stir the fury of the know-nothings. There will be a frenzied effort to prove that our stand on Formosa is somehow related to Acheson's stand on Hiss. We have an instinctive confidence that most Americans will react with greater kindness than the puny politicians who want to convert the Hiss tragedy into an election-year comic-opera. In a way there could be no more dramatic advertisement for our way of life than the spectacle of our Secretary of State refusing to turn his back on a friend who has been linked with a foreign tyranny.

The totalitarians cannot possibly fathom the episode; if Acheson were to conform to the style set by dignitaries of the Soviet empire when their associates get into trouble, he would "confess" at once that he, too, is an enemy of the state; if guilt by association were accepted American doctrine, he would be damned overnight. But it is not. In a free society millions will understand Acheson's act and respect it, whatever they think about the Hiss-Chambers case. It is the kind of act which defines the gap between a monolithic slave-state and the world of freedom.

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CLIPPING FROM THE  
*Post Home News*

# Senate Approval Won by Acheson

## Warning Sounded By G.O.P. Leaders

By United Press

The Senate confirmed Dean G. Acheson as secretary of state yesterday after Sen. Vandenberg (R) of Michigan warned that President Truman will be held strictly accountable for Acheson's future performance.

The roll call vote was 83 to 6. The six were all Republicans.

Vandenberg, G.O.P. foreign policy spokesman in the Senate, fully endorsed Acheson and read a statement from the secretary designate in which he pledged "total and aggressive hostility" to subversives in the State department.

But, obviously irked that Mr. Truman did not consult G.O.P. leaders in advance on the appointment, Vandenberg made clear that the overwhelming vote for the suave, 55-year-old diplomat did not mean the G.O.P. is ready to "underwrite the results in terms of foreign policy."

Voting against Acheson were Sens. Bridges of New Hampshire, Capehart of Indiana, Jenner of Indiana, Knowland of California,

Langer of North Dakota, and Senate Republican leader Wherry.

In his statement, Acheson restated his attitude toward Donald and Alger Hiss, who were accused by former Communist Whitaker Chambers of being members of a prewar Communist "apparatus" operating in the government. Both brothers denied it.

### Takes Oath Tomorrow

As read by Vandenberg, the statement said:

"An assertion of personal friendship for the Hiss brothers, a staunch defense of Donald Hiss and a purpose to leave Alger Hiss to the courts."

Acheson will be sworn in tomorrow, succeeding Gen. Marshall, shortly after President Truman is inaugurated.

Vandenberg addressed the Senate on the nomination and its ramifications on the bipartisan foreign policy after Chairman Tom Connally (D) of Texas, of the foreign relations committee, appealed for "overwhelming" approval to show that U. S. policy abroad will be administered with "firmness and skill."

### "Unpredictable Policy"

But Vandenberg said that foreign policy as laid down by the Administration may "sometimes be quite impromptu and unpredictable." He apparently referred to President Truman's recent proposal to send Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson on a "peace mission" to Moscow.

The G.O.P. spokesman went on to say that henceforth most Republicans would be willing to leave Cabinet appointments up to the President. But thereafter, he said, the G.O.P. will hold Mr. Truman to "strict unpartisan accountability" for their performance.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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# Acheson Faces Senate Probe On Link to Hiss

## Inquiry Due Before His Confirmation

By International News Service.

A Senate investigation was stated yesterday into the political views and diplomatic record of Dean Acheson before the upper chamber acts on his nomination as Secretary of State.

Acheson was nominated Friday by President Truman to succeed Gen. Marshall, who retired for reasons of health.

Sen. Connally (D) of Texas, of the Senate foreign relations committee, said he had no objections to an inquiry expected to center around Acheson's position with respect to Alger Hiss.

### Wants Chambers Called

Hiss is now under indictment for perjury in connection with the theft of secret documents from State department files. He was a policy official in the department when Acheson was undersecretary.

Sen. Vandenberg (R) of Michigan, ranking G.O.P. member, said the committee will "wholly explore" the "viewpoints" of Acheson.

Sen. Mundt (R) of South Dakota, former member of the House committee on un-American activities, suggested that ex-Communist Whitaker Chambers, who exposed Hiss, and former Assistant Secretary of State Berle be called as witnesses.

Berle has told the House committee of clashes which he had with Acheson, when the latter was undersecretary of state, concerning American policy toward Russia. Berle blamed Acheson for supporting those who favored a soft attitude toward the Soviets.

Recalling that 134 State department employes were dismissed for "security reasons" between Jan. 1, 1942, and July 29, 1948, Mundt said:

### Jenner Joins Demand

"Many of these individuals presumably were recruited or retained at the time of Mr. Acheson's services as undersecretary of state.

"I would like to be certain that Mr. Acheson would continue to give Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy the free hand given him by Secretary Marshall in cleaning out of the State depart-

(Turn to Page 2 - ACHESON)

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## Acheson

(Continued from First Page)

ment all remnants of the Communist cells now known to have been operating there."

Mundt was joined in his demand for an investigation of Acheson's background, and for assurances regarding his present views, by Sen. Jenner (R) of Indiana.

Jenner said that a hearing seemed to be called for in view of various insinuations which have been made regarding Acheson's relationship with a number of "discredited" former officials of the State department.

Vandenberg said that President Truman's "choice of Mr. Acheson to be secretary of state nominates a distinguished American with wide experience in foreign affairs and with many proven qualifications for this critical responsibility."

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- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# Acheson to Get Nod Despite Cool GOP

By United Press

A group of Republicans urged today that the Senate quiz Dean Acheson on his law firm's dealings with the Communist Polish government before confirming him as Secretary of State.

The 55-year-old lawyer-diplomat appeared virtually certain, however, of getting the two-thirds Senate majority needed for confirmation.

The GOP senators also indicated they will look into Mr. Acheson's association with Alger Hiss, his one-time State Department aide who now is under indictment for perjury in connection with the Communist spy case. Sen. Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.), Foreign Relations Committee member, said the Senate should determine whether President Truman's new choice for the top State Department post is "soft" on Communism.

Despite the GOP murmurs, Chairman Tom Connally (D., Tex.), of the Foreign Relations Committee, predicted Mr. Acheson would be confirmed "without much opposition." His committee will consider the appointment next week.

Justice Department files show that two members of Mr. Acheson's law firm were registered as representatives of the Polish Supply and Reconstruction Mission from 1945 to 1947. During that time, Poland obtained the use of a \$90,000,000 credit from the Export-Import Bank.

A spokesman for the law firm said that at the time, Mr. Acheson was Undersecretary of State, and was in no way connected with the deal. The spokesman said the firm concluded its dealings with Poland soon after the State Department accused the Communists of fixing an election.

Other Hill developments:

## RANKIN

Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee have voted, in effect, to bar Rep. John E. Rankin (D., Miss.) from the House Un-American Activities Committee. Actually, the vote was on a motion to keep chairmen of major committees from serving on other committees. But the effect was to oust the Mississippian from the Un-American group since he is slated to head the Veterans Affairs Committee. However, the motion still is subject to approval of the Democratic caucus.

## FOOD STAMPS

Congress may be asked to authorize a food stamp plan to improve the diet of low-income families. The Agriculture Department would like to try out the scheme on an experimental basis. Sen. George D. Aiken (R., Vt.) has introduced a bill under which the Government would help pay the food bill of low-income families.

## PRESIDENTIAL PAY

President Truman's chances of getting a salary boost look good. House Democratic Leader John W. McCormack says legislation to increase the President's pay will be one of the first matters considered by the House. A Senate group already has proposed the Chief Executive's salary be hiked from \$75,000 to \$100,000, and that he be given a more liberal expense account. Congress will have to act before the Jan. 20 Inaugural, if at all, because the President can't have his pay raised during the term to which he has been elected.

## ECONOMIC REPORT

Sen. Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D., Wyo.) called for early congressional consideration of the proposals made in President Truman's economic report. He promised full co-operation of the Joint Congressional Economic Committee, which he will head. Sen. O'Mahoney also said Mr. Truman's economic report yesterday should quell Republican fears that the Chief Executive is leading the nation into Socialism.

G.I.R.-7

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## A Big Day for Acheson



Dean Acheson (left) was attending a meeting of the Hoover Commission here yesterday when his appointment as Secretary of State to replace Gen. Marshall was announced. First thing then was this picture showing the former president congratulating the new Cabinet member.



After that, Secretary Acheson took a walk in Lafayette Park with James E. Webb, former budget director, who was named Undersecretary of State yesterday, replacing Robert Lovett, resigned. The day was balmy and the cameramen out in force.



As Bernie Baruch, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Webb discussed weighty matters informally on a bench in the park.

# THE DAYBOOK

By TRIS COFFIN

**D**EAN ACHESON, the tall and elegantly-moustached secretary of state, is quietly marshaling his forces for a show down and truce in the cold war. In the few weeks Acheson has been on the job, the whole strategy has been shifted, very much on the qt.



Tris Coffin

The secretary is lining up every diplomatic weapon in the book—economic warfare (preventing needed materials from getting to eastern Europe); hard-hitting propaganda to create unrest throughout the Communist empire, and a defensive alliance (the Atlantic pact)—to force Russia off her high horse. Then, but not until then, there can be a meeting of the big-shots of east and west to talk things over.

When Gen. George C. Marshall was running the show, the tactic was from another book. The idea then was to keep on the pressure of the "cold war" until Russia collapsed in a heap from internal weakness. There was a lot of big talk around the department about revolution sweeping the Communist empire in 10 to 15 years.

**B**UT the new secretary doesn't think the "cold war" has to be pushed that far—that Russia will calm down once she gets it through her noodle that the west means business. President Truman goes along with this with an approving nod of his head.

Two dumb plays by the Russkies almost ruined the plot. The first was the lofty, it's-up-to-you, bud tone of Joe Stalin's replies to the Kingsbury Smith questions.

Dean Acheson was spitting mad, because this exchange outside diplomatic mail put him right on the spot. Secretary Acheson's press conference soon after was the most sizzling verbal shot yet from the State department. Acheson was burned up because any attempt by him to improve American-Russian relations would look like mealy-mouthed appeasement brought on by the Stalin statements.

Second, the phony trial of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary and religious prosecution elsewhere in the Balkans aroused an important segment of American opinion to a fever

**A**GE OF MIRACLES—There was a miraculous conversion at a congressional committee hearing.

Two scholarly members of the President's council of economic advisers were on the stand. Hour after hour until heads were nodding, Rep. Robert Rich, the Pennsylvania manufacturer and sharp foe of government controls, was after them.

Almost everyone else in the big House caucus room had lost interest, except peppy Joe O'Mahoney, chairman of the joint economic committee. A

slow smile spread over his face as he listened intently.

He interjected, "Unless the government acts to restrain the spiraling process, there will be no means of stopping it, and prices will go up and up."

Congressman Rich said thoughtfully, almost to himself, "I am thinking that, but not out loud. If you don't stop it, or take some means to stop it, we are just going on and on. You are going to get a depression, or something else is going to bust." He added gloomily, "You mark my words on it."

Sen. O'Mahoney sat bolt upright and said happily, "This is a most interesting session, because we have quite evidently developed a convert from a most unexpected source—the congressman from Pennsylvania."

**L**ESSON IN POLITICS—It hasn't leaked out before, but Scott Lucas, the Senate Democratic leader, made a secret gesture of peace to the southerners. The good-looking Illinois senator made a proposal to Dick Russell, the chairman of the Dixie rebels who won't sit quietly on the civil rights bills.

Lucas said in so many words, "I know you fellows have got to put on a filibuster show to prove to your folks you aren't being corrupted by the damyankees. Why don't you have a filibuster for the next two weeks in the Senate? We don't have anything real important on the calendar."

"I won't be tough on you. We'll adjourn the Senate every afternoon at five o'clock so you won't wear out your lungs or anyone else's patience. Then, you can quit for a while when we have the Taft-Hartley bill

ready and start again when the way is clear."

**F**ORCED SICKNESS—Harley Kilgore, the jolly West Virginia senator, had a jolt looking through his mail the other day. There, big as life, was the scrawled entreaty, "Dear Sir: This is to advise we are opposed to compulsory sickness, as proposed by our government."

To this the senator remarked, "I haven't heard about it, but if the Administration ever does get around to recommending that, the Republicans could elect even Tom Dewey."

**F**OOTNOTE TO A THREAT—The FBI has a hefty file on John Florian, the Hungarian diplomat ordered to skeedaddle from the U. S. A. He is the first secretary of the Hungarian legation in Washington.

Last summer this column revealed that Florian had threatened the life of a Canadian woman who formerly worked for the Hungarian minister. He and his goons followed this woman and her best friend, skulked in the shadows as they ate or went to movies, and told her unless she returned to the legation and kept mum, she'd be buzzard pie.

In fright, the woman fled for protection to the embassy of a western European power. She told her story in some detail to the intelligence officers and, upon request, repeated it to the FBI. The State department asked that the report be kept on ice until it was needed.

The facts won't be brought out unless Hungary raises a loud squawk about Florian's orders to "get."

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60 Mar 1 1949



# FAIR ENOUGH

AS a lawyer, Dean Acheson should be diligent to thwart violators of law at whatever embarrassment to whomsoever. He has been falsely acclaimed by a few advocates as having come through his examination by the Senate foreign relations with flying colors, on his way to the office of secretary of state.

He knows that an examiner determined to get the facts of treachery in the State department would not have been deterred by an actorish get-up and stagey declarations.

This performance did not answer the question whether Alger Hiss was disloyal, as Whittaker Chambers had charged, or acquit Acheson of knowledge of leaks.

All these people, Acheson, the Hiss brothers, Alger and Donald, Frankfurter himself, and a whole cluster of other Harvard lawyers who followed Felix to Washington made up a group within the government. Three of them refused to answer whether they were Communists lest they incriminate themselves.

ACHESON fell under justifiable suspicion when his old colleague, Adolf A. Berle, the blood-thirsty bull-twerp of the little circle, flatly said on oath that Acheson and his cozy corner were pro-Russian.

He, Berle, by a flash of revelation almost heretical in the Harvard law intellect, thought Russia was unco-operative with the United States. In 1937, Killer Berle had stamped a dainty foot at a New York political rally and shrieked that the thing to do was to put the opposition to the firing squad.

When, some years later he saw the issue of loyalty to the United States or partiality to the enemy, all he did was gossip a little, pull a pretty pout and flounce away to be ambassador to Brazil.

They didn't even give him a going-away shower. They were a vixenish lot, those Harvard law characters at the State department when sweet accord to hatred turned.

THE only way to clean them out is to throw them all out and keep them out instead of inviting back in the most powerful job the fellow who was Frankfurter's mouthpiece when he was up for confirmation for the court by the judiciary committee.

Acheson's job now is to carry out Felix Frankfurter's foreign policy as communicated to Truman through David-K. Niles in the White House.

It would be a terrible thing if Acheson were the best man we had for secretary of state. But we aren't that bad off. Even Pegler would be better.

It didn't take Pegler until 1946 to learn that you couldn't trust any Communist and that the Russian government was our enemy. It didn't take him until 1940 to observe the clannishness and the European odor of the politics of this cult, so close to the teachings of Harold Laski of London, the "apologist for communism," as the New York Times confidently calls him.

WE have a right to know why Acheson, an officer of the court, asked the House committee on un-American activities to quit questioning Sam Carp of Bridgeport, Conn., Molotov's brother-in-law, and whether he frankly believes in selective enforcement of laws against crime.

Carp said he was commissioned to spend either

By WESTBROOK PEGLER

\$200 million or \$300 million among us at a rake-off of either two or three per cent. He never had to show his books or give straight answers.

The committee had suspicions of a weekly scandal paper in Bridgeport run by a man called Leigh Danenberg which had been the smearing agent of the Roosevelt administration for years.

It was so low that even Carp, no fastidious Puritan, said he wouldn't have it in his house lest his children see it. Carp, Danenberg and Lawrence Finkelstone, their lawyer, were closely associated.

By coincidence, no doubt, the political tone of Danenberg's paper often echoed that of Communist publications, but decent Americans within its purview expressed themselves on political and moral issues only at the risk of blackguarding by this thing.

IN Sept., 1945, when the committee called Carp to go to the bottom of Carp's mysterious financing with Russian money, a call came from the State department, from "Acheson's office."

The "spokesman" was afraid the committee might cause an "international incident" by questioning Molotov's brother-in-law. Molotov was the Russian foreign minister, then in conference with James Byrnes, our secretary of state, and others in London.

Carp had been fetched down with a whole batch of New York Communists including William Z. Foster, the present boss of the party, and Benjamin J. Davis, a Negro councilman now on trial in New York.

Carp said he wasn't a Communist and knew nothing about the business of the New Deal's smear paper.

THE Roosevelt government already had signaled its favor by giving Danenberg and his wife carte blanche to tour Europe, including Russia, as liaison agents.

A special rule, nevertheless, excluded legitimate publishers of reputable American papers from all war zones because Roosevelt had so much to hide.

Of late, Danenberg lectures against restoration of the war power of the German Ruhr for use against Russia.

THE committee acquired an affidavit by Sam Carp in which he swore that one D. A. Rosoff, apparently an agent of the Soviet, loaned him \$100,000 on unsecured notes and went back to Russia; and that a Russian trading corporation called Nastorg handed him \$100,000 more.

His tax returns never were investigated, thanks to the delicacy concerning Molotov's feelings and perhaps Carp's and Danenberg's. The affidavit was signed, in pencil, as notary, by "S. J. Keating, Int. Rev. agent."

Carp plainly was \$200,000 ahead of Rosoff and Nastorg, aside from the \$200 or \$300 million. He was not registered as an agent of a foreign power. Native Americans, however, were prosecuted for technical violations of the registration law in relations with the Axis and Japan. Now Acheson goes back to the State department, this time in full command.

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Date

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Acheson  
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Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# Spy Network

By William Philip Simms

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ONE of the jobs awaiting Dean Acheson when he takes over the State Department tomorrow is to do something about Soviet espionage now rampant from Alaska to Cape Horn.

Allied intelligence has evidence that Moscow systematically is tightening up its "technical services" everywhere, especially thruout the Western Hemisphere.

This coincides with moves by the United States and Western Europe to strengthen their defenses thru an Atlantic Pact. If the East-West showdown comes, the Kremlin hopes—and is making plans—to paralyze the West by sabotage from within.

The sudden "revolution" during the Inter-American Conference in Bogota last spring, during which large sections of the Colombian capital were sacked and burned, is widely regarded as a sort of dress rehearsal.

**R**EPORTS indicate the presence of organized and well-integrated bands within every one of the 22 countries of this hemisphere. A well-trained liaison group is said to move about with facility, from country to country, on passports and papers provided by Moscow's "technical services."

Stalin, it is learned, is now copying Hitler. Nazi embassies, legations and consulates compiled lists of

German nationals living on this side of the Atlantic with the names and addresses of relatives and friends in the fatherland. By this means, overseas Germans were terrorized into acting as Nazi spies. They were warned that refusal meant punishment of their relatives back home.

Moscow is using the same method. Only the more thoro Russians are making use not only of its own overseas people but those of their satellites as well.

**S**OVIENT saboteurs in key positions thruout North and South America could paralyze port facilities, ships, railways, transports, communications, important industries and even vital stockpiles by means of a general uprising of the Bogota type.

For several years the American republics have been talking about hemisphere defense. The plan, on paper, is now well advanced. Arms are to be standardized, maneuvers synchronized and intelligence reports exchanged. But implementation is far from complete.

One of the first and most vital needs of the West, it is remarked—particularly in the Western Hemisphere—is to co-ordinate Inter-American intelligence efforts so that enemy agents and their activities in any one country quickly can be made known to all the others.

Fortunately, the new Secretary of State is no stranger to Latin America and its problems.

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# Confirmation Of Acheson Voted, 83-6

By Ferdinand Kuhn, jr.  
Post Reporter

The Senate confirmed Dean Acheson as Secretary of State yesterday by an overwhelming 83-to-6 vote.

The six who voted "no" all Republicans, were Senators Styles Bridges (N. H.), Homer Capehart (Ind.), William E. Jenner (Ind.), William F. Knowland (Calif.), William Langer (N. Dak.) and Kenneth Wherry (Nebr.).

Confirmation followed a two-hour debate in which three of Acheson's opponents flung long-familiar charges against him.

Capehart denounced him as a "Wall Streeter," Jenner held him a spokesman of an "absurd" American foreign policy, and Wherry, who has had his knife sharpened for Acheson for years, attacked him as one of the architects of UNRRA, of the so-called Morgenthau Plan for Germany and of American policy in Japan and China.

"If you go through this country and talk to the people," cried Wherry, "you will find it is common knowledge that Mr. Acheson has been an appeaser of Russia." This was the charge which Acheson himself described, at a public hearing on January 8, as "so incredible" that not even "disinterested malevolence" could have thought it up.

There was no surprise in the opposition votes of Wherry, Jenner, Capehart or of Langer, who has constantly fought against recent American foreign policy.

The real surprises were the "no" votes of Bridges and Knowland, both of whom supported the Marshall Plan and other major foreign policy decisions. Bridges' vote was believed to be a protest against the State Department's policies in China; Knowland's was a puzzle.

Almost as surprising were the votes cast for Acheson by Senator George W. Malone (R., Nev.), a

See ACHESON, Page 10, Column 3

Mr. Tolson   
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols   
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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## Acheson Given Confirmation

persistent critic of almost everything the Administration has done abroad, and by Senator Karl E. Mundt (R., S. Dak.), a former member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Mundt had suggested inviting Whittaker Chambers to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee on Acheson's alleged link with Alger Hiss.

### Connally Praises Acheson

Support for Acheson in the debate came from both sides of the aisle, and from the Democratic and Republican leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Chairman Tom Connally (D., Tex.) predicted Acheson would make "a distinguished Secretary of State" and would uphold American foreign policy "with firmness and skill." He described Acheson as "thoroughly at home" in the office of Secretary of State because of his past service as Acting Secretary.

And he called for confirmation by an overwhelming vote "that will carry a message to the entire world that he has our support."

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R., Mich.) also praised Acheson's qualifications, but warned that the Republicans would hold President Truman rather than Acheson accountable for future American foreign policy.

"I think the President's choice of his official family is more his business than ours, more his responsibility than ours," Vandenberg declared. "I personally shall leave this preponderant responsibility where it belongs, and where I can later hold it to strict nonpartisan account."

"Of course it is impossible to ask him or any other nominee what policies he will pursue, because those policies are directed by the President. Therefore, it should be made wholly obvious that we do not underwrite results in foreign policy which will flow from our confirmation."

Vandenberg then dealt with the whispers and rumors of Acheson's association with Alger Hiss. Nowhere in the evidence, he said, were there any "sinister implications" about Acheson.

### Attitude Summarized

"I have asked Mr. Acheson," Vandenberg went on, "if I might summarize his Hiss attitudes in the following single sentence, and he agrees:

"An assertion of personal friendship for the Hiss brothers; a staunch defense of Donald Hiss; a purpose to leave Alger Hiss to the courts—and total, aggressive hostility to subversion in the State Department."

Vandenberg disclosed publicly that he had "vigorously" opposed a proposal last April, presumably from President Truman, that Acheson be made the first head of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

He recalled that Congress was insisting on separating ECA from State Department control, and also on appointing "an administrator who was a proven success in large-scale business management."

"Mr. Acheson was not a large-scale business operator, and he was substantially related to the State Department," Vandenberg explained. "Therefore, I did not believe he qualified as ECA administrator under the particularly narrow and technical specifications which he had drawn for the job."

There were other tributes to Acheson yesterday—from retiring Floor Leader Alben W. Barkley (D., Ky.), who predicted a "brilliant record" for him; from Senator Brian MacMahon (D., Conn.), who called Acheson's fight for control of atomic energy "one of the great achievements of diplomacy and statecraft in our time," and from Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), a new member of the Foreign Relations Committee who said no Secretary of State in the last 15 years had been so well qualified.

Even Senator Glen Taylor (D., Idaho), Henry Wallace's running mate in the last election, said he was "mildly happy" about Acheson's appointment, because it would mean the return of a civilian at the top of the State Department.

# Washington Calling

By Marquis Childs

## Dean Acheson Takes Over

FEW MEN in American public life have had the opportunity and, at the same time, the burden of responsibility that now falls on Dean Acheson. The new Secretary of State will enter office with the confidence and friendship of the President and responsible leaders in Congress.



Childs

In the department he takes over he will find associates with whom he had worked on intimate terms while he was Undersecretary. One of the advantages in Acheson's appointment is that he begins with a broad range of experience and background.

He was in part responsible for the appointment of George F. Kennan to head the State Department's planning staff. Contrary to rumors circulated since the President appointed Acheson, the two men worked well together; in fact, when Acheson's good friend, Justice Felix Frankfurter, gave him a dinner at the time of his retirement as Undersecretary, one of two close associates present from the department was Kennan. The other was Charles E. Bohlen, now counselor of the department. Bohlen, regarded as one of the ablest and most knowledgeable experts on foreign affairs, particularly in the Russian sphere, also worked closely with Acheson.

The new Secretary will, of course, be faced with the necessity of major changes. If Walter Bedell Smith, when he ends his vacation, informs the President that he cannot for reasons of health and income return to his post as Ambassador to Russia, the President will accept his resignation willingly.

GENERAL Smith should not be asked to return. Two years and more of the solitary confinement that is the American Embassy in Moscow is enough to make the most dispassionate and objective man lose his perspective.

In other diplomatic posts abroad the United States is inadequately or badly represented. Changes, to be made gradually and tactfully, are essential.

A drastic overhaul is due also in the field of Latin-American relations. The deterioration there has gone a long way and the prestige and influence of this country have suffered greatly, as we seem to have condoned or even encouraged the

overthrow of democratic regimes by force.

Reflecting the era of hysteria and fear now happily passing, Acheson's critics have directed most of their suspicion at the possibility he might "appease" Soviet Russia. To those who followed most closely his work as Assistant Secretary and Undersecretary that was patently absurd.

Their fear is not that he will appease Russia but that he may fail to explore all the avenues, however dim and uncertain, that might lead to a negotiated armistice or, at any rate, a truce ending the cold war. To be resolute and yet not completely unyielding at a sign of change from the Kremlin is Acheson's curiously difficult position.

HOW WATCHFUL and alert he must be, while maintaining the firm course of American policy, we can know from the past. When the Russians in the spring of 1939 decided to change their approach to Nazi Germany, they did not come marching into Berlin with flags and trumpets.

An unimportant diplomat in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin gave a hint to the German Foreign Office of a desire to improve trade relations. The significance of that hint was immediately understood and the Foreign Office prepared the way for negotiations that led to the Nazi-Soviet pact of August, 1939. While that is not a happy example, it is nonetheless indicative of Russian methods.

One difficulty faced by any American Secretary of State is that public opinion has come to expect him to be Machiavelli, Metternich, St. John and Superman all rolled into one. In other words, we expect the Secretary and something called "foreign policy" to solve the world's ills, even when the world is in the midst of a revolutionary change as it is today.

That attitude was implied in much of the criticism directed at that great American, George C. Marshall, who now retires. He was handicapped, it was said, by the limitations of his military background. Of course, he was. But the critics too often overlooked the qualities of greatness that carried him through a difficult transition period.

The point is that every human being has limitations of one kind or another. There is no saintly magician who can resolve every dilemma. Acheson's qualifications and capacities are so apparent that no one should be in the least surprised when the limitations of what he can do also becomes obvious.

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols ✓
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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# Acheson to Take Oath Tomorrow or Friday; Confirmation Hailed

## Connally Construes Vote As 'Ratification of Firm, Vigorous Foreign Policy'

By J. A. O'Leary

Dean Acheson, who won Senate confirmation for Secretary of State by an overwhelming vote late yesterday, is expected to be sworn in tomorrow or Friday.

Mr. Acheson takes over the reins from retiring Secretary George C. Marshall with the experience gained as Assistant Secretary and Undersecretary during and after World War II.

Senator Connally, Democrat of Texas and Senator Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, joined in steering the appointment through the Senate against only token opposition. The vote was 83 to 6. Senator Connally is chairman and Senator Vandenberg ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Vandenberg praised Mr. Acheson and reminded his colleagues that the policies he carries out as head of the State Department will be those of President Truman. The policies of the President, the Michigan Senator added, may be "impromptu and unpredicted."

### Approval of Policy Seen

The six Republicans who voted "no" are Senators Bridges of New Hampshire, Capehart of Indiana, Jenner of Indiana, Knowland of California, Langer of North Dakota and Wherry of Nebraska.

Senator Connally construed the overwhelming vote in favor of the Acheson appointment as a "ratification of our foreign policy of firmness and vigor."

Some of the opposition to Mr. Acheson was based on a belief that, in his earlier period of service, he leaned toward appeasement.

As to Mr. Acheson's views toward Russia, Senator Vandenberg said that question could be turned around to ask what the Russians think of him. Senator Vandenberg said the answer is that they have "bitterly assailed" Mr. Acheson.

### Lovett Also Leaving

Mr. Acheson gave up the post of undersecretary 18 months ago to return to private law practice. He was replaced then by Robert A.

Lovett, who also is leaving the department now with Gen. Marshall. President Truman has nominated Budget Director James E. Webb to be Mr. Acheson's Undersecretary of State, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to act on his appointment immediately after the inaugural ceremonies are over this week.

Mr. Acheson will be the fourth Secretary of State to serve under President Truman.

The first was Edward Stettinius, who had been appointed by the late President Roosevelt and continued in office for a short time after Mr. Roosevelt's death.

Mr. Stettinius was succeeded by James F. Byrnes, former Senator and Supreme Court Justice, who resigned two years ago. He was followed by Gen. Marshall. Gen. Marshall is now in Puerto Rico recovering from a kidney operation.

### Marshall Praises Aides

Gen. Marshall, in a farewell message to State Department workers, yesterday praised their ability and rejected "aspersions" which he said had been directed their way by "some public commentators and politicians."

The general did not identify the commentators or politicians in his note to Undersecretary Lovett.

"As I will be out of the country at the time of my resignation and will not again be in the department before that date, I wish you would convey to all the personnel my very real appreciation of the support they gave me during the last two rather trying years. Please say that I especially appreciated the loyalty and good will with which they met my requests and the long hours they gave to the work."

"I am familiar with large organizations and the complications necessarily involved in their work. In complete contrast to the aspersions of some public commentators and politicians, I found talent, efficiency, energy and co-operation present in a large measure and completely at my disposal. It but remained for me to make the best of it."

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Miss Gandy *Baumgardner*

*Schmidt*

*1-1*

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# Senate Approval Won by Acheson

(Continued from First Page)

Langer of North Dakota, and Senate Republican leader Wherry.

In his statement, Acheson restated his attitude toward Donald and Alger Hiss, who were accused by former Communist Whitaker Chambers of being members of a prewar Communist "apparatus" operating in the government. Both brothers denied it.

## Takes Oath Tomorrow

As read by Vandenberg, the statement said:

"An assertion of personal friendship for the Hiss brothers, a staunch defense of Donald Hiss and a purpose to leave Alger Hiss to the courts."

Acheson will be sworn in tomorrow, succeeding Gen. Marshall, shortly after President Truman is inaugurated.

Vandenberg addressed the Senate on the nomination and its ramifications on the bipartisan foreign policy after Chairman Tom Connally (D) of Texas, of the foreign relations committee, appealed for "overwhelming" approval to show that U. S. policy abroad will be administered with "firmness and skill."

## "Unpredictable Policy"

But Vandenberg said that foreign policy as laid down by the Administration may "sometimes be quite impromptu and unpredictable." He apparently referred to President Truman's recent proposal to send Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson on a "peace mission" to Moscow.

The G.O.P. spokesman went on to say that henceforth most Republicans would be willing to leave Cabinet appointments up to the President. But thereafter, he said, the G.O.P. will hold Mr. Truman to "strict unpartisan accountability" for their performance.

# Senate Approval Won by Acheson

## Warning Sounded By G.O.P. Leaders

By United Press

The Senate confirmed Dean G. Acheson as secretary of state yesterday after Sen. Vandenberg (R) of Michigan, warned that President Truman will be held strictly accountable for Acheson's future performance.

The roll call vote was 83 to 6. The six were all Republicans.

Vandenberg, G.O.P. foreign policy spokesman in the Senate, fully indorsed Acheson and read a statement, from the secretary-designate, in which he pledged "total and aggressive hostility" to subversives in the State department.

But, obviously irked that Mr. Truman did not consult G.O.P. leaders in advance on the appointment, Vandenberg made clear that the overwhelming vote for the suave, 55-year-old diplomat did not mean the G.O.P. is ready to "underwrite the results in terms of foreign policy."

Voting against Acheson were Sens. Bridges of New Hampshire, Capehart of Indiana, Jenner of Indiana, Knowland of California,

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This clipping is from the morning edition of The Washington Times Herald

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Date

# Acheson Confirmation As Secretary of State Is Scheduled Today

## Vandenberg Is Expected To Support Nomination In Talk Before Senate

The nomination of Dean Acheson for Secretary of State is expected to go through the Senate today with not more than a scattering of opposition votes.

Democratic leaders are anxious to have the appointment approved in time for Mr. Acheson to take office Thursday, when Gen. George C. Marshall's retirement from the State Department post becomes official.

Chairman Taft of the Senate Republican Policy Committee said that group is taking no party stand on the nomination.

Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, main Republican advocate of a bipartisan foreign, is expected to give Mr. Acheson his support in a speech in the Senate floor.

### Vandenberg Plans Brief Talk.

There had been speculation that Senator Vandenberg would use that opportunity to make a major statement on the importance of a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs. But his office said he merely plans a brief discussion of Mr. Acheson's qualifications.

Such opposition as there has been to the appointment has centered mainly on Mr. Acheson's views toward Russia when he was Assistant Secretary and Undersecretary of State.

The nominee apparently set most of those doubts to rest when he told the Foreign Relations Committee he never was an "appeaser" of the Soviet Union, and criticized communism strongly as a threat to democracy and world peace.

On that subject, John Foster Dulles, a Republican who heads the American delegation to the United Nations, said yesterday there is now "less fear of war" than there was last year.

### Defense Outlays "Exaggerated."

In a copyrighted interview in the magazine U. S. News, he added: "I think there is a risk of war, but I think the risk is not so great that we should seriously jeopardize our own economic health." He said he thinks therefore, that outlays for national defense are "exaggerated" and spoke critically of "saddling ourselves with such vast armament."

Mr. Dulles gave strong backing to plans for American military aid to Western Europe. The people living close to Russia are "greatly frightened," he said, and "until those people get some military strength of their own, that fear is going to have a paralyzing effect."

The military aid program will be one of the first matters to confront Mr. Acheson if his nomination is approved as expected.

Unanimous Approval Unlikely  
Despite the lack of organized opposition, that approval is not likely to be unanimous. One Republican Senator said privately he will vote against it.

Senator Malone, Republican of Nevada said Mr. Acheson was part of the administration when there was "muddle-headed thinking" about Russia, but added:

"He says now he has got religion. Maybe it would be better to have him than to train another one all over again."

The Foreign Relations Committee postponed a hearing scheduled for today on the nomination of James E. Webb to be Undersecretary of State. No new date was set.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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## Speedy Senate Action Urged On Acheson

Dean Acheson's speedy confirmation as Secretary of State was urged upon the Senate yesterday by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Chairman Tom Connally (D., Tex.) filed a brief committee report praising Acheson's record and finding him abundantly fitted to succeed "one of the great Americans of our time, George C. Marshall."

Connally plans to bring Acheson's nomination before the Senate today, with every prospect of quick and overwhelming approval. The Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously last week to recommend his confirmation.

"It is the view of the Committee," said Connally's report yesterday, "that Mr. Acheson is exceptionally well qualified to assume the responsibilities of the high

post to which the President has nominated him.

In view of the importance of the post, and in view of Mr. Acheson's exceptional qualifications for that post, the committee expresses the hope that prompt action on the nomination may be taken by the Senate."

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols ✓
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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# Senators 'Clear' Acheson

## Examination of New Secretary by Men Who Knew Him Well Reflects Jitters

By Thomas L. Stokes

The jittery state of the world—and of us here in this country—is illustrated again sadly in the melodramatic performance that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seemingly felt compelled to put on over the nomination of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State.

Here was a man of integrity, fine character, and of proved ability in the handling of foreign affairs from long experience as Assistant Secretary and Undersecretary. He had served under three Secretaries of State. The high quality of his service was well known to members of the Senate who follow every aspect of foreign policy carefully because of their share in its direction. A great many of them have known him personally from his tour of duty as liaison for the State Department which kept him at the Capitol much of the time.



Thomas L. Stokes

Yet despite all that, despite his selection by the President of the United States as his Cabinet officer of top rank, he had to undergo the unusual—if not unprecedented—experience for an appointee to the post of coming forward and explaining himself as if he were a novice and an unknown.

Why that was so is a commentary on our strange times.

### Commentary on Period.

It was not on account of Dean Acheson, himself, or his record. It was not so much the fault of the Senate, itself. It was because of the weird and almost unreasoning hysteria whipped up over the so-called "spy cases" which has reached bounds that are not characteristic of the American people, or complimentary to them.

Senators felt themselves impelled to put Mr. Acheson on the grill publicly because of the pressure. He became a sort of scapegoat for the hysteria. His confirmation was assured, but an act of absolution was required, politics being like that.

To the reporter who walked into the huge Senate caucus room for this public confessional, there was something familiar about the atmosphere. With some differences and some restraints, it was comparable to the atmosphere of another caucus room in the House Office Building across the Capitol Plaza where the Un-American Activities Committee stages its shows.

There was the same tingling excitement in the air, the same line of people waiting to get in to see the spectacle, the same klieg lights, the same photographers bustling about snapping all and sundry. And, for the proper touch, just as the hearing started, a former member of the House Un-American Activities Committee slipped into the

spectators—Senator Mundt, Republican, of Nebraska.

### Atmosphere Different.

Fortunately, it was a somewhat different atmosphere after the proceedings got underway, for this is a different breed of men. But the Senators went through their paces. It must be said for them that they were somewhat embarrassed and apologetic as they put their questions with an air of this-hurts-me-more-than-it-hurts-you.

Mr. Acheson had consideration for their discomfort, and he maintained his good humor and disciplined diplomatic calm as he answered precisely, and in detail, all their questions. He went fully into his relations with the Hiss brothers, Donald and Alger, glad for the opportunity finally to clear up all sorts of misconceptions and present the facts, and fully conscious, since he has been long in public service, that this unfortunately would be the headline—as it was—for early editions.

In the background always of the give-and-take, though rarely mentioned, was Soviet Russia. To delicately phrased inquiries he made it known he was no "appeaser" and, in proof of his attitude toward Russia, he read excerpts from his speeches, like a young man taking an examination to be a "G" man. Senator Vandenberg helpfully brought out that he had been denounced, in Moscow, which seems now to be the test.

A Secretary of State is concerned with all sorts of affairs all over the world, and they change from day to day, but Russia now was the only bother. It got to the point where, you would not have been much surprised if someone had asked bluntly when the war was going to start.

Then, the day after, the new Secretary of State was grilled for two and a half hours privately in secret session. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee afterward showed its view of all the fuss and fury by voting unanimously for Mr. Acheson's confirmation, but not before a final act of absolution, which was to make public a couple of sentences of Mr. Acheson's secret testimony severely condemning communism and all its works.

Now he was 100 percent pure. So were they.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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# Senate Group Backs Acheson Unanimously

## Action Follows His Denunciation of Communism; Quick Confirmation Seen

By Ferdinand Kuhn, jr.  
Post Reporter

After hearing Dean Acheson denounce communism as an evil and a danger, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously yesterday to approve his appointment as Secretary of State.

Chairman Tom Connally (D., Tex.) said he would seek quick Senate confirmation, probably next Tuesday. All signs indicated an overwhelming vote for Acheson on the Senate floor.

### Two Sentences Made Public

The committee questioned him yesterday behind closed doors on his friendship with the Hiss brothers, his views on relations with Russia and other policy matters which Connally described to reporters as "intimate and delicate." Only two sentences of his testimony were made public, as follows:

It is my view that communism as a doctrine is economically fatal to a free society and to human rights and fundamental freedoms. "Communism as an aggressive factor in world conquest is fatal to independent governments and free peoples."

He was asked, according to one member, whether he would still regard Alger Hiss as a "friend" if the New York court convicted Hiss of perjury. Acheson was said to have answered that a conviction would end the friendship on his part.

### No Open Dissension

Members of the committee said there was no dissension about approving him, although some of the Republican members seemed far from enthusiastic in their questioning of Acheson at Thursday's public hearing.

The 13-0 vote showed that Acheson had won the votes of Senators Alexander Wiley (R., Wisc.) and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa), who had asked him somewhat critical questions on Thursday.

One or two Republican Senators not on the committee conceded that any fight against Acheson was hopeless.

Senator George W. Malone (R., Nev.) said he would vote against confirmation; Senator Homer Capehart (R., Ind.) indicated he would like to, but added:

"I don't see any chance of beating him. I haven't seen any documentary evidence against him."

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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*W. H. H. W. G.*  
*Schultz*

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**Senators Are Told  
His Public and  
Private Record Both  
Refute Detractors**

By Ferdinand Kuhn, jr.  
Post Reporter

Dean Acheson hit back at his detractors yesterday for suggesting that he might conduct a weak or appeasing foreign policy as Secretary of State.

"I think I know something of the need in American foreign policy for steadiness and continuity," he said at a dramatic open hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"The things that I read about myself as an appeaser seem to me so incredible that I cannot believe that even disinterested malevolence could think them up."

**Stands on Record**

He told the committee that his entire public and professional record disproved the attitudes that had been charged to him.

He avowed his continuing friendship for Donald and Alger Hiss, but said Alger had never been his assistant in the State Department. He told the committee that former Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle, jr., had confused the two brothers in testimony that aroused the House Un-American Activities Committee last year.

For almost two hours Acheson answered questions quietly, patiently, but now and then with acid in his words. The big caucus room was jammed with press and public.

**Hearing Sets Precedent**

Research by the Senate library failed to turn up a single precedent in all American history for a public hearing over anyone's confirmation as Secretary of State.

There was no doubt after yesterday's hearing that the committee would approve Acheson's nomination without delay. Chairman Tom Connally (D., Texas), said his Committee probably would vote this morning, with the prospect that the Senate would confirm him early next week, and that Acheson could be sworn in on Inauguration Day.

Acheson seemed relieved and took a long breath when Connally asked him about his reported close association with Alger Hiss.

"I have waited a long time for an opportunity to answer this question," Acheson began.

"As a preliminary matter, I should like to state to the committee that my friendship is not easily given and it is not easily withdrawn."

**Friendship Continues**

"In this instance Donald Hiss was my assistant in the years when I was Assistant Secretary of State. He served me and served his country with complete fidelity and loyalty. He and I became, and we remain, close and intimate friends. He is now my partner with everything that that relationship implies."

"Alger Hiss was an officer of the Department of State during most of the time that I served there. During this time he and I became friends and we remain friends."

"I do not wish to detract in any way from that statement when I see ACHESON, Page 8, Column 3."

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ACHESON—From Page 1

## Acheson Hits At Detractors

point out, as I shall have to point out in a moment, that he was not my assistant, he was never my assistant and, except for the last few months of his service when I was Acting Secretary of State, he never reported to me in any way."

Then Acheson read from a record of the Un-American Activities Committee hearing in which Berle was quoted as having warned Acheson about Alger Hiss in 1941. He said it was clear that Berle's memory went "badly astray" and was "quite wrong."

Acheson's story, told with a wealth of dates and supporting detail, was briefly as follows:

When he became Assistant Secretary early in 1941 he appointed Donald Hiss as his assistant. "A few days or a few weeks later," in February or March, Berle sent for Acheson and told of "information" that one of the Hiss brothers had associations which would be "embarrassing" to Acheson in his new office.

Acheson said it was important to know which brother he had in mind; Berle declined to tell him. Acheson then asked the nature of the "information"; Berle again declined to tell, "for security reasons."

Acheson then saw Donald Hiss, asked him to reflect carefully, and asked whether he had any "associations" that might throw light on Berle's story. Donald Hiss took time to reflect, and said he did not know what the question referred to. He offered to resign as Acheson's assistant if there should be any "embarrassment," but Acheson refused.

### Other Assignments

In 1941 (Acheson went on) Donald Hiss worked chiefly on financial controls imposed on Axis and Axis-occupied countries and, for a time, on Soviet Russia.

"I had no dispute with Mr. Berle about anything in the fall or summer or other time in 1944," he said, dealing with the alleged dispute over policy toward Russia. He himself was away at the Bretton Woods conference for most of the summer of that year; he was away at another conference in Montreal until October 8, and Berle left on November 1 to attend the aviation conference at Chicago.

"Therefore," Acheson declared, "whoever had any controversy with Mr. Berle at that time, it was not I."

He was asked whether he would give Assistant Secretary John E. Peurifoy, in charge of State Department administrative matters, the same "free hand" that Secretary Marshall did in weeding out possible subversive employes. Acheson answered with a grin, that Peurifoy had been his own executive assistant and his own choice as Assistant Secretary.

### Comments on Disloyalty

"You don't want and haven't wanted any disloyal aides in the State Department?" Connally asked.

"Of course not," was the answer. Acheson added that it would be improper for him or the committee to comment in any way "on the Alger Hiss matter which is now before a United States court"—namely, the indictment for perjury.

Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa) asked him whether he had anything to do with the resignation of Joseph Panuch, formerly active in personnel security in the State Department. Acheson briskly replied, without explanation, that he advised Secretary Marshall to accept Panuch's resignation.

Much of yesterday's question dealt with the foreign business Acheson's law firm, especially its legal work for the Polish government from October, 1945, to March, 1947. Acheson explained that he was not connected with the firm in any way at that time, though it kept his name in its title.

He recalled that Poland had received a 40-million-dollar loan for coal cars and 50 million for surplus property, with State Department approval but over the protests of Arthur Bliss Lane, then Ambassador in Warsaw. The State Department later ordered the surplus property loan suspended.

He told the committee he never had any conversation with any of his former partners on the subject of the Polish loan. In all his 8½ years at the State Department, he said, he had only one call from his firm—because a client who was an exporter wanted to know "whether the State Department would be pleased if he stopped sending materials to Japan."

### Million Dollar Fee Denied

For 30 years, Acheson told Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R., Mich.) his firm had done "considerable" foreign business. For its work on the Polish loan over an 18-month period, he said the firm received not "a million" dollars, as had been reported by a radio commentator, but \$50,175.

He reported other foreign business by his firm, and the fees charged, as follows:

For helping the government of Iran in its case before the United Nations Security Council, from 1946 to 1948, \$25,000.

For legal help in compensation cases brought by Danish shipowners from July, 1941, to the present, \$16,000.

For legal help to the Greek government in its case before the

This clipping is from  
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United Nations and in its loan application to the Export-Import Bank, since February 8, 1947, \$40,000.

For legal help to Finnish ship-owners since December, 1945, \$50,000.

For legal help to the Arabian-American Oil Company on tax matters, beginning in December, 1946, \$7,500.

Acheson said his firm had also been retained by the Royal Swedish Air Board, regarding the purchase of materials, and by the government of Colombia, regarding defaulted bonds.

Repeating that he had no connection with the firm at any time during his service with the State Department, he said he had confined his legal work in the past 18 months to matters actually before

the courts. When he is confirmed as Secretary of State, he said, he will ask the firm to drop his name from its title.

Toward the end of the long examination Vandenberg mentioned "the rather universal debate on our policies toward Russia," and asked whether Acheson could make a general statement of his attitude.

Acheson was careful to keep his reply general, although he said he would gladly be more specific in a closed hearing. He spoke of the "worry and regret" of many people that President Truman was about to lose Secretary Marshall's "powerful help and support."

"No one can take General Marshall's place," he said, "yet someone who has worked under him can do his best with the strength

and ability that are given him to follow General Marshall's example."

Reminding the committee that "a man is the product of his past," Acheson said he had re-examined about 100 speeches and statements on foreign policy he had made since 1939, and read a few excerpts for the record.

One was a speech at Yale in November, 1939, urging preparedness against aggression and help to the free countries resisting totalitarian aggression. Another was a speech in New York in June, 1940, warning that irresolution in foreign policy would be fatal for the United States.

Still another was the much-debated speech at Madison Square Garden in November, 1945, under the auspices of the Council for

Soviet-American Friendship, in which he criticized Soviet attacks on the liberties of neighboring peoples. This speech, he said, was written in the State Department, approved by Secretary Byrnes and delivered on department orders.

Finally, he read his statement of February 10, 1947, that Soviet foreign policy was "an aggressive and expanding one"—a remark that brought a formal protest from Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov.

Answering Senator Alexander (R., Wis.), Acheson said that as an individual he favored a constitutional change whereby treaties would be ratified by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

The only other witness yesterday was former Secretary of State

Edward R. Stettinius, who flashed his well-remembered smile on the committee and read a brief prepared statement praising Acheson.

Stettinius called him a man "of unusual intellectual brilliance, of great personal integrity, forceful and courageous in meeting problems."

"Only frivolity or irresponsibility on the part of any member of the public," he said, "could suggest that Mr. Acheson was ever actuated by anything except a desire to further the honor and safety of his country."

Thereafter the committee went into brief executive session, and decided to hear Acheson behind closed doors this morning before voting on his confirmation.

This clipping is from

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Washington Post 1/11/49

# Acheson, <sup>3</sup> in Job Bid, Cites Anti-Soviet Acts

By Rob F. Hall

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13. — Dean Acheson today paraded his record of anti-Soviet actions as proof of his qualifications for the post of Secretary of State. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on his appointment, Acheson told how he had suspended loans to the Polish government and recalled the speech he had delivered at Madison Square Garden in November, 1945, which had an anti-Soviet bias.

He referred to a statement he once made that "Russian policy is aggressive and expansionist," and recalled how Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in a protest to the Secretary of State, called it "inadmissible and rudely hostile."

Acheson stressed the fact that President Truman had announced that his appointment meant no change in the present cold war foreign policy, and asserted he would seek to follow the example of the present secretary, Gen. George Marshall. He said he recognized the need for "steadiness and continuity on foreign policy."

Acheson's testimony obviously pleased most of the members of the Senate committee, including the Republicans, but it failed to satisfy a small group of members of pro-fascist organizations.

"A lot of dishwater," a heavy blonde woman told the Daily Worker. "Why didn't they ask him about Yalta and Teheran?"

She said her group put the stiffest kind of pressure on Sen. Karl Mundt (R-SD) over the week-end, and they were deeply disappointed that he had not organized more open opposition to Acheson.

The South Dakota Senator, who was active in staging the pumpkin spy melodrama involving Acheson's associates, stood quietly in the rear of the hall

The blonde woman's group identified itself as "a lot of patriotic societies," planted questions with Mundt which he was supposed to plant with Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), she said. Hickenlooper did ask some questions, but she said she considered them pretty weak.

"Where's that screwy dame? she was supposed to do something," the blonde complained. She evidently referred to Agnes Waters, leader of a fascist group called "We, The Mother," who was scheduled to stage a one-woman demonstration.

Statements have been submitted to the committee by Mrs. Waters and Merwin K. Hart.

Acheson expressed himself as disturbed at reports that he was an "appeaser" of the USSR, and read into the record excerpts from speeches he made during the past 10 years to disprove the appellation.

After the hearing, chairman Tom Connally (D-Tex) predicted the committee would vote to confirm Acheson tomorrow. He said he believed the vote would be close.

Although he testified that he had severed all connections with his law firm—Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb—when he entered the government in 1941, Acheson detailed the activities of

the firm in representing foreign clients. His firm was retained by the Polish supply mission in 1945 and 1946, he said, and helped prepare its applications for Export-Import Bank loans of about \$90 million.

He himself canceled these credits, however, Acheson said.

But Acheson took pains to point out that most of the firm's foreign clients were hostile to the Soviet Union. These included: Iran, the Danish Ambassador, owners of nine Finnish ships, the Charge d'Affairs of the Greek Embassy, the Royal Swedish Air Force, the Republic of Colombia, and the Arabian American Oil Co.

*Handwritten signatures and initials, including "Schmidt" and "J.P."*

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# Acheson of Standard Oil, Helped Flapmy

By Art Shields

Dean Acheson, the incoming Secretary of State, was one of the arch appeasers of Japanese imperialism shortly before Pearl Harbor. Acheson is better known as an author of the Marshall Plan to build up Germany and control Europe's economy.

His appeasement of fascist Japan came first, however. The new Secretary of State appeased the Japanese war lords in a peculiarly deadly manner when he insisted on their right to get American aviation fuel.

**BOMBED CHINESE WOMEN**  
Some of the fuel was used to bomb Chinese women and children. Much of the rest of it was stored for the coming attack on America.

The fuel was furnished by the Standard Oil (Rockefeller) interests, which Acheson represented as a corporation attorney before he became a State Department representative.

Rep. John M. Coffee (D-Wash) exposed this rotten oil imperialism in a House speech in 1943. He told how Acheson had first served the oil interests when he appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court in defense of the Ethyl Corp., then under fire in an anti-trust suit.

The Ethyl Corp., which Acheson was defending, had been set up by the duPont firm and the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey to make high octane gas.

Illegal price fixing was the government's charge against Acheson's client.

## REMEMBERED STANDARD

Acheson didn't forget his Standard Oil friends when he became Assistant Secretary of State in 1941. Coffee tells how Acheson came before an exclusive session of the House Rules Committee in late spring of that year to oppose Coffee's anti-appeasement resolution.

Coffee's resolution would have shut off the flow of oil products to Japan from American refineries.

Acheson admitted that the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (his former client) and British oil firms had stepped up their shipments of oil to Japan from their refineries in Indonesia by more than four-fold.

The oil flow had swollen from a bottom of 400,000 tons monthly in 1939 to 1,800,000 tons. The Japanese must not be offended by cutting off this oil stream, Acheson argued behind the closed doors of the House Rules Committee.

**AGAIN IN 1947**  
Acheson was backing the Japanese ruling class again in May 1947 in a speech foreshadowing the Marshall Plan that was announced the next month.

The United States, said Acheson, who was Undersecretary of State at that time, "must push ahead with the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan—upon which the ultimate recovery of the two continents largely depends."

Germany has since been getting the lion's share of Marshall Plan exports to Europe.

Acheson is also the chief author of the so-called Baruch plan, which seeks to give the American imperialists the monopoly of the atomic bomb and atomic energy under the pretense of United Nations control.

## BEST DRESSED DIPLOMATS

The new Secretary of State will be one of the best dressed diplomats in American history. The family money, however, does not come from the Acheson side, al-

though his father, the Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut, lived comfortably enough. It comes from a maternal grandfather, who ran a big brewery in Canada. With this money behind him Acheson went through the exclusive boys' school at Groton, and afterward took degrees at both Yale and Harvard.

He broke with President Roosevelt in 1933, several months after becoming Undersecretary of the Treasury. He objected to the President's gold policies, he said.

He came back—as Assistant Secretary of State—in 1941 after eight years of lucrative corporation law practice. He quit as Undersecretary of State in 1947 after the Marshall Plan had been launched.

## SHIFT IN BALANCE

Acheson will find the balance of forces in the struggle between the peoples and the imperialists have been changed considerably since he stepped out of the State Department in 1947.

Rob F. Hall, in the Daily Worker of March 21, 1947, says that Acheson was interrupted by a question when he was asking the House Foreign Affairs Committee for more aid for Chiang Kai-shek.

What would the State Department do if Chiang should be facing defeat? A Congressman asked.

Acheson replied: "I should hope that the Chinese government would never be in that position, and I see no reason why it ever should be."

The incoming Secretary of State was also a losing forecaster on Greece, where he expected American arms to crush the people's armies.

## FALSE PROMISE

Acheson also promised the House Committee that no American troops would be used to train Greeks.

The facts belie this promise today.

President Truman's "cold war" against peace has been rough on Acheson's predecessors. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, a House of Morgan magnate, had to be scrapped in less than a year after the "cold war" began. James F. Byrnes, the southern polltaxer, was dropped a year later. And the five-star Gen. George Marshall has just faded out.

It remains to be seen how long the fourth foreign policy man will last.

*Clippings  
White  
Schiff*

This is a clipping from Page 6 of the Daily Worker

Date 1-14-49  
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MAR 16 1949

*FIVE B*



61

# Senate Group O.K.'s Acheson by 13 to 0

By International News Service

The Senate foreign relations committee today unanimously approved nomination of Dean Acheson as secretary of state after hearing him denounce communism as a "fatal" world influence.

The committee's 13-to-0 vote indicated a continuation of the nation's bipartisan foreign policy.

Acheson's nomination to succeed Gen. Marshall, whose resignation because of ill health is effective Jan. 20, now goes to the Senate, where confirmation by a large majority is expected.

The committee will report its action to the Senate next Monday, with confirmation of Acheson due Tuesday.

### Closed Session Held

Chairman Connally (D) of Texas, announced the unanimous vote after a two-hour closed meeting during which Acheson outlined his stand on top policy matters.

Connally said the committee will meet Tuesday to consider the nomination of James E. Webb, retiring budget director, as undersecretary of state.

Speedy confirmation of Webb, who will replace acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, also is anticipated.

The committee kept secret all of Acheson's testimony at the executive session except an excerpt making clear his attitude toward communism.

Acheson told the committee:

"It is my view that communism as a doctrine is economically fatal to a free society and to human rights and fundamental freedoms.

### Pledge Renewed

"Communism as an aggressive factor in world conquest is fatal to independent governments and to free peoples."

Acheson, at a public hearing yesterday, renewed his pledge to carry out the present United States policy in the "cold war" against Russia.

File

G. I. R. - 7

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This clipping is from  
the evening edition of  
The Washington Times Herald  
1-14-49  
Date

# This Changing World

## Revising His Views as Undersecretary, Acheson Did Best to Counter Soviet Policy

By Constantine Brown

The appointment of Dean Acheson, one of the most controversial figures in Washington, as Secretary of State is not likely to raise more than a mild storm in the Senate.

While some Senators may criticize President Truman's decision to put the former Undersecretary of State in the top-ranking cabinet position, there is not the slightest doubt that the nomination will be confirmed overwhelmingly.



Constantine Brown.

There is no doubt, even in the minds of those who do not like Mr. Acheson's "liberalism," that he is brilliant and able. When he was Assistant Secretary of State in the Roosevelt administration he was in charge of economic affairs, and was assigned by Cordell Hull as official lobbyist for UNRRA.

Mr. Acheson's sympathies once lay somewhat toward the left, but the difference between him and so many violent appeasers and pro-Russians in Government office was that while he was genuinely convinced that the U. S. S. R. would accept the extended hand of America's friendship, others followed that policy because it was opportune, politically, to do so.

### Friend of Frankfurter.

His close friendship with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter gave more strength to his conviction that reactionaries in this country wanted to disturb our relations with Moscow. When Mr. Acheson was seen frequently walking to the State Department, in company of Justice Frankfurter it used to be said: "There goes Dean, taking orders for the day from Felix."

It was because of this conviction that only close friendship with the U. S. S. R. could offer a solution of world problems that Mr. Acheson went a long way to keep the so-called liberals—Alger Hiss and some others—in their positions in the State Department. He was so convinced of their honesty of purpose that he treated as "piffle" and mere Washington rumor—just as John Foster Dulles did—the reports that there had been dangerous leaks of secret information from the State Department.

But from the time he assumed the more responsible position as Undersecretary of State, and as such began to learn more of the acts of life in our relations with the U. S. S. R., he experienced a change of heart.

This change of attitude, unfortunately, applied not to his feelings toward his friends and proteges in the State Department, but rather to his understanding of where Russia stood and what the Kremlin intended to do.

From certain of his actions as Acting Secretary under Secretary of State Byrnes—who like his successor, Gen. Marshall, spent more time abroad than at home—Mr. Acheson showed that he appreciated the Soviet game and attempted to counteract it, within the limit of his powers.

In the fall of 1946—and this story has never been published before—reports from Turkey indicated that the Soviets were massing important forces on the Turkish border. The situation was strained, and it looked as if Moscow were ready to fall on the Turkish armies, then poorly prepared.

Mr. Acheson drafted a strong note and presented it to President Truman, who approved it without hesitation. It said, in effect, that any attack on Turkey would be considered by this country as an attack on the United Nations and the United States. The note, which Mr. Acheson took care to see retained its strong expressions, was dispatched to Moscow and had the desired effect.

### Spoke to Iranians.

Similarly, at the time when the Russians were moving rapidly toward Teheran and it looked as if the Soviet would gobble up Iran, Mr. Acheson made a short speech at a small dinner party given by the Iranian Ambassador in which he said that so long as the Iranian people themselves were willing to resist aggression, and to show their determination to live freely and independently, the United States Government would live up to the solemn pledges made to Iran by the United States, Britain and Russia in the Teheran conference.

The substance of these remarks was cabled immediately to Teheran by the Ambassador and resulted in a stiffer Iranian attitude toward Russia, which was behind the advancing armies of the Azerbaijan rebels.

These facts are known only to a handful of people, but show that as soon as Mr. Acheson was given a position of responsibility he put his liberal inclinations to one side and acted more sternly than many "non-liberal" Secretaries of State have acted.

Mr. Acheson was not prompted by any one to take such steps. He acted on his own initiative, and while "covering" many leftists in the State Department, he did the same thing with respect to the few "rightists," who were the targets of violent attacks by pro-Soviet groups both inside and outside the administration.

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols ✓
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Free*  
*W. H. ...*  
*J. ...*  
*...*

G.I.R. 7

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File

### Mr. Acheson's Return

Everybody on earth, including the President, is insisting that the appointment of Dean Acheson as secretary of state means nothing new. American policy toward Russia hasn't changed and won't change. We're going to be tough as ever; no "softness."

All of which may be true enough. While Acheson in his early days in the State Department was rated with the group that was not unfriendly to Russia, he has taken a far sharper line in recent years. As undersecretary of state, he called Russian intentions "aggressive" in his testimony before Congress on aid to Greece. He might justly be called one of those who contributed to development of the cold war.

Yet, when all this is said, the fact remains that something has happened in the administration's approach to relations with Russia. The President has placed the State Department back in the hands of a New Dealer, not a flaming one to be sure, but a New Dealer nevertheless. He has placed it in the hands of a man experienced in diplomacy, one who worked with FDR and was long close to Sumner Welles. And, serving to emphasize at least a new look, is the departure of Undersecretary of State Lovett.

Most important of all, the President has made a sharp break with his habit of turning to the generals whenever he had a hard job to fill. That, in itself, is profoundly important and surely must serve as a warning that foreign policy is to be returned to where it belongs—the White House and the State Department—instead of the Pentagon.

All this is said without the slightest disrespect for the character and integrity of Secretary Marshall, whose place in history has long since been made secure.

The meaning of the Acheson appointment also will not escape the intemperate members of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. They can, if they want to, read into the appointment a sardonic reiteration of the President's "red herring" estimate of the committee's work.

me

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Acheson is known to favor a strong policy toward Russian "aggression," but he does not belong among the blind Russophobes who have been riding high and often rough-shod. As a lawyer, he represented Lauchlin Currie, former presidential assistant, when Currie was under the fire of the Thomas committee because Elizabeth Bentley had mentioned him as a possible source of some of her information.

The replacement of Lovett with James E. Webb is a welcome indication of the President's determination not to let the military run away with us. As director of the budget, Webb, more than anyone else, helped Mr. Truman battle the Pentagon's demands for a \$25,000,000,000 budget against the \$14,000,000,000 ceiling the President had set. The latter figure is appalling enough to merit the kind of scrutiny Webb can and should give it if we are to avoid the disaster of a brass-knuckled foreign policy.

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Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## They Have New Jobs in Washington



Dean Acheson

... will serve as secretary of state following resignation of Gen. George Marshall.



James E. Webb

... has been appointed as under secretary of state, succeeding Robert A. Lovett.



Frank Pace

... will replace Webb as budget director. He was formerly assistant director. Associated Press Photos

JAN 1940

NEW YORK STAR

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Page 2

# GOP Fight On Acheson Shaping Up

By ALEXANDER H. UHL  
STAR Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8—The possibility of a Republican fight against confirmation of Dean Acheson as secretary of state began developing today.

No senator said flatly that he would vote against confirmation, but there were enough demands that Acheson's record be carefully scanned to indicate that the GOP looked with decided coolness at the President's appointment.

Key man on the Republican side was Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg (Mich.), former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. While referring to Acheson as "a distinguished American with wide experience in foreign affairs and with many proved qualifications for this critical responsibility," Vandenberg warned:

"I expect the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will fully explore his viewpoints when it considers the nomination."

Another powerful Republican leader, Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry

(Continued on Page 2)

# Acheson Faces 'Full' Inquiry

(Continued from Page 1)

(Neb.), the GOP floor leader, said flatly that he was just as much opposed to Acheson now as he was in 1945, when Wherry was a sharp critic of Acheson's influence in the State Department.

(In New Haven, where he and Acheson attended a meeting of the Yale Corporation, Sen. Robert A. Taft [R., O.] said Saturday that he "will certainly vote" for Acheson's confirmation.)

Still another Republican, Sen. Homer E. Capehart (Ind.) declared that he and some of his Republican colleagues felt that the "Bipartisan foreign policy" was dead and that they were ready for a fight on the Administration's foreign policy proposals.

## Mundt Wants 'Assurance'

Sen. Karl Mundt (R., S. D.), formerly a top figure on the House Un-American Activities Committee, said that he wanted assurance that Acheson would clean Communists out of the State Department. Mundt said that many of the 134 persons dismissed by the State Department "for security reasons" during the past year and a half "were recruited or retained at the time of Mr. Acheson's service as under secretary."

He wanted such men as former Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, Jr. and Whittaker Chambers to be called by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Despite administration denials, Washington diplomatic circles look on Acheson's appointment as meaning the beginning of a new cautious approach to ending the cold war with Russia.

These circles believe that in spite of the rebuff to President Truman over the Vinson "mission to Moscow," Truman has never given up the idea that there is still hope, however feeble, for an accommodation with Russia. They regard as highly significant the President's emphatic repetition at his press conference Friday that it is he who makes foreign policy.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
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Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## Problems Arising

Two main problems however, already have grown out of the President's announcement of the appointment of Acheson to succeed ailing Secretary Marshall, and of James E. Webb, budget director, to succeed Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett. These are:

¶ The possible fight against Acheson's confirmation.

¶ Necessity by the administration to counter the charges of "appeasement" and "softness" certain to be raised against any policy that carries the slightest indication that agreement with the Russians is possible.

It is known that today Acheson is one of the staunchest supporters of the "tough" policy against Russia.

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JAN 9 1948

NEW YORK STAR

EX-DAILY

Page 1 - 2

5-7-48

# Acheson Was Identified With Pro-Soviet Clique

## Observers in Capital Speculating Whether Elevation in State Department Means Softer Russian Policy.

By L. EDGAR PRINA.  
Special to THE NEW YORK SUN.

The New York Sun Bureau,  
Washington, Jan. 7.

Capital observers were speculating today whether the appointment of Dean G. Acheson as Secretary of State to succeed the retiring George C. Marshall presaged a softening of this nation's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

While the 55-year-old diplomat, a graduate of Yale and the Harvard Law School, is credited in State Department quarters as having contributed to the present United States foreign policy as regards Russia by his aid in the forging of the Marshall Plan, Acheson, nevertheless, had been identified with a pro-Soviet clique during his 1941-47 tenure in the Department.

Acheson, who is leaving his private law practice here to return to public service, served as assistant and under-secretary during the terms of Cordell Hull, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., James F. Byrnes and Marshall.

The identification of Acheson with Russophiles in the department was made by Adolph A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944.

Testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 30, 1948, Berle made the following statement in connection with Alger and Donald Hiss, ex-State Department aids, who had been accused as members of a pre-war Red espionage ring:

"I checked on the two Hiss boys. Specifically, I checked with Dean Acheson, and later I checked when Acheson became the Assistant Secretary of State and Alger Hiss became his executive assistant. . . . Acheson said that he had known the family and these two boys from childhood and he could vouch for them absolutely.

"As I think many people know, in the fall of 1944 there was a difference of opinion in the State Department. I felt that the

Russians were not going to be sympathetic and co-operative. Victory was then assured, though not complete, and the intelligence reports which were in my charge, among other things, indicated a very aggressive policy not at all in line with the kind of co-operation every one was hoping for, and I was pressing for a pretty clean-cut showdown when our position was strongest.

"The opposite group in the State Department was largely the men—Mr. Acheson's group, of course—with Mr. Hiss his principal assistant in the matter."

Donald Hiss, who was recently questioned by a Federal Grand Jury in New York investigating Communism and espionage, is an associate in Acheson's law firm—Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb.

President Truman said today that the change at the State Department helm did not mean a change in the foreign policy, especially along the conciliatory lines toward Russia.

On the other hand, the comment from Representative Sol Bloom (D.-N. Y.), who is slated to head the House Foreign Affairs Committee, appeared significant. He said that if anything can be done to improve relations with Russia, Acheson can do it.

"If any one can do anything, I think Dean Acheson—with his experience and ability in getting a good staff—can do it," Bloom said.

Meanwhile, the appointment of the suave, 6-foot-1-inch diplomat was being received warmly among scores of Federal officials

and members of Congress. The consensus was, that Acheson is capable and efficient and has a great deal of splendid experience to guide him in his tremendously responsible position.

Mr. Tolson	.....
Mr. Clegg	.....
Mr. Glavin	.....
Mr. Ladd	.....
Mr. Nichols	.....
Mr. Rosen	.....
Mr. Tracy	.....
Mr. Egan	.....
Mr. Gurnea	.....
Mr. Harbo	.....
Mr. Mohr	.....
Mr. Pennington	.....
Mr. Quinn	.....
Mr. Nease	.....
Miss Gandy	.....

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N. Y. Sun  
JAN 7 1949  
DATED  
FORWARDED BY N. Y. BUREAU

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**DEAN** ACHESON, who succeeds Gen. George C. Marshall as Secretary of State today, is a tall man (6 ft. 1 in.) with a red mustache, New England accent, and has one of the best wardrobes in Washington . . . It is hard to believe, looking at him, but he once worked as a railroad section hand for two dollars a day . . . He has brains, ability and courage. Acheson, son of an Episcopal bishop, was born 55 years ago in Middletown, Conn., attended Groton, Yale and the Harvard law school. He first entered the Government service in 1933 as Undersecretary of the Treasury, but left after a disagreement with President Roosevelt's money views. He has had an apprenticeship of six and a half years for the job he takes over today, having served in the State Department from 1941 to 1947, first as Assistant Secretary and then as Undersecretary. In the beginning, along with Mr. Roosevelt and most other officials, he was pro-Russian. His attitude became "cool" and "determined" when he saw the Soviet Union break treaties and adopt a policy which he saw as "aggressive and expanding."

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Washington Post  
 1/20/49

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April 15, 1949

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA LIAISON

Honorable Dean G. Acheson  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

*Handwritten notes:*  
...  
4/19/49  
...

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed with this letter you will find a very brief memorandum relating to Communist principles, practices, organization and achievements. It occurs to me that this confidential memorandum may be of some value to government administrators who, naturally, do not have the time to scrutinize thousands of Communist pamphlets and books.

In the event greater detail is desired, you will find attached to this memorandum a "Limited Bibliography" with some of the more pertinent pages designated.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

APR 19 1949  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosure

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EX-31

94-40672-2

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

WCS:mac

75 MAY 19 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
Tom  
John  
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RECORDED 64

June 29, 1949

94-40672-3

CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

TO: Mr. Jack D. Neal  
Associate Chief  
Division of Security  
Department of State  
515 22nd Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

FROM: John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: THE PARTISAN REPUBLICANS OF CALIFORNIA  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

This Bureau is in receipt of an eight page pamphlet entitled "Petition to the United States Congress to Impeach Dean Acheson for Conspiracy against the United States", published by the captioned organization whose address is shown thereon as P. O. Box 1281, Los Angeles 53, California. Two photostatic copies of the above-mentioned pamphlet are included herewith for your information.

The files of this Bureau reflect no information concerning the captioned group. However, it has been learned from a confidential source that the officers of the above organization are as follows:

Chairman	Robert McGauley
Vice Chairman	Dr. Robert W. Meals
Vice Chairman	Mrs. Louise Wood Watkins
Vice Chairman	Gregory G. Bern
Chairman of Legislative Committee	John Barcone
Chairman of Advisory Committee	Paul Jones
Secretary	Mrs. Shirley Shepperd
Chairman of Finance Committee	Edward Mills

b6  
b7C  
b7D

In connection with the above-listed individuals, the Bureau has no identifying information concerning McGauley, Meals, Barcone, Jones, Shepperd or Mills.

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

COMMU [redacted]

Investigation of [redacted] who may be identical. This investigation was INSPECIAL MESSENGER of allegations that [redacted] was pro-Japanese

★ JUL 1 1949 ★

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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and had made a trip to Japan in 1940 as a guest of the Japanese Government. The investigation failed to substantiate the allegations. (100-6902)

With reference to Bern, although no investigation has been conducted by this Bureau concerning him, it is known that he is the author of several pamphlets and is also the author of a book entitled "Behind the Red Mask", the advertisements of which indicate that it is anti-Communist in nature. (62-81580)

This is being furnished for your information and no dissemination should be made outside of your Department.

(Bern is reportedly a White Russian who resides in Los Angeles and who for some time has been waging his own anti-Communist, anti-Soviet campaign by writing letters to prominent figures in the Federal Government).

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 25, 1949

FROM : SAC, Los Angeles

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
Secretary of State  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed herewith please find a pamphlet entitled "Petition to the United States Congress to Impeach DEAN ACHESON for Conspiracy against the United States" put out under the name of the Partisan Republicans of California.

GREGORY G. BERN, a White Russian who has previously furnished information to this office, advised SA MERLE L. PARKER that the Partisan Republicans of California were organized in December 1948 and they are striving to rid our government of Communist elements. He stated that the officers of this organization are as follows:

Chairman	ROBERT McGAULEY
Vice Chairman	Dr. ROBERT W. MEALS
Vice Chairman	Mrs. LOUISE WOOD WATKINS
Vice Chairman	GREGORY G. BERN
Chairman of Legislative Committee	JOHN BARCONE
Chairman of Advisory Committee	PAUL JONES
Secretary	Mrs. SHIRLEY SHEPPERD
Chairman of Finance Committee	EDWARD MILLS

Mr. BERN advised that copies of this pamphlet have been forwarded to Congressmen, to the Bureau and Department of Justice officials.

Encl.  
MLP:dbt  
100-23822

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EX-138

EX-138

94 40672-3

L.A.

**Petition To The United States Congress**

**To Impeach Dean Acheson  
for  
Conspiracy Against  
The United States**

**The Partisan Republicans of California**

P. O. Box 1281 • Los Angeles 53, California

MAY 1949

94-40672-3

## CAUSE OF ACTION

When it became clear that our foreign policy is formulated by traitors in the State Department, the **PARTISAN REPUBLICANS OF CALIFORNIA** decided to take action to remedy this situation.

At a meeting held on May 5, 1949, in Los Angeles, The **PARTISAN REPUBLICANS** unanimously voted to petition the **UNITED STATES CONGRESS** to impeach **DEAN ACHESON** for conspiracy against the United States. The Political Education Committee was instructed to prepare this brief as a basis for congressional action, and it was ordered that copies of this document be sent to each and every member of the United States Congress.

It would require volumes to enumerate in detail all the treasonable acts committed under the New Deal Administration and therefore the Partisan Republicans submit this brief merely as a starting point. We herein outline the evidence which shows a consistent and undeviating support of Soviet aims to conquer the world which ipso facto proves conspiracy. It is irrelevant and immaterial whether the conspiracy is tacit or verbal.

## DEFINITION

We herein define as traitors anyone who gives aid and comfort to our enemy—in this case **INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM** which levies war against the United States and all capitalistic nations.

## WAR

The cold war began a century ago when Karl Marx issued the **MANIFESTO**. This war was intensified beginning in 1917 when Communists seized power in Russia. The Soviet objective of world domination is too well known and documented to need elaboration here.

## DECEIT AND TRICKERY

Pro-Soviet foreign policy in the United States originated with the New Deal when Roosevelt recognized a band of professional murderers and thieves as the legal government of Russia. Since then the New-Deal clique which formulates our foreign policy has invariably aided the Soviet enemy to gain strategical advantages in their war against the United States and other capitalistic nations.

It must be remembered that in August 1939 Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler concluded a pact by which they divided Poland and other nations. Hitler's troops marched into western Poland and shortly thereafter the red army seized the eastern part of that country. This attack upon Poland was used as the pretext for a declaration of war on Germany by the British and French governments. These governments declared war with Roosevelt's promise that the United States would enter the war against Hitler at a later date.

The astonishing and incredible fact is that they did not declare war on the Soviets who are equally guilty of aggression in Poland. **WHY?** Because the Soviet war criminals were protected by a treach-

erous clique within the New Deal Administration. The fight for Poland was merely a hoax and not the real reason for making war on Hitler. Indeed, upon the conclusion of World War II the very same country for which we purportedly fought the war was betrayed into the hands of the criminals in the Kremlin in the most cynical way. The red conquerors of Poland have perpetrated every crime upon that nation and have placed it under a ruthless and tyrannical rule. These facts are recited to illustrate that the clique which manipulates our foreign policy is composed of ruthless and dangerous men. Trickery and deceit is their stock in trade.

## "FREEDOM EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD"

The last war was fought under the Roosevelt slogan "Freedom Everywhere in the World" and this was another fraud: At the war's end more nations were subjugated and enslaved than before the war began. The traitors in our State Department aided the Soviets to conquer these once free nations.

Roosevelt and his collaborators, including General Marshall, agreed with Stalin — contrary to Churchill's warning — to open a second front in Western Europe. Churchill insisted on invading Germany through the Balkans to save those countries from Soviet domination. Stalin wanted to conquer the Balkan countries which had been promised to him by his pact with Hitler. Roosevelt took the place of Hitler in Stalin's scheme and handed him precisely the same countries which were promised to him by Hitler. The utter cynicism of labelling this betrayal a fight for "Freedom Everywhere in the World" clearly shows the type of criminal minds that direct international policy.

## CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

To conceal these acts from the American people, the State Department consummated secret agreements with our Soviet enemy. These agreements were not secret from other governments who were full informed. They were secret only from the American people. Thus it was a conspiracy against the United States that was entered into between the Politbureau and our own State Department officials. The secrecy of the agreements establishes the fact that the officials themselves were aware of their own guilt. Byrnes and Acheson were compelled to admit the existence of these secret agreements only after parts of the agreements leaked out in the foreign press.

## WAR CRIMINALS

The Soviets constantly commit mass murder and other crimes in every country which they conquer. These crimes were defined at Nurenberg as "Crimes Against Humanity" and those who perpetrated them were labelled "War Criminals." Germans were hanged for such crimes but the Soviet war criminals are still recognized as a legal government. Instead of prosecuting Soviet war criminals they

were even permitted to sit with us as judges of their former partners in crime.

State Department officials themselves became accomplices and accessories after the fact in the criminal plunder of Eastern Europe and China—crimes for which Germans were hanged. Stettinius, Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson and other high officials—all have had their part in accomplishing these betrayals. This fact must NOW be faced if we are to save our nation from the same fate.

The State Department tacitly approved Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries. We recall that Cordell Hull issued an ultimatum to Japan to remove Japanese troops from China where they had been for six years. No such ultimatum was ever given to Stalin—as would have been done had the same principles been universally applied.

#### BETRAYAL OF POLAND

Boleslaw Beirut, an agent of the Communist Internationale, was sent by Stalin to head the Soviet fifth column in Poland after the war. State Department officials, obedient to Stalin's wishes, hastened to recognize the Beirut "government" and withdrew recognition from the legal Polish government which was seated in London. To give a semblance of legality to this war crime it was agreed to "broaden" the Polish government and then hold "free" elections, which was another deliberate fraud. It is known to all that the Soviets do not keep their agreements.

#### BULGARIA BETRAYED

Next, the traitors in the State Department tacitly aided Soviet war criminals to enslave Bulgaria. The Soviets established a puppet government in Bulgaria, by means of force and terror, and it was made up of cruel and degenerate murderers who at once began to massacre and torture the innocent citizens. The government which Stalin imposed upon Bulgaria had no semblance of legality and the act of forcing an alien government on a free nation was defined as a "war crime" at Nuremberg. Did our State Department charge Stalin with this crime? It did not—on the contrary they approved this criminal coup and provided him with the semblance of legality. The United States entered into an agreement with the Soviets to guarantee free elections in European countries. This agreement was another hoax to justify Soviet annexation of free nations. Soviet "agreements" are worthless, and State Department officials knew perfectly well that the Soviets would never permit a free election in any nation which they dominated and no free elections were held. In spite of this the State Department hastened to recognize the Soviet puppet government in Bulgaria as the legal government and thus gave the semblance of legality to another war crime.

#### BETRAYAL OF RUMANIA

The same treacherous performance was repeated by Byrnes and his successors in the State Depart-

ment in the case of other countries. In 1945 Stalin sent one Petru Groza to head a puppet government in Rumania. The King refused to recognize Groza as prime minister and Vishinsky, who was then in Rumania, surrounded the palace with red troops and tanks and overthrew the legal government, installing Groza in its place. American citizens protested this outrage and the State Department stated that it would never recognize a government which had been forced upon the Rumanians. Was this a bona-fide promise—or just another hoax?

Byrnes went to Moscow and there delivered Rumania to the Soviet gangsters. This was done by a typical New Deal trick. They announced that the Groza government would be "broadened" to include some minor representatives from the Peasant and Liberal parties. The State Department sent Averill Harriman to Bucharest where he met Vishinsky and the deal was consummated. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr represented Great Britain at this sell-out. They agreed that an election would be held in 1946, which was merely window dressing for the outside world. Everyone knew of course that any election held in a Communist dominated nation would be a mockery.

#### BETRAYAL OF YUGOSLAVIA

A similar sell-out was perpetrated in Yugoslavia, coupled with the murder of the great Yugoslav hero and leader Drazha Mihailovich. Some members of our own Office of War Information and Office of Strategic Services were involved in this dastardly crime. They falsified reports to Washington in order to discredit Mihailovich and at the same time favorably reported on Tito. The history of this "war crime" is known and documented. In Yugoslavia the Soviets did not even pretend to hold free elections. They had there only one party candidate—the communist party. The State Department officials could not charge the Soviets with this war crime because they were accomplices in establishing the Tito government.

On December 22, 1945, Dean Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State informed Tito that the United States recognized his "government" in Yugoslavia, notwithstanding the fact that Tito had held no free elections. Acheson thus used the State Department for the purpose of approving a "war crime", as defined at Nuremberg.

#### ARGENTINA AND SPAIN

The State Department followed the communist party line in its policy toward Argentina and Spain. The Soviets manipulated this policy through Gustavo Duran, a communist and ex-member of the Soviet secret police who was appointed as Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State. The BLUE BOOK which was issued by the State Department contained charges against Peron, and these charges were taken from the exaggerated statements of Nazi agents—without any substantiation. This was inspired by the Communist party.



In 1946 our military strategy called for an alliance between the 21 American republics.

Dean Acheson and Spurrille Braden interfered with War Department plans by imposing some ridiculous conditions in this plan before they would give State Department approval.

The War Department considered it necessary to standardise our arms with the Latin American nations, as a measure against Soviet aggression. This met with vociferous protests by communists from within the United States and abroad. Acheson followed the Communist party line and opposed standardization. He wrote to Robert H. Patterson, then Secretary of War, objecting to the military plan.

In Spain the State Department obediently followed the wishes of the Kremlin. The attack on Franco began in 1946 by French communists on orders from Moscow. On April 10, 1946 the Soviet agent Lange, who claims to represent Poland at the United Nations, filed charges in the U.N. alleging that "Franco endangers international peace and security." Instead of refuting this ridiculous charge by simply stating that the Soviet aggressors represented the greatest menace to the world, the State Department representatives followed the lead of Lange and the Kremlin. These facts are too well known and documented.

Communists have constantly agitated against the recognition of Spain under the pretext that the Franco government is undemocratic, but for obvious reasons they would not apply this rule to the Soviet government. Acheson follows the communist party line again and is viciously vindictive in his animosity toward Spain. In a public statement on May 11, 1949 Acheson said that "Franco Spain must go a long way toward restoring basic civil rights before it can hope to be admitted into the family of free European nations." This is pure and unadulterated hypocrisy on the part of Acheson. Acheson has never objected to the inclusion in "the family of nations" of the professional murderers in the Kremlin.

## CHINA

The latest victim of the traitors in our State Department in China, our gallant wartime ally. These traitors are directly responsible for the betrayal of China to the Soviets.

After the Soviets had grabbed Manchuria, part of Korea, the Kurile Islands and other territory "given" them by our State Department, they paused momentarily. Stalin dared go no farther at that time lest he provoke a shooting war with the United States. It must be remembered that in March 1947 the President had made a declaration that free nations would be protected against Soviet aggression and pressure. He asked Congress for \$400 million for military aid and loans to Greece and Turkey. It was understood, of course, that this policy applied to all free nations. The "Truman Doctrine" did not mean that we intended to protect only two small nations.

## BETRAYAL OF CHINA

The Far Eastern Division of the State Department was headed by red sympathizers and thus our policy toward China reflects the wishes of the Kremlin. To achieve the sell-out of China the traitors in the State Department threw their influence behind the Soviet fifth column to aid them to penetrate the Chinese Government. Our policy in China was to protect that nation against aggression, as seen from Cordell Hull's ultimatum to Japan. Did the State Department follow this policy when China was faced with the more deadly enemy—Soviet fifth column.

In September 1945 General Hurley charged that pro-communist elements in the State Department were undermining United States policy in China. He complained that his secret reports to the President and Secretary of State were leaking out and thus caused him constant embarrassment abroad. A similar charge of "leaks" was made by Berle in testimony before the congressional committee. He said that the leaks came from Acheson and Hiss. In his testimony on December 6, 1945, Hurley exposed the treacherous activities of one John Service, a State Department official. He said that in October 1944 Service submitted a report on "How to Let Fall the Chinese Government." Hurley testified that Service's report, labelled No. 40, was circulated among Chinese communists. After the FBI took charge of the Amerasia case, it was discovered that John Service was sending copies of his confidential reports on China to Phillip Jaffe, a member of the communist spy nest. Jaffe was convicted for conspiracy to steal secret documents from various government departments. Hurley resigned because he refused to follow the Communist party line of the State Department. John Service who was arrested together with five others was recently appointed by Acheson to a key position.

Hurley asked for investigation of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, which had previously been headed by Alger Hiss. He submitted dates and numbers of documents to substantiate his accusations. Since the State Department was under the Byrnes-Acheson administration, as could be expected, they took no action.

Acheson made a statement on June 28, 1946 which revealed that there existed a plot in the State Department to facilitate the infiltration of Chinese Communists into the Chinese government. To put over the scheme, George Marshall was sent to China to force Chiang Kai-Shek into a truce with Chinese traitors under threat of withdrawing American aid. Marshall tried to force Chiang to form a coalition with the Soviet fifth column. The meaning of this outrageous, disgraceful and insulting proposal can best be illustrated if we imagine that a foreign emissary came to Washington and demanded that Truman take Gerhart Eisler, Eugene Dennis, William Z. Foster, or others (whom we now prosecute for conspiracy) into his cabinet. The fact that Marshall

was ordered to carry out such a treacherous mission shows to what extent the State Department is subservient to orders from the Kremlin. This blot on American honor can never be wiped out.

To aid the Soviet fifth column in China, the communist party began to pour out fraudulent propaganda. The "line" was that we should not aid the Chinese government because it is corrupt. Owen Lattimore, formerly an adviser to Acheson followed this line and toured the United States to discredit the Chinese government. This communist propaganda can be refuted and discredited very simply. If we were so anxious to aid the so-called corrupt government of China to fight Japan, then why should we not now aid it to fight a more deadly enemy? And speaking of corruption—what could be more corrupt than a president of the United States using the pressure of his high office to swindle a business man out of \$200,000.00 as shown in the John Hartford case?

The red sympathizers who directed our foreign policy forced Chiang to agree to a truce with Chinese traitors (communists). The truce lasted 14 months and thus enabled the communists to reinforce their armies. It enabled them to move soviet armies from inner Mongolia and Shensi and Shansi Provinces in the northwest to Manchuria where the Soviets were waiting to give them the arms captured from the Japanese army of 700,000. Chiang's men barred the communist's way at Kalgan Pass west of Peking. The communists appealed to General Marshall who had the arrogance to urge Chiang to permit the communist army to proceed. Chiang properly refused but was finally forced to yield after long urging by Marshall who again threatened to withdraw American aid. Thus we witnessed the disgusting spectacle of our own State Department blackmailing the Chinese government into treason by forcing them to a coalition with Chinese traitors.

As a result of this treachery more than 500,000 communists came through the Pass. The same treachery was enacted north of Hankow. Additional aid to the Soviet fifth column in China was given by the traitors in the State Department who blocked delivery of American military equipment from Pacific Islands although it had been officially assigned to China. The result was that Chiang's American equipped divisions were helpless for lack of parts and airplanes were grounded. It should be noted that the so called Marshall Plan did not include aid to China and only because of Congressional pressure on the State Department was a small amount finally appropriated for China.

Congress authorized \$125,000,000 for military aid to China. Even then State Department officials dared to disregard the congressional orders and sabotaged the aid. They prolonged the time of delivery until the Soviets had dealt a crushing blow to the Chinese government.

#### RED HERRING

The Soviets and their agents in the United States

are the cleverest strategists and propagandists. Their timing is perfect and they know just how to focus public opinion on one part of the world while they grob off a country somewhere else. Thus, before they started the main drive in China, they created the so-called BERLIN CRISIS to divert the attention of the Western Powers from the Far East. Those who are familiar with this phase of Soviet technique knew that the Berlin crisis would have no serious outcome. At the end of 1945, the Soviet aggression in Europe had reached a saturation point. There were signs of trouble in the satellites, furthermore the presence of American troops in Germany was a natural barrier to Soviet expansion there. In brief the Soviets wanted to conquer Germany but had no intention of moving into Western Europe at that particular time. Instead they concentrated the attack on China.

The same pro-Soviet elements in the State Department who had previously aided Soviet aggressions, all of a sudden pretended alarm over the situation in Western Europe. Acheson proposed the North Atlantic Pact which purports to defend a comparatively small territory against the Soviet aggression but which permitted at the same time Soviet expansion over the vast continent of Asia. Furthermore it contains no guarantees against the only methods Soviets use in their conquests—by infiltrating the governments of other nations with Soviet fifth column.

On the other hand the North Atlantic Pact served two Soviet objectives:

- 1) It diverted world opinion from Soviet invasion in China and
- 2) It diverted Congress from delving into the treasonable activities within the State Department because it seemed that Acheson had dealt a crushing blow to the Kremlin

#### GERMANY

The creation of a separate German state in the western zone was a great accomplishment of our military authorities, because it kept that part of Germany clear of communist influence. For obvious reasons this is contrary to Kremlin plans. The Soviet war criminals still hope to dominate Germany with the aid of Soviet collaborators in our State Department. We now expect the Soviets to attempt the same coup which they put over in Poland and other countries, namely to unify Germany under a government in which Soviet fifth column (communists) will be included. This would be the beginning of the end for Germany but it can be achieved only with help of our State Department. Will the State Department dare this treason?

#### CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

The State Department officials were not satisfied with having aided the Soviets to conquer free nations, but aided them even to round up helpless refugees and send them back to face torture, firing squads and slave camps in the Soviet Union. This

was done through the United Nations Committees to which our State Department was a party.

The criminal physiognomy of these men can be seen from their deeds in Europe where they were sure that they could operate with impunity. Their crimes are officially recorded, documented and have been published in fragmentary form. The criminal program had its inception at Yalta, where Roosevelt promised Stalin to return political refugees who had fled Soviet persecution. This inhuman act was contrary to all concepts of decency and the accepted principles of international law. Sanctity of political refuge was respected by all nations before the sinister forces of New Dealism begun to operate in the United States.

Byrnes and Acheson, as officials of the State Department, cannot escape responsibility for these crimes against humanity. The New Dealers appointed Herbert Lehmann, Eleanor Roosevelt and Fiorello LaGuardia to the U. N. Committee which had charge of the refugees in Europe. Thus they became accomplices in these crimes. They forced the so-called "repatriation" of political refugees. When the refugees resisted the pressure of the U. N. officials to send them back to the Soviet Union, they were placed on a subsistence diet and then LaGuardia offered them a bribe of 60 days free rations if they would voluntarily return. Not content with this dastardly deed the U. N. Committee issued the infamous Order No. 199 which denied freedom of speech to poor refugees confined in concentration camps and permitted their persecutors, the Soviet NKVD to visit the camps and intimidate the victims. To make the situation worse for the refugees, a Spanish communist and ex-member of the Soviet secret police, Gustavo Duran was appointed to the screening committee. Prior to this he was Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State. He obtained citizenship by fraud and he was aided in this by our own State Department officials.

When these crimes were exposed, the Refugee Committee was disbanded and a new committee known as The International Refugee Organization was created.

The history of the murders perpetrated with the acquiescence of New Dealers is too voluminous to present in this brief.

#### DISCRIMINATION

It should be investigated who is responsible for discrimination against White Russians who constitute the majority of refugees in Europe, yet only infinitely small number of them have been admitted to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act. These refugees are asked the questions to determine to what degree they oppose communism, and then they are falsely accused of being "fascists".

#### REORGANIZATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The Soviet war criminals succeeded in their conquests only because of collaborationists in our State Department. If the United States had stood firm,

such conquests would never have been undertaken. This clearly shows how important it is for the Kremlin to maintain a fifth column in our State Department. Through their agents (communists) and communist front pressure groups, the Soviet government succeeded in manipulating appointments in the State Department so that pro-soviet men are placed in key positions. This is accomplished by organized attacks on patriotic Americans and support for the individuals who are considered useful to the Soviet cause. The technique by which communists within and without the State Department forced out patriotic citizens is seen in the case of former Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew. Grew was an expert on the Far East and he was a stumbling block to Soviet aggression in Asia. The Soviet government had to remove him in order to proceed with their plot. The fifth columnists turned the heat on Grew. They were especially irked when Grew said that he would clean up the Department of its disloyal employees, at the time of the Amerasia scandal. Immanuel S. Larsen, former specialist in the State Department's China Division, described how "Amerasia"—a magazine published by members of a communist spy nest—started an editorial campaign against Grew.

Amerasia was a vehicle used by the State Department reds to start a smear campaign on Grew. Larsen stated that this attack was timed with the opening of an attack on Chiang Kai-Shek by the Soviet government. He further disclosed that Dean Acheson headed the anti-Grew faction in the State Department. In this battle the pro-Soviet bloc won. Grew resigned and Byrnes appointed Acheson in his place.

Larsen described the joy of the communist faction over this incident. Phillip Jaffee, a communist spy, told him upon the resignation of Mr. Grew, "Well, we have suffered a lot but anyhow we got Grew out." This is the technique by which the Soviet government manipulates the appointments in our State Department. It was known that Acheson was a favorite of the radicals. Arthur Krock commented in the New York TIMES, December 6, 1944 that radicals would welcome the appointment of Acheson.

Another case is that of Adolph Berle, Jr. He too was a target of the pro-communist clique. He testified that Acheson and Hiss headed the pro-Soviet bloc and that he "got trimmed in that fight and that ended my diplomatic career."

Persons who understand the nature of communism, as Bullitt, Earle, Lane and many other outstanding citizens do, are not acceptable to the Kremlin and therefore cannot expect to be appointed to positions in the State Department.

Other patriotic Americans were forced out of the State Department. Eugene Dooman, head of the Far Eastern Division, had to resign and Acheson appointed in his place the notorious communist party-liner, John Carter Vincent who is now our Minister to Switzerland.

Secretary Ludden of the American embassy in Chungking was another leading figure in the pro-Soviet bloc. Another was John Davis, a native of Chengtu who acted as a State Department attache with our military observers in China. John W. Emerson was another soviet sympathizer who served as a political adviser on Chinese affairs to Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Appointing red sympathizers into key positions, Acheson cleverly laid the ground for twisting our foreign policy to suit the Kremlin.

WIN THE PEACH COMMITTEE was one of the communist fronts organized by the Soviet government (through their agents) to exert influence on the State Department. One of the purposes of this front was to induce the State Department to share our top military secret—the atom bomb—with the Soviet government via the United Nations. They actually succeeded in influencing Byrnes and Acheson to support this idiotic idea of sharing the bomb with our potential enemy, and the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was the result. If Acheson would actually do what the Report advocates, he would be liable to prosecution under Title 50, Section 32, Federal Penal Code. Baruch's proposal saved us from this criminal folly which was proposed in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.

Another who exerted great influence on our foreign policy was Acheson's friend, Alger Hiss. He held many important positions in the State Department. In 1936, Hiss was appointed as Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State. In 1939 he was made Assistant to the Adviser on Political Relations. In 1944 Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and then promoted to Deputy-Director. In January 1943 Hiss was elevated to Director of Office of Special Political Affairs. In Addition to these positions Hiss acted as Executive Secretary of the Dumbarton Conference in 1944 and accompanied Roosevelt to Yalta in February 1945. Hiss gradually ascended the ladder of promotions while Acheson was Under-Secretary of State. Hiss was one of the authors of the U.N. Charter. Edward Stettinius, then Secretary of State, was the principal speaker at the San Francisco U. N. Conference. His speech was prepared by a notorious Hollywood communist-script writer who was introduced to Stettinius by Hiss.

Analysis of the Stettinius speech written by Communist Trumbo, shows that it did not contain open communist propaganda. At that time the communist line was to create the U. N. so that the Soviet government could use it for propaganda and spy activities on a world wide scale, while they gained time to prepare for aggression in Asia. To pacify the American people who were becoming alarmed at Soviet aggressions, Trumbo's (Stettinius') speech contained flowery phrases regarding "world peace" and praised the "unity" of all the nations. This case shows the clever technique by which the Kremlin — through its agents — used our Secretary of State as their mouthpiece.

The influence which the Kremlin exerts on our State Department can be judged from the case of J. Anthony Panuch, who was Assistant Secretary of State when Acheson was Under-Secretary. Panuch attempted to sweep the reds out of the Department and as a result of his battle with the fifth columnists, he had to submit his own resignation to Acheson.

Two organizations which were notoriously infiltrated with communist sympathizers, the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services were welcomed into the State Department instead of being disbanded at the war's end. It is no secret that State Department foreign policy is formulated either by Soviet sympathizers or outright fifth columnists. The NEW LEADER had this to say about Alger and Donald Hiss:

"While they were in the State Department, the Hiss brothers were . . . tooling the State Department policies which have resulted so disastrously to democratic hopes and American interests throughout the world."

During the congressional investigation the Hiss brothers were charged with being members of a Soviet spy ring headed by Victor Perlo. Donald Hiss is a member of Acheson's law firm.

#### LOYALTY PROGRAM A FAKE

On July 2, 1946 Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State, made the statement that if a charge of communist views was established against a State Department employee, he would favor his discharge. In view of existing conditions in the State Department this was obviously untrue. James Byrnes himself unwittingly gave the lie to Acheson when three weeks later on July 26, 1946, he wrote a letter to Representative Sabath in which he said that "no employees have been eliminated from the State Department by the screening committee because of their communist leanings, or activities or membership."

It was only after pressure from congress that the so-called "loyalty" program was initiated. This proved to be another hoax. Inasmuch as Byrnes and Acheson collaborated with red sympathizers over a long period of time, it would be folly to suppose that they would change this attitude because of congressional determination to investigate the Department. Red sympathizers are dismissed from the Department with reluctance. In most cases the dismissals are forced by congressional committees and not by initiative on the part of the State Department. In some cases, even after the employees had been exposed — as in the case of Gustavo Duran, the Department kept them on for a considerable time. Indeed, the man who was appointed to watch for disloyal employees in the State Department was none other than Carl Marzani, himself a fifth columnist.

The State Department whitewashes Soviet spies, as seen in the case of Robert C. Alexander, Assistant Chief of the Visa Division, who on July 15, 1948

testified that many foreigners who came into the United States through the auspices of the U. N. are undesirable from the standpoint of security. The experience has proven beyond doubt that the Soviets use all diplomatic facilities for purposes of espionage. Former big Soviet officials (General Krivitsky, Bessedovsky, Alexieev, Guzenko and others) exposed this technique.

It is known that the U. N. serves as a nest for Soviet spies. This has been recorded by the Senate Judiciary Committee and Alexander's testimony merely corroborated known facts. George Marshall, then Secretary of State, appointed a committee of three to whitewash the soviet spy activities within U. N. Alexander was reprimanded and almost lost his position as a result of telling the truth. This is additional evidence that an invisible hand in the State Department screens out patriotic Americans and gives aid and comfort to spies and fifth columnists.

The State Department assisted Soviet spies to escape punishment as seen in the cases of Arthur Adams and Mikhail Gorin. Gorin was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison. His sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court but in order to save him from prison, Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, wrote a letter to the Attorney-General which freed the convict and he was permitted to return to the Soviet Union.

Top Soviet spy Arthur Adams, who stole mass of confidential information on atom bomb, also was protected and he was permitted to leave the U. S. without arrest because of pressure from the State Department.

Acheson himself took part in a communist rally held in Madison Square Garden where he was one of the principal speakers. Later when questioned about this by the Senate, he tried to justify it by saying that he was ordered to do this by Byrnes and that his speech had been prepared by someone in the State Department. This was obviously camouflage. If Acheson did not agree with the communist line of the State Department he would have resigned as others did. Actually Acheson, Hiss and others were architects of this policy.

In spite of all assurances from the State Department that red sympathizers and those with communist-front connections are being released from the Department we point to WILLIAM T. STONE who now holds the important position of Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of VOICE OF AMERICA. Stone was connected with the communist spy nest headed by Philip Jacob Jaffe, alias J. P. Phillips. This group published the magazine AMERASIA, under the chairmanship of Frederick Vanderbilt Fields, a members of the communist party and a regular columnist for the Daily Worker. Jaffe was managing editor of Amerasia and William T. Stone was a member of the editorial board of this left-wing publication from 1937 through November 1941. He then entered the government service and while he was in London he appointed

one George Shaw Wheeler to the Board of Economic Warfare, notwithstanding the fact that Wheeler had a long record of communist affiliations and was later dismissed from his post by the Civil Service Commission.

John S. Service was recently appointed by Acheson to the SELECTION BOARD which recommends all State Department promotions. He is also Assistant Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, John S. Service also was associated with the communist spy nest at Amerasia. He was arrested at the time of the expose although he escaped indictment. His pro-communist views were exposed by Ambassador Hurley and have been mentioned above.

Lack of space limits our citations of these cases but it cannot be passed without notice that Phillip C. Jessup, Charles E. Bohlen, Benjamin A. Cohen and others are still kept in the State Department.

Despite Acheson's pro-Soviet activities he apparently tries to cover himself by anti-Soviet statements and at one time Molotov called him a "war monger." This characteristic of Acheson's is well described by NEW LEADER, a socialist publication in the issue of December 14, 1946:

"Diplomats in Washington regard as interesting and probably significant, the manner in which Under-Secretary of State Acheson has lately been scuttling for cover . . . Acheson lately has been seizing every opportunity publicly to breath fire and thunder in the general direction of the Soviets."

## CONCLUSION

There are many facts which are necessarily omitted here, but it has been clearly established that in the cold war between the United States and the Soviet government, the State Department officials have consistently aided the enemy. The evidence presented here conclusively proves that United States foreign policy has consistently reflected the wishes of the Soviet war criminals.

Acheson's record shows that he has consistently promoted the interests of the Soviet government and therefore he cannot escape responsibility under the plea of ignorance.

Nation after nation was sacrificed to the Soviet enemy by State Department policy. It will never be known how many millions in Eastern Europe and Asia were murdered, tortured and enslaved as a result of the policy pursued by Byrnes, Acheson, Marshall, et al. In view of the gravity of these crimes, we consider that the impeachment of Acheson is merely a starting point to wipe out these blots upon American honor.

Laval, Quisling and others, were convicted in their respective countries for collaboration with German war criminals. We recommend that a special tribunal be convened by congressional action to deal with Americans who collaborate with the Soviet war criminals.

The precedent was established at Nurenberg.

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SAC, Los Angeles

June 29, 1949

Director, FBI

**THE ~~X~~ PARTISAN REPUBLICANS OF CALIFORNIA  
INFORMATION CONCERNING**

Reurlet May 29, 1949 captioned "Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, Information Concerning", wherein you enclosed a copy of a petition calling for the impeachment of Dean Acheson, which petition was published by the captioned group.

While no investigation is desired of the above organization at this time, you are instructed to advise the Bureau of any future activities on the part of the captioned group which come to the attention of your Office.

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR  
F B I  
J. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE RECEIVED - 10-5-50  
JUN 30 11 26 AM '49  
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DEPT. OF JUSTICE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 13 8  
JUN 30 1949 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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45 JUL 1 1949

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. D. Fletcher *HDF*

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*

SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF STATE

DATE: February 24, 1950

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Admiral Hillenkoetter confidentially informed Mr. DeLoach this afternoon that he had received information from a reliable source indicating that Mr. Dean Acheson would resign as Secretary of State within the next few days and that W. Averill Harriman, ECA Roving Ambassador, would succeed him.

CDD:eb

*omit*

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

1950

The Director  
 Mr. Tolson                       Mr. Callan  
 Mr. Ladd  
 Mr. Clegg                       Mr. McCabe  
 Mr. Fletcher  
 Mr. Glavin                       Mr. Pennington  
 Mr. Harbo                         
 Mr. Nichols                       Mr. Scott  
 Mr. Tracy  
 Mr. Egan  
 Miss Gandy  
 Mr. Nease

M \_\_\_\_\_

Room No. \_\_\_\_\_

Miss Evans                       See me

Call me

Miss Wright                       Note and return

Prepare tickler

For Appropriate

**Action**

*Your penned notation on Drew Pearson's  
article today concerning Acheson's  
defense of Hiss is very significant.  
My only regret is that it can't  
be published because it is a great  
deal more significant than Drew  
Pearson's article drawing the parallel  
between Acheson and Andrew Jackson,  
et al.*

Room 5706  
Branch 571

A. Rosen



## Merry-Go-Round

# Acheson Has Precedents in Hiss Defense

By Drew Pearson

Secretary Acheson's refusal to "turn his back" on Alger Hiss is now criticized not only by GOP Senators, but also by Dictator

Franco's official radio.

The Madrid broadcast is significant. Because, like Moscow, the "Voice of the Falange" radio station operates for and by the Spanish government. What it says represents the official view of the dictator.



ACHESON

It may also be significant that the Spanish attack on Acheson and the State Department came shortly after Acheson had quit "turning his back on Franco" and had indicated that he was willing to extend him full recognition.

Despite this the voice of the Falange blared forth on February 13:

"Well-known Communists have been located in the U. S. State Department. This has been stated by a Republican Senator (McCarthy of Wisconsin) who added that these men held quite important positions in this ministry. It is not merely a question of Hiss, who has been convicted of perjury and to whom Acheson has promised his continued friendship. We are not surprised by this announcement.

Acheson's defense of Hiss has a lot of interesting precedents in United States history. They include: Andrew Jackson's defense of Aaron Burr; Charles Evans Hughes' defense of Senator Newberry; Taft's early defense of Richard Ballinger—later silenced; and Harry Truman's defense of Boss Tom Pendergast.

Note—It may have been the Pendergast incident that led Truman to support Acheson when he informally offered to resign over the Hiss incident three weeks ago.

Though the State Department issued a carefully worded denial, here is exactly what happened. Acheson dropped in at the White House late in the afternoon shortly after the Hiss statement, and Truman began to tell him, half-jokingly, what a barrage of criticism he had been getting. Acheson remarked that he would be glad to get out if he was causing any embarrassment, to which the President told his Secretary of State to pay any money to these "yapping S.O.B.s."

Charles Evans Hughes, Cal. calm and cautious Secretary of State Hughes did pretty much what Acheson did when Michigan's Senator Truman H. Newberry was convicted of violating the Corrupt Practices Act.

Newberry had been elected to the Senate in a contest with the late Henry Ford in which Newberry spent a great deal of money and later was convicted. Hughes, then in private practice, defended him, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which set aside the conviction. By this time Hughes had become Secretary of State, but nevertheless wrote a letter stating: "The plain fact was that Senator Newberry was wrongly and most unjustly convicted and his conviction was set aside."

The Hughes letter brought just as loud protests from the Democrats as the Acheson defense of Hiss has from Republicans.

Andrew Jackson—When Aaron Burr was being tried for treason in Richmond, Andrew Jackson was one of the few to support him under extremely unpopular circumstances. Albert J. Beveridge describes the Richmond incident as follows:

"A tall, lank, uncouth-looking personage with long locks of hair hanging over his face . . . mounted the steps of a corner grocery and harangued the glowering assemblage that gathered in front of him. His daring and unmistakable air of danger to anyone who disputed him prevented violent interruption certain to have been visited upon one less bold. He praised Burr as a brave man and a patriot who would have led Americans against the hated Spanish.

William Howard Taft—On September 13, 1909, President Taft wrote a letter to Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger, completely absolving him in the Alaskan land scandals. In 1911, however, Ballinger resigned following an investigation by Louis Brandeis, which disclosed that the letter of 1909 actually was written by Ballinger's attorney, Oscar Lawler.

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- Tolson ✓
- Ladd ✓
- Clegg ✓
- Glavin ✓
- Nichols ✓
- Rosen ✓
- Tracy ✓
- Harbo ✓
- Mohr ✓
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

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Significant that none was ever found to have been wrongfully charged even as this paper of the alleged embezzlement at this moment was discredited. N.

MAR 8 1950

Grove City, Pa.,

January 30, 1950.

*nc*

Honorable John E. Rankin,  
House Office Building,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

*ret*

In my estimation, ~~Mr. Acheson~~ in his great effort to win public sympathy of so-called 'Christian America' for his Red friend Hiss by quoting Scripture sure did get his wires crossed. In this particular (Hiss) case he should have started quoting from verse 41 to 46 inclusive, It would have been much more appropriate.

Yes, America is spiritually sick. Thirsting for Living Water, Naked of the garments of Righteousness, a Stranger under the Flag of the Cross, and encompassed by the forces of evil; all because we have like sheep wandered too far away from the paths of Righteousness, seeking to find our own life, Matt. 10-39.

President Hoover broke off relations with Russia because Russia broke off relations with God. But when that Forked-tongued individual took over he sure did change things. One of the first statements I heard Roosevelt make was - the Republican Party broke off relations with Russia, but when I came into power I immediately renewed relations with our good friend and ally Soviet Russia. I said at the time he did just exactly that which was contrary to God's will as Russia is the No. 1 enemy of God and of America. President Hoover put up the bars against Communism, but Roosevelt let them all down, and the result is that America is not only flooded with Red Rats but is on the brink of being overpowered and ruled by them.

Soon America will cry out to God for help, but I think such a cry will be in vain. God will not do for us that which He knows we can do for ourselves. To me that was proven at the tomb of Lazarus when Jesus said, roll ye away the stone. Man put the stone there and Jesus knew that he was able also to take it away. Jesus took over from there. God knows too well we deliberately got ourselves into the mess we are now in, and He is going to stand on the side lines until we humble ourselves and exhaust our every effort to get out, before He takes over to put the Communists into Hell where they belong.

*Hoover*

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I do not believe in capital punishment (God alone should call us out regardless) but if I did believe in it, in my estimation the first thing we should resort to would be the firing squad, and I also

EX-105

*Damm*

EX-105

think the first line pp should be 66 such as Miss, Acheson, a little fellow named Harry, a woman named Eleanor, a man named David etc. etc.

This understand, is not just a political battle we are facing. No, it is a battle of the forces of Evil against the forces of Righteousness. Just as God gave David the sling and stone, also the courage and faith to use them; He also has given us several secret??? weapons for our protection. But what have we done with them? Yes, we have given them to the enemy (Philistines), but not in the same way that David gave them. In my estimation anyone living under the protection of the stars and stripes that would do this or had the knowledge that it was being done should face the firing squad - regardless - whether he be President of the United States or the man that soiled the Presidents boots.

I am getting well on in years and it is not going to personally harm me much as I think I know what the score is, but when I look into the faces of my precious little grand children I imagine that they are saying - granddad are you doing for us what John the Baptist did for Jesus? Yes, John did his best to prepare the way. Just what are we doing in preparing the way for All the precious little PETS that believe in us, and trust us so much? God help us to wake up before it is forever too late.

Mr. Rankin Mr. Gerald K. Smith stated in a recent letter that he thought you were the most courageous man in Washington. What Mr. Smith says carries much weight with me as I think he is the type of man that should be in the White House. We do not see ALL of Mr. Smiths pictures with that Simple Simon grin as if he did not know just what the score was. All of Mr. Smiths pictures are an expression of a Serious, Fearless, Determination; realizing the true meaning of the hand writing on the wall, and that just one mis-step NOW would spell DISASTER.

May God help you Mr. Rankin, Mr. Hoover, and all your true and fearless little group to continue in putting forth every effort to hold the fort till Jesus comes to take over.

Sincerely yours,

P.S. If we are going to still Sleep On and let the Reds take Formosa also, I suggest that we call Gen. MacArthur Home as I would hate to see him Trapped in another Corregidor.

Grove City Pa 2-22-1950

Honorable, John, E. Rankin  
House Office Building  
Washington D.C.

Dear Sir;

We hear so much talk about the A and H. Bomb we are worrying our fool heads off wondering just when Russia will start dropping Bombs over here in America, in the first place I think if we had enough Faith in God and horse sense enough to clean out ALL the Enemy Rats regardless of race creed or color, then have sense enough to keep our BIG Mouth Shut about All the Secret Weapons that God has revealed to us for our own Protection we then would have little need to worry.

If I knew there was One Rat Yes, just One Rat in my brood house instead of running across town to help some unworthy individual to kill the Rats in his brooder-house, I first would not rest till I had the One Rat of my brooder-house, -- America is sending Billions across to help others kill their Rats apparently ignorant of the fact that eventually the Rats will take ALL over just when ever they wish to do so, and then use it Against US. "Listen? Just how many that we are helping over there would even think of coming over to help us kill our Red Rats, Little Finland alone has given us reason to believe they would like to come, But they can not COME, WHY??.

I just heard Gen. Wedmeyer state that our military defense was in good shape and that we should keep it as an Iron Curtain of Defense, I would have liked it much better if he had suggested that we first should Destroy all the Red Rats then lower the Curtain that I think Franklin Roosevelt Raised and Invited All the Red Rats to Come In, some one has said that we should have a Women for President, in my estimation we have had one since 1932 and I also think that her influence will be felt long after her body is six feet underground and her Soul is --- Rewarded according to HER WORKS.

Whether Russia has the Bombs or not I do not know, But I have every reason to believe they have no more notion of dropping any on America than I have, But Old Joe Sure is using that idea to Keep our Dumb minds away from what I think he really has in mind, I have said for years the Strikes we are having over here are just a rehearsal Joe is putting on as Feelers or Testing to see how well the Stupid Americans Respond to his call, Just how long could we stand up in War with out Coal?? Listen, Just how long could America Carry On with out Electric Power?? America is now practically an Electrified Cuntry, JUST how many well trained RATS would it take to CRIPPLE and BRACK-OUT AMERICA?????

"PLEASE" Give this careful consideration as I feel sure this is the Type of Bomb Joe is working on, while we stand out on the Front Porch in Washington Shouting out that we are spending Billions to build Bombs, Old Joe is Sneaking in the Back Porch way

This is my reason to again ask in Gods name Turn J. Edgar Hoover and his organization loose to clean out America as they have proven themselves as the only group in Washington with sense enough to keep their mouth shut and do their work as they Trust God to direct them, no individual should be permitted to work in any Secret Weapon or Electric Power Plant until J. Edgar Hoover said O.K. Please do not think this is just a dream I had last night NO" I saw it many years ago and like the late Bill Mitchell I was looked upon as "FOOL" people said Uncle Sam is To smart for Old Joe, God in heaven knows that I could sleep much better IF I THOUGHT SO..

Joe took China over very nicely with out dropping any BOMB and I think it will be much EASIER for him to take America over as the leader (President) of China was TRULY AGANIST COMMUNISM. Some seem stupid enough to say we should try and make some Agreement with Russia, -- Stalin came into power by way of the Sword and that is the Only Way to Deal with him as it is the Only Language that Godless Cut-Throat understands. "Yes" All of our Dear Boys Died in Vain, We should not let them Down any Further, I suggest that we Humble ourselves

ENCLOSURE

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and step back down and TRY Gods plan as mentioned in deuteronomy 25.17-18-19  
then 1st Samueh 15.2-3. Sure it is much to late to Wake Up. But the BLOOD of  
Dear Boys Continue to Cry Out, SHAME, SHAME.

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# That Romance Is Mighty Cool

## Between Mr. Acheson & Congress

By **ANDREW TULLY** Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

(See pictures on Page 35; editorial on Page 42.)

Somebody must have been kidding with all that talk about State Secretary Dean Acheson and Congress being a lot closer together these days. Neither has changed a bit.

That is to say that Mr. Acheson, for all his golden intentions, still can't help acting a trifle superior toward the legislators. Try as he will, a faint note of patronage occasionally still creeps onto his voice. As for Congress, even those who openly support Mr. Acheson still seem ill at ease in the Secretary's presence.

The newest test of relations between Mr. Acheson and Congress came during his report to Congress on the recent Big Three and Atlantic Treaty meetings. And it was just as it's always been when Mr. Acheson and Congress get together—stiff and formal and with all the warmth of a stepmother's kiss.

### BIG MISTAKE

To be sure, the setting was not all that could be desired—Mr. Acheson standing up there on the formal stage of the Library of Congress Auditorium and reading a prepared speech. Possibly that was the biggest mistake of all; perhaps Mr. Acheson should have given one of those informal, so-called "man-to-man" talks from notes instead of making the occasion a radio and television production. His intimates are always claiming the Secretary is a woe in smoke-filled rooms, and this would have been a good chance to prove it.

### POLITE—AND APATHETIC

As it was, the gathering was most polite—and a trifle apathetic. Above the whirring of the newsreel cameras, the only noises were a few discreet coughs, which didn't sound annoyed or impatient. Only once during his speech was the Secretary applauded—and that was at about the three-quarter mark when he spoke of the need for strong national defense. Most congressmen seem to feel it connotes disloyalty not to cheer any reference to keeping the nation's defense strong.

But mostly, the trouble lay in Mr. Acheson's personal contact with individual congressmen during the question-and-answer period. It was there that the legislators betrayed the same old querulousness and Mr. Acheson the same old impatience.

### EXCHANGE WITH JUDD

The tension was most noticeable in the exchange between Mr. Acheson and Rep. Walter Judd (R., Minn.). In reply to a question from Rep. Judd, the Secretary said with a kind of mock exasperation that he had explained the Administration's position on that to Rep. Judd 1000 times but that he'd be glad to do so again.

Now Rep. Judd has been one of the most outspoken critics of the Administration's China policy and probably has asked a lot of questions many times. But it made even a neutral observer uneasy to hear Mr. Acheson chide the Minnesota legislator in such a fashion.

### NOTHING TO DO WITH IT

This irritation with what he considers shopworn questions showed up again when Mr. Acheson was questioned by Sen. Harry Cain (R., Wash.).

Sen. Cain wanted to know how a balanced collective force could be built up in Europe without letting Turkey and Spain into the Atlantic Pact membership.

With a sigh, Mr. Acheson replied shortly that the question of taking in new members had nothing to do with the achievement of a balanced collective force.

And so it went. It didn't help any

when Rep. Robert Rich (R., Pa.), asking one of his inevitable questions about the costs of rearming, was drowned out by the restless mutterings and foot shufflings of his colleagues. And then, when they applauded Mr. Acheson's dismissal of the question, Rep. Rich was on his feet again, gesturing vigorously, obviously convinced the Secretary of State had tried to make him look ridiculous.

The trouble seems to be that Mr. Acheson still sometimes permits the contrast between his cleverness and another's slower wit to be etched a little too sharply. And that Congress still can't rid itself of its suspicion toward a man who is so different from the boys in the back room.

*JAW*  
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# State Department Release Based on Acheson's Question-and-Answer Session

The following was released by the State Department, after Secretary of State Acheson's appearance before Congress yesterday. It is based on the exchange of questions and answers, but Mr. Acheson's answers do not represent direct quotations.

Mr. McCormack: We appreciate very much and evaluate in the proper way the appearance of the Secretary of State on this occasion at what might be termed this informal joint meeting of both branches of the Congress, and we also appreciate the significance of the report that he has made to us.

The Secretary in addition has, as you all know, consented to answer questions, and of course any question asked that he may not be able to answer on this occasion will be also appreciated and respected, particularly if at this time the national interests of our country might be involved in his judgment.

The questions and answers will not be recorded on the sound tracks, so I ask that that be noticed and respected and observed. The Secretary requested that the answers not be quoted, but they may be attributed to him; is that a correct statement?

The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Mr. McCormack: Are there any members who desire to ask the Secretary a question at this time?

Mr. Miller: Mr. Chairman.

### Question on Armaments.

Mr. McCormack: The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Miller.

Mr. Miller: Mr. Secretary, is the American Government framing any over-all proposals for the reduction of armaments, including control of atomic energy?

Mr. Acheson replied that we have no new proposals. He added that both of those subjects are still under discussion, or rather they were under discussion until the Soviet representatives walked out of the appropriate bodies of the United Nations where they had been under discussion for some time. The Secretary continued that in regard to both the international control of atomic energy and the limitation of conventional armaments, the United States has made proposals. We have said repeatedly that we were willing to consider any alternative proposals which would accomplish the basic purposes to be achieved, Mr. Acheson said.

Mr. Cain: Mr. Chairman.  
 Mr. McCormack: Mr. Cain from Washington.

Mr. Cain: I should like to ask the Secretary how it will be possible in the future to achieve a balanced collective force if we do not take into the Atlantic community both Turkey on the one flank and Spain on the other.

The Secretary stated that he thought the question of whether any other countries ought to be brought into the North Atlantic Treaty is a wholly separate question from the question of building balanced collective forces. The principle of balanced collective forces, he said, means that each country does what it can do best, and that it does not duplicate what every other country is going to do. You concentrate, Mr. Acheson continued, on the mission which is assigned to a particular country as part of the whole collective defense.

Whether or not any additional countries should be brought in is a wholly separate question, he said. It may be that the bringing in of other countries would help the collective defense, but it may be that it wouldn't. But that is a different question from the one of building the type of force which we recommend, Mr. Acheson pointed out.

Mr. Price: Mr. Secretary.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Price of Florida.

### On French Proposals.

Mr. Price: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask how vigorously the American State Department is prepared to back the very important French proposals for unification of heavy industries, in view of what appears to be British opposition to such a plan.

Mr. Acheson replied that in his address he pointed out how important we regarded that proposal, how constructive and how courageous it was. He added that the President had made a statement regarding it, that he had made another statement in London regarding it. I think we have taken a very strong position in supporting it, he concluded.

Mr. Knowland: Mr. Secretary.

Mr. McCormack: Senator Knowland.

Mr. Knowland: Mr. Secretary, in your remarks today, you apparently did not go into the situation with regard to China. I am not going to pursue that at this meeting because you will be before the proper committees later this week. I would like to ask, however, if any new understanding has been reached with any of the Western powers relative to our position on the admission of the Communist regime of China into the United Nations.

The Secretary replied that no new agreement had been reached. In fact, he added, no agreement of any sort has been reached on that subject.

Mr. Biemiller: Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Biemiller.

Mr. Biemiller: I would like to ask the Secretary if any decisions were reached, aid if so, what plans have been made, for implementation on the expellee question in Western Germany.

The Secretary replied that he did not understand the question. He was asked what was meant by "expellee."

Mr. Biemiller: Did the Big Three agree on any plan to alleviate the unemployment problem of the Volks Deutsche, or did they discuss the problem of migration as the Walters Report has recommended?

### Certain Steps Ordered.

Mr. Acheson replied that there was discussion on both these questions, and that instructions were issued to the High Commissioners from three governments to take certain steps which would have an important effect on the unemployment problem in Germany. He added that it also has been announced that a group has been established in Europe to go into the question of migration which Mr. Biemiller mentioned.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Rich of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Rich: Mr. Secretary, why are we not giving support to the proposals to ask the President to request Mr. Trygve Lie to call the 59 member states of the United Nations to discuss general disarmament rather than go ahead in building this great war machine, not only here but in Europe?

The Secretary stated that he had discussed that as fully as he possibly could in his address.

Mr. Rich: If you did, I couldn't understand it, as to what your ideas

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N.Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

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were in trying to get to the point of peace rather than to build up a great war machine, because, as I understood your statement, you contend that we have to continue to build this war machine, not only here, but in those foreign countries in order to get peace.

Now, why can't you do it by calling those through the United Nations, to get them in there and agree to some form of cutting armament down, rather than expending ours to the point where we are unable to stand the great expense that you are putting onto this country?

Mr. Acheson replied that he had just pointed out that we have been trying to get agreement to the limitation of armaments for the last two or three years. We not only have had no success during that period, he added, but on the contrary the Soviet Union has been strengthening its arms, its military forces. That, Mr. Acheson continued, presents the free world with a very dangerous situation, and it is to meet that and to insure, so far as we can, the maintenance of peace, that all the actions were taken at the recent meeting. Mr. Acheson emphasized that, as he had pointed out, over and over again, the whole purpose of what is being done in the North Atlantic Treaty is to maintain peace.

Mr. McCormack: I think the Secretary's position on that question is very clear, and my own observation is that if my good friend from Pennsylvania, Mr. Rich, or anyone else could convince Stalin to be reasonable, then the things you talk about might be capable of performance.

The gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. Judd: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that when the Secretary recently announced the policy of total diplomacy, most of us applauded. And I understand that to mean resisting every available legal and political and diplomatic and economic means the further spread of this totalitarian system.

How does the Secretary reconcile with this policy of total diplomacy the announcement that we will not use the means at our disposal to prevent ejection from the United Nations of one of its founders, the Republic of China, and admission to the United Nations of the Communist regime, which will give an

enormous boost through Southeast Asia, more than any possible assistance we can give to those countries will offset?

The Secretary replied that this is an old debate which he and Mr. Judd have had for a great many months. He added that he thought he had explained his position to Mr. Judd a thousand times. I will be glad to do it once more, he said, adding:

We have taken the view that we are for the continued seating of the Nationalist representative. We do not regard that matter as a subject which should be vetoed. If the majority vote with us, then the situation remains as it is now. If the majority votes against us, then we accept the judgment of the majority, Mr. Acheson concluded.

Mr. Judd: (continuing) That is, we maintain our superior rectitude, but the other people will win the balance. When are we going to start total diplomacy in terms of winning the balance by all available means?

Mr. McCormack: (Interposing) The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. Tobey: Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment as to your appraisal of the results which have accrued or are likely to accrue from the recent conference of Mr. Trygve Lie with Mr. Stalin?

#### Confidential Interview.

The Secretary replied that he could not say anything more about that than Mr. Trygve Lie has said, namely, that the interviews were sought by Mr. Lie. He has had an interview with me, Mr. Acheson continued, and he stated that that was a confidential interview.

Mr. Acheson added that Mr. Lie himself said several important things, which Mr. Acheson thought were worth repeating as fairly good comments. Mr. Lie, he pointed out has said in the first place that he was not a bearer of any messages between any of the capitals. This Mr. Acheson regarded as a significant statement. Mr. Lie said that he did discuss in all the capitals the outstanding problems before the United Nations. He said that those outstanding problems, among them or primarily among them were the question of the admission of the Communist government of China as a member of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, and

also this question of a periodic meeting of the Security Council.

Mr. Lie, Mr. Acheson continued has also pointed out that there can not be periodic meetings of the Security Council of the sort that he has in mind until the Russians return, and the Russians have stated that they won't return until the question of Communist China is settled. Therefore, Mr. Acheson concluded, it all comes back to this question of who is going to represent China.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Gore.

Mr. Gore: Mr. Secretary, not long ago I heard a very eminent American, in an off-the-record discussion, say that the most vital thing in the world today, was Germany. Would the Secretary be willing to comment upon his own appraisals as to the possibility of the policies which our Government is pursuing, of eventually and soon or finally bringing a united Germany to the side of the Western democracies.

The Secretary pointed out that Mr. Gore's question has two aspects to it. He asked if it was: Would he comment on the effect of our policies in bringing a united Germany on the side of the Western democracies?

Mr. Gore: Yes, sir.

The Secretary replied that he would have to start out then with the question of what he thought the chances are of getting a united Germany. That, he added, unfortunately does not depend on us.

#### Proposals Drawn Up.

At our recent meeting, as was the case at our meetings in 1948, Mr. Acheson continued, we drew up very specifically the proposal for bringing about a united Germany. In June, 1949, the Russians would not accept our proposals. In fact, they would not accept any proposal of any sort which did not leave them in complete control in East Germany and very greatly strengthen the possibility of their getting control in West Germany, whereas we continually laid down the fact that a united Germany must be brought about through the free choice of free Germans and not by people who are under some security police in the East.

Mr. Acheson continued that he saw no indication on the part of the Russians of modifying their views. They have moved security



forward ever since 1943 with an effort to Sovietize Eastern Europe. Mr. Acheson added that, as far as he could see, they are still doing it.

As to the effect of our policies on bringing that part of Germany which is free or may in the future be free to line up with the free world, Mr. Acheson stated that he had the greatest possible belief in the effectiveness of those policies. There has been increasing co-operation, not only between the occupying powers but with the other countries in Europe, he said, with the Benelux countries, and also among the North Atlantic powers.

Mr. Acheson concluded that we all believe in the same ends. We are all using the same means, and we believe that we are being successful.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Cox from Georgia.

Mr. Cox: I should like to propound a supplementary question to that asked by Mr. Gore. I am wondering if there has been any recent change in the attitude of the State Department towards Germany, and if Germany is going to be permitted to participate as an equal in the effort to rebuild Europe.

The Secretary replied that that has been our constant effort, to bring Germany into the community of Western Europe as an equal adding that the three Foreign Ministers at their meetings in November of last year made declarations to that end. We started certain work Mr. Acheson continued which is now bearing fruit in the joining by Germany of the Council of Europe.

At the London meeting we went further along that road, Mr. Acheson added, expressing the hope that those policies will be successful.

Mr. Cox: I should like to ask the Secretary if, in his opinion, there can ever be a revitalized Europe in the absence of a revitalized Germany.

#### For Germany as a Part.

The Secretary replied that we have repeatedly said that, in order to have a strong, vigorous, economic community in Western Europe, Germany should be a part of it.

Mr. Cox: Has the dismantling of industrial plants come to a complete end in Germany?

The Secretary replied that, as far as he knows, the last decision on dismantling was that which was made in November, and we are con-

tinuing to carry out that agreement.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Lodge of Connecticut.

Mr. Lodge: Mr. Secretary, I was wondering whether you would have any comments to make with us with respect to the so-called Atlantic Union proposal, and also with respect to the participation of Spain, both in the OEEC and in the Atlantic Treaty, as a result of your recent conversations in Paris.

The Secretary replied that he had no comments to make on either of those points.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Boggs of Louisiana.

Mr. Boggs: Mr. Secretary, in connection with the question propounded by Mr. Gore and Mr. Cox of Georgia, what significance, if any, for the future does the Department attribute to the fizzle of the Communist demonstration in Berlin on last Sunday?

The Secretary replied that he found that a hard question to answer. The Department, he said, believed that the demonstration was going to be a fizzle, and it was a fizzle. We find that very encouraging. We do not believe that this means that the administration of Western Germany can relax. We think we must go forward with great vigor and great dynamic power to assist the Germans, lead the Germans, into a really democratic society in very close co-operation with Western Europe, Mr. Acheson concluded.

Mr. Boggs: Does it mean by a firm stand on the part of the democracies in any given situation that the Russians at this time will not risk a shooting war?

#### Unity, Strength Aid.

The Secretary replied that he thought it meant that, if we continue to move forward vigorously in establishing strong positions, that then we will not provoke, by weakness, a shooting war on the part of the Russians. It is very important, Mr. Acheson said that we understand that what is essential to the maintenance of peace is the maintenance of unity and strength. If we get that firmly in our mind, Mr. Acheson said, then all these other things explain themselves.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Dolliver.

Mr. Dolliver: Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment upon the stability of the Stalinist regime in Russia and in the Eastern European

countries, and perhaps the Orient?

The Secretary replied that he had no comment to make on that.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Burnside.

Mr. Burnside: I wonder if you could give us some information as to dovetailing of the economy of Japan with that of Southeast Asia.

The Secretary replied that that was not a subject of the recent conferences, and that it is not a matter on which he could recite at a moment's notice. It is the subject of constant effort by the ECA, the Defense Department, and the State Department, and is something which can be accomplished Mr. Acheson said. It is not easy to do, because the Japanese economy has been closely integrated with North Asia for some time, Mr. Acheson explained, expressing the belief that it is possible, and that steps are being taken toward that end.

Mr. McCormack: Mr. Rankin.

Mr. Rankin: Mr. Secretary, you spoke a moment ago of Trygve Lie representing the Western countries in conference with Stalin.

The Secretary replied that he had made no such statement.

Mr. Rankin: But isn't it a fact that Trygve Lie is a known Communist?

Mr. Acheson replied that there are two things we must get clear. No one ever spoke in any way of Mr. Trygve Lie representing anybody but himself in any conversations that he had with anybody.

Mr. Rankin: And isn't he behind the movement to recognize Communist China, give them a voice in attempting, as the United Nations is trying to do now, to govern the internal affairs of the United States?

#### Public Statement Recalled.

The Secretary replied in answer to part of Mr. Rankin's question that Mr. Trygve Lie, who is Secretary General of the United Nations has stated publicly that he believes that the Peking regime should be seated as the representative of the Republic of China in the UN.

Mr. Rankin: That is the Communist wing.

The Secretary replied that that was correct.

Mr. Rankin: In other words, he is for bringing another Communist

country into the United Nations to try to govern the internal affairs of the United States.

The Secretary replied that that was Mr. Rankin's statement.

Mr. McCormack: One more question. The Secretary has been very considerate. Mr. Gross.

Mr. Gross: Mr. Secretary, does the State Department support dictators or totalitarian governments?

The Secretary replied that he did not find that a very clear or useful question. He asked if Mr. Gross had anything specific in mind?

Mr. Gross: Yes. Let me ask you: Does the State Department support the recent loan or alleged loan to Dictator Peron of Argentina?

The Secretary replied that most certainly the State Department is in favor of the loan made to the government of Argentina.

Mr. McCormack: We thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Director, FBI

6/6/50

SAC, Philadelphia

[Redacted]

SECURITY MATTER - C

b6  
b7c

Mr. [Redacted] Stouffer's Restaurant, 1526 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, was interviewed concerning another matter and volunteered the following information.

He stated "This country is shot through with Communists" and that an accountant friend of his, a ROBERT CAMERON, who was formerly in the State Department, had told him that DEAN ACHESON and Justice FRANKFURTER were the #1 and #2 Communists in the United States, and further, that he, CAMERON, could prove it. Mr. [Redacted] stated that he had given the above information to Congressman SAMUEL K. MCCONNELL, JR., a Republican from Pennsylvania. Mr. [Redacted] stated that he was thoroughly disgusted and that nothing has happened concerning the information given the Congressman.

The complainant advised that he had no idea as to CAMERON's present position, but believed him to be residing in Washington, D. C. He stated that he was willing to have his name used if CAMERON were interviewed and to quote him as saying that CAMERON had said he could prove ACHESON and FRANKFURTER were Communists.

A check of the Philadelphia indices revealed that an investigation had been made concerning a ROBERT CAMERON predicated on a Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 7/30/42 under Bufile #77-25391. The applicant in this case is believed to be identical with the above-captioned subject.

This information is being set forth in the event it is deemed desirable to locate and interview ROBERT CAMERON.

mlm/rac  
100-0

cc: Washington Field

11-25391-1  
100-364067-1

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94-40672-✓ (not recorded  
dated 6/16/50  
CHANGED TO

77-25391-✓

C

SAC, Washington Field

June 16, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

~~RECORDED~~  
DEAN ACHESON;  
ELIX FRANKFURTER  
INFORMATION CONCERNING  
*100-369661*

Re Philadelphia let to the Bureau, copy to your office, dated June 6, 1950, entitled "Robert Cameron, Security Matter - C."

You are instructed to take immediate steps to locate Robert Cameron and to interview him concerning the statements attributed to him by [redacted]. Any other information in Cameron's possession which would be of interest to the Bureau should also be obtained.

In order that you may possess complete background data concerning Cameron, you are being furnished herewith one copy each of the following reports prepared in connection with an Office for Emergency Management investigation conducted by the Bureau concerning Robert Cameron (WFO File 77-13020).

Report of SA J. R. Craig, dated August 17, 1942, at New York, New York

Report of SA [redacted] dated August 26, 1942, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Report of SA T. A. Bronstad, dated August 30, 1942, at Albany, New York

This interview, of course, must be conducted in a most discreet manner.

Enclosures

cc: Philadelphia

94-40672 ✓

EBR:CMC

cc: 62-37356

77-25391

*100-369661*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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RECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-40672-6

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 9, 1950

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~BY SPECIAL AGENT~~

DEAN ACHESON  
FELIX FRANKFURTER  
INFORMATION CONCERNING  
FBI File 94-40672

RECORDED 104

94-40672-9

63680

Information was recently furnished to the Philadelphia Office of this Bureau that one Robert Cameron of Washington, D. C., formerly in the State Department, had stated that Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter were the Number 1 and Number 2 Communists in the United States, and that he, Cameron, could prove it.

b6  
b7c

Mr. Robert Cameron, 3700 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., who now works as a private accountant-investigator, has been interviewed by the Washington Field Office of this Bureau in view of the foregoing remarks attributed to him. Mr. Cameron, when interviewed, stated that he had formerly held the position of Chief Evaluation Engineer of Lend-Lease under Mr. Edward Stettinius, and had previously worked on Defense Aid Reports, Lend-Lease's predecessor, under Messrs. Philip Young and Harry Hopkins.

I am transmitting one copy of the report of SA George E. Davis dated July 14, 1950, furnishing the results of the interview with Mr. Cameron. This report is being furnished for your information.

No further action is contemplated in this matter in the absence of instructions from you to the contrary.

5/26/45  
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ON 5/26/88

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont ✓

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
FELIX FRANKFURTER  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: August 7, 1950

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
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Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*see in committee  
subject  
- to a -*

### PURPOSE

To advise you of an interview of a former Lend-Lease official who alleges that Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court are the number one and number two Communists in the United States.

### BACKGROUND

Robert Cameron, when interviewed by Washington Field Office, stated that he had held the position of Chief Evaluation Engineer of Lend-Lease under Edward Stettinius. He had previously worked on Defense Aid Reports, Lend-Lease's predecessor, under Philip Young and Harry Hopkins.

Cameron is now working privately as an accountant-investigator. *CP 206, 845*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/26/88 BY SP8 BTJ/af

### DETAILS

Cameron states that he became convinced that Acheson and Frankfurter are the number one and number two Communists in the United States; that he is unable to support his convictions by concrete evidence; that he reached the conclusion by circumstantial evidence which is set forth below in approximately the informant's language:

1. Cameron was called into Stettinius' office and asked to bring up to date a report showing the per capita income for each country in the world originally prepared by Harry Dexter White in 1936. Edward Campion Acheson, brother of Dean Acheson, was in Stettinius' office at the time, quoted Dean Acheson and told Cameron that the report should show as of 1942 how much each country could give up until the United States and other leading countries could be brought down to the income level of Latvia plus ten per cent.

*ad. NUK - new  
4/9/50*

PFD:mac

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*94-40632-9*  
*Frankfurter*  
*Reuben*

2. *Harry Dexter White was a member of the group headed by Acheson and Frankfurter and White committed suicide because of his fear of testifying before the HCUA. Cameron said he could not prove this surmise.*
3. *Cameron said Dean Acheson, while Undersecretary of State, represented David Lilienthal before the Senate Committee "selecting" the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Dean Acheson resigned from the State Department after obtaining Lilienthal's appointment.*
4. *Dean Acheson represented Alger Hiss when Hiss was first accused by the HCUA and succeeded in getting the matter quashed.*
5. *Dean Acheson and Alger Hiss were both at the San Francisco UN Conference.*
6. *Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed and others in the Acheson-Frankfurter orbit testified in Hiss' behalf.*
7. *Dean Acheson and Felix Frankfurter are extremely close friends, almost daily they walk together from their homes in Georgetown to the State Department en route to their offices. They are in "almost constant consultation."*
8. *Within a week after Dean Acheson succeeded James Byrnes as Secretary of State, existing differences between the United States and Russia dissolved.*
9. *Acheson's policy weakens and delays preparedness.*
10. *Everything Acheson and Frankfurter do weakens the fiber of the United States.*
11. *Lilienthal resigned after Russia obtained the atomic bomb.*

*Mr. Cameron admitted that he possessed no admissible proof supporting his belief that Mr. Acheson and Mr. Frankfurter*

are the number one and number two Communists respectively in the United States. He said that obviously such individuals would not be caught carrying membership cards of the Communist Party and that his conclusions are based solely upon circumstantial evidence and deductive reasoning on his own part.

ACTION

None. Information only.



# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FORM NO. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT

WASHINGTON FIELD

FILE NO. 62-6355 ep

REPORT MADE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.	DATE WHEN MADE 7-14-50	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 6/30/50	REPORT MADE BY GEORGE E. DAVIS
TITLE DEAN ACHESON FELIX FRANKFURTER		CHARACTER OF CASE INFORMATION CONCERNING	

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

ADMINISTRATIVE

ROBERT CAMERON, former Lend-Lease official, reported on 6/30/50, that circumstantial evidence leads him to believe that DEAN ACHESON, Secretary of State, U.S. State Department and FELIX FRANKFURTER of the U.S. Supreme Court, are the Number One and Number Two Communists respectively in the U.S. CAMERON related that Dr. EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, brother of DEAN ACHESON, who was also formerly in Lend-Lease attributed to DEAN ACHESON in the early days of Lend-Lease a plan which would have reduced the American income level to that of Latvia. CAMERON said that MAXIM LITVINOV, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States was a close personal friend of Dr. EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON. CAMERON stated that ACHESON was counsel to ALGER HISS when HISS was first accused before HCUA at which time ACHESON got matters squelched. CAMERON reported that ACHESON is a close personal friend of Justice FRANKFURTER and that both walk together from Georgetown each morning enroute to work. CAMERON believed that ACHESON, FRANKFURTER and their associates weaken the fibre of the United States.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/26/88 BY SP8/BK

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>Gray Hottel</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5 - Bureau (94-40672) 2 - Philadelphia, Info 3 - Washington Field		94-40672-10	RECORDED - 111 INDEXED - 111

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ADMINISTRATIVE

## DETAILS:

At Washington, D.C.:

On June 30, 1950, Mr. ROBERT CAMERON, 3700 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, who is now working privately as an accountant-investigator, reported that he is convinced in his own mind that Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON and Justice FELIX FRANKFURTER of the U.S. Supreme Court are the Number One and Number Two Communists respectively in the United States, but he stated that he is unable to support his convictions with admissible evidence. He pointed out he has reached this conclusion by virtue of circumstantial evidence which first came to his attention when he himself was employed under the Lend-Lease Program in the early days of the 1940's.

Mr. CAMERON explained that a personal friend PHILIP YOUNG, son of OWEN B. YOUNG, who was formerly head of the Division of the Defense Aid Reports, this being the forerunner of Lend-Lease, induced him, CAMERON, to join that organization. Mr. CAMERON stated he had been a veteran of World War I and that he had tried to get a commission in some active duty during World War II, but that he had learned he would merely be given a desk job and consequently he accepted the proposal of PHILIP YOUNG. He said that Mr. YOUNG was the assistant to Mr. HARRY HOPKINS and was actually the "wheel horse" of the Defense Aid Reports under HARRY HOPKINS and later of the Lend-Lease Program under Mr. EDWARD STETTINIUS. Mr. CAMERON said that he himself became the Chief Evaluation Engineer of Lend-Lease and it was his duty to appraise the value of everything that President ROOSEVELT had given away prior to, and during Lend-Lease. Consequently, he said that he himself was furnished with top secret reports on Lend-Lease operations. It soon came to his notice that these reports actually did not show anything of real significance, therefore, CAMERON "shot off his face" in objecting to such reports and that consequently HARRY HOPKINS made him the Chief Accountant. He said that Mr. HOPKINS still ran the Lend-Lease Program even though he was not its nominal head following its outgrowth from Defense Aid Reports.

Mr. CAMERON said that one day Mr. STETTINIUS, Head of Lend-Lease, called him in and said that the Chief, HARRY HOPKINS, wanted Mr. CAMERON to take a report prepared by HARRY DEXTER WHITE in 1936 and bring it up to date. Mr. CAMERON explained that in 1936 while working for Treasury Department, HARRY DEXTER WHITE prepared a report for the Treasury Department purporting to show the per capita income for every country in the world. The United States was first in its income level.

Mr. CAMERON said that also present in Mr. STETTINIUS' office was Dr. EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, commonly known as TED ACHESON, and that STETTINIUS after announcing in general his desire, passed the matter over to Mr. ACHESON for further discussion with CAMERON. Consequently TED ACHESON took over and began to quote his brother, DEAN ACHESON, and stated that CAMERON was to bring the report down to 1942, so that it could be shown how much each country could give up until the United

ADMINISTRATIVE

States and other leading countries could be brought down to the income level of LATVIA plus 10%. Mr. CAMERON stated he immediately objected to this assignment pointing out it would weaken and lower the income bracket of the United States. Mr. CAMERON stated he refused outright to accept the assignment on these grounds and that no action was taken directly against him, although later he was always circumvented and such tasks were assigned other individuals some of whom were his inferiors in rank.

Mr. CAMERON said that while TED ACHESON was explaining the plan to bring the HARRY DEXTER WHITE report up to date that TED ACHESON attributed this idea to his brother DEAN and made frequent allusions to what DEAN ACHESON thought should be done.

Mr. CAMERON referred to HARRY DEXTER WHITE'S death a year or two ago at about the time the HCUA was conducting certain investigations and Mr. CAMERON stated that in his opinion HARRY DEXTER WHITE was a member of the group headed by ACHESON and FRANKFURTER and that WHITE as a matter of fact had committed suicide because of his fear to testify and that he had not died a natural death as the newspapers had reported. Mr. CAMERON stated that of course he was unable to prove this surmise.

Mr. CAMERON stated that while he was in the Lend-Lease program he found out that every time the Russians had asked for something under the program and failed to get it that MAXIM LITVINOV immediately went to HARRY HOPKINS. He reported that Mr. HOPKINS had on one such instance called members of the Committee to review methods for Lend-Lease and told them he wanted the committee abolished and that the Russians were to be given everything they wanted. Mr. CAMERON said that he personally knew that MAXIM LITVINOV was a very close friend of TED ACHESON and that the two were in frequent company with each other despite the fact that LITVINOV should have come to Mr. CAMERON on certain matters since ACHESON was subordinate to Mr. CAMERON.

Mr. CAMERON then referred to Mr. DAVID LILLIENTHAL, former Head of TVA and later Head of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. CAMERON said that while Mr. DEAN ACHESON was Undersecretary of State, he represented LILLIENTHAL before the Senate Committee which was meeting to select the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He said that LILLIENTHAL was selected after which Mr. ACHESON resigned his position as Undersecretary of State, after, in Mr. CAMERON'S opinion, having accomplished his purpose in obtaining Mr. LILLIENTHAL'S appointment to the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. CAMERON did not state that he felt Mr. LILLIENTHAL'S appointment as Head of the Atomic Energy Commission was inimical to the best interests of the United States.

Mr. CAMERON pointed out when ALGER HISS was first accused by the House Committee on Un-American Activities that DEAN ACHESON served as HISS'S counsel and according to Mr. CAMERON succeeded in getting the matter squelched.

ADMINISTRATIVE

He said that when HISS was later arrested and tried in New York City, that of course Mr. FELIX FRANKFURTER, Mr. STANLEY REED, former Attorney General, and other persons within the ACHESON-FRANKFURTER orbit testified on HISS' behalf. He indicated that Secretary ACHESON and his group were so influential and persuasive that even President TRUMAN came out with his "red herring" statement concerning the activities of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He also referred to the fact that both DEAN ACHESON and ALGER HISS were at the San Francisco Conference but he did not specify the nature of their activities while there.

Mr. CAMERON stated he personally knew that Mr. DEAN ACHESON and FELIX FRANKFURTER are extremely close friends and that they almost daily walk together from their homes in Georgetown to the State Department enroute to their offices. He said that they were in almost constant consultation with each other.

Mr. CAMERON recalled that when Mr. JAMES BYRNES of South Carolina was Secretary of State that the United States and Russia were almost at each other's throats in Berlin and that there were threats of war between the two countries but that when the President selected DEAN ACHESON to succeed Mr. BYRNES that within a week everything was all right between the United States and Russia. He attributed this to the relationship between Mr. ACHESON and the USSR.

Mr. CAMERON said that in his opinion Justice FRANKFURTER's judicial opinions warranted examination if one is to show that he has been consistently following USSR policy.

He expressed the opinion that Secretary of State ACHESON's policies weaken the United States and delay preparedness. He also claimed that everything Mr. ACHESON and Justice FRANKFURTER and their associates do is to weaken the fibre of the United States.

Mr. CAMERON claimed that he feels sure of his ability to show that the American officials are now playing into the hands of Russia. He pointed out for instance that last August 19, Mr. LILLIENTHAL decided that he wanted to quit the Atomic Energy Commission and enter private business and this was announced in the newspapers. Mr. CAMERON said he immediately told his wife that the Russians must now have the atomic bomb since Mr. LILLIENTHAL had decided to quit. He said that the following September, President TRUMAN announced that the Russians had exploded their first atomic bomb. Mr. CAMERON said that he is certain in his own mind that LILLIENTHAL had fulfilled a specific mission.

Mr. CAMERON admitted that he possessed no admissible proof supporting his belief that Mr. ACHESON and Mr. FRANKFURTER are the Number One and Number Two Communists respectively in the United States. He said that obviously such individuals would not be caught carrying membership cards of the Communist Party and that his conclusions are based solely upon circumstantial evidence and deductive reasoning on his own part.

WFO 62-6355

ADMINISTRATIVE

Mr. CAMERON pointed out that he was formerly associated with the Securities Exchange Commission and he is an expert accountant, that he has done considerable accounting investigative work and that consequently he has learned to deduce accurate conclusions from facts at hand better than most individuals.

- C L O S E D -

WFO 62-6355

LEAD SHEET

Two copies of this report are being designated for Philadelphia inasmuch as CAMERON formerly resided and worked in Philadelphia and since the complaint on which this investigation was predicated originated in Philadelphia.

\* \* \* \* \*

REFERENCE: Bureau letter to Washington Field, June 16, 1950.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
Secretary of State  
Information Concerning

DATE: August 17, 1950

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Mrs. E. CAMPLIN ACHESON, 356 Washington Street, Middletown, Connecticut, mother of DEAN ACHESON, Secretary of State, advised this office on August 16, 1950, that she had received an anonymous post card August 9, 1950 containing uncomplimentary facts concerning her son. On contact, Mrs. ACHESON advised that she had received the following post card:

"Dear Madam: There is no doubt in the minds of many of us that your son, Dean Acheson, is working for Stalin to the detriment of the United States. He cannot be called a Communist, but he cannot be called a loyal American either. Russia has caused intense suffering to the people and nations all over the world, but they will be defeated one day as are all rulers who defy the laws of God.

"There is a God above, and one day your son will pay for the suffering he has caused in Korea, China, and elsewhere. God will punish him severely, the punishment we do not know. Your son is a very ugly man, according to the pictures.

(Signed) A Veteran

The post card was postmarked August 7, 1950, at 3 P.M. and mailed at Middletown, Connecticut. Mrs. ACHESON stated that she was not concerned for herself, but did not want her family to know about the card. She advised that she had been advised by friends of hers to contact this office, due to the fact that on September 15, 1950, in conjunction with a sesquicentennial celebration by the City of Middletown, a highway is to be dedicated to the ACHESONS and she believes some one might try to cause trouble at this time. She advised it was because of this that she was bringing to the Bureau's attention the receipt of the above post card. Mrs. ACHESON was advised that the Bureau had no jurisdiction in this matter, but that the Post Office had. Mrs. ACHESON stated that she was desirous that this office turn the above mentioned post card over to the Postal authorities and furnish them with the facts in the case.

On August 16, 1950, Inspector E. J. MORAN of the Hartford Post Office was furnished the above facts and given instant post card, and he advised that the post office will handle the matter from here on.

JAD/jcp

62-0

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194-40672

SEP 2 1950

34

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: September 16, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON, DEAN

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

This morning, SA W. C. Sullivan was advised very confidentially by [redacted] that the Secretary of State, Acheson, will resign within the next few weeks.

It will be recalled that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was affiliated with the State Department during the war and has a few close friends there now. He did not disclose to Sullivan the source of his information, but he did say it came from a State Department official and he believes it to be reliable in substance.

ACTION

This is for your information.

EX - 83

RECORDED - 73

WCS:mpm

94-40672-12  
SEP 20 1950

SEP 26 1950

b6  
b7C  
b7D



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont *CLB*

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON;  
FELIX FRANKFURTER  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: June 15, 1950

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Ladd \_\_\_\_\_

Clegg \_\_\_\_\_

Glavin \_\_\_\_\_

Nichols \_\_\_\_\_

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_

Tracy \_\_\_\_\_

Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

### PURPOSE

To obtain authorization to interview Robert Cameron relative to statements attributed to him concerning Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.

### DETAILS

Stouffer's Restaurant, 1526 Chestnut, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, recently advised an agent of the Philadelphia Office that Robert Cameron, a former employee of the Department of State, had told him that Dean Acheson and Felix Frankfurter were the number one and number two Communists in the United States, and that he, Cameron, could prove it.  indicated that he had previously furnished this information to Congressman Samuel K. McConnell, Jr., Republican, Pennsylvania. Vollmer further advised that he was willing to have his name used in the event the Bureau desires to interview Cameron.

*Call Stanley*

*REK*

b6  
b7c

The Bureau's files reflect that in 1942 an investigation was conducted concerning Robert Cameron as an employee of the Office for Emergency Management. From a review of the file it would appear that this Robert Cameron is identical with the individual mentioned by  All of the persons interviewed during the investigation vouched for Cameron's loyalty, intelligence and ability. Several persons, however, indicated that Cameron was overly suspicious and continually distrustful of his fellow employees.

### ACTION

In spite of the reports that Cameron is overly suspicious and distrustful of his fellow employees, it is recommended that he be located and interviewed concerning the statements attributed to him by  If you approve, there is attached hereto a letter to the Washington Field Office requesting that Cameron be located and interviewed.

Attachment

EBR:CMC  
94-40672

cc: 62-37356

RECORDED - 27

194-40672-13

SEP 19 1950

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*FILE*

*CRB*

*20 218*

*EBR*

UNRECORDED COPIES FILED IN 62-37356-10

59 SEP 26 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 14, 1951

The Attorney General  
Director, FBI

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON

I wanted to bring to your attention the attached copy of Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, which was introduced by California State Senator Jack Tenney on January 15, 1951, "relating to the impeachment of Secretary of State Dean Acheson."

With reference to the statement appearing on page two of this resolution to the effect that "whereas, Dean Acheson, in 1948, used his influence with the F.B.I. to save Alger Hiss. . .", such a statement is, on its face, ridiculous.

No further action is contemplated by this Bureau in this matter.

Enclosure

RHE:EHW:wmj

*Wray*

G. I. R. - 7

RECEIVED DIRECTOR  
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194-40672  
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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
MAIL ROOM

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

APR 7 1951

94-40672-15

March 9, 1951

RECORDED - 108 SAC, Baltimore

EX-3

Director, FBI

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State  
Information Concerning  
Urfile 121-0

REGISTERED MAIL

Reference is made to your letter dated March 1, 1951, transmitting one roll of film pertaining to the above-captioned matter.

In accordance with your request, two prints have been made of each exposure and one copy of each is being retained in the Bureau. The remaining prints are being forwarded together with the film to your office herewith.

Enclosure

*Substantive*  
*E. J. [Signature]*

- Olson \_\_\_\_\_
- Wadd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RGR:vs  
US

MAR 9 1951

*AL*  
*J*  
*WPA*  
*AK*

RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1951

65 APR 30 1951

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Baltimore

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: 3/1/51

~~BAK~~  
G. J. [unclear]

ATTENTION: FBI LABORATORY

THIS IS NOT EVIDENCE.

Transmitted herewith via registered mail is one roll of 35 mm. film containing some 19 exposures of a pamphlet entitled "China" which was forwarded to the Baltimore office by Brigadier General (retired) EUGENE S. BIBB, 905 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland.

The Laboratory is requested to prepare two complete photographic sets of this pamphlet of appropriate size. One set should be furnished to the Security Section at the SOG and the other set should be forwarded to the Baltimore Office for completion of our file.

JOM:mhp  
121-0

Enclosure

Registered Mail

~~ENCLOSURE~~

70-1 [unclear]

RECORDED - 112

94-40672-15

INDEXED - 112

Act. Mem. Re.  
V. Skinner  
MAR 9 1951

~~BAK~~  
G. J. [unclear]

~~X~~

To receive [unclear]  
3/1/51

A. L. [unclear]  
W. R. [unclear]  
3/1/51

ENCLOSURE

94-40672-15

## CHINA

Fifty years ago it might have been possible to discuss "China", and its relationship to United States and world security, without leaving the Chinese main land or the Pacific.

But the China of today must be viewed as a continental block of 440 million human souls, living in an area that controls the coastline of the Northern, Central and Southern Pacific Ocean, lying adjacent to territory of the Soviet Union, a nation that has given, and is giving, every evidence of determination to control the world in order to give Communism an uncluttered stage upon which to play its part.

The China of today, in the language of geopolitics, is the site of the fourth largest concentration of coal and iron in the world, with a vast grain belt, and vast mineral resources virtually untapped, - that would be a fine addition to the resources, both in manpower and industrial potential, to a would-be world government.

The islands that lie immediately beyond China's horizon, - - Japan, Okinawa, the Marianas, the Carolines, the Philippines, Formosa, the Netherlands Indies, - are potentially "easy" military targets for a land power based in the string of Chinese coastal cities.

If the United States is to survive the Twentieth Century as an independent power, we must divorce ourselves from Nineteenth Century thinking.

This presents China to us as an amorphous mass of millions of people, periodically stricken by famine, a peasant economy, upon which has been superimposed a few industries and banks fashioned by the great colonial powers, Britain, France, and Japan. It is to see China as a melange of missionary depots, haphazardly founded educational institutions, with barefooted coolies obediently trotting to and fro in the streets. THIS IS NOT THE CHINA OF 1950.

Until December 7, 1941, most Americans visualized the Japanese as quaint little people, mincing about beneath their umbrellas, amid slanting, curled roofs, with the smoke of sacred Fujiama rising peacefully to the skies.

These visions were somewhat true in 1850, but they correspond to the European version of America that persisted until World War II - that we were a nation of gangsters and Indians and Hollywood, and they must be discarded, if we are to think clearly in this period of dying morality, integrity, and leadership.

In discussing China, our first point must be to recognize WHAT ARE SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD THIS KEY NATION OF THE PACIFIC.

As early as Peter the Great, Czarist Russia began to push toward the Pacific. In 1776, while the American Revolution was being fought, the navy of Catherine the Great was exploring the Pacific coast of China. Pressure from Western Russia was driving trappers and settlers into Central Asia, and under Alexander I and Nicholas I, more and more Russians made their way to the Pacific Coast. It was a natural expansion for Russia. While Britain and France developed the Central and South China coasts, Russia was building a firm foothold in the North.

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During the mid-Nineteenth Century, Russia expanded southward over the steppes to the borders of Iran, Afghanistan, and India, where they were stopped by the fierce rebellions of the Asiatic tribesmen, and by the Himalaya Mountains.

At the beginning of this century, Czarist Russia again began to consolidate her gains in Central Asia, and Outer Mongolia. Czarist Russian agents spread dissention in these areas, and sent troops to quell the rebellions.

In 1912, in Canton, where the effects of Western philosophy were making themselves felt, the revolution broke out under the leadership of Sun Yat Sen, a Chinese Nationalist, which with the aid of the landlords, the merchants, and the intellectuals, were finally successful in overthrowing the Manchux dynasty. Among Sun Yat Sen's lieutenants was a young man who was to fall under Communist influence, Chiang Kai Shek, who welcomed the Bolshevik agents to China.

The Moscow-trained revolutionaries remained in China from 1912 until 1927, - for 15 years, - while the revolution raged up and down the continent. Finally, in 1927, the Kuomintang Party, of which Chiang was now the leader, expelled Borodin the Russian Minister, from China. This led Stalin to remark that he would "get" Chiang, if it took a lifetime, and made Chiang the sworn enemy of the Soviets.

This is one point to remember, in judging Stalin's intentions toward the Chinese Republic, and Chiang. At this time Britain developed a loose alliance with the Nationalist Government of China, in order to protect its heavy investments there. American-British and French policies were dovetailed in the 9 Power Treaty of 1922 as a pledge "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China." This policy was first officially proclaimed by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899, at which time he said:

"The storm center of the world has gradually shifted to China. Whoever understands that mighty empire socially, politically, and economically, and religiously, has a key to politics for the next 500 years."

We are familiar with the next step in the tragedy of the Republic of China. This was the invasion of Manchuria, China's richest province, by Japan, now bent on expansion, in 1931. Chiang had had no time to consolidate the Republic. The revolution had lasted in various provinces from 1912 to 1927. The railroads were in terrible condition from guerilla warfare, and some provinces were practically independent of the national government.

While the Chinese Nationalists were fighting Japan, a new menace appeared on the scene. This was the Chinese Communist movement, directed by Mao Tse Tung, loyal Moscow lieutenant, and on several occasions during the mid-Thirties Chiang was captured by them, and barely escaped with his .

Japan, allied with Germany in 1936, swept down the Chinese coast-line, - the Communists retreated to the northwest provinces, adjacent to the Soviet Union, and Chiang retreated to the South.



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Britain and the United States, with their attention focused on domestic problems, failed to heed the storm signals flying in the Far East, - or even in Europe, for that matter.

Hanson Baldwin's article in the January, 1950 Atlantic Monthly helps to clear the picture somewhat as to WHY we eventually went to war against Germany and Japan. It differs completely from the stories told us at the time.

History will show, IF HISTORY IS WRITTEN BY CITIZENS OF WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, that Germany signed the pact with Stalin in August, 1939 to advance her determination to dislodge Britain from the continent of Europe, and to help Japan dislodge her from Asia. Stalin intended to let Hitler pull his Communist chestnuts from the fire for him by defeating Britain and France, the Nos. 1 and 2 Capitalist powers of Europe, and then biding his time before Moscow could take on the victorious Hitler. Hitler intended to use the Soviet Union as a source of raw materials and food until he had defeated Britain and France and the Low Countries, and then he intended to turn upon Stalin's Asia.

At no foreseeable time in 1941 did the plans of the German General Staff, or the Soviet Politburo conceive of attacking the United States.

Reduced to the simplest terms, the United States entered the conflict in December, 1941 in order to rescue Great Britain, and in mid-war, 1943, when the Pro-Soviet advisors dominated the State Department, we went on to bail out Russia and then hand her Eastern Europe and China.

The State Department in 1941 was pro-British, pro-China, anti-German, and neutral on Russia. Cordell Hull's views on reciprocal trade prevailed in the decision to give up extra territoriality in China, and to force Britain and France to do the same. But from December 7, 1941 onward, as Hull himself puts it in his memoirs, HE WAS NOT CONSULTED ON ANY MAJOR DECISIONS, and foreign policy began to be developed by a "kitchen cabinet", whose names have never yet been revealed.

We do know that Dean Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State in 1941, and that both Alger and Donald Hiss became members of the State Department Staff. We have an inkling as to what happened in the crucial years after January, 1942.

With our eyes focussed on Europe, exactly as we are doing today, with the Atlantic Pact, we let the Philippines fall, and then one after another, all of the islands of the Pacific. We rushed arms and munitions to Russia via Murmansk and the Persian Gulf.

By late in 1943 the tide had so noticeably turned that every informed person knew that Germany was done for, and competent authorities have suggested that Soviet Russia also realized it, and began to stockpile for World War II beyond the Urals from December, 1943 onwards. At no time during the war with Germany did she ever move a single unit of her 1 million-man-army under General Stern across the border of Manchuria from Japan's Kwantung Army. She definitely knew that under the lash of Communist propaganda, then in full cry in Washington, that we would finish the war against Germany for her.

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It has also been suggested that through Elizabeth Bentley's spy ring in 1944 she also knew that several very high U. S. government officials would see to it that Russia would secure every demand that she might make, in order to be in a striking position to take over Germany and Manchuria at the end of the war.

Mr. Whittaker Chambers ceased his activities in behalf of Communism in the spring of 1938. Miss Bentley continued until the fall of 1944. We are all familiar with the names of some of the Government officials who, they state, furnished them with information. They are quite a galaxy of stars from the State Department, the Treasury, and various other Departments. It is small wonder that our foreign policy from 1943 onward showed such a pronounced red tinge.

Mr. Dean Acheson put Mr. Alger Hiss in charge of UN Liaison Activities in the summer of 1943.

Appearing before the House Un-American Activities Committee in August, 1948, Mr. Adolph Berle, formerly Assistant Secretary of State, a liberal of leftist tendencies, and now Chairman of the leftist Liberal Party in New York, testified that by 1944 there was a difference of opinion in the State Department; that he headed the clique that did not have complete trust in Russia; that the pro-Soviet clique was headed by Dean Acheson and his assistant Alger Hiss; that he (Berle) lost out and was removed from his position and sent off to Brazil as Ambassador.

During this period the UNRRA negotiations were settled, and Dean Acheson forced the Chinese Nationalist delegate to accept the veto principle, written into UNRRA by the Russian delegate. (Jan Ciechanowski - Defeat in Victory).

General Patrick Hurley testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had been President Roosevelt's special Ambassador to China; that the entire staff of his Embassy was composed of pro-Communists and that most of the men in charge of China affairs in the State Department in Washington were likewise pro-Communist.

The White Paper, released in August, 1949, after Chiang had been nearly driven off the Chinese mainland, reveals in the reports of Messrs. Ludden, John P. Davies, John S. Service, and George Acheson, starting in 1943 in the very middle of the war, a determination to discredit the National Chinese Government and to build up a picture of the Chinese Communists as ardent fighters for democracy, whom we should implicitly trust. This decision was probably taken by Moscow at the time it was sure of Germany's eventual defeat, and when the stock-piling east of the Urals began for World War III.

General Hurley said on August 7, 1949 (New York Times):

"President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta. The State Department officials took over. The secret agreement at Yalta surrendered every principle of the Atlantic Charter and the Iran declaration.

"The text of the Yalta agreement was finally released by the State Department on March 24, 1947. Among other things, it undertook to obtain for the Soviet Union territorial concessions in Manchuria, goal of the Czarist colonizers since 1725.

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At the Teheran conference, which took place in February, 1944, he said Roosevelt insisted on defining the war goal of the Allies as the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter. Presumably he would have done so again at Yalta, in General Hurley's view, if it had not been for the maneuvering of the State Department's career diplomats. "Nearly all the officials relieved by me in China because they were pro-Communist are now in the State Department, presumably writing alibi white papers," he declared.

Among those present at Yalta were Alger Hiss and Harry Hopkins, the latter accused in Major Racey Jordan's testimony as having influenced shipments of a-bomb material to the Soviet Union in 1944, in his zest to give our "ally" every possible aid. It is an amusing and tragic sidelight on history that this former social welfare worker was at this point an emissary of the President of the United States, and making policy recommendations after his whirlwind tours of the Kremlin and the Bolshoi Ballet. There is no record that either Mr. Alger Hiss, or Mr. Dean Acheson, for that matter, are experts in geopolitics or even economics, and these tremendous policy matters, affecting the future of the United States both require profound knowledge in these fields.

Mr. Edward Stettinius, the front-man at Yalta, could not possibly have been sufficiently briefed on world history and economics in time to give sound advice, - even if he had been asked for it, - which he allegedly was not.

In furtherance of the objective of thoroughly discrediting the Chinese Nationalist government, the State Department induced President Roosevelt in June, 1944 to send Vice-President Henry A. Wallace (who Pegler says sponsored the trips of Guru Nicholas Roerich to China in 1934) on a trip to China, and Siberia accompanied by three left-wing advisers. Vice President Wallace spent four days in Chungking and 10 days visiting American airports in China.

The White Paper contains a summary of his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek, in which he urged the Generalissimo to take the Communists into the family.

The White Paper and the State Department categorically deny that VP Wallace made any written report to President Roosevelt on his return from China. In spite of this denial, Ambassador Hurley states that he read Mr. Wallace's report, which was shown to him by the State Department; and Mr. Wallace himself writing in a publication of the COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY IN SEPTEMBER, 1949, stated, "After I visited China in 1944, I reported to President Roosevelt:

"Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run post-war China. The leaders of post-war China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter."

It might be noted that the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, for whom Mr. Wallace wrote his article, is listed by the Attorney General as a subversive organization.

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Why the State Department in 1950 should deny the existence of the Wallace report is an IMPORTANT QUESTION?

Persons who have read the Wallace report surmise that its publication now would give the showaway, because if published, even we dumb Americans could see that the policy we have followed since 1945 has been the policy laid down by Wallace, whose pro-Soviet sympathies are public knowledge.

A FACT OF VITAL IMPORTANCE MUST BE BROUGHT OUT HERE.

In July, 1944, at the Democratic National Convention, desperate efforts were exerted by Sidney Hillman, then head of CIO-Pac, Eleanor Roosevelt, the President's wife, then champion of such groups as the American Youth for Democracy, a Communist front organization, etc., and the Wallace supporters, to get the nomination as Vice-President for Henry Wallace. IT WAS KNOWN AT THIS TIME, IN JULY, 1944 THAT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT HAD ONLY MONTHS TO LIVE. HIS PHYSICAL CONDITION WAS OBVIOUS. Rumors were WHOLESALe IN WASHINGTON IN MIDSUMMER 1944 THAT HE WAS A MARKED MAN - to the extent that the White House physician spent a busy Fall denying them, - - and yet this group worked maniacally to get Henry Wallace the nomination, knowing that he would succeed as President. If the President's desperate physical condition was known to reporters, HOW CAN WE POSSIBLY ASSUME THAT IT WAS UNKNOWN TO HIS WIFE, AND SIDNEY HILLMAN, DAVID K. NILES, SAMUEL ROSENMAN, HENRY WALLACE AND HIS OTHER INTIMATES OF THIS PERIOD?

Admiral Ellis N. Zacharias revealed in the August, 1949 issue of UN World that Japan made several offers to surrender during December, 1944, through the mediation of His Holiness the Pope, the Dowager Empress of Japan, and the U.S. envoy to the Vatican, Myron C. Taylor. THE STATE DEPARTMENT, COMPOSED OF SUBSTANTIALLY THE IDENTICAL PERSONNEL THAT IT BOASTS TODAY, shrugged off this intelligence at the time by saying that the offers came through irresponsible individuals.

One may draw the conclusion that if the news that Japan was attempting to negotiate a surrender in December, 1944, leaked out, the necessity for the infamous Yalta conference no longer existed, - since there was no need to enlist Russia in the war against Japan - - and NO NEED WHATSOEVER TO GIVE HER MANCHURIA, PORT ARTHUR, DARIEN, THE SAKHALINS AND THE KURILES IN RETURN FOR HER 5-day aid.

John Carter Vincent, now in Switzerland and Owen Lattimore of Baltimore were two of Henry Wallace's "advisors" on the 1944 trip.

Shortly after Henry Wallace returned to America in July, 1944, on the urging of General Stillwell, as revealed in his diary (1948), President Roosevelt requested Chiang Kai Shek to appoint Stillwell Supreme Commander of the Armies of China. This was agreed to by Chiang, and a diagram of the chain of command was drawn up by Stillwell, and signed by Chiang. A few days later General Stillwell received a telegram from President Roosevelt for delivery to Chiang, demanding that the Civil Government also be put under the control of Stillwell, and threatening that if this were not agreed to, American forces would be withdrawn from China and further lend-lease ended.



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At the same moment, the State Department was telling Poland that if she did not yield to Russian demands on the composition of her post-war government, and Russia's possession of Polish territory given to her by Hitler in 1939, the U. S. would make no more effort to aid the Polish legal government in London.

General Stillwell's diary also reveals that he had been working on General Marshall for such an ultimatum for Chiang for more than a year, and the fact that the telegram from President Roosevelt was dated at Quebec, where General Marshall was in attendance at the Conference with Churchill, but Secretary of State Hull was not present, seems to indicate the origin of this demand.

Chiang refused, and at the same time demanded the recall of Stillwell, General Marshall's buddy. Stillwell revealed in his diary that he had advised Chiang Kai Shek that he intended to arm the Communists if he had the authority.

General Stillwell was recalled and replaced by General Wedemeyer. Relations between General Wedemeyer and Chiang were gradually restored to the friendly basis that should prevail between allies.

In March or April, 1945, shortly before VE Day in Europe, and during the period when Mr. Roosevelt succumbed, a STATE DEPARTMENT prepared proposal was sent to the U.S. Navy Department, recommending that American troops be landed on the coast of China north of Shanghai. This area of Japanese-occupied China was infiltrated with Communist guerillas and the plan called for arming and training these guerillas.

The War and Navy Department plan previously prepared, had called for landings on Hangchow Bay, south of Shanghai, which sea was held by Nationalist troops and guerillas.

The objective of the STATE DEPARTMENT for landings in the north was to arm and train the Chinese Communists for the attack on Shanghai in place of the Nationalists.

THIS WAS THE PERIOD WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO KEPT THE AMERICAN ARMIES OUT OF BERLIN, PRAGUE AND VIENNA - PROBABLY FOR THE SAME REASON - TO GIVE RUSSIA THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OF BEING THE CONQUEROR OF GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA.

THIS PLAN WAS TO HAVE CHINA "LIBERATED" BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. ARE ALL OF THESE DESIGNS MERELY COINCIDENCE?

Had the State Department plan for a Communist attack on Shanghai succeeded, all of Central China on V-J day would have been in the hands of the Communist Army.

The STATE DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL was refused by the Navy on non-political grounds because the coastal area north of Shanghai was unsuitable for landings and the only port there available, the port of Haichow, was too small to be used.

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Later, about the first week of July, 1945, General Stillwell, who by that time had been appointed Commander of the ground forces preparing on Okinawa for the landing on the coast of China, made the same proposal to the War Department, which forwarded it to the American Commander in China, General Wedemeyer, who showed it to Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang immediately called in our Ambassador, General Hurley, who had not been informed of either proposal by Washington.

General Hurley immediately saw the implications of this landing and turning over of the heart of China to the Communists and cabled to both State and War Departments, and received a promise that when landings were made in China, the general commanding would be subject to the approval of Chiang Kai Shek, the President of the Country in which we were to land. The Japanese surrender a little over two weeks later made the entire question academic.

Shortly after V-J Day, when Ambassador Hurley was attempting to bring about some agreement between the Chinese Communists and the National Government, the Communist emissary, Chou En-lai (now Premier of Communist China) twitted Hurley on his lack of support from Washington, and told him he did not really speak for Washington, and to prove it to him, told him that the Chinese Communists were receiving 2 shiploads of surrendered Japanese arms and ammunition from Manila, which were at that moment actually at sea, headed for the North China port of Chefoo held by the Communists. Chou En-lai told Hurley, the American Ambassador to China that the very fact that he did not even know about it, indicated that he was not in the confidence of Washington. General Hurley immediately cabled Washington in the strongest of terms and had the two shiploads diverted elsewhere.

In the Fall of 1945 orders were issued to destroy all the arms and ammunition lying in India en route to China under lend-lease. This was a very large amount of material charged to the Government of China. The small caliber ammunition was destroyed in dumps. The exact amount is not known but was large, so large that about 25 Americans and 125 Indians were killed in accidents in connection with the demolitions.

Larger caliber ammunition, aerial bombs, etc. being too dangerous to destroy in that fashion were taken to sea and dumped to a total of 120,000 tons.

DURING THE FALL OF 1945 SOVIET RUSSIA WAS STRIPPING MANCHURIA OF \$10 BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY ERECTED BY JAPAN - THANKS TO THE YALTA AGREEMENT- AND FURNISHING MILLIONS OF ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION TAKEN FROM SURRENDERED AND CAPTURED JAPANESE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN MANCHURIA. In connection with the destruction of arms and ammunition the report of ex-President Hoover that the equipment of over 60 divisions was destroyed, mostly in Europe, is of interest. This equipment destroyed in Europe is very largely the kind of equipment needed now by our allies in Asia, and which we must supply at the cost of many billions of tax dollars in order to rearm them within the next few years against the Soviet threat. Who ordered this destruction of American material is not known, nor does the White Paper on China reveal it.

Dean Acheson has refused to make available to U.S. Senators the initials of the various officials who worked on the White paper. His answer is that as Secretary, he assumes the full responsibility. It might be a good idea to have him assume it, in the form of questions as to why these various actions were taken.

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After V-E Day, but prior to V-J Day, the Chinese asked for a share of the surrendered German arms and ammunition. This request was approved by the American Theatre Commander, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and orders to this effect were sent to General Eisenhower. Actually the first shipment of such arms taken from a German warehouse left Germany on a boat headed for India.

SHORTLY AFTER, THIS ORDER WAS COUNTERMANDED ON WHITE HOUSE STATIONERY IN A LETTER SIGNED BY LAUCHLIN CURRIE, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, AND NO FURTHER ARMS FROM GERMANY WENT TO CHINA. LAUCHLIN CURRIE WAS NAMED IN THE SUMMER OF 1948 BY ELIZABETH BENTLEY SOVIET COURIER AS ONE OF HER "CONTACTS".

General Marshall has stated that as Chief of Staff he had armed over 30 divisions of Chinese troops, BUT BY AN EMBARGO PLACED BY HIM SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN CHINA IN DECEMBER, 1945, NO FURTHER AMMUNITION WAS PERMITTED TO BE SHIPPED, SO THAT, AS HE STATED, BY A STROKE OF THE PEN HE HAD DISARMED THOSE 30 ODD DIVISIONS.

THIS EMBARGO ON AMMUNITION FOR THE AMERICAN ARMS OF THESE CRACK CHINESE DIVISIONS CONTINUED UNINTERRUPTEDLY UNTIL DECEMBER 1948, EXCEPT FOR A SMALL SHIPMENT OF 2,000 tons of ammunition declared unseizable lying on one of the Pacific Islands in 1948. THUS THE AMERICAN TRAINED DIVISIONS OF THE CHINESE ARMY RECEIVED NO AMMUNITION FOR THEIR WEAPONS FROM THE END OF 1945 UNTIL DECEMBER, 1948 BY WHICH TIME THE GREAT BATTLES OF THE NORTHERN PLAINS OF CHINA AND MANCHURIA HAD BEEN FOUGHT AND LOST BY THE NATIONALISTS.

In the summer of 1947 President Truman sent General Wedemeyer back to China to make a survey and a report on what could be done to stop the Communist conquest. General Wedemeyer made his report to President Truman on September 19, 1947.

In this report, revealed in August, 1949, 2 whole years later, General Wedemeyer did not spare his criticism of some elements in the Nationalist Government, composed as it was of landlords, bankers, former warlords, feudal family groups, and many other rightwing elements, as well as a sprinkling of Centrists, but he laid down proposals for the defeat of the Communists by American supervised military aid to the Nationalists.

Former Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard has publicly stated that the Chinese Constitution of 1946, adopted by the Nationalist Government, is a splendid one, and that Chiang made desperate efforts, in the face of constant Communist guerilla warfare, to put its principles into effect. Dean Mary Sinclair Crawford of the University of Southern California went during this period at the invitation of Chiang to supervise the improvement of university arrangements for women and girl students. Witnesses abound to testify that at no time under the rule of the Kuomintang or the Chinese Nationalist Government has there been Government persecution of missionaries and churches, or interference with educational efforts.

At the time he presented his report to Truman, there was wide public demand for publication of the report. The STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS CLAIMED IT WAS INADVISABLE TO MAKE THIS REPORT PUBLIC BECAUSE IT CONTAINED SEVERE CRITICISMS OF HIGH CHINESE OFFICIALS, AND BECAUSE SOME OF THE INFORMATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO GENERAL WEDEMEYER IN CONFIDENCE.

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Now that publication reveals that both of these reasons of the State Department are false, a new reason is given for non-publication in 1947, when the Nationalists still had a good chance of ending the Chinese Communist menace once and for all.

The new reason is that in this report General Wedemeyer recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria, and to have made that public would have offended the Chinese. This statement is made with a straight face by the State Department in spite of the fact that two years before, in 1947, General Wedemeyer had reported to President Truman (p. 131 of the White Paper) that General Chiang had agreed with his recommendations on Manchuria.

Just prior to that time, in fact, Dean Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State reported to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives: (1947)

"The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years." (Since 1927, when Chiang threw out Borodin, the Kremlin's representative.)

Secretary Acheson in the White Paper now states in August, 1949:

"The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it."

THIS, IN SPIKE OF THE FACT THAT THE WEDEMAYER REPORT, WITH A PLAN FOR SAVING CHINA IN AUGUST, 1947, LAY BURIED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT FILES FOR TWO YEARS WHILE STALIN'S CHINESE HENCHMEN TOOK OVER CHINA.

At this point it is important to remember that the elements composing the Nationalist Government in China do not differ in the slightest degree from the groups composing the Governments of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the right wing elements in Great Britain and France.

AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT DIFFER IN THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE FROM THE COMMUNISTS IN THOSE SAME NATIONS, OR IN LATIN AMERICA, CUBA, MEXICO, INDIA, GERMANY, OR THE UNITED STATES. ALL HAVE PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED THEIR LOYALTY TO MOSCOW THE WORLD GOVERNMENT OF TOMORROW.

General Wedemeyer did criticize the petty jealousies among Chinese Nationalist officials, and Chiang thanked him for it. It is not possible for the President of the United States to control the pulling and hauling of Big Business, Big Banking, Big Farming, Big Cooperatives, Minorities, Liberals, and Labor Unions, much less the President of a nation that had suffered under a Civil War since 1912, and the invasion of a foreign power, Japan.



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This is a crooked argument, - and it does not mask for a moment the certainty that the Chinese Communists will demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt within the coming year or two what they will do with the do-gooders, the short-sighted British businessmen who insisted on recognition and trade with Moscow's new "autonomous" Chinese Republic, and worst of all - to the missionaries and teachers of the Christian faith, not to mention the Chinese priests, teachers, and educated classes.

In the Fall of 1948 former Ambassador to Russia and France William C. Bullitt took up where General Wedemeyer had left off. He returned horrified at the coming debacle in January, 1949, where he immediately sought out President Truman and Congress and demanded that aid be sent to Chiang Kai Shek.

Among his charges were that:

- 1 - China has no military academy, and consequently no trained generals. Soviet Russia was actively supervising the Chinese Communist troops.
- 2 - The so-called mission sent to aid Chiang had been instructed not to advise him on any question of ground, air, or other forces, - that nearly half of the 1500 man military "mission" was composed of fellow travellers or Communist sympathizers.
- 3 - Nationalist troops had good morale, but from each new blow defections occurred, and the Chinese Communists were busy making deals with the same generals who had hitherto supported Chiang, sensing the pro-Communist United States and British policies.
- 4 - China could be held below the Yangtze by a skeleton airforce operating from the mountainous areas of the South. (He was supported in this evaluation by General Claire Chennault, who commanded the Flying Tigers during the War.)
- 5 - If all of China fell, it would only be a question of time before Japan, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Philippines, and Indonesia would be in the hands of the Communists. Japan has no one else with whom to trade, and that the Japanese Communists were far stronger than even General MacArthur cared to see them. Southeast Asia is riddled with revolt, with the Communists fishing in troubled waters.
- 6 - He agreed with Wedemeyer that: "The disappearance of a traditionally friendly China as an ally would have these very important military effects in the event of war:
  - 1 - Our own naval and air bases in Japan, the Ryukyus islands and the Philippines would be subject to relatively short-range neutralizing air attacks.
  - 2 - It would result in denying us important airbases for use as staging areas for bombing attacks, as well as important naval bases along the China coast.

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- 3 - Its control by the Soviet Union or a regime friendly to the Soviet Union would make available for hostile use a number of warm-water ports and airbases.
- 4 - (Wedemeyer) Moscow had deliberately strengthened the Communists in China, in violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945.

Mr. Bullitt's recommendations were ignored in January, 1949, just as General Wedemeyer's had been in September, 1947. Mr. Dean Acheson had been sworn in on January 17th, 1949 as Secretary of State, after continuous service in the State Department since the fatal year of 1941.

General Chennault's recommendations were also ignored, and he was smeared with the brush of foreign interests, because of his Chinese wife. Former President Hoover was smeared as having "interests" in China. As if the Soviet Union had no "interest" in the seizure by the Chinese Communists of the Chinese Nation.

A short paragraph here will illumine a ray of Soviet interest in Communism in China:

"Shanghai, September 17, 1949 (NYTimes, Henry R. Lieberman: "Dialectical and Historical Materialism, written by Premier Stalin of the Soviet Union, has been adopted by the Higher Education Commission in Peiping as the basic textbook for teaching the 'new philosophy' in China's colleges and universities, according to the newspaper Wen Wei Poo.

"The textbook apparently was chosen as part of the new curriculum recently promulgated for colleges of law and literature by the Peiping commission after 6 months of deliberation. Reporting earlier on the adoption of the curriculum, the newspaper said the reactionary courses formerly required by the Kuomintang had been dropped, and there had been substituted 3 new compulsory subjects, - Marxian "Dialectical Materialism, Mao Tse-Tung's "New Democracy," and Political Economy. Teachers were warned to use a critical approach in teaching logic and metaphysics."

On June 30, 1948 at Shanghai (NYTIMES July 1, 1949) Mao Tse Tung said:

"We belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the USSR, and we can only look for genuine friendly aid from that front and not from the imperialist front. China can not sit on the fence. We also oppose the illusion of a third road. Not only in China but also in the world without exception one either leans to the side of imperialism, or the side of socialism. Neutrality is a camouflage."

WE WONDER IF MR. ACHESON AND THE FAR EASTERN DIVISION HAD READ THESE WORDS BEFORE THEY BEGAN TO PROMULGATE THEIR DELUSION OF A CHINA THAT CAN BE WEANED AWAY FROM RUSSIA?

Continuing, Mao said:

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"China must ally with the Soviet Union, to ally with the new democratic countries of Europe and to ally with the proletarian and masses of the people in other countries to form an international united front." Mr. Mao maintained: "The victory of the Chinese Communists would have been impossible without the aid of the Soviet Union, and the pressure of the "masses" in many countries, including the United States."

YET THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHITE PAPER HAS THE EFFRONTERY TO DENY RUSSIAN AID TO MAO TSE TUNG. WHO SHOULD KNOW BETTER - MAO, WHO RECEIVED THE AID, - OR THE FAR EASTERN DIVISION, comprising W. Walton Butterworth, John P. Davies, and the other "appears" - or the learned John S. Service, placed by Dean Acheson in the summer of 1949 in a high position in the State Department Policy Planning Staff, - perhaps as a reward for his alleged efforts in behalf of the Chinese Communists in the never-explained "AMERASIA" case.

On August 20, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was charged by Rep. Walter H. Judd, Republican, of Minnesota, with suppressing a secret military report that advocated pursuit of a Chinese policy far different from that which the State Department has followed. Mr. Judd said the report was prepared in 1944 and 1945 after observations in China and said: as its principal conclusions:

- 1 - The Chinese Communists held the same concept of democracy as the Soviet Union.
- 2 - The Chinese Communist party was part of the Communist international and was guided from and sponsored by Moscow.
- 3 - The Soviet Union planned to establish Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria and North China.
- 4 - China could not exist as a nation without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China.
- 5 - It was essential that China not be divided into Anglo-American and Russian zones of occupation, in the event the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan.
- 6 - The victory over Japan would be inconclusive unless China came out of the war in complete independence and in united form. The defeat of Japan would produce such an imbalance, or vacuum in the Far East that Russia would be left as the only military land power of any moment in Asia.

IF THE MILITARY EXPERTS REALIZED ALL OF THESE FACTORS, WHAT EARTHLY EXCUSE DID HOPKINS AND HISS HAVE, AMONG OTHERS, FOR THE DISGRACEFUL PERFORMANCE AT YALTA, WHICH PUT RUSSIA IN THE POSITION TO MARCH IN AND RAPE MANCHURIA AFTER A FIVE-DAY WAR?

One must not forget that Donald Hiss, the brother of Alger Hiss, also mentioned by Mr. Whittaker Chambers, as a member of a Soviet spy apparatus in the mid-thirties, was also in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department,

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where he could have access to important Far Eastern policy evaluations.

Do not forget that on January 17th, 1950, the Yugoslav delegate, Ales Bebler, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, a Communist state that we are now aiding under some weird interpretation of Tito's possible usefulness to us, demanded before the Security Council that Nationalist China's Chief delegate, T. P. Tsiang, give up the Council Presidency immediately. Britain, Norway, and India abstained in the vote, thereby giving tacit approval to Yugoslavia's request that Nationalist China be deprived of her right to the Council Presidency during this crucial month.

There are only a few further comments to be made:

Paul T. Ward commented in the Sun of January 14th:

"Angus Ward, former American consul-general at Mukden arrived here today, and proceeded at a State Department press conference today to undermine - unwittingly - the thesis expounded here Thursday by Acheson :....." regarding the coming difficulties between Mao Tse-Tung and Stalin.

YOU CAN BET IT WAS "UNWITTINGLY". POOR MR. ANGUS WARD WAS PROBABLY BLURTING OUT THE TRUTH.

The Foreign Policy Association bulletin of July 29th, 1949, stated:

"A suggested union of Pacific countries against communism, proposed by General Chiang Kai Shek of China and President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines on July 11, 1929 raises the question as to what policy should be followed in this area to meet the impending threat.

"So far the United States has remained aloof. Michael J. McDermott, press officer of the State Department, said on July 11 that the time was still premature for a Pacific pact, thus reaffirming a stand taken by Secretary of State Acheson on May 18 following AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A TREATY."

"Whether a pact can be effective in Southeast Asia depends upon the specific types of problem which are likely to arise... The major exposed position is doubtless Indo-China where the insurgent Republic of Viet Nam, already in control of most of the coastal provinces of Tonking and Annam, as well as much of the hinterland of Cochinchina, is under the guidance of President Ho Chi Minh and Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Sap, both Communists."

Yet Philip K. Jessup, State Department Ambassador at large, who carried out the secret talks that led to the lifting of the Berlin blockade, which is now to be reimposed as the Soviets begin to consolidate in China, - and who was sent by Dean Acheson on a slow boat to China to consult with our Pacific "so-called allies" after Chiang had been driven off the mainland, has the temerity to announce that he will consult with Indo-China as a potential ally?



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WHAT KIND OF GHASTLY FARCE IS THIS? Not only the Foreign Policy Association knows that Indo-China is doomed. So are Burma and Malaya, - and Nehru, that pillar of strength, has just advised "cautious friendliness" at the Ceylon Conference with our Soviet friends.

Walter S. Robertson, Trustee of the Virginia Historical Society, as well as Trustee of the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, former Minister and counselor on Economic Affairs of the American Embassy in China, and a former Charge d'affairs in that country, spoke before the Maryland Historical Society, on Wednesday, November 16, 1949. He raised the interesting question, "If we thought it important to keep Japan out of this area in 1939-1941 -- why doesn't Dean Acheson think it important to keep Soviet Russia out of the same area." He asked that his remarks not be reported in the press, which they were not, -- but nevertheless, his entire talk insinuated that the State Department is completely off its rocker in its present stand.

As Senator Ferguson of Michigan stated before the Senate on January 17, 1950:

"Our Formosan policy was formulated in a secret note at least as early as last October, and reaffirmed in another secret memorandum dated December 23rd.

"Our wartime and post-war agreements have misled the Defense Department, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Security Council, who are concerned with the defense questions which follow our foreign policy. It is clear that the State Department allowed the Chiefs of Staff to indulge in shadow boxing with the Security Council prior to the meeting of December 29, which presumably was a meeting to decide the Formosan question. The State Department had already decided.

"One-half the population of the world is located in Asia; and one-half of Asia's population is in China. Her size, location, and resources make her the political and economic center of gravity in the East.

"If we recognize Red China, we completely abandon the hopes of all the people of the world, particularly those in southeastern Asia.

"We have yet to have an authoritative opinion, freely expressed, on the strategic importance of Formosa.

"It looks as if the Senate of the United States will be stymied on the question of Formosa's strategic importance until January 26th, the date set for the appearance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of National Defense before the Foreign Relations Committee.

"A quick glance at its history and geography should emphasize the strategic importance of Formosa. It contains 13,429 square miles of territory. It lies about 100 miles off the east coast of China. Okinawa is to its north and the Philippines are only 457 air miles away - the distance from Washington to New York City, - to the south and east.

"Japan is 780 air miles to the north and east."

"The population is 6,500,000, mostly Chinese, from the Chinese mainland provinces of Fukien and Kwantung.

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"Japan has treated Formosa as of great strategic value since 1895 when it was ceded to Japan under the terms of the treaty following up the Sino-Japanese war. Japan built it up as an island fortress for future aggression. Japan used it after Pearl Harbor to launch her attack upon the Philippines and Hongkong and to move southward to conquer the British and Dutch empires in southeast Asia.

"General MacArthur, in a warning placed before the National Security Council and reported in the New York Herald Tribune December 30, 1949, stated:

1. Communist possession of Formosa would endanger the Philippines, American-held Okinawa, and even Japan, and that
2. Communist drives made possible by a Formosa base might eventually push America's defenses back to the Marianas, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Pacific West Coast.

"On January 5, 1950, a New York Times dispatch from Moscow said:

"Soviet press comment made it plain today that the Chinese Communist Government of Mao Tse Tung could be certain of the full support of the Soviet Union in efforts to establish sovereignty over Formosa.

"With absolute certainty, the Chinese Communists are planning an invasion of Formosa as soon as the winter monsoon season in the Formosa Straits is over, - in the early spring.

"I am not satisfied that the legal status of Formosa, and our responsibility for it can be dismissed easily.

"The President, in his January 5 statement, cited the provisions of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations as governing the status of Formosa.

"The Cairo declaration was issued December 1, 1943, signed by Roosevelt, Chiang Kai Shek, and Churchill:

"It is their (the Allies) purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of World War I in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."

This 1943 declaration was seriously compromised by the secret Yalta agreement of early 1945, which promised Russia certain rights in Manchuria, among other things, and some of that old nonsense about Russia having "friendly governments" on her borders.

The Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945 reiterated the Cairo terms in a proclamation defining terms for Japanese surrender:

"The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and such minor islands as we determine."

The Potsdam declaration was signed by Truman and Churchill and concurred in by Chiang. Russia announced its adherence to this declaration when it declared war on Japan August 5, 1945.

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"It has always been my understanding and belief that international law requires that territorial changes pursuant to a surrender be accomplished only by TREATY. THAT FEATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW HAS PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, BECAUSE TREATIES ARE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 'BY AND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE SENATE'".

"Note that the Cairo and Potsdam statements were purely declaratory in form. But the President in his January 5 statement said: Formosa was surrendered to Chiang Kai Shek and for the past 4 years the U.S. and the other allied powers have accepted the exercise of (Chinese) authority over the island.

"What he said in effect was that by OUR OWN CONDUCT WE CANNOT APPLY INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Senator Milliken: "I think the legal situation regarding Formosa involves the question whether our military leaders during war-time can make permanent disposition of conquered territory. If they can do that, there is no limit to the power of our military leaders. It seems to me they can make military dispositions and military arrangements which can last throughout the war, but for them to assert that they can make permanent dispositions and permanent future peace-time arrangements because of their positions as military leaders, which of necessity are temporary ones, is a very swollen contention which runs CONTRARY TO THE ULTIMATE PEACE TREATY POWERS OF THE SENATE.

Ferguson: "Insofar as action by the U.S. is concerned, independent of communism, independent of the whole question - if the military leaders are charged in fact with holding the acquisitions from the enemy as trustees for the future disposition by the victorious powers, there is a firm LEGAL BASIS FOR OCCUPATION OF FORMOSA.

I BELIEVE THE TRUSTEESHIP OF GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK ON THE ISLAND OF FORMOSA IS THE SAME AS THE TRUSTEESHIP OF GENERAL MACARTHUR IN JAPAN, AS THE TRUSTEESHIP OF GENERAL MCCLOY IN GERMANY AND THE TRUSTEESHIP OF OUR FORCES IN BERLIN. WE ARE TRUSTEES IN LAW UNTIL THE PEACE TREATIES ARE SIGNED, and we, I am sure, would defend our trusteeship in Berlin, and we would defend it in Japan.

"The Constitution of the U.S. provides that this body shall have the right to advise and consent to a treaty. Other nations may say it makes little difference to them, because their executive branch may be able to dispose of conquered territory differently than we can. But the philosophy of the Constitution is that the Senate of the U.S. shall say what the treaty will be at the conclusion of a war.

"It is apparent that the U.S. has not always treated the possession (by Chiang) of Formosa as absolute. In October, 1949 we demanded that the Nationalist Government of China do certain things in relation to its government on Formosa. We even demanded that it change the Governor on the island, -- which was done. It seems to me that at that time, in October, 1949 we had in mind that the status of Formosa was to be settled finally as a treaty. I think these facts show the absolute incorrectness (of Truman's) statement that we did entirely give Formosa to the Chinese Nationalists.

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"The State Department may say that the Island of Formosa is ripe for revolution. I FOUND ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF THIS. I realize also that the State Department was not anxious that any Senator visit the island of Formosa. The Senator from New Jersey (Smith) advised the Senate how difficult it was for him to get to Formosa. The State Department did not even make clearance for the plane in which I rode to Formosa.

"The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 12, January through June, 1945 (June 3, 1945), p. 1019 says:

"Strategic factors greatly influence the problem of Formosa. With the exception of SINGAPORE, no location IN THE FAR EAST OCCUPIES SUCH A CONTROLLING POSITION. Formosa is 200 from the main island of the Philippines. Flying distance from military airports in Formosa is 559 miles to Manila, 410 miles to Canton, 428 miles to Shanghai, 1290 miles to Tokyo. It is larger than the State of Maryland, stands in a strategic relation to the China coast comparable for the United States to an imaginary island of such size 100 miles off the coast of North Carolina, 400 miles from New York City. Every POINT ON THE ENTIRE COAST OF CHINA FALLS WITHIN A RADIUS OF 1,100 miles. A RADIUS OF 2000 MILES INCLUDES BURMA, SINGAPORE, BORNEO, GUAM, AND JAPAN. IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE IT HAS BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT BASE IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE PRESENT WAR.

NOW ACHESON SAYS FORMOSA IS USELESS AND NOT IMPORTANT. IT IS THE SAME STATE DEPARTMENT, BUT THE VOICE IS THE VOICE OF JACOB!

"Senator McMahon says the admirals and generals told the Foreign Relations Committee that Formosa didn't matter last spring and summer. I conferred with generals and admirals who are now in the Far East on the question of Formosa, and I received no such report as that which Senator McMahon says was given to the Committee.

Senator Knowland asked: "1 - On what day and hour did the cable relative to the January 6 proclamation by the Chinese military authorities reach the State Department?

2 - On what day and hour did the January 7 order of the communist authorities addressed to the Consul General for requisition of U.S. Government-occupied property at 22 Legation Street on the prior order of January 6 reach the State Department?

3 - Was there any prior indication of any type or character written or verbal given to the American authorities at Peiping prior to the issuance of the January 6th proclamation? Did the State Department receive it, and when?

The time becomes significant when it is realized that on January 5th at approximately 10:30 a.m. the President of the U.S. was issuing his press statement relative to cutting off all further military supplies to the non-Communist Republic of China, on Formosa, and the British Government on January 6th, the British Government was announcing its recognition of the Communist regime. WAS THIS MERELY ONE OF THE COINCIDENCES OF HISTORY?

January 6th is JANUARY 5th in the United States.

On January 13, 1950, the Communists seized the American consular compound in Peiping. This is in violation of the protocol signed on September 7, 1901, and the Sin-U.S. Treaty of 1943. This shows they will not honor treaties.

Chiang has a trusteeship on Formosa because he was sent there by General MacArthur to receive surrendered Japanese arms.



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Chiang Kai Shek was sent to Formosa under an order of General MacArthur known as General Order No. 1, and he is there, in effect as a trustee for all the Allied Powers until a peace treaty is made. I cite Martin and former Secretary of State Byrnes on this very question, - to the effect that it was his opinion that a peace treaty was necessary before a final closing of sovereignty over these conquered nations.

Russia is occupying Eastern Germany and Eastern Austria without a peace treaty. We shall have a chance to take up the question of the seizure of Polish and other territories when the time comes.

Edward M. Martin wrote on this in the Allied Occupation of Japan, with the great advantage of knowing by virtue of his official position in the U.S. State Department, the complex but seldom publicized interactions of political, economic, and strategic factors which shape the formulation and execution of occupation policy in Japan. He says: on page 35:

"With the support of U.S., Great Britain, China, and Russia, altho legal confirmation of the transfer of the territories involved cannot take place until the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, de facto transfers have already been made."

Byrnes stated on February 10, 1946, page 189, in the State Department Bulletin, that the question of the Kuriles would have to be formalized by a treaty.

Former President Calvin Coolidge said in regard to recognizing Bolshevik Russia: "I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity. I do not propose to make merchandise of the American principle."

IT IS TOO BAD THAT SOMEONE DID NOT CALL THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF GREAT BRITAIN WHEN SHE RECOGNIZED COMMUNIST CHINA ON JANUARY 6, 1950.

THE U.S. has received no right to trade in Russia since recognition in 1933. All we have received is a nest of spies.

The Communist program for China from the DAILY WORKER is this:  
Also March 1, 1949 letter from the Communist Party of New York State:

- 1 - Demand a new China policy. An end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid any elements and remnants of the Kuomintang.
- 2 - Preparation by the U.S. government to recognize the Chinese Communist government.
- 3 - Planning now by our authorities for the genuine and self-respecting cooperation with the people's government in China, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

CAN ANYONE DOUBT WHAT IS THE SOURCE MATERIAL FOR OUR PRESENT POLICY?

There are more citizens in Formosa than in Australia, with only 7,881,601 population. Australia has not recognized Communist China. She is aware of her peril.

If the Russians don't like a trusteeship over Formosa, administered by Gen. MacArthur, let us remind them that they have placed a Russian national and Citizen, Gen. Rokossovsky, in command of the armies of Poland, - once an independent state. They have issued orders thru the Cominform to Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, that their Communist puppets would not dare to disobey. LET THEM CAST THE FIRST STONE- WE SHALL HAVE A NEAT LITTLE PILE WAITING FOR THEM.

WE SHALL REMAIN ON THIS GHASTLY ROAD OF APPEASEMENT AT THE PERIL OF OUR LIVES AND NATIONAL EXISTENCE.

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Ladd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Clegg	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Glavin	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nichols	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Tracy	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Harbo	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Belmont	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Miss Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Baltimore

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: 3/1/51

Remytel of February 27, 1951, concerning above captioned matter.

As reported in referenced teletype, it was confidentially learned from [redacted] a reliable contact of the Baltimore Office, that a Brigadier General EUGENE S. BIBB (USA retired) spoke before a Lions Club meeting at the Park Plaza Hotel, Baltimore, on February 20, 1951.

[redacted] advised that during this speech, General BIBB among other things, stated that upon his return from Seoul, Korea, in late 1945, he confronted Mr. ACHESON, then Under Secretary of State, in General MacARTHUR's Headquarters in Tokyo and personally accused ACHESON of being America's No. 1 Communist, and further he stated he could prove his charges. According to [redacted] the General continued by informing the Lions Club members that he wrote to the Senate Committee, which held hearings on the qualifications of Mr. ACHESON for the office of Secretary of State, and at that time volunteered to furnish sufficient material to convict ACHESON as No. 1 Communist, and further, that he volunteered to appear as a witness at his own expense.

Pursuant to Bureau instructions, General BIBB was interviewed at his home, 905 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland, on the afternoon of February 27, 1951, by agents of the Baltimore Office. With reference to his background, he furnished the following information:

BIBB stated he was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1892 and graduated from the University of Minnesota in the year 1912-1913. He stated that he first saw service in the

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cc Washington Field (Encl)

Enclosures (2)

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RE: DEAN ACHESON  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

United States Army in 1917 and after attending officer candidate school at Camp Dodge, Kansas, and at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he was commissioned a Captain. From 1917 to 1919 he stated he served in the Field Forces of the United States Army in Europe.

General BIBB advised that upon his return to the States, he entered into the practice of law in New York City and maintained offices at 149 Broadway and later at 340 Madison Avenue,

General BIBB claims that he was recalled to active duty as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1941 and saw service both in the European and in the Pacific Theatres of War. In early 1949, BIBB states he was released from active duty. However, he was recalled later in the year and retired in February, 1950, as a Brigadier General.

BIBB further advised that his wife deceased two years ago and since his retirement he has maintained residence in Baltimore with his brother, FRANK BIBB, at 905 St. Paul Street. FRANK BIBB has been employed as head instructor in the voice department, Peabody Institute of Music, Baltimore, for the past 30 years.

During the interview, General BIBB was specifically questioned concerning any documentary evidence he possessed relative to the accusations he was reported to have made against Secretary of State ACHESON. BIBB stated that he has no documentary material of any kind reflecting any Communist affiliation on the part of ACHESON. He explained that material used in his talks since retirement from the Army has been obtained solely from publications, pamphlets and other writings of public record. He further stated he had no papers or material of a secret or classified nature and had no access to any such material.

BIBB was questioned concerning his statement that he had documentary proof of ACHESON's affiliation with the Communist Party and he stated he intended to point out that any reasonable person reading public documentary material available

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to anyone, could reach the same conclusion that he did. He stated emphatically that he did not intend to infer that he had any secret proof that Secretary ACHESON has ever been affiliated with the Communist Party.

BIBB related an incident that occurred in General MacARTHUR's Headquarters in Tokyo in early 1946. BIBB stated that upon his return from Seoul he personally confronted ACHESON in MacARTHUR's Headquarters at which time he personally accused ACHESON of being a Communist. According to BIBB, ACHESON made no reply to his accusation. BIBB says he bases his belief that ACHESON is a Communist on the continuous course of action pursued by ACHESON in his official capacity as an official of the State Department.

During the course of the interview, it was ascertained that BIBB considers himself a crusader against Communism and he advised that he intends making a series of some 16 speeches before groups along the Eastern Seaboard. He further stated he desires no publicity or personal glory, but merely wishes to acquaint the public of the facts concerning Communism as he sees them. He further stated that he does not desire to profit from his rank as a retired Army General and wishes to be heard merely as a private citizen. General BIBB indicated that he is scheduled to give a talk at 8:30 p.m. on March 10, 1951, sponsored by the Minute Women of America in Baltimore at the Enoch Pratt Library.

With reference to this scheduled talk, BIBB furnished a copy of a 19-page paper he prepared more than a year ago for use in his speeches entitled "China" in which he purports to analyze the Chinese situation.

This 19-page paper has been photographed and the undeveloped film is being furnished the Bureau under separate cover for processing. The original paper has been returned to General BIBB per his own request.

For information of the Bureau, a recording of BIBB's speech was made by  On March 27, 1951,

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furnished the Baltimore Office with a duplicate recording of BIBB's entire speech and two copies of a stenographic transcription of this speech are being forwarded to the Bureau as an enclosure with this letter. The duplicate recordings as furnished by [redacted] [redacted] are being retained as an exhibit in the Baltimore file.

One copy of this letter is being furnished to the Washington Field Office, along with a stenographic copy of General BIBB's speech for information purposes. This is deemed advisable in view of allegations made against Secretary ACHESON by General BIBB.

Unless advised to the contrary, the Baltimore Office contemplates no further investigation in this matter.

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SPEECH MADE BY  
Brigadier General (ret.) Eugene S. Bibb  
Before Lions Club, Baltimore  
February 20, 1951

Thank you so much for your very warm and cordial  
welcome.

This is not going to be a tour of the Orient in one  
easy lesson. It is obvious that with the half-hour at stake  
very little can be said which should be said. However, we'll  
do the best we may in that time.

The Orient is indivisible. When you think of Korea,  
you think of Japan, you think of China, you think of Indo-  
China, the Philippines and all the other smaller nations which  
go up to make the Orient. China in itself is divisible and  
has been divided throughout history. This business of  
Communism coming down from the north in China is nothing new,  
only they didn't call it Communism. They called it something  
else. Robbery would have been the better name. As you  
know, there is no distribution system in China and so the  
rich rice paddies down on the coastal plains have had to  
provide the food for all of China, mule-back, piggyback, and  
woman-back, mostly woman-back, because the women over there,  
as in Japan prior to our adventure there, have been always  
slaves.

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China has had a varied career which has brought upon it the present situation. As you know, Communism - and let us not think for one moment that Chinese Communism is any less red than Russian red because it isn't. It is all one bag of tricks and it cannot be divided from Russian Communism. China in itself has starved for thousands of years, so it's nothing new for millions of Chinese to starve every year. That is a condition where the seeds of Communism readily sprout. Obviously there can be nothing worse than where I am now, said the Chinese, so therefore I'll take a chance on Communism. He lasted just one hour in that frame of mind because after that one hour, he found out that there were worse things than starving to death. Some of those things were enslavement spiritually, of enslavement mentally, and of enslavement physically, and he found that out just about the end of the first hour after the Communists took over his little village.

More than fifty million people in China live in outlying sections to which there is no access except footpaths. Obviously, there can be no distribution system or no collective system of any character under those circumstances.

The Chinese Communist is an opportunist as all Communists are. He is nothing more or less than a self-seeking, selfish, egotistical opportunist. I am very sick and tired

of hearing people talk about democracy in the United States. We never have been a democracy and never will be a democracy. If you read the Constitution, it talks of a republic. Russia calls themselves democracy. They call themselves socialist democracies, the United Soviet Republics. They are no more republics than I am, individually.

Korea has been in the middle between the nutcracker throughout its entire history. Before Kublai Khan or Genghis Khan came down in the 6th century A.D. and devastated Korea and enslaved it, it was enslaved by Chinese, by the Mongols, and by the early Russian settlers in and around Vladivostok. The history of Korea has had some bright spots. Its civilization early produced many great things in art and also in material. Bronze was given to the world by Korea; they were the first people to make successfully any alloyed metals.

Then, we jump from that time down to about 1900 and -- uh 1880 when the Japanese, having had the so-called restoration under the Emperor Mei-Chi (phonetic) - he came in in 1868 and for the first time then Japan became a unified empire for the first time in its entire history, there have been as many as four emperors at one time in Japan way back, one of them happened to be a woman and she gave birth to a child and they found out she wasn't a man, that was the first time anybody ever heard of

it apparently. And so, in Korea the Japanese infiltrated early - uh - late in the 19th century and after the Russo-Japanese War, President Theodore Roosevelt at the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Treaty, I should say, in 1905 - gave Korea to - he was very generous with the Korean people and land - and he gave Korea to Japan as a province. They immediately went in in force, having had the old emperor murdered and his wife incarcerated and treated so badly she died of starvation and one of the Japanese tricks reminds me a great deal of the Russian Communist tricks -- they said the empress, who was the mother of Prince Li who lives in Japan in Tokyo today, a full-blooded Korean, they said that the empress was not fit person to be an empress of a great country like Korea because she was a common prostitute and therefore she should be treated like a common prostitute and they proceeded to do so and, as I said, she died very soon thereafter. They married Prince Li off to one of the distant Japanese princesses and gave him a very luxurious villa in Tokyo and he lives there still today, as far as I know.

Now then, the Japanese went into Korea to try to develop it. Let's take a glance for a minute at the magnificent natural resources in Korea. North of the 38th parallel and to

the east is a long line of mountains called the Diamond Mountains in which you'll find everything from gold through tin, tungsten and uranium and diamonds and very beautiful emeralds, and off the shores there are great pearling grounds. All of those things the Japanese recognized and they started to produce from them but they found that they had much more of a job than they had anticipated because of the utter lack of transportation, so they built roads and some spur railroads and they dug into the earth and dug out as much as they could in gold quickly and with crude methods. They did take vast quantities of coal from up there and brought them over to Japan. They also took vast quantities of rice, barley and some wheat in the uplands and took those over to Japan and fed the Koreans chaff. That was customarily done, however, because the Chinese had done it before, the Mongols had done it before and so there was nothing new, there was no new routine about that so far as Korea went.

I mention these things to show that the Korean is the victim of his own abuse and it cannot be helped at this time at least. There are doer evil evilly intended totally devoid of principle and they, I think, have been the bad boys of the Far East for lo, these many, many years.

Whenever there was an assassination to take place in China, Japan, Russia, or other place, they always hired Koreans to do it and gave them so many yen and they were very glad to do it because the Korean thinks that the minute he doesn't like you, the thing to do is to erase you, don't argue with you at all, just knock you over and kill you - that is easy. That is the normal method of procedure over there. We went the first few months over there - we were not permitted out at night at all unless three officers were together or three enlisted men, all armed to the teeth. We carried tommy-guns and pistols and knives and forks and every other thing because we thought they were going to attack us. They did not, however; in the main, there were some untoward incidents but that was sporadic rather than chronic so to speak.

I'd like to jump over to Japan for just a minute and then we'll run down the war situation. The Japanese people are by far in my opinion the vast superiors of any of the Oriental people I have ever seen. I have lived in the Orient and I have lived in China, I have lived in Korea and I have lived in Japan - all over Japan - and I have lived with the Japanese people and I know that they are the superior in every way. Even nationally their credit today stands higher than England's does. Even though we have no peace treaty with them yet,

there is a transaction on now whereby New York and Chicago and San Francisco bankers propose to underwrite \$100,000,000 in externally-financed bonds in dollars for the Japanese nation to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. I would hate to think that England could raise one hundred million cents, the way they have been acting in the last thirty or forty years.

The Japanese people themselves are peace loving, they are home loving, they are industrious to a vast degree, something I have never seen, they work seven days a week and they work from sun until dark and sometimes after dark if they have a little oil for their lamps. They are honest in the main, strictly honest; they believe in discipline and they follow discipline very readily. We have had as many as three hundred thousand troops in Japan at the time when there were three million and a half Japanese troops in Japan still un-armed. It took three months to unarm the Japanese Army in the homeland and you can recognize what might have happened had they shown the slightest treachery with only three hundred thousand men spread over the four islands, the four main islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku. What would have happened to our troops would have been just plain murder but nothing happened. To this day, to my

knowledge after three and a half years in Japan, I say that, on this last trip, I say it is the most amazing occupation ever undertaken in the history of this planet. Not one single untoward incident happened in Japan toward our people. I am ashamed to tell you that there were a number of untoward incidents happening toward Japanese by our gallant young G.I.'s. I suppose you can't get eight or ten million men together and take the run of the mine and get all Sunday School teachers. I presume that's true, but I am not entirely proud of the early occupational troops and their behavior. They were there to teach democracy, so-called, and to knock a Jap down and spear him for the fun of it with a bayonet is not the way I would choose to teach democracy. I think you might agree with that. Rape cases were often found and I personally sat on the court on two different rape cases where six men were in the two cases, four in one and two in the other. I was president law member of the court which convicted them and sentenced them to hang. It was none of my business whether the sentence was ever promulgated but it was a difficult job, but I thought well worth the effort.

Most of the depredations done to our troops that you have heard of, the March, the shameful Death March from Bataan and other atrocities were performed by Koreans in

Japanese uniforms. We had at one time in the prison in Tokyo where Tojo and the rest of his jokers were incarcerated before they hung them, some eight hundred fifty population in that prison, ninety-two percent of whom, all of whom were charged with depredations, atrocities, ninety-two percent of them were Koreans who had been in Japanese uniforms.

Now let's start back to China for a moment and trace the war effort. Generalissimo Chiang was educated in the Japanese Military College at Zama (phonetic) which is about thirtytwo miles from Yokohama in the interior. It was similar to our West Point, that is, its purpose was similar. Its treatment was entirely dissimilar because the poor little student officers at that school, among whom at one time was Generalissimo Chiang, were treated just like beasts - that was what they called the hardening process in Japanese. Chiang studied there for three and a half years and then went back to China and he immediately organized an Army and fell in with the Communists, (portion of speech not recorded because record at this point was turned) who were then infiltrated into China and for a number of years he played footsie and knees with the Communists in China, Chinese Communists and some Russian Communists and even studied in Moscow for a period. He, because he was an opportunist and because he had found



it more opportune to fight the Communists, decided that he would break with them and with a characteristically treacherous move destroyed two or three regiments of the Chinese Communist Army and then started the fight. During the World War II, of course, the Communists were finally induced to fight the Japanese in China and it was very helpful because it made it possible to tie down one million and a half Japanese with all their equipment and material in China; otherwise, they would have been free to fight us in the various and sundry islands through which we came.

The Generalissimo saw fit, being an opportunist, to surround himself by as pretty a bunch of brigands as you ever saw locked in one house, and it is that reason which brought about the loss of so much of the material which, at great pains and labor and deaths and destruction was taken over the hump by air into China. It is said that 32% of all the material we shipped over there, the millions of tons of material, equipment, ammunition, clothing, food and what have you, ever reached the Chinese Army - only 32% ever reached the Chinese Army. You will find today in China poor Chinese peasants riding coolies, riding around in American made jeeps which they stole or purchased for rice or by other means. It's not a little unpleasant to think that our American made goods finds their way into those hands.

Chiang, of course, was very smart at the beginning. He played both ends against the middle and in doing so, he was able to confuse the Communist Chinese up to a certain point. When the war was over, the Chinese Communists were fortunate enough from their viewpoint to have more than a million Chinese fall into their hands as prisoners of war with all of their equipment and today, they are using that same equipment. The Chinese Communists at that time, until

Russia stepped in and helped them, had little or no artillery whatsoever. They had a few antiquated old French 75 pieces which had been acquired by one means or another through Indo-China, French Indo-China particularly, and they had some old French rifles and they had no ammunition for them in the main. They have at least 14 different makes of rifles in the Chinese Armies today and very little ammunition to fit any of it; because some of it is .25 caliber - the Japanese is .25 caliber, the Russian is .32 caliber, and ours is .30 caliber and the English rifle, the Enright, is .30 caliber also. You can't shoot a .30 caliber bullet in a .32 caliber rifle or a .25 caliber rifle. That was the occasion for all of the early "messing rounders" over there and they called it a great battle that ten people were killed at that time between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists.

There wasn't the slightest excuse for us at any time to withhold helping Chiang against Russian Communism, and that's all it is, there never has been such an excuse. If you will remember, General Marshall was sent over there shortly after his retirement as Chief of Staff, and at that time that distinguished "young punk" Dean Acheson was then Under-Secretary of State, and he was able to induce the General to write a report, or first of all he oriented him - we can't

have anything in the national government, Army or otherwise, without orienting somebody, just what it means I have yet to find out, although I have been oriented by experts. Oriented - he was oriented to this point, that General Marshall was to go over to China, and he was to tell Generalissimo point blank that we would not give him one single item of material or food unless he permitted 50% of a new government to be formed to represent Communist China. Well, if he had said 1% that would have been 14% too much, but 50% meant that their job would have been only a matter of hours until they had infiltrated throughout the entire government and made it a Communist government. Acheson, of course, knew that, and later I had the great pleasure of telling Mr. Acheson to his face in the Supreme Commander's office in Tokyo that you are No. 1 Communist in America, and the gentleman did not have anything to say back. General turned to me and said Bibb that's a pretty strong accusation unless you can back it up and I said sir, I can back it up, and Acheson knows how, that's the reason he makes no reply. Later I had the great pleasure of writing the Senate committee when he was up for -- his nomination was in the Senate as Secretary of State, and I wrote and said that I had material sufficient to convict Mr. Acheson of being No. 1 Communist in America and I would

like the opportunity at my expense and at no expense to the government to appear in Washington before that committee and to submit that material and I got one of the most delightfully polite notes you ever saw.-- We appreciate your patriotic efforts. Your letter will be held in suspense and when the time comes if we can find time to hear you, we shall be delighted to invite you to Washington. -- Full Stop. Yours truly, 17th Assistant Secretary of the Committee.

You say I feel bitterly about this. I do feel most bitterly. We have lost 75,000 men in an unlawful war brought on by such people as Acheson in Korea. We're losing men every day and are going to lose more because Acheson knows that the Far East is the touchy point with Russia, and that is the reason they put all the pressure on Germany and created out of whole cloth that disgraceful Berlin incident when our people as smart as they are allowed the Russians to come into Berlin and cut us off with no means of egress or ingress and they tied up all of our people in Berlin with no means of feeding them whatsoever and we had to carry, as you know, millions of tons by air at the expense of about a million dollars a day over a period of 90 days until that was opened up. If that isn't evidence, not of stupidity, it's too

cleverly cunning to be stupid, it's in evidence of an outright conspiracy to take over this government, the United States government.

It has been said commonly and I have heard it from Tokyo to Maine or to England that Acheson must have something on the President. I don't know why he wants him in there unless he does have it because there never has been a Secretary of State who has been subjected to the bitter criticism, and justly so in my opinion, as Acheson has been subjected. We, at Acheson's insistence, withdrew from Korea the 24th Corps under General Hodge and at that moment there were massing on the Yalu River Chinese Communists troops ready to jump that river. There were also, and we knew it when I was in Korea, 260,000 Army which had been organized, equipped and trained by Russian officers and men and the minute we moved out of there, of course they moved in. They would never have come down there if we had kept our troops in South Korea. In the first place why did we have a South Korea. I'll tell you why, because such people as Hiss, Acheson, Jessup, Remington and others of like yoke advised the President of the United States that it would be very wise to let Russia come into North Korea, not knowing or not caring perhaps, that

all of the coal, all of the water power, all of the wealth of Korea lies north of the 38th Parallel. That is just as bad in a larger scale than Berlin was and I don't believe that is stupidity. I believe that is part of a well calculated conspiracy, a plan to toss everything we have into the lap of the dear Russians - good old Joe, I can get along with him said the President of the U.S., speaking about this "rat" Stalin - good old Joe, I can get along with him splendidly. I went to Korea late in the year 1945 for the first time and I came back to Tokyo to report to the Supreme Commander and then went back again in January, and we then had a mission coming down from North Korea which had been arranged by radio through Vladivostok. General Kristanokoff (phonetic) and General Stukoff (phonetic), one a three-star General and one a two-star General, neither of whom could read or write Russian or any other language, reported that they would have 67 people in their party. They would arrive on or about such and such a day. That is typic to Russia because 1 or 2 or 20 days doesn't mean much except when they are going to kill you and then they do that very readily, very quickly and with great dispatch.

We impressed by radio upon them through our interpreter section, the necessity for knowing exactly how many

and their sex because we were very short of housing. We were living-- at that time I was living in the Chosen Hotel quartered there without any heat and it was below zero weather. We did our work in the old palace, former imperial palace in Seoul, that is an old building about three or four foot through walls and if you have ever been in a tomb below zero weather you would have recognized your situation by working eight or ten hours or fifteen hours a day in that place, which we did, for months on end. Now we jump two weeks, and all of a sudden we get a signal from the 38th Parallel from our outpost up there saying that there was a long Russian train asking permission to pass into the 38th Parallel and General Kristanokoff (phonetic) and General Stukoff (phonetic) were in the party. Well, instead of 67 in the party, they had 148 in the party, most all the surplus were camp followers, women. It is very difficult to billet women along with men in anybody's Army. I found that out when we had these WACS running all over a post or two where I commanded. It is very difficult and - you can figure out the physical examinations and other examinations required and inspections required in the Army if you are going to inspect women's quarters with their pink panties hanging on the line and a few other things like that and that is exactly what we had to put up with.



They came down and they had six gondola cars full of coal. They had about eight flat cars with the latest American Cadillacs and Packards on. We were lucky to get one jeep for four officers to bounce around on official business on those foul roads in Korea. They came to the Chosen Hotel. They were met by a guard of honor, General Hodges, all the rest of them clear down to my lowly rank. We met them, and we performed all the courtesies and fired a hell of a lot of gunpowder, giving them salutes and stuff and then came the time when they were going to be billeted. Well, they kicked all of us poor little American officers out and we sought tents or ambuscades or some other place to sleep at below zero weather with no heat and dear old Russians got everything they wanted. The one thing they did nicely and that was, they brought two or three boxcars filled with good liquor and that was helpful. It did at times prevent us from freezing to death or having snake bites at night be fatal. The first thing they did was, General Stukoff came up and he said, I'll have thar garage and that was General Hodge's garage just in behind the Chosen Hotel and I called the young MP officer over and I said young man stretch your line over here, take the men that are armed with tommy guns and shoot the first Russian that steps across this line regardless of what it is.

That was really a diplomatic incident that should have - - if Acheson had been in Seoul at that time he would have certainly had me shot at sunrise whether I got up that early or not. Now then, that was an incident that was absolutely unheard of - we the great Russians, and they blustered and swore and shouted and screamed and the more they shouted, the more I shouted. Well, finally they cooled down and said come over and we'll have some vodka. So I went over and had some vodka and then we started the talks the next day or two, after everybody got well and drunk and slept it off and then got well and drunk and slept that one off, including all the camp followers, these strange looking Tartar women they brought down, Mongols and everything else they had, and we started to talk and well, as you know, when you talk with a Russian, you don't talk about anything yet. You're going to talk about what you're going to talk, if you talk - that's called an agenda. You talk only about to this point, what are we going to talk about if we talk, if any. So we talked about the agenda and it went on for two solids weeks, days and nights. In the meantime, of course, we got drunk, or some of them did. That is always necessary, the Russians start to work at five o'clock and they work until about three in the morning and then he is going to get drunk until six and then he sleeps until about three the next day. That is

typical Russian reasoning, you know, always turn everything around to suit just the way you want it, turn the whole world around to suit yourself, don't make any difference what the natural limitations are. So General Stukoff finally said he was going to pack up and leave and that was the nicest thing he had said since he had been in Seoul. So he did pack up and left and I picked up and left and went back to Tokyo. Then we came back again a month later and the same thing happened and I got disgusted and got on a tactical wire to Tokyo and asked permission to leave. I was doing no good over there. The Supreme Commander said you stay there, I'll tell you when to come over to Tokyo and I stayed. So we then -- I got a little mad and others and General Hodges, who was commanding general of the forces in Korea, 24th Corps of the Eighth Army, backed me up magnificently, and I pounded the table and swore and shouted and did everything in the world I could do to impress them with the fact that we weren't frightened and right in the middle of that I was called back to Tokyo and thereupon I met that distinguished then Under Secretary of State, and he was very, very much put out and I was permanently relieved from that detail at the instance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, engineered in the usual casual way by one Dean Acheson, and so the general called me in one morning and promptly gave me the highest decoration.

(Portion of speech not recorded here due to turning of record)

He says it is not war, it is a police action. Well, it's a pretty costly police action to have 75,000 casualties in seven months. That's a pretty costly war it seems to me, a pretty costly police action, and the reason we have had those casualties - only one reason, and that is because Dean Acheson has insisted and the President has backed him up on sending everything to Europe. Great Britain had \$3,800,000,000 in food, material or loans, gifts,--It's silly to call a thing like that a loan, it's a gift -- since the war stopped, and they were gracious enough just to back us up magnificently in Korea by sending one brigade of 2,000 men. One brigade of 2,000 men is all Great Britain has ever done in the Korean police action, if you please. I think that is disgraceful. They tell MacArthur that they will give him not one troop, not one soldier more, but it's very easy to send six divisions not yet in existence, or to where, I don't know, do you? - some place in Europe and for what purpose - to fight the Russians? Well now, it is common knowledge that Joe Stalin and his crew of brigands are not going to fight anybody at least for five or ten years. That's just ordinary - the boy on the street should know that. Why?

Because there are, I don't like this to go out any further, 750 to 1,000 atomic bombs already in storehouses in the United States. We have enough bases and enough planes already abroad to drop five atomic bombs on every city in Russia in one night. Do you think that Stalin and his group of burglars are so stupid not to know those things. Do you think they are so stupid not to understand that we could do that and they can't stop it. If they had 50,000 airplanes, we'd get most of ours through because we would send so many that we'd take 80% casualties and still get enough atomic bombs through to ruin Russia forever. It takes one solid year, you know, according to the information from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to make a place tenable to any life after an atomic structure has been exploded at a proper height over that area. So Russia would become untenable, all the cities for at least year, if not longer, --, able to destroy 50,000,000 Russians. You think Stalin is that crazy to think that he can, with all of his huge land Armies and his huge submarine fleet in the making; do you think he is crazy enough to subject that to such an attack. Of course, he isn't that crazy.

I'm not saying we shouldn't watch him. I think we should draw a line across the map and say, look Joe, if

you cross that line we're going to smother you, that's all about that, and Joe wouldn't cross it. Just as long as we have people who deal with silk gloves with these Ruskies, we're going to have them bluff us just as long as they can and they have been doing nothing but bluff the greatest republic this planet ever saw. They've bluffed us clear through from Yalta clear down to Berlin. Sheer bluff -- it's time they were called. It's time that bluff were called. You're not going to have it until you clean the government out in Washington. You're never going to have that bluff called, never. In the history of the country you'll never have it called as long as these people are down there. I'm not talking politics, I'm not interested in politics. I'm talking America. I don't need to tell you what I think about America I hope, but I would like to tell you what a lot of other people think about it. I'd like to tell you that William Z. Foster's book is most enlightening. William Z. Foster, as you know, is the avowed, acknowledged leader of the Communist Party in America and the title of the book is "America Toward Communism," and I read it thank you. I read it with gloves on because I didn't want to stink up my hands, and believe me the 30 projects that he outlines will happen when, as and if the United States is total Communism or Socialism. They call it Socialism, they are all the same

thing; out of those thirty projects, sixteen of them are already on the books in Washington City. More than one-half of his entire program has been promulgated by this government in the last eighteen years. Don't you think it's time somebody woke up to those things. I do. I think it's time somebody woke up to the fact that the U. S. government is in the greatest business in the world, the land business, 24% of all the rural land in the United States is today owned outright by the U. S. Government. Twenty-six people out of every 100 in the U. S. are on the payrolls, directly or indirectly of this administration. I wonder how a lot of us fellows got out from under that. How long has this been going on, you get on the government payroll. I would like to know about that.

Now another thing I'd like to point out and that is this. I would like to point out that every average family of four people owes the government today \$7,000, payable upon demand and that same average family's income in 1949, later figures are not yet available, was \$1335 - does that make sense. It doesn't make sense to me. How can I pay with \$1335, seven thousand dollars, 90% of which should never have been on the books in the first place. All of these socialist sophistries that we have had thrust upon us simply because a

lot of people didn't vote. A lot of people didn't even have the guts to go out and use their God-given privilege to say I don't want that government in, bing goes my ballot against it, or I want that government in and vote for it.

There are many bright things in the horizon, not the least among which I see on every hand. I'm not a religionist in any sense, but any man in my judgment who does not believe in the divine plan is either a fool or crazy. I'm going to give you a little outline how we should be thinking. There comes from the Far East a great mantram which being freely interpreted goes like this: Oh Lord of Lord and king of kings, may we thy little ones early come to a realization of the power of the endless life. May we know the peace eternal that is theirs who know Thyself as one. May the great courage possess us, the great light guide us, and may Thy star ever go before us until we arrive at Thy holy feet. So be it.

- - - -

Q. We have had at this table a speaker, Owen Lattimore. I would like to have your opinion.

A. Well sir, there has grown up in this country a very strange sort of feeling. It was espoused in 1948 by



a certain candidate for President. It's "me too but not so much. Mr. Lattimore is one of those individuals who is "me too but not so much." Progress is inevitable in right thinking people, but revolution such as we have had in government, discarding that God-given constitution of the United States which, for 175 years has served us all too well in my opinion - those things cannot be thrown out of the window as the Kaiser once tore up treaties and called them just mere scraps of paper. The Constitution is more divinely inspired than a mere scrap of paper, and I believe that any man who proposes such crazy fool things that destroy the effect of this Constitution, as Owen Lattimore, Hiss and Remington and a hundred others I could name, has no business being in prominence in our government. Jessup is another lovely light. I'd like to mention him and pay my disrespect to him too. He was one of the boys that went with the President of the United States out to one of the little islands to meet with the Supreme Commander. Why Jessup? Well you tell me. What could Jessup add except a nudge with a red stick every once in a while in the back of the President. What could he add to any conversation with such a distinguished man as General MacArthur, who knows more about the Far East than any living man.

What could he add to it. What could Lattimore add to it. I don't know. Are you answered sir?

Q. In your remarks about England - do you agree that the present form of government which I understand is of a Socialist type is responsible for their not sending more troops?

A. I don't think there is any question about it - that and the fact that we have played with England. We have just given them anything they wanted. Now we have given a Socialistic group over there everything they wanted. Why do we give anything until such time as we think that their government is responsible. There is no Socialist government in the world responsible. Do you know what happened when Atlee came over here recently. Now just mark this one up. He came over and with a grandiose gesture, the first thing he said, I don't want a thing from America, not a thing. Well we could have said but we want something from England. We would like to have England pay just a part of the interest on \$8,500,000,000 that England has owed us since 1917. Not one nickel of interest has England paid during this interim, not one nickel on principal,

and poor little Finland over here, poor as they are, has paid their debt right on the nose. Now if Finland can do it so can England but England is not going to do it because England will fight until the last drop of Australian, Canadian and American blood until the last American dollar. That's why.

Q. What do you propose should be done with the Korean situation as it presently exists today?

A. There is only one thing that they can do. First of all why are we interested in Korea at all. What is the mission, what is the objective in Korea. The objective is quite obvious. If the Russians get into Korea in toto and are allowed to organize that on Communist lines, it is a direct thrust to our greatest outpost, the four islands and Japan. If you remember, President Roosevelt with a grandiose gesture, just like Atlee, just give them anything, gave Russia the south end of Sakhalin Island, which is that narrow island to the north of Hokkaido. If you remember Japanese had one-half of that up to the time that Roosevelt handed it over. What Roosevelt's right was to hand it over to them I wouldn't know, but he's a liberal, see, that is liberal

with everybody else's money and property and never his own, hell no.

Now Korea, if occupied by Russia, would mean that we would have to put into Japan at least one full field Army well equipped and well trained. Otherwise, the first thing you'd know they would be down in Kyushu and then the Russians would move up into Honshu. Kyushu is the large manufacturing center, Kokora (phonetic), the north part of Kyushu and then they would come up to Kobe and they would grab that port, one of the valued ports in southern part of Honshu and they then would get up in the Tokyo district and then they would get Japan. I propose this. I propose we send immediately four more divisions to Korea with the latest equipment we have and we've got some beauts too, I'll tell you that now, the Army, Air Force and the Navy have not been sitting down on the well known "seat of the pants" that you were talking about John at all. They have been doing a good job. I'd send them in there and I would immediately bomb the three big dams on the Yalu River. I'd knock them out and that would throw all of Korea, all of Manchuria out of kilter, give them no light, flood their fields and they would have no power. Just three little dams. You can do it in about

ten minutes. Knock them off, that's all you have to do and then I would put parachute troops all along the Yalu River and move right through on a pincer movement, land at Inchon like we have done and at Suchon on the West and East coast and pinch them right off and let them starve to death and then the first move of any other troops coming in, I would bomb all the airfields on the Manchurian side. Isn't it ridiculous, don't you think, that here are our aviators dying over there because they can't cross this river here, and they see this fellow taking off right across the river there and they see him land there but he is just as safe as you are in this room, perhaps a little safer, as long as I'm here, perhaps a little safer.

Q. Tell me, why is that? We have the troops, money and everything else, why do we have to listen to that stuff?

A. Would you ask that of Mr. Dean Acheson as I have and see what answer you'll get. You'll get no answer. My letters actually numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, once a week I send him a new number, a new addition. I send them registered mail, return receipt requested, and I get that stamp of the State Department on the returned red copy and that's all I hear from them. Of course, he

is not going to answer anything as long as he is sitting in the catbird's seat over in Washington, drawing a hell of a lot of side issues. He got \$50,000 for the Polish loan. Did you know that - when he was Under Secretary of State. His law firm represented the Polish government and he recommended to the congress that they be granted a loan of \$50,000,000 and he got \$50,000 of it.

Q. Your criticism of sending troops to Europe - do you believe Secretary Marshall, General Eisenhower are ill-advised?

A. I think General Marshall has always been ill-advised. I didn't want to leave the impression that I object to sending troops to Europe. I object sending troops any place until we take care of our own troops in Korea. That is the imminent danger right there. It will only take four or five divisions to fill that thing out over there and the right to bomb those dams as I said. They have deliberately hamstrung MacArthur because they are afraid of him in Washington, He is too great a man for this group of fourth rate people from the White House down. He's too great a man. He has shown himself by service to this republic over a period of 35 or 40 years to be a brilliant man, tactician and a brilliant

administrator and they don't want any part of him in Washington. He has not been allowed to come back here, if you will note. Every time the Congress wants to bring him back, somebody shushes it. They don't want to bring him back. He has a son 13 years old who never saw his native land. I know little Arthur very well, Arthur MacArthur. He has never seen his native land, his home country.

I don't believe there is any question but we should send troops to Europe, if they're going to do it. If Great Britain will say, I'll put up fifteen divisions under General Eisenhower's command, France will put up twenty divisions under General Eisenhower's command (portion of speech not recorded because record at this point was turned) and little Denmark put up one division. Then I'd say, we take X percent of that in accordance with the population. Britain has forty-five million, we have one hundred fifty million, all right, then we should put up more than Britain does under those circumstances. That's only fair but I think we should not even plan on sending one soldier to Europe or one general until we've taken care of our own front yard and that's in Korea.

I am not an isolationist, let's not think that for a minute, there is no such thing as isolation in the world today. You can't be an isolationist when I can get on a plane in New York and have breakfast the next morning in London and - if I could get in - and the next afternoon in Moscow if I could get in - I don't want to. There is no such thing as isolationism. When in less than one-quarter of a second, an electrical impulse can go clear around the world, twenty-five thousand six hundred miles in less than one-quarter of a second, how can you say there should be isolationism?



There isn't any such a thing. It's impossible. I believe in living in peace and harmony with our neighbors the same as we have for one hundred seventy years with Canada with not a soldier in between, not a fort, no fortification. We can do that, of course we can if we can find some guys that are intelligent enough to treat the gangsters in Russia that they cannot go any further. They are through. They know they are through, they are more frightened of themselves than we are of them, I'll tell you that now. Four percent of the Russian people belong to the Communist Party. Four percent of them and they would love to get out from under, all of the four percent except the boys that are in the Commissar class and they get the gravy, they can go to one store (three or four words not intelligible) couldn't go there at all because I go way down to the other end of town to buy a loaf of bread or something, if I can get bread, but oh, the Commissar goes over here in a very elegant department store and he and his women-folks go in there and buy anything they want, Paris goods all the time.

Another thing I'd like to pay my disrespect to England about is this -- that this last week there was a very significant item which is merely routine of course, there were ten thousand tons of raw rubber shipped in British bottoms to Chinese Communists to help to kill our people. No -- business

as usual with England, I don't care - they don't care whether they kill off their own people or our people, so long as the Bank of England makes a helluva lot of money, that's all they are interested in.

\* \* \*

Another voice - apparently Walton: General, I hate to see this discussion come to a close. Unfortunately, though, we have to get back. I know that there are a number of questions that could be asked and you would more than willingly answer them but as a sort of untrained layman, I have two comments to make. One of them is that I think the greatest financial disaster the United States of America ever suffered was when that haberdasher in Independence, Missouri, went broke, and the second one is, and I speak not as president of this club but just as I say, an untrained layman, the second one -- it's rather difficult to me to understand how such a colossal bunch of jackasses can be all assembled in the so-called Congress of the United States. I tell you frankly and I tell every man in this room, that the things that the President of the United States has been guilty of, there is absolutely no reason why he couldn't be

removed from office when he surrounds himself with the type of individuals that he has had around in these recent years and I say to you and to every man in this room that any Senator or member of the House of Representatives of the United States that throws his hands up and says, "I can't do a thing about it," he is not a man of character. I feel awfully strong about this thing. These fellows in this club probably don't realize just how keenly I do feel about it and I have never gotten in politics but boy, I tell you, if the right fellow comes along and says to me, "Walton, your family and mortgage will be taken care of, you can go out and tell them what you really think of them and back it up," somebody is going to get a damned good man to work for him. And I'm not just trying to blow my own horn. But there are two things that have been deeply implanted in my mind and this thing about the Congress, members of Congress saying they can't do, they can't do, they can do if they want to. Well sir, enough for that. It's been a pleasure to have you and I trust and I know you have a great many mementos and things that remind you of very pleasant incidents in your life but I trust you will

take this along with our thanks and recall a very pleasant time that you gave us today.

Bibb: Thank you, sir. Is it a postage stamp?

Walton: No sir, it is not a postage stamp, it's a little heavier than a postage stamp.

Bibb: Thank you so much, sir.

Walton: Delighted to have you indeed. Gentlemen, if there is nothing further, declare the meeting adjourned.

COPY:mcg

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 10, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT : SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA  
Internal Security - C  
Special Inquiry - State Department

You will recall that we recently supplied information to the State Department concerning information received that the Slovak League of America, New York City, had allegedly made an offer of \$10,000 for the elimination of President Truman and/or Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The information concerning this organization and the alleged threat against the President and the Secretary of State were given to the Secret Service and the Security Division of the State Department. The State Department has now requested, through Mr. Roach, that the Bureau supply to it a summary of information in our files concerning the League.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to the Internal Security Section and that an appropriate summary of information concerning the League be prepared for the State Department.

RRR:arm

94 40672 ✓  
NOT RECORDED  
45 MAR 1951

The Attorney General

April 26, 1951

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

DE. TOLSON  
Secretary of State

Reference is made to my memorandum of February 14, 1951, forwarding a copy of Senate Joint Resolution #2 which had been introduced in the California State Legislature on January 15, 1951, by State Senator Jack Tenney "relative to the impeachment of Secretary of State Dean Acheson." (94-40672-14)

Information has been received that this resolution, relative to the impeachment of Secretary of State Acheson, was heard by the Senate Rules Committee, California State Legislature, at Sacramento, California, in evening session, April 19, 1951, and shelved by that Committee. It was learned that this action killed the resolution as far as that Committee was concerned and no further action can be taken unless this measure is introduced again.

The above is furnished for your information.

RHE:dba

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
APR 26 6 34 PM '51

RECORDED - 18

EX-86

194 40672-14  
APR 28 1951  
F B I  
RECEIVED READING ROOM  
APR 26 6 23 PM '51

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

469

65 MAY 8 1951

MR. TOLSON

October 6, 1951

L. B. NICHOLS

I am attaching hereto a copy of a very unusual letter signed by [redacted] It was written on plain paper, addressed to Senator Pat McCarran but was mailed in an envelope postmarked October 1, 12:30 p.m. at New York in an Astor Hotel envelope. The original letter was returned to Jay Sourwine who furnished it to me.

b6  
b7c

The letter points out there is a conspiracy to go after Senator McCarran, indicating that Justice Frankfurter is back of it, etc. The letter is quite amazing.

I had the New York Office make a discreet check at the Astor Hotel. They had no record of a LeRoy A. Phillips and the only Phillips who has been a guest at the hotel in the past six months was L. C. Phillips of Prairie Point, Mississippi. Obviously, this could not be the person as the initials are different.

I do not think we are justified in making any open investigation. In fact, Sourwine did not ask that this be done.

cc - Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Belmont

LBN:mb  
Attachment

ENCL.

94-40672  
NOT RECORDED  
OCT 17 1951

1000

100-40672-116

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P  
Y

Dear Senator:

I wish I could come right out and tell the public what I know about a conspiracy to discredit you and invalidate the great work you are doing. I set in a room next doore with my ear at the key hole and heard conversations that involve militant leaders of the World Zionist Movement. Chief among those present I recognized as they came out was Rabbi Abba Silver of Cleveland who remarked several times that Senator Lehman had the "guts" to get Pat McCarran\*. There will be little difficulty in getting what money is needed and whatever is needed to smear and defeat Senator McCarthy will be furnished by just two men in NY.: Justice Frankfurter has the program in hand which has the support of Acheson\* who has ordered the entire underground of writers to put the heart on and get you - McCarthy and others on the list kicked out of the Senate. Without their help President Truman would not have been elected. With their influence in A.F.C. and F.H.A. where their sympathisers and friends are infested. Nothing is impossible. Don't worry about investigations and especially McCarran's deceit about his Christian character. Public relations will at the proper time reveal him as a fraud. I recognized Drew Pearson as he left the room.

Respectfully

(signed)

NOTE: Words underlined were underlined in letter by writer.  
Words marked with an asterisk were misspelled by writer

Senator McCarran noted on letter "This is some thing".

94-4-675-4

ENCLOSURE

b6  
b7c



0878

January 2, 1952

Honorable Dean Acheson  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

I wish to extend to you my heartiest  
congratulations on your designation as the  
recipient of the Gold Medal of Merit of the  
Jewish War Veterans at their annual dinner  
last Sunday evening in New York City.

I deeply regret that a roundness  
over which I had no control made it impossible  
for me to be there personally; however, I do  
want to extend to you my congratulations on  
the honor which was conferred upon you.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc: New York

cc: Mr. Jones

RECORDED - 76

194-40672-18  
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JAN 2 6 00 PM '52  
S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

EX-194

LB N: hmc

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- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_

COMM - FBI  
JAN - 3 1952  
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64 JAN 16 1952

RECEIVED REAL...  
JAN 2 6 00 PM '52  
FBI

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1952

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Laughlin	
Mr. Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

*[Handwritten initials]*

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January 2. I am sorry that you were unable to receive in person the Jewish War Veterans' award which you so richly deserve. I am deeply grateful for your congratulations on my receipt of their medal.

Sincerely yours,

*Dean Acheson*

Dean Acheson

RECORDED - 97

94-40672-19


The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover,  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Department of Justice,  
Washington 25, D. C.

~~INDEXED - PROCESSING~~

RECORDED - 79  
INDEXED - 79

94 40672 20

September 8, 1952



b6  
b7C

Your letter dated September 2, 1952, has been received.

While I would like to be of assistance in connection with your inquiry, I must advise that in accordance with a Departmental regulation data contained in the files of this Bureau is maintained as confidential and available for official use only.

I am sure you will understand the necessity for this regulation and no inference will be drawn because of my inability to be of assistance that we do or do not have in our files the information you have requested.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

2 - cc Norfolk (with copies of incoming)

Bureau indices negative re correspondent.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nehr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Note On File Only: Correspondent's inquiry concerns a controversial issue in which the Bureau should not become involved under any circumstances.

WWK:jdt

COMM - FBI  
SEP - 9 1952  
MAILED 30

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
FBI  
U S DEPT OF JUSTICE

Handwritten signatures and initials

80 SEP 17 1952

TRUE COPY

September 2 - 1952

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Would you kindly tell me if Dean Acheson still is a member of a law firm representing the Soviet Union. If this is true for how many years and if so does he benefit from this financially.

Thanking you. I am

Very Sincerely yours

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

b6  
b7c

Sept 2-1952

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. Hoover:

Would you kindly tell me if Dean  
Johnson still is a member of a law firm  
representing the Soviet Union. If this is  
true for how many years and if so  
does he benefit from this financially

Thanking you. I am

Very sincerely yours

9-8-52  
[Handwritten initials and notes]



b6  
b7c

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓

DATE: May 4, 1953

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

Tolson ✓  
 Ladd ✓  
 Nichols ✓  
 Belmont ✓  
 Clegg ✓  
 Glavin ✓  
 Harbo ✓  
 Rosen ✓  
 Tracy ✓  
 Gearty ✓  
 Mohr ✓  
 Winterrowd ✓  
 Tele. Room ✓  
 Holloman ✓  
 Sizoo ✓  
 Miss Gandy ✓

For record purposes, Allen Drury of the Evening Star (STERLING 3-5000, Branch 459), called at 10:30 a.m., today and talked with Wick in my office. He asked whether we had anything to say on the report that Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, had received a threatening letter and the FBI had been called into the case.

After checking with the Investigative Division, which advised that the Walter Winchell column of today carries a statement to the effect that Dean Acheson has received a threatening letter and the FBI may perform guard duty, Wick called Drury and told him we had no comment whatsoever to make.

The Investigative Division advises that no such case is known to them, the FBI Laboratory has not heard of it and the Washington Field Office has no knowledge of it.

ACTION:

None. For information only.

cc - Mr. Ladd  
 cc - Mr. Rosen  
 cc - Mr. Jones

REW:ptm

RECORDED-12

94-40672-21

MAY 8 1953

63 MAY 18 1953

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Evans

DATE: 6/21/61

FROM : T. J. McAndrews

SUBJECT: **MARTHA STANLEY;  
 PATRICK STANLEY,  
 FRESNO, CALIFORNIA,  
 SPECIAL TOUR**

*Handwritten signature/initials*

The above-captioned individuals were afforded a tour of Bureau facilities on 6/15/61. At the completion of the tour, they expressed their appreciation for courtesies extended. This tour was conducted by Thomas J. Emery, (SA).

*Captives interviewed are the niece and nephew of Mrs. Max Ackerson*

*Handwritten initials*

REC-74

*94 40672-22*

EX-107

JUN 22 1961

TJE:mac *mac*

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1417688-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 19  
Page 70 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 71 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 72 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 73 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 74 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 75 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 76 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 89 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 90 ~ Referral/Consult;

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DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1266233-0

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STANDARD FORM 85 Revised August 4, 1947, by Civil Service Commission		REQUEST I REPORT OF LOYALTY DATA ON APPLICANTS AND APPOINTEES		THIS FORM TO BE USED ONLY FOR APPLICANTS AND APPOINTEES WHERE RECORD CHECKS AND INQUIRIES ARE CONDUCTED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (PART I - Executive Order 9835)		CASE SERIAL NUMBER (CSC use only) 4 50 36091	
TO: The Federal Bureau of Investigation, through the U. S. Civil Service Commission The following information is furnished for identification purposes on the person named below. Kindly furnish a report on any loyalty information contained in your files. (The fingerprints of this person are attached.)							
1. FULL NAME (Initials and surnames of full name are not acceptable).		(Surname) Acheson		(Given name) Dean		(Middle or other names) Gooderham <i>ES</i>	
2. ALIASES AND NICKNAMES None				3. DATE OF THIS REQUEST 3-6-50			
4. SPECIAL NUMBERS KNOWN TO REQUESTING AGENCY (FBI number or FBI file number, passport number, Army or Navy serial number, seaman's certificate of identification, alien registration number, Social Security number etc. Specify which) None							
5. PLACE OF BIRTH Middletown, Connecticut			6. DATE OF BIRTH April 11, 1893		7. TITLE OF POSITION Secretary of State		
8. SEX <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE		9. MARITAL STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARRIED		10. IF MARRIED, GIVE SPOUSE'S FULL NAME, AND DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH Alice Stanley Acheson			
11. DATE OF APPOINTMENT Jan. 21, 1949		12. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: <input type="checkbox"/> EXCEPTED <input type="checkbox"/> TEMPORARY <input type="checkbox"/> COMPETITIVE (Cite Civil Service or other legal authority) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Presidential					
13. ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH AFFILIATED OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OR THOSE WHICH SHOW RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS Fellow Yale Corp. Scroll and Key American Bar Association Harvard Law Schl Assoc. Delta Kappa Epsilon Alfalfa Club D.C. Bar Association (See Continuation Sheet)							
14. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS From To Street City State 2805 P Street N.W. Washington D. C. <i>Comp. in Md</i> and Harewood Farm Sandy Spring Md. <i>221 - 294 05</i>							
15. DATES, NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF EMPLOYERS FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS Date Employer Address Jan 1, 1934-Jan. 31, 1941 Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb, Washington, DC Feb. 1, 1941-June 30, 1947 U.S. Department of State Washington, DC July 1, 1947-January 20, 1949 Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb January 21, 1949 to Date U.S. Department of State Washington, DC							
RECORDED - 6							
16. THIS AGENCY HAS LOYALTY INFORMATION RECEIVED FURNISHED BY THE AGENCIES INDICATED BELOW. 22401							
AGENCY WHICH MADE THE LOYALTY REPORT <i>4-7-50</i>		DATE OF REPORT <i>SE 3-8-50</i>		REMARKS <i>RECORDED - 104-MAR-21-1950</i>			
17. THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RETURN REPORT TO AGENCY WHERE NECESSARY INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED APR 7 1950 NOT TO BE CONSIDERED				18. NAME AND ADDRESS OF REQUESTING AGENCY Department of State Washington 25, D. C. I certify that the foregoing is complete and correct. <i>Dean Acheson</i>			

SEE REVERSE FOR REPORT ON CASES WHERE NECESSARY INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED  
54 MAY 2 1950  
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1948 O-2386

19. REPORT OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED ( )

Date:

121 - 224 US I

(Name of Reporting Agency)

INSTRUCTIONS ON PREPARATION OF STANDARD FORM 85

1. This form (Standard Form 85) is promulgated by the United States Civil Service Commission at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities with respect to applicants for Federal employment and persons appointed to Federal positions after September 30, 1947 as provided in Part I of Executive Order 9835.
2. A separate form (Standard Form 84) will be used for excepted employees when investigation is conducted by the agency.
3. The Fingerprint Chart (Standard Form 87) of the applicant or appointee must be submitted with the original and two copies of this form. The third carbon copy of the form should be retained by the agency.
4. If additional space is needed in filling in Items 14 and 15, use a separate sheet of paper, number the item to correspond with the item number of this form, and attach.
5. If the requesting agency has previously received loyalty information from any Government agency (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation) concerning the employee named in this form, the name of the agency which furnished the information and the date of the report should be shown in Item 16.
6. Item 17 is reserved for use in reporting on this request when no derogatory information is developed.
7. Whenever information is developed the report will be covered in Item 19 above.
8. For further details regarding the use of this form see the Federal Personnel Manual.

DEAN G. ACHESON

SF 85 - Request for Report of Loyalty Data on Applicants and Appointees  
(Continuation Sheet)

Item 13 -

4 50 36098

Montgomery County Cooperative Agriculture Center ✓  
Georgetown Citizens Association ✓  
Yale Club of Washington ✓  
Council of Foreign Relations ✓  
Metropolitan Club ✓  
Chevy Chase Club ✓  
Century Club ✓  
New Haven Lawn Club ✓

Mr. Acheson was formerly a member of the following organizations:

Hammonasset Fishing Club ✓  
Honorary Membership for 1948 in World Affairs Council of Northern  
California ✓  
Champlain Society ✓  
National Policy Committee ✓  
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies ✓  
Advisory Committee of Lawyers on President's Committee on Civil Service  
Improvement ✓  
Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery ✓  
Member of Board of Trustees of Brookings Institution ✓  
Member of Board of Trustees of Madeira School ✓

121 - 22405 B

NO DISLOYAL DATA  
FBI FILES  
APR 7 1950  
NOT TO BE CONSIDERED  
3 AS CLEARANCE

The Attorney General

March 30, 1950

Director, FBI

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

On March 21, 1950, this Bureau received from the Civil Service Commission Standard Form 85, Request for Report of Loyalty Data on Applicants and Appointees, dated March 6, 1950, relative to the Honorable Dean Gooderham Acheson, Secretary of State.

An investigation concerning Mr. Acheson was conducted by this Bureau in 1941 under provisions of the Hatch Act. I am forwarding herewith a memorandum which summarizes the basis for and the results of that investigation. Records of the Department contain an investigative report by Special Agent Harry G. Kaynor, dated August 20, 1941, at Washington, D. C., and another by Special Agent G. D. King, Jr., dated November 3, 1941, at Washington, D. C., reflecting more fully the results of the investigation referred to in the attached summary. This summary also sets forth information concerning Mr. Acheson's background and certain other information regarding him which came to the attention of this Bureau in 1943 and in 1945.

As you know, there have been comments in the press and on the radio concerning statements attributed to Mr. Acheson in connection with the Alger Hiss case.

Your advice will be greatly appreciated as to whether, in processing the Standard Form 85 of Mr. Acheson under the President's Loyalty Program, it is considered desirable to conduct investigation, or whether the form should be returned to the Civil Service Commission with the notation, "No Disloyal Data, FBI Files," and no further action taken.

Attachment

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

JG:mgc:zb

MAILED 2  
MAR 31 1950  
RECORDED - 6  
INDEXED - 6

221 - 22405  
OK  
Handwritten initials and signatures

54 MAY 2 1950

March 28, 1950

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

*[Handwritten signature]*

Background

Dean Gooderham Acheson was born on April 11, 1893 at Middletown, Connecticut, the son of Edward Campion and Eleanor Gooderham Acheson. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree at Yale University in 1915 and a Bachelor of Law degree at Harvard University in 1918. Mr. Acheson was awarded an Honorary Master of Arts degree by Yale University in 1936.

On May 5, 1917, Mr. Acheson married Alice Stanley and they have three children,

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After serving as an Ensign in the U. S. Navy during the First World War, Acheson was employed as private secretary to the late Louis D. Brandeis, Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court from 1919 to 1921. In 1921 he entered law practice with the firm of Covington, Burling and Rublee in Washington, D. C. He was appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury in May, 1933 from which position he resigned on November 15, 1933. Mr. Acheson reentered private law practice on January 1, 1934 as a member of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb, Washington, D. C. He was appointed Chairman of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure by former Attorney General Frank Murphy, a committee which was created by presidential order on February 24, 1939.

On January 23, 1941, Dean Acheson was appointed Assistant Secretary of State and was later appointed Under Secretary of State on August 27, 1945, in which position he served until July 1, 1947 when he resumed private law practice. On January 7, 1949, President Truman nominated Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. The Senate confirmed this appointment and Acheson was sworn in as Secretary of State on January 21, 1949.

Investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

In the fall of 1941 a Hatch Act investigation was conducted by this Bureau after having been authorized by the Attorney General concerning Dean G. Acheson, based upon a report that the indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action contained the name of Mr. Dean G. Acheson and the name of Mrs. Alice S. Acheson. It was also reported that the name of Mrs. Alice S. Acheson appeared in the indices of the League of Women Shoppers and the

FR Warner; AS Fipp:mk  
101-3396

BLIND MEMO TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

101-22405

*[Handwritten initials]*

cc - Mr. Ladd Rewrite of page 2 of summary memo on Dean Acheson  
Mr. Belmont attached to Memo to AG 3/30/50.  
Mr. Stanley  
Mr. Purvis

Committee to Keep America Out of War.

It may be noted that the Washington Committee for Democratic Action was cited as a Communist front organization by the former Attorney General as within the purview of Executive Order 9835. The League of Women Shoppers was described as a Communist-controlled front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, March 29, 1944. Relative to the Committee to Keep America Out of War, this organization was believed to be identical with the Keep America Out of War Committee which was a pacifist, socialist group.

It was not disclosed during the investigation that the name of Dean Acheson did appear on the active indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action. Inquiry made during the investigation among Acheson's associates and neighbors developed no information which indicated membership on his part in any of the above-listed groups.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Acheson was interviewed on November 25, 1941 by representatives of this Bureau. During the interview, Mr. Acheson stated he was not a member of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action and had never participated in the activities of the organization. Copies of the Hatch Act investigation on Acheson, as well as a summary, were furnished on January 13, 1949, to the Attorney General.

Alleged Pro-Soviet Views and Contacts

The "People's World", a West Coast Communist newspaper, carried an article on August 21, 1943, by Adam Lapin in which Lapin discussed an apparent split and conflict in personalities among the officials of the State Department. Lapin stated that Hull, then Secretary of State, leaned first toward one faction and then toward another. He stated that on the "enlightened side" Sumner Welles had allied himself with Dean Acheson. Concerning these two men, Lapin stated, "They were not haunted by the specter of Communism."

On November 14, 1945, Dean Acheson appeared at the War Freedom Rally in Madison Square Garden, New York City, sponsored by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. as one of the principal speakers. Among other speakers were Reverend Howlett Johnson, known as the "Red Dean" of Canterbury; former Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies; Paul Robeson; and Nicolai Novikov, then acting Russian Ambassador in Washington, D. C. At this time, Acheson

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
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Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
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Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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presented a historical treatise on American-Soviet Relations since the Russian Revolution in 1917 and closed with a plea for free collaboration between the two countries. ("Daily Worker" 11-7-45; 66-1138-336)

The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. was declared within the purview of Executive Order 9835.

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The following information does not appear on the original.

Attached to this memorandum is a yellow copy of a memorandum on Dean Goddard Acheson dated February 1, 1949, which reflects information that has been deleted for transmittal to the Attorney General. The data which contains an asterisk in red on the left side of the page of the attached referenced yellow memorandum is data which was not included on the original of this memorandum to the Attorney General.

The Washington Evening Star dated January 13, 1949, carried an article which reported in substance that Dean Acheson had stated that he and Alger Hiss remained friends. He made this statement when testifying before the Senate in regard to a hearing concerning his confirmation as Secretary of State. Acheson also stated that Donald Hiss "served me and the country with complete fidelity and loyalty". (74-1333-A)

The Washington Daily News dated January 13, 1949, contained an article stating, among many things, that Dean Acheson had testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and stated at this hearing that Alger Hiss remains "a friend" but he was "never my assistant". (74-1333-A)

On January 14, 1949, the Washington Post carried an article stating that Dean Acheson, among other things, has pledged a firm policy concerning the Soviet Government so far as the State Department was concerned while he was Chief of it. He also stated that he was still a friend of the Hiss brothers. (74-1333-A)

On January 14, 1949, the Daily Worker attacked Dean Acheson and set forth debatable issues concerning his confirmation as Secretary of State. (100-3-81-A)

On January 18, 1949, the Washington Evening Star carried an article by Constantine Brown concerning Acheson's background and the fact that he was about to be confirmed as Secretary of State. (100-275683-A)

The Daily Worker on January 27, 1949, carried an article concerning the first press release made by Acheson since his becoming Secretary of State. It was reported that he gave a lecture on the "reactionary" philosophy of Communism. This matter was discussed in this article. (100-3-81-A)

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The week-end previous to January 31, 1949, Mr. George F. Kennan of the State Department advised a Bureau Agent that shortly after Acheson was ~~appointed~~ <sup>appointed</sup> as Secretary of State Mr. Kennan had a long talk with him and from his observation he was inclined to believe that "Acheson has seen the light" and would probably continue to pursue the policy toward Russia and satellites as laid down by Marshall and Lovett. According to Kennan, Acheson had at least outwardly changed considerably concerning the USSR since Acheson was Undersecretary of State. Kennan saw Acheson as a somewhat converted soul in so far as the Soviet was concerned and as a person <sup>who</sup> had recently been awakened and enlightened. (100-358267-15, page 4.)

On February 3, 1949, the Daily Worker ~~article~~ <sup>article</sup> which reported in substance that Dean Acheson had acted quickly in his attempt to dash the people's peace hopes which had been raised by Joseph Stalin's offer to meet President Truman in Europe. The article stated that between scorn and ridicule Acheson discussed Stalin's invitation. (100-3-81-A)

The New York Brooklyn Eagle under date of February 7, 1949, reported that the National Council for American Soviet Friendship had charged that Dean Acheson's statement on Stalin's bid for behind the Iron Curtain meeting contained "contradictory and fallacious" arguments. (100-146964-A)

On March 10, 1949, the Daily Worker reported that Dean Acheson had indicated that the North Atlantic Military Pact was virtually complete but would not at that time discuss the provisions of it. (100-3-81-A)

The Daily Worker on March 22, 1949, stated that a very revealing light on the North Atlantic Pact was cast by responsible British, Belgian and Dutch official and that they had been more frank and informative than Dean Acheson concerning this pact. (100-3-81-A)

On March 23, 1949, the Daily Worker commented on a recent radio speech of Dean Acheson when Acheson defined what he considered to be "an intolerable threat to the National ~~Security~~ <sup>Security</sup> of the United States" - namely "the control of Europe by a single aggressive power". (100-3-81-A)

The Washington Post on April 18, 1949, reported that Senator McCarran had accused Dean Acheson of giving the Senate "misleading" and "false" information on American aid to China. His statement was prompted by a letter from Acheson to Senator Tom ~~Connally~~ <sup>Connally</sup> in opposition to McCarran's Help-China suggestions. (109-12-246-A)

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On June 1, 1949, [redacted] Washington Times Herald, made a comment to Mr. J. F. Mohr of the Bureau that Eugene Meyer, former owner of the Washington Post, had contributed \$3,000 to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund and that he also understood that Dean Acheson had done the same thing through a member of his law firm. [redacted] stated that "We are endeavoring to prove this through the House Un-American Committee and subpoenaing bank officials to produce canceled checks". (74-1333-3389)

Mr. R. R. Rouch of the Bureau learned during November, 1949, from [redacted] of the State Department that the State Department would not publicly admit that they will accede to the request of the Hiss Defense attorneys to make files available but were in fact doing so. According to [redacted] the policy seems to exist that documents would be made available upon request but none would be volunteered. [redacted] commented in passing that one can draw his own conclusions by remembering the fact that Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss, was still employed by the law firm of Dean Acheson and that Acheson could not officially grant <sup>access</sup> for Hiss. He could say that certain files heretofore "revealed" were produced for the defense attorneys of Hiss. (74-1333-4186)

On January 23, 1950, the Washington Daily News editorial stated that when the existence of a spy ring in the State Department was reported in 1939 an investigating official was told that Dean Acheson and Justice Felix Frankfurter would vouch for "the Hiss boys". (74-1333-A)

On January 24, 1950, the Washington Times Herald stated that Senator Capehart had called upon President Truman to force the resignation of Dean Acheson. He told the Senate that Dean Acheson was given the espionage story and shortly after Mr. Hiss received a promotion in the State Department. (74-1333-A)

The New York Times on January 26, 1950, reported in substance that Dean Acheson had told a news conference that regardless of what the courts or other men might do he did not intend to turn his back on Alger Hiss. (74-1333-A)

On January 27, 1950, the New York Mirror carried an article which among many things reported that Senator Ferguson and other members of the House and Senate had stated that Acheson's statement of friendship for Alger Hiss called for an investigation of "subversive activities" in the State Department.

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The Saint Joseph News - Press, Saint Joseph, Missouri, carried an editorial on January 27, 1950, containing in substance the following: That a pronouncement of friendship for Hiss could mean one of three things. 1. The Secretary of State thinks that Hiss was misunderstood. 2. That he feels that Hiss' love for Russia was as understandable as that of Roosevelt. In other words, that Hiss gave nothing more vital to the Communists than Roosevelt did at the Yalta. 3. That there were deep and grave secret reasons why he should shout for friendship for a man convicted of being a Russian spy. (74-1333-A)

The New York Mirror on January 27, 1950, carried an article concerning Acheson who wanted "to stand by his pal Alger Hiss, brother of his law partner Donald Hiss". The article continued along this same vein. (74-1333-A)

The Washington Post on January 29, 1950, reported that several republican members of the House of Representatives had demanded that Acheson resign because of his friendship with Hiss and his position with respect to the Far East situation. (74-1333-A)

The Washington Times Herald dated January 30, 1950, carried an article captioned "Over Decay of U. S. Judiciary". This article in substance discussed the various Federal Judges that had been appointed since beginning of the Roosevelt regime in the White House. It was mentioned that Frankfurter had been described as the most powerful man in Washington because of the influence exerted through his proteges who include State Secretary Acheson. (94-8-66-A)

On March 27, 1950, the Washington Times Herald reported that there were mounting demands in and out of Congress for removal of Dean Acheson on the ground that he was incompetent to conduct our foreign relations, that he was responsible for harboring Communists and spies in the State Department and that he had impaired his standing by befriending Hiss. It was also reported that President Truman had declared his confidence in Acheson and had complimented him in doing a good job as Secretary of State. (No file No.)

There are also other newspaper clippings in the Bureau files relating in substance to the same data as reported above including the recent accusations made by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Republican of Wisconsin) as well as data contained in the January 14, 1949, issue of the News Letter Counterattack. (100-350512-202)

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February 1, 1949

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

I. BACKGROUND

Dean Gooderham Acheson was born April 11, 1893, at Middletown, Connecticut, the son of Edward Campion and Eleanor Gooderham Acheson. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree at Yale University in 1915 and a Bachelor of Law degree at Harvard University in 1918. Mr. Acheson was awarded an Honorary Master of Arts degree by Yale University in 1936.

On May 5, 1917, Acheson married [redacted] Stanley and they have three children, [redacted] and [redacted]

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After serving as an ensign in the United States Navy during the First World War, Acheson was employed as private secretary to the late Louis D. Brandeis, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, from 1919 to 1921. In 1921 he entered law practice with the firm of Covington, Burling and Rublee in Washington, D. C. He was appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury in May, 1933, from which position he resigned November 15, 1933. Acheson reentered private law practice January 1, 1934, as a member of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb, Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C. Mr. Acheson was appointed Chairman of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure by the then Attorney General Frank Murphy, this committee having been created by presidential order on February 24, 1939.

On January 23, 1941, Dean Acheson was appointed Assistant Secretary of State and was later appointed Under Secretary of State on August 27, 1945, in which position he served until July 1, 1947, when he resumed private law practice. On January 7, 1949, President Truman nominated Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. The Senate confirmed this appointment and Acheson was sworn in as Secretary of State on January 21, 1949. (66-1138-336; Washington Times-Herald, January 9 and 22, 1949)

\* The 1948 edition of Who's Who in America indicates that Mr. Acheson was awarded the Order of Vasa (Swedish); is a fellow in the Yale Corporation, a trustee of Brookings Institution, a member of Delta Kappa Epsilon, Scroll and Key, the Democratic Party and the Episcopal Church. Acheson's current address is 2805 P Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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## II. CONTACTS WITH THE BUREAU

### A. Hatch Act Investigation

In the fall of 1941 the Washington Field Office reported that the name of Mr. Dean G. Acheson appeared in the active indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action and that the name of Mrs. Alice S. Acheson appeared in the indices of the same organization, as well as the indices of the League of Women Shoppers and the Committee to Keep America Out of War.

By way of review, it may be noted that the Washington Committee for Democratic Action was a branch of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties and an outgrowth of part of the membership of the old American League for Peace and Democracy. The Washington Committee for Democratic Action was cited as a subversive Communist front organization by the Attorney General as within the purview of Executive Order 9835. Relative to the Committee to Keep America Out of War, this organization is believed to be identical with the Keep America Out of War Committee, which was a pacifist, socialist group headed by Norman Thomas. It was not considered to be a Communist front organization. The League of Women Shoppers was cited as a Communist controlled front in the report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities on March 29, 1944. (100-7254-118, 101-3396)

This information was furnished to the Attorney General by memorandum dated October 23, 1941, and an investigation was authorized under Public Law 135, 77th Congress.

A detailed check of the photostatic copies of the indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action reflected that the name of Dean Acheson was listed in the Washington Field Office files because of the fact that his wife's name did appear on the indices of that organization. It was therefore apparent that Acheson himself was originally reported as being affiliated with this organization on the above questionable basis.

Inquiry was made during the investigation among Acheson's associates and neighbors and no information was obtained which indicated membership on his part in any of the above-listed subversive groups.

At the conclusion of this investigation Mr. Acheson was interviewed at his office in the State Department on November 25, 1941, by representatives of the Bureau and was questioned concerning his alleged affiliation with the Washington Committee for Democratic Action. At that time he stated that he was not a member of this organization, that he had never participated in its meetings or deliberations, and in so far as he could recall, he had never before heard of the organization.

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\* At the time that Mr. Acheson was being considered for appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the newspaper dispatches on May 17, 1933, reflected that Acheson had at one time represented the Soviet Union in a legal capacity. Mr. Acheson was asked whether he cared to comment on this former situation, to which he replied that the law firm of which he was a member in 1933 had as a matter of fact been retained by the Amtorg Trading Corporation in connection with a tax matter then pending before the Treasury Department. Mr. Acheson stated that he did not personally handle nor participate in this litigation, which was handled in its entirety by another member of the firm.

\* Following the above-described interview with Mr. Acheson, no further inquiry was conducted in this matter. (101-8396)

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B. The [redacted] Case

\* Dean Acheson played a major role in the decision against prosecution of [redacted] the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission Inspector at the Bell Aircraft Corporation, who engaged in espionage in connection with his official duties.

\* On October 25, 1945, the Director attended a conference in the Attorney General's Office at which were present Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, [redacted] head of the Eastern European Affairs of the State Department, and Mr. Bohlen, Russian expert of the State Department, as well as Mr. Theron L. Caudle, then of the Criminal Division. At this meeting the Attorney General advised Under Secretary of State Acheson that the [redacted] Case had reached a point where certain documents were to be passed to [redacted] on the following Saturday night and that an arrest would be made unless the State Department deemed it contrary to policy. Dean Acheson advised that a few weeks previous, in connection with investigations which were being conducted incident to the matter developing in Ottawa, Canada, the President and the Secretary of State at that time held the opinion that no arrests should be made except in order to protect the security of the United States. Mr. Acheson stated that he felt their attitude would be the same in this case. Acheson pointed out that an arrest of [redacted] at that time might aggravate the international situation which was in such a state that Russia had refused to attend a forthcoming meeting on Pacific affairs. It was then agreed by those present that the Bureau should take steps to see that the informants would not deliver any documents to [redacted] and that no arrest would be made. (100-340996-130)

\* On December 17, 1945, the Director transmitted to Dean Acheson a letter referring to the above meeting and furnishing him with the recent developments in the [redacted] matter. The Director pointed out that the

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\* Bureau possessed information that [redacted] and his wife intended to leave the United States for the Soviet Union and requested his immediate opinion with regard to possible prosecutive action against him. By note dated December 18, 1945, the Attorney General advised the Director that the State Department had indicated it would be all right to let the [redacted] leave this country. (100-340996-181, 182)

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C. The Canadian Spy Case

On October 9, 1945, the Director met with Dean Acheson at the State Department to discuss the Soviet espionage case in Canada. At that time the Director advised Acheson that all leads in the United States were being given most careful investigative attention by the FBI and that in the event the Canadian authorities determined to apprehend certain subjects, it would not necessarily follow suit that this country would make arrests. Acheson expressed approval and stated that both the President and [redacted] felt no arrests should be made at that time. With reference to Acheson's request for the identity of the individual in the service of the State Department who was suspected at that time of being a Soviet agent, the Director advised Acheson that Alger Hiss was the suspect. The Director pointed out that he did not feel it was the proper time to make any accusations in this matter in the absence of direct proof of his Soviet connection.

\* On November 27, 1945, the Director met with the Secretary of State to discuss the Canadian Spy Ring case and subjects Gousenko and Bentley in particular. Dean Acheson was present during this discussion in which the Director advised the Secretary of recent developments in the Canadian case and the activities of the Bureau in connection therewith. (61-3499-181, 66-1138-336)

III. ASSOCIATIONS OF INTEREST TO THE BUREAU

\* Under the auspices of the American Civil Liberties Union, a meeting was held in memory of Ricardo Flores Magon, a political prisoner on December 10, 1922, in Washington, D. C. Dean Acheson was listed on the committee endorsing this meeting. Magon died in Leavenworth Penitentiary on November 21, 1922, after having been convicted of obstructing military service, Trading with the Enemy Act, and mailing non-mailable matter, for which he was sentenced on June 22, 1916, to serve a term of twenty years. The purpose of this meeting was indicated to be a demonstration to show that the principles of freedom of speech and conscience should be maintained. The file does not reflect the source of this information. (61-1594-37, 61-190-39)

\* The Secretary of State forwarded a letter to the Bureau dated February 13, 1940, containing a list of persons who had registered with the

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\* Secretary of State under the Registration of Agents of Foreign Principals Act of June 8, 1938. A registration statement abstract reflects that Dean Gooderham Acheson was an attorney for Mr. Vladimír Hurban, Minister of Czechoslovakia, and that the nature of the business Acheson was to transact was in line with an accredited diplomatic representative of a foreign government in the United States. Supplemental registration statements were filed on October 12, 1939, May 8, 1940, and December 8, 1940. Bureau files further reflect that Acheson was withdrawn from this registration list at the time he was appointed to the position of Assistant Secretary of State on January 23, 1941. (97-0-155, 101-3396-10)

\* On June 17, 1940, a pamphlet published by the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies carried Dean Acheson's name as a member of the Washington branch of this organization. It was the purpose of this organization to urge assistance of the United States to the Allies in their fight against Germany. (66-1138-336)

On November 14, 1945, Dean Acheson appeared at the War Freedom Rally in Madison Square Garden, New York City, sponsored by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Incorporated, where he was one of the principal speakers. Among the other speakers were Reverend Hewlett Johnson, known as the "Red Dean" of Canterbury; former Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies; Paul Robeson; and Nicolai Novikov, then Acting Ambassador for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D. C. At this time Acheson presented an historical treatise on American-Soviet Relations since the Russian Revolution in 1917, and closed with a plea for free collaboration between the two countries. ("Daily Worker" for November 4, 1945; 66-1138-336)

IV. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN STATE DEPARTMENT AND ALLEGED PRO-SOVIET VIEWS OF ACHESON

\* During the period from 1941 to 1947 the Bureau received information from many sources, both creditable and unreliable, regarding alleged pro-Soviet sympathy on the part of Dean Acheson, as well as his permitting Communists to infiltrate into the State Department. These allegations were also the subject of much discussion in various newspapers and editorials. Specific examples are set forth as follows:

The "People's World" for August 21, 1943, carried an article by Adam Lapin, in which Lapin discussed an apparent split and conflict in personalities among the officials of the State Department. Lapin stated that Hull, then Secretary of State, leaned first toward one faction and then toward another. He stated that on the "enlightened side" Sumner Welles had allied himself with Dean Acheson. Concerning these two men Lapin stated, "They were not haunted by the specter of Communism." (66-1138-336)

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\* The Washington Times-Herald for March 20, 1946, contained an article captioned "U.S. and Us" by Katchen Smith. The following is quoted from the article: "Three top-ranking State Department officials are among the 'pro-Soviet' employees members of Congress have asked that agency to investigate and oust ... they are Assistant Secretaries Dean Acheson and Spruille Braden and Alger Hiss, Chief of Office of Political Affairs."  
(65-56402-A)

\* On June 3, 1946, George E. Allen, Special Advisor to the President, told Special Agent R. R. Roach of the Bureau's Liaison Section, that he had discussed Acheson and his pro-Soviet views with the President and had the President very well convinced that Acheson should be replaced. Before this could be done, however, he stated it would take some careful maneuvering so as to have Acheson ousted without causing any serious repercussions in the Administration. Speaking specifically of the State Department, Allen said he felt that Alger Hiss, Gustavo Duran and Robert T. Miller, should be dismissed, adding that the trouble lies at the top and with the removal of Acheson there would be a different atmosphere at the State Department.  
(62-48771-8)

\* An article was contained in the July 9, 1946, issue of the Chicago Journal of Commerce by Andrew Avery captioned "Senators, Representatives Active in Red Front Outfits." Under the subheading "State Department Coterie," it is stated that the Senate had given former Secretary of State Byrnes authority to fire anybody he pleases. The following is quoted from the article: "This authority, however, will be used very sparingly if Under Secretary Dean Acheson has his way. Largely responsible for the strength of the Communists in the Department, he has more than undone the good work of former Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle in combatting them. Apparently Acheson has been trying to show his totalitarian liberal friends in the New Republic, the Nation and the university circles that a man can be a Wall Street lawyer and still adhere to their version of liberalism. Cooperating with Freda Kirchwey, editor of the Nation, he has applied prolonged pressure to the Spanish Loyalty Government in Exile to force it to admit Spanish Communists. No wonder the proportion of Communists -- or 'progressives', as he calls them -- in the State Department is even higher than elsewhere in the government." (100-3-2018, page 41)

\* Through a technical surveillance on Alger Hiss, it was ascertained that on January 4, 1947, Francis Russell of the State Department conferred with Alger Hiss regarding the length of stay of Dean Acheson in the State Department. They agreed that it would be a "major disaster" if Acheson should leave at that time. (65-56402-2294, page 43)

On January 19, 1947, in a radio forum "Is Congress Doing its Job" over Stations WINX, Representative Paul W. Shafer (Michigan -R) charged that

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Dean Acheson had not denied that "his former Economic Advisor, Mr. Donald Hiss, left the State Department to become affiliated with the law firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb. Mr. Acheson has not denied that Mr. Donald Hiss is a brother of Mr. Alger Hiss, who resigned from government service because of his affiliations with certain one-world, do-gooder, Communistic, starry-eyed, crackpot, left-wing groups." (66-1731-900, page 219)

\* The Washington Times-Herald for February 15, 1947, contained an article regarding Gerhard Eisler and indicated that the House Un-American Activities Committee would hear testimony of Louis F. Budenz, former editor of the Communist Party "Daily Worker." Budenz is quoted in the article as stating, "David E. Lillenthal, and others of like liberal leanings, are encouraging Communist expansion in this country." The article also states "He (Budenz) classified Under Secretary of State Acheson as another whose appointment 'delighted the Communists'." (100-32520-Sub.A)

\* On March 2, 1947, Mr. R. F. Cartwright of the Bureau met Jan Ciechanoski, former Ambassador from Poland, at a social gathering in Washington, D. C. During this gathering Ciechanoski made certain comments regarding his experiences with the various government officials. Several times during the discussion Ciechanoski indicated his thorough awareness of the left-wing sympathies then existent in the State Department. At one point he mentioned Dean Acheson and he was specifically asked if he thought Acheson was a Communist. Ciechanoski replied that he doubted this very much but felt that many of his immediate assistants were in this category. Mr. Cartwright asked Ciechanoski his concept of the recent instance in which Dean Acheson was criticized by Russia for his description of the Russian Government as expansionist and aggressive. Ciechanoski stated that he felt this was another test case and that the Russians well knew the setup in our State Department as to Acheson and his ideas. (62-87992-1)

\* Tristram Coffin wrote a book "Missouri Compromise" published by Little, Brown and Company on May 5, 1947. This book is very critical of President Truman. Coffin in the book made favorable comments on Acheson who was then Under Secretary of State. In this book much is made of a cocktail party once attended by Acheson. There he was approached by a Midwestern Congressman who asked "When are you going to get rid of the Communists in the State Department?" The Under Secretary is alleged to have replied, "I am not aware of any Communists being in the Department. If by Communists you mean liberals, I shall certainly do all I can to keep them." (62-83503-7)

\* On May 22, 1947, British Intelligence advised they had received information from an unproven source indicating that certain individuals may be Soviet agents in North America. Included was one [redacted] whom British Intelligence stated was alleged to be in contact with Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State. A check of the Bureau files and numerous

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\* inquiries failed to identify this [redacted] The Bureau requested British Intelligence to furnish further data and on October 8, 1947, they advised that upon a recheck they had discounted this information as the original sources were determined to be unreliable. No further inquiries were made in this matter. (65-57683)

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\* The attitude of a number of responsible writers was summed up by Benjamin Stolberg in his analysis of the United States State Department published early in 1947 by the Commission of the National Industrial Conference Board. Stolberg said, "It was Cohen (Benjamin) who got Acheson in as Under Secretary of State. Acheson is the real administrator of the State Department. He reorganized it and is responsible for its personnel. Unlike any former Under Secretary of State, he is totally inexperienced in international diplomacy. He went straight from Harvard Law School, where he was under the influence of Frankfurter, into corporation law, and from there into the Roosevelt administration. The main influence in his life was Justice Brandeis, intellectual father of the New Deal, whose secretary he had been as a young man. Like Cohen, Acheson is neither a Communist nor a fellow traveler but unlike Cohen he is not fussy minded .... he is just a competent opportunist, bright without being very intelligent. And the atmosphere in which he moves causes his opportunism to function chiefly on the left. It is he as administrator who is primarily responsible for the appointment of left-wingers in strategic positions in the Department." (62-39749-828, page 6)

V. THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT ON ATOMIC ENERGY

\* It will be recalled that early in 1946 Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal jointly published the official State Department report on atomic energy. Information in the Bureau files indicates that the report was actually drafted by them with the help of one Herbert Marks of the State Department, and that they were advised by various atomic scientists, chief among whom was J. Robert Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer is, of course, a noted scientist who was the subject of an intensive investigation by the Bureau to determine whether he was engaged in Soviet espionage. Our files reflect that during the course of the preparation of this report Acheson on numerous occasions was in contact with Oppenheimer and spoke very highly of him.

\* It may be significant that the Acheson-Lilienthal report for international control of atomic energy met with the approval of Henry Wallace and the opposition of Bernard Baruch. However, the "Daily Worker" of May 20, 1946, severely criticized the Acheson report on atomic energy for not making technical knowledge available to all members of the United Nations. (100-17828, 100-345079-Sub.A)

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VI. LEAKS OF INFORMATION IN STATE DEPARTMENT

- \* You will recall that there have been numerous instances in the past wherein information of an extremely confidential nature has leaked out of State Department files and has appeared in articles by various columnists for numerous newspapers. It is notable that on a number of occasions it is indicated that Drew Pearson reported the receipt of confidential data by the State Department within a day or two after it was received by high State Department officials. Two instances pertinent to this subject matter are set forth herein.
- \* You will recall that a security survey of the State Department was conducted by the Bureau in 1945. In connection with leaks in the State Department to newspapers and various columnists, the following was noted. On May 20, 1944, Drew Pearson's column related to a plan for the Near East submitted to the President by Major General Patrick J. Hurley. It was the conclusion of the State Department that this leak originated through either Eugene Victor Rostrow or a Mr. Sturm, both of whom were formerly connected with the office of Acheson when he was Assistant Secretary of State. (62-58301-172)
- \* Another check was made in April, 1946, on leaks of information in the State Department at the request of Captain Clifford, Naval Aide to the President. This concerned the leak of confidential information from the State Department to Drew Pearson as indicated by the Pearson broadcast of April 7, 1946. It involved a six-page telegram from the United States Ambassador to Moscow to the Secretary of State regarding General Bedell Smith's interview with Stalin. The leak was not definitely traced, but the following facts were uncovered. Dean Acheson received a copy of this message on the previous day, Saturday, April 6, 1946. He took it home prior to the time the information appeared on Pearson's radio program the next day. During the inquiries conducted, then Secretary of State Byrnes advised that his assistant, Donald Russell, had occasion to talk with Pearson on April 12 and chided Pearson for obtaining and printing such highly confidential material. Pearson was reported to have told Russell that he was aware that the FBI was conducting an investigation of the incident and wished to state that the FBI was on the wrong track, as the information did not emanate from the State Department. It is interesting to note that our investigation was not commenced until the day before this interview between Pearson and Donald Russell and, as a matter of fact, the only interview conducted on the previous day was the interview with Dean Acheson. (62-58301-216)

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VII MISCELLANEOUS DATA

\* Fred Lyon of the State Department furnished a copy of a memorandum to the Bureau which was addressed to Colonel John W. McCormack from Dean Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State, dated October 1, 1945. As you will recall, Colonel McCormack was named as head of the Interim Research and Intelligence Unit of the State Department. This memorandum contained instructions to formulate plans to develop a coordinated foreign intelligence program for all intelligence agencies. Acheson advised McCormack in this memorandum of a letter to the President instructing the Secretary of State "to undertake the lead in developing a comprehensive foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity."

\* With further reference to the world intelligence matter, it was ascertained through a technical surveillance on Thomas Corcoran that on November 18, 1945, Corcoran conversed with [redacted] a close friend of Corcoran, who was then employed in the State Department. In the past Corcoran had referred to [redacted] as "his intelligence". In this conversation [redacted] told Corcoran that "the intelligence thing" at the State Department was getting to be a very, very hot issue. He stated that Dean Acheson and John W. McCormack were lined up on one side and were referred to as the "Frankfurter Axis" against James K. Byrnes and Donald E. Russell on the other side.  
(101-3395-12)

\* In this same connection [redacted] of the State Department confidentially advised Special Agent R. R. Roach on November 26, 1945, that certain individuals in the State Department were opposed to the continuance of the Bureau's SIS program. Included among these was Under Secretary Acheson.  
(62-76274-170)

\* The Chicago "Daily Tribune" for October 11, 1948, contained an article captioned "Bare Acheson's Aid to Molotov Kin in Red Probe Induced House Group To Keep Facts Secret". The following is quoted from this article:

\* "Under Secretary of State Acheson prevailed upon the House Un-American Activities Committee to keep secret its questioning of a brother-in-law of Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov during a recent probe of Communist activities in the United States. The witness was Sam Carp, a Russian born Connecticut filling station owner, who skyrocketed to handling billions when Molotov came into power in Russia in the '30s..... Acheson, a protege of Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, has been accused of following the Moscow line since he came into office in August..... Acheson also has placed known leftists in key State Department posts."

(100-5193-A)

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\* An article in the Washington "Times Herald" for February 21, 1948, written by Jakob Walter, related that Representative Shafer of Michigan had charged that Acheson was one of several "former New Dealers" who had supported big foreign loan programs and were now representing foreign governments in obtaining loans from the Export-Import Bank. Other members of Acheson's law firm included in these allegations were Edward B. Burling and John G. Laylin. Bureau files reflect that as of April 1, 1948, Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb were the legal representatives in this country for Denmark, Greece and Iran. (100-32520-A)

#### VIII ACHESON'S POLITICAL VIEWS

\* By way of summary it may be stated that there are numerous allegations in the Bureau files regarding Acheson's alleged pro-Soviet sympathies and political views during the time that he entered the State Department in January, 1941 until 1946. These political views have, of course, been rehashed on numerous occasions by various newspapers, editorial writers and radio commentators.

\* A review of our files also reflects that Acheson's alleged pro-Soviet sympathies were first affected by the realities of the international situation as indicated in a speech made in May, 1946, as reflected in the "Washington Post" of May 18, 1946. This article is captioned "Dean Acheson Says U. S. Opposed to Reds Here And in Japan". There is quoted from this article the following:

\* "The State Department has openly asserted its disfavor of Communism in the United States and Japan. An informal statement of Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a news conference focused attention on an issue which diplomatic authorities consider a major irritant in American-Russian relations."

\* This article states that Acheson said the State Department supports the policy that the United States wants Communism neither in America nor Japan. (62-39749-A)

\* Again in a speech delivered on June 15, 1947, just two weeks before his retirement from the State Department, Acheson accused the Soviet Union of exploiting, disorganizing and isolating eastern Europe. In blunt language Acheson charged Russia with fomenting trouble in Europe, the middle East and the Orient, and he called on the United States to continue to expose "the fronts behind which people are deprived of their liberty by little groups supported by a foreign power." (64-211-304-A N.Y.M. 6-16-47)

\* As to Dean Acheson's current political views as expounded by Dean Acheson himself, an excellent summary is contained in the January 14, 1949 issue of the "Washington Post". This article covered Acheson's testimony

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\* At a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was considering his confirmation as Secretary of State. This article stated that Dean Acheson hit back at his detractors for suggesting that he might conduct a weak or appeasing foreign policy as Secretary of State. Acheson is quoted as making the following remark:

\* "I think I know something of the need in American foreign policy for steadiness and continuity. The things that I have read about myself as an appeaser seem to me so incredible that I cannot believe that even disinterested malevolence could think them up."

\* In addition to the above, the following items are taken from this newspaper article and are set forth under various headings since they are pertinent to many of the allegations contained on previous pages of instant memorandum.

#### Association With Alger Hiss

\* According to the article, when Senator Connally asked Acheson about his reported close association with Alger Hiss, Acheson replied:

\* "I have waited a long time for an opportunity to answer this question. As a preliminary matter I should like to state to the Committee that my friendship is not easily given and it is not easily withdrawn. In this instance Donald Hiss was my assistant in the years when I was Assistant Secretary of State. He served me and served his country with complete fidelity and loyalty. He and I became, and we remain, close and intimate friends. He is now my partner with everything that that relationship implies. Alger Hiss was an officer of the Department of State during most of the time that I served there. During this time he and I became friends and we remain friends."

#### Communists in State Department

\* According to the article, Acheson was asked whether he would give Assistant Secretary John E. Peurifoy, in charge of State Department administrative matters, the same "free hand" that Secretary Marshall did in weeding out possible subversive employees. Acheson answered that Peurifoy had been his own executive assistant and his own choice as Assistant Secretary. The article stated that Senator Connally asked Acheson "You don't want and haven't wanted any disloyal aides in the State Department?" Acheson's answer was "Of course not."



### General Foreign Policy Views

\* According to the article, toward the end of the examination of Acheson, Senator Vandenberg referred to "the rather universal debate on our policies toward Russia" and asked whether Acheson could make a general statement of his attitude. The article stated that Acheson was careful to keep his reply general although he said that he would be glad to be more specific at a closed hearing. The following is quoted from the article:

\* "Reminding the Committee that a man is the product of his past, Acheson said that he had re-examined about 100 speeches and statements on foreign policy he had made since 1939 and read a few excerpts for the record. One was a speech at Yale in November, 1939, urging preparedness against aggression and help to the free countries resisting totalitarian aggression. Another was a speech in New York in June, 1940, warning that irresolution in foreign policy would be fatal for the United States.

\* "Still another was the much-debated speech at Madison Square Garden in November, 1945, under the auspices of the Council for Soviet-American Friendship, in which he criticized Soviet attacks on the liberties of neighboring peoples. This speech, he said, was written in the State Department, approved by Secretary Byrnes and delivered on department orders.

\* "Finally, he read his statement of February 10, 1947, that Soviet foreign policy was 'an aggressive and expanding one' - a remark that brought a formal protest from Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov." ("Washington Post 1-14-49)

\* The "Washington Post" for January 15, 1949, reflected that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously on January 14, 1949, to approve Acheson's appointment as Secretary of State. The article reflects that the Committee had questioned Acheson at a closed hearing and two sentences of his testimony were made public as follows:

\* "It is my view that Communism as a doctrine is economically fatal to a free society and to human rights and fundamental freedom. Communism as an aggressive factor in world conquest is fatal to independent governments and free peoples."

### IX PRIOR DISSIMINATION OF INFORMATION REGARDING ACHESON

\* Our files reflect the following instances in which information appearing in the Bureau files has been disseminated to individuals outside the Bureau.

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- \* (1). On October 23, 1941, a memorandum was directed to the Attorney General reflecting information in Bureau files at that time which resulted in the opening of the Hatch Act investigation. (101-3396-1)
- \* (2). On February 26, 1946, a summary memorandum was prepared for the Director regarding Acheson and there is a notation contained thereon to the effect that the Director orally advised the Attorney General of the substance of this memorandum as reflected on an attached note. (101-3396-12)
- \* (3). On August 5, 1946, a brief summary reflecting the activities and background of Acheson was transmitted to George E. Allen who was then Director of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at which time Acheson was being regarded as a possible appointee to the Atomic Energy Commission. This was made available to Mr. Allen for the information of the President, as well as himself. (101-3396-14)
- \* (4). On January 12, 1949, Attorney General Clark called and stated that he had had lunch with Senator Vandenberg who inquired if the Department had any derogatory information on Dean Acheson. Pursuant to the Attorney General's request we transmitted to him on January 13, 1949, copies of Hatch Act reports on Acheson, as well as a summary of the same information which was furnished to George E. Allen on August 5, 1946. (101-3396-18)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director  
FROM : D. M. Ladd  
SUBJECT: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

DATE: March 29, 1950

Tolson  
Ladd  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

PURPOSE:

To advise you (1) of receipt by the Bureau of a loyalty form for Secretary of State Acheson and previous investigation and dissemination of information concerning him, and (2) to recommend the transmittal at this time of a summary memorandum to the Attorney General concerning Mrs. Acheson, together with a request for advice as to what action is desired by the Attorney General with respect to disposition of the loyalty form.

BACKGROUND:

Standard Form 88, Request for Report of Loyalty Data on Applicants and Appointees, dated March 6, 1950 was received by the Bureau on March 21, 1950 regarding Secretary of State Acheson.

An investigation of Mr. Acheson under provisions of the Hatch Act was conducted in 1941 with approval of the then Attorney General, Francois Biddle. This investigation followed receipt of information that the names of Mr. and Mrs. Acheson appeared in the indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action. The investigation established that Mr. Acheson's name did not in fact so appear, but the name of Mrs. Acheson did appear in the indices.

Upon being interviewed on November 25, 1941 in connection with this investigation Mr. Acheson declared he was not a member of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action, had never participated in its meetings or deliberations, and insofar as he could recall had never before heard of the organization. This information was furnished to the Attorney General by memorandum dated November 26, 1941.

Under date of February 26, 1946 I furnished you a detailed summary of information in the Bureau's files concerning Mr. Acheson. The original of this memorandum is attached hereto, showing you advised the Attorney General orally of the substance thereof as indicated.

Thereafter, by letter dated August 5, 1946 a summary prepared under date of August 2, 1946 reflecting the background and activities of Mr. Acheson was forwarded to Director George E. Allen of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The letter of transmittal made reference to press statements mentioning

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Attachment

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*Stanley*  
*Karpavich*

*AB*

Mr. Acheson as a possible appointee to the proposed Atomic Energy Committee and expressed the thought that the President and Mr. Allen would be interested in the information.

On January 12, 1949, Attorney General Clark called and stated Senator Vardenberg had inquired whether the Department had any derogatory information on Mr. Acheson. Pursuant to the Attorney General's request we transmitted to him on January 13, 1949, copies of the Hatch Act reports as well as a summary of the same information which was furnished to George E. Allen on August 5, 1946. Mr. Acheson became Secretary of State on January 21, 1949. The Bureau has, of course, received considerable information of a public nature concerning Mr. Acheson subsequent to the Hatch Act investigation, such as the recent statements attributed to him in connection with the Alger Hiss case and various allegations resulting from Senator McCarthy's charges regarding employees of the State Department. The attached memorandum to the Attorney General refers to the fact that statements of Mr. Acheson regarding Hiss have been reported in the press and on the radio.

In response to a request from ONI and with your approval a copy of the summary on Mr. Acheson dated August 2, 1946, was given by hand to Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Director, ONI, on January 25, 1949.

STATUS:

No action taken as yet with respect to Mr. Acheson's loyalty form.

RECOMMENDATION:

That in view of Mr. Acheson's position and with your approval the attached memorandum be forwarded to the Attorney General, furnishing him a summary on Mr. Acheson and requesting advice as to disposition to be made of the loyalty form.

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NAME (last, first, middle) <b>ACHEBON, Dean Gooderham</b>		SERIAL NUMBER <b>4 50 36091</b>	
BIRTH DATE <b>4-11-93</b>	PLACE <b>Middletown, Conn.</b>	IMMEDIATE <input type="checkbox"/>	REGULAR <input type="checkbox"/>
ADDRESS <b>2805 P St., N.W., Wash., D.C.</b>		R CH & IN <b>xxxx</b>	
STATES OF RESIDENCE <b>D.C. Md.</b>		SYMBOL	STATE
APPLICATION PAPERS RECEIVED FROM: <b>Wash., D.C.</b>		POSITION	<b>Secty. of State</b>
DATE RECEIVED R.I.D. OF ORIGIN: <b>3-16-50</b>		TYPE OF APPT. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EMP	
POINTS OF INVESTIGATION <b>completed</b>	ASSIGNED TO <b>7-24-50</b>	DATE DICTATED	DATE REC'D REGION OF ORIGIN
<p><i>FBI xxxxx investigation - November 1947 - immediately Capt. [unclear] sent from farm etc. advised to Bureau. [unclear] returned with [unclear] to refer to Farm B. which was sent. e.s.c. 4-7-52</i></p>			
RECORD CHECKS: FP-FBI-REF-MI-HOUSE		NATURE OF FINAL ACTION: <b>5-Luc</b>	
DATE OF FINAL ACTION:			
CSC FORM 3746 APRIL 1948			

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FROM : The Attorney General  
SUBJECT: Dean Gooderham Acheson, Secretary of State  
Loyalty of Government Employees

DATE: April 5, 1950

*Handwritten initials: J.H.G.*

*Handwritten circled 'M'*

Mr. Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Clegg	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Glavin	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Tracy	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Harbo	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Miss Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

With reference to your memorandum of March 30, I would approve your returning Mr. Acheson's file to the Civil Service Commission indicating "No Disloyal Data, FBI Files."

*Handwritten signature: Rappaport*

*Handwritten note: Form 702  
Per Atty General  
4-7-50*

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*Handwritten initials and stamps*

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR  
FROM : MR. D. M. LADD  
SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

DATE: February 27, 1951

Tolson  
Ladd  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

PURPOSE

To inform you of the results of an interview with Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb who on February 20, 1951, at a Lions Club meeting referred to Acheson as the Number One Communist in the country.

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BACKGROUND

The Baltimore Office by teletype dated February 21, 1951, advised that on that date [redacted] a reliable contact of the Baltimore Office had confidentially advised that Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb, USA Retired, spoke before a Lions Club meeting in Baltimore on February 20, 1951, during which he referred to Acheson as the Number One Communist in the country. He was alleged to have remarked that he had documentary proof to back up his charges. According to [redacted] General Bibb stated he had offered his services as a witness before the Senate Committee during the hearings concerning the qualifications of Acheson but his services were declined.

On February 27, 1951, Brigadier Eugene S. Bibb, Retired, was interviewed by the Baltimore Office at which time he stated that he has no documentary material reflecting Communist affiliation on the part of Acheson. He explained that material used in his talks has been obtained from publications and other writings of public record.

When questioned concerning his statement that he had documentary proof of Acheson's affiliation with the Communist Party he stated he intended to point out that any reasonable person reading public material could reach the same conclusion that he did. He related an incident that occurred at General Douglas MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo in 1946. Bibb stated that upon his return from Seoul he personally confronted Acheson in General MacArthur's Headquarters at which time he accused Acheson of being a Communist. Bibb said Acheson made no reply

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to his accusation. Bibb bases his belief that Acheson is a Communist on the continuous course of action pursued by Acheson in his official capacity as a State Department official.

Bibb considers himself a crusader against Communism and he advised he intended to make a series of some sixteen talks before groups along the Eastern seaboard. He stated that he desires no publicity or personal glory but merely wishes to inform the public of the facts concerning Communism as he sees them. His next scheduled talk is at 8:30 P.M. on March 10, 1951, before the Minute Women of America in Baltimore at the Enoch Pratt Library. He furnished the Baltimore Office a copy of a nineteen page paper he has prepared for use in his speeches entitled, "China," in which he purports to analyze the Chinese situation. The Baltimore Office will furnish a copy of this paper to the Bureau. The Baltimore Office is also making available a verbatim transcription of Bibb's speech before the Lions Club meeting in Baltimore on February 20, 1951.

The Baltimore Office advised that Donald Surine of Senator McCarthy's Staff has an appointment to interview General Bibb on the night of February 27, 1951.

ACTION

None. This is for your information.

There is attached for your information a summary of information contained in Bureau files concerning Eugene S. Bibb. There is attached a suggested letter to the Attorney General.

Attachment

121 - 22405 5



EUGENE SHARP BIBB - Summary  
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

BACKGROUND:

A Dun and Bradstreet report dated September 26, 1940, reflects that Eugene Sharp Bibb was then 47 years of age and was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He is a graduate of the University of Minnesota in both college and law courses, class of 1909 and 1912 respectively. He went to New York City around 1920 where he began to practise law. Prior to that time he had served in the United States Army during World War I. In 1940 he was said to be a Colonel in the Reserves. In 1940 he resided at 145 West 55th Street, New York City. (65-33434-211)

CONNECTION WITH ESPIONAGE - G CASE ON SIMON EMIL KOEDEL;  
MARIE HEDWIG KOEDEL, et al.:

John R. Walters was interviewed in July 1944 by FBI Agents, at which time he advised that around January 1940, Marie Koedel showed him a page upon which were typed about 12 questions concerning shipping information which she indicated the German espionage system wanted answered. Walters had this paper in his possession for a period of about one day during which time he showed the paper to Colonel Eugene S. Bibb, the attorney to whom he first related information in 1940 concerning his suspicions of the activities of Marie and Simon Koedel. Walters related that Colonel Bibb had assisted him in making up information which Walters gave to Marie Koedel. This information which Colonel Bibb and Walters compiled, most of which was false or of no value, was responsive to the questions on the sheet of paper which Marie Koedel had given to Walters. It was determined that as of 1942, Colonel Eugene S. Bibb was on active duty in the United States Army. (65-20365-70, page 4,5,31)

Lieutenant Colonel Eugene S. Bibb was interviewed by the Seattle Office in 1944, at which time he stated that as a practising attorney, he had been retained in 1939 by John Walters to handle some patent work. During the interview, he stated that Walters had shown him a list of espionage instructions which had been given to him by Marie Koedel. He related that

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

R.H. EGAN:nb (ew)

1221-224055-55

ENCLOSURE

Handwritten initials and signatures, including "R.H. EGAN" and a large signature.

he subsequently met Marie Koedel who was interested in securing a parole for her brother who was then serving a sentence at the Auburn Penitentiary, Auburn, New York. He advised that Marie Koedel had discussed with him her activities concerning the gathering of information vital to the national defense of the United States. At that time, Lieutenant Colonel Bibb stated that he was willing to testify in this matter. (65-20365-188)

On February 5, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene S. Bibb was interviewed by the New York Office at which time he furnished similar information concerning his relations with John Walters and Marie Koedel. Lieutenant Colonel Bibb was a witness in this case. On March 1, 1945, Simon Koedel was sentenced to fifteen years and Marie Koedel to 7½ years in prison by the Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York.

(65-20365-239)

INTEREST IN ALGER HISS CASE:

The Department made available a letter dated June 6, 1949, written by Eugene S. Bibb, Counselor at Law, 60 East 42nd Street, New York, to Tom Clark, then the Attorney General, with a copy to Harry Truman. This letter reads as follows:

"Many of my friends at my instance have written you for weeks past, as have I, demanding that you force this foul Jew Hiss to trial.

"Now you caused him to be brought to trial. And it becomes more and more apparent to many of us skilled and disciplined lawyers who have practiced law with honor and success, that which you dare not allege about yourself, that you and the pressure group whom you serve, not the least among whom is that lewd Roosevelt woman and her cohorts Acheson and Dulles, all communists and/or socialists or both, have long planned that if sufficient public demand forced you to trial you would cause this trial to be 'thrown.' That is an expression with which you are doubtless very familiar.

121 - 22405 5

"Better not, little man! Powerful influences watch this case. Your future depends upon an honest portrayal of the stinking influences which have pervaded your mis-deal government for all too long.

"I am honestly sorry for those of your ilk. You come shortly to the end of the gravy train track. Then what can you do?"

(74-1393-3611)

721 - 22405 5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO  
SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
LGE

DATE: February 20, 1951

AMSD

Rebulet February 14, 1951.

Senate Joint Resolution Number 2 introduced by Senator JACK B. TENNEY before California State Legislature January 15, 1951, referred to Committee on Rules that date. Resolution still in Committee when Legislature recessed January 23, 1951, and no further action can be taken until Legislature reconvenes March 12, 1951.

This Resolution will be closely followed and Bureau kept advised as to developments.

121-0-955  
PJM:NFB 121 - 224 05 3

RECORDED - 58 / 121-22405-1

FEB 21 1951

156 APR 9 1951

*[Handwritten signature]*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION 579

FEB 21 1951 237

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	.....
Mr. Ladd	.....
Mr. Clegg	.....
Mr. Glavin	.....
Mr. Nichols	.....
Mr. Rosen	.....
Mr. Tracy	.....
Mr. Harbo	.....
Mr. Mohr	.....
Mr. Nease	.....
Miss Gandy	.....

RELAY TO WFO

WA AND WFO 9 FROM BA 2-21-51 5-42 PM

DIRECTOR AND SAC WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE URGENT

DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, INFORMATION CONCERNING. FEB TWENTYONE, FIFTYONE, [REDACTED] A RELIABLE CONTACT OF THIS OFFICE, [REDACTED] CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED

THAT ONE BRIGADIER GENERAL EUGENE S. BIBB, USA RETIRED, SPOKE BEFORE A LIONS CLUB MEETING IN BALTIMORE ON FEB TWENTY, FIFTYONE, DURING WHICH SPEECH HE REFERRED TO SECRETARY ACHESON AS THE NUMBER ONE COMMUNIST IN THE COUNTRY. HE IS FURTHER ALLEGED TO HAVE REMARKED THAT HE HAD DOCUMENTARY PROOF TO BACK UP HIS CHARGES. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] GENERAL BIBB STATED THAT HE HAD OFFERED HIS SERVICES AS A WITNESS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE DURING THE HEARINGS CONCERNING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF SECRETARY ACHESON, HOWEVER, HIS SERVICES WERE DECLINED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHICH WILL BE FURNISHED

TO BUREAU BY SEPERATE LETTER. IDENTITY AND LOCATION OF BIBB WILL ALSO BE DISCREETLY ASCERTAINED IN THIS REGARD.

CARSON

END

HOLD PLS

*memo to Director*  
*attachment*  
*2/27/51*  
**RECORDED**  
**INDEXED**  
58/21-22405-7  
APR 2 1951  
221 RHF  
22405 ?

66 APR 9 1951 COPIES WFO

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 27 1951

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Ladd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Clegg	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Glavin	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Rosen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Tracy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Harbo	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Mohr	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Miss Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

WA 3 FROM BALTIMORE 2-27-51 10-30 AM  
DIRECTOR PERSONAL ATTENTION, INSPECTOR A. H. BELMONT

MR. STANTON  
URGENT

DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, INFORMATION CONCERNING. REMYTEL  
FEB TWENTY, FIFTYONE, SAME CAPTION. THROUGH COOPERATION OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO

IS A RELIABLE CONTACT OF THIS OFFICE, IT WAS ASCERTAINED THAT  
BRIGADIER GENERAL EUGENE S. BIBB, US ARMY RETIRED, SPOKE BEFORE  
LIONS CLUB MEETING IN BALTIMORE FEB TWENTY, FIFTYONE. BIBB STATED  
AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT HE CONFRONTED DEAN ACHESON IN GENERAL  
MAC ARTHUR-S HEADQUARTERS IN TOKYO, NINETEEN FORTYFIVE, AND  
ACCUSED DEAN ACHESON OF BEING NUMBER ONE COMMUNIST, FURTHER STATING  
THAT HE COULD PROVE HIS CHARGES. ACCORDING TO GENERAL BIBB,  
ACHESON MADE NO REPLY TO HIS ACCUSATION. BIBB ALSO SAID THAT HE  
VOLUNTEERED HIS SERVICES BEFORE SENATE HEARING COMMITTEE RE ACHESON-S  
QUALIFICATIONS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AND OFFERED TO FURNISH  
SUFFICIENT MATERIAL TO CONVICT ACHESON AS NUMBER ONE COMMUNIST.  
HOWEVER, HE READ LETTER FROM SENATE COMMITTEE WHICH STATED  
END OF PAGE ONE

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APR 2 1951  
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APR 9 1951  
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PAGE TWO

HIS SERVICES WERE NOT REQUIRED. IT HAS BEEN DISCREETLY ASCERTAINED  
THAT GENERAL BIBB IS PRESENTLY RESIDING WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BALTIMORE, MD. THE BALTIMORE  
INDICES NEGATIVE TO EUGENE S. BIBB OR [REDACTED] BALTIMORE HAS

APPOINTMENT TO INTERVIEW GENERAL BIBB TWO PM TODAY RE HIS  
ALLEGATIONS. WILL SUTEL TODAY RESULTS OF SUCH INTERVIEW.

CARSON

END

BA R 3 WA RD

DSC

21 - 22405 8

RECEIVED  
JULY 18 1951  
RECEIVED

cc - Belmont

b6  
b7c

RECORDED

121-22415-9

cc - Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Egan

The Attorney General

February 27, 1951

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

DEAR ACHESON  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

M

This is to advise that information was received that one Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb, USA Retired, spoke before a Lions Club meeting in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 20, 1951, during which he referred to Acheson as the Number One Communist in the country. He was alleged to have remarked that he had documentary proof to back up his charges. Information was also received that General Bibb has stated that he had offered his services as a witness before the Senate Committee during the hearings concerning the qualifications of Acheson but his services were declined. \* (See page 4)

Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb, Retired, was located and interviewed on February 27, 1951, at which time he stated that he has no documentary material reflecting any Communist affiliations on the part of Acheson. He explained that material used in his talks has been obtained from publications and other writings of public record.

When questioned concerning his statement that he had documentary proof of Acheson's affiliation with the Communist Party he stated he intended to point out that any reasonable person reading public material could reach the same conclusion that he did. He related an incident that occurred at General Douglas MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo in 1946. General Bibb related that upon his return from Seoul he personally confronted Acheson in General MacArthur's Headquarters at which time he accused Acheson of being a Communist. Bibb said Acheson made no reply to his accusation. Bibb bases his belief that Acheson is a Communist on the continuous course of action pursued by Acheson in his official capacity as a State Department official.

Bibb considers himself a crusader against Communism and has advised he intends to make a series of some sixteen talks before groups along the Eastern seaboard. He stated that he desires my publicity for personal glory.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

121-22405-9

MAILED 7  
FEB 27 1951  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "E B", "W", "A.E.S.", and "PH".



1951

but merely wishes to inform the public of the facts concerning Communism as he sees them. His next scheduled talk is at 8:30 P. M. on March 10, 1951, before the Minute Women of America in Baltimore at the Epoch Pratt Library.

Information has also been received that Donald Surine of Senator McCarthy's Staff has an appointment to interview General Bibb on the night of February 27, 1951.

\*\* (See page 4)

Your Department made available a letter dated June 6, 1949, written by Eugene S. Bibb, Counselor at Law, 60 East 42nd Street, New York, to Tom Clark, then the Attorney General, with a copy to the Honorable Harry Truman. This letter reads as follows:

"Many of my friends at my instance have written you for weeks past, as have I, demanding that you force this foul Jew Hess to trial.

"Now you caused him to be brought to trial. And it becomes more and more apparent to many of us skilled and disciplined lawyers who have practiced law with honor and success, that which you dare not allege about yourself, that you and the pressure group whom you serve, not the least among whom is that lawd Roosevelt woman and her cohorts Acheson and Dulles, all communists and/or socialists or both, have long planned that if sufficient public demand forced you to trial you would cause this trial to be 'thrown.' That is an expression with which you are doubtless very familiar.

"Better not, little naph! Powerful influences watch this case. Your future depends upon an honest portrayal of the stinking influences which have pervaded your mis-deal government for all too long.

121 - 22405 9 17

"I am honestly sorry for those of your ilk.  
You came shortly to the end of the gravy  
train track. Then what can you do?"  
\*\*\* (See page 4)  
The above is being furnished for your information  
and you will be advised of any further developments in this  
matter.

F21 -22405 9

NOTES ON YELLOW ONLY:

\* Baltimore Office a reliable contact of the [redacted]  
captioned "Dean Acheson, Secretary of State - Information Concerning." tsi dated February 21, 1951,

\*\* Teletype from Baltimore dated February 27, 1951,  
captioned "Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, Information Concerning."

\*\*\* (74-1899-3611)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 27 1951

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Ladd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Clegg	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Glavin	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Rosen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Tracy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Egan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Mohr	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Nease	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Miss Gandy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

WA 12 FROM BA 27 5-58 PM  
DIRECTOR URGENT

PERSONAL ATTENTION INSPECTOR A. H. BELMONT  
 DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, INFO. CONCERNING.  
 BRIGADIER GENERAL EUGENE S. BIBB, RETIRED, INTERVIEWED THIS DATE RE  
 HIS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SECY ACHESON MADE AT LUNCHEON OF LIONS CLUB,  
 BALTIMORE, FEB. TWENTY LAST. BIBB NOW STATES THAT HE HAS NO DOCUMENTARY  
 MATERIAL OF ANY KIND REFLECTING ANY COMMUNIST AFFILIATION ON THE PART  
 OF ACHESON. HE EXPLAINED THAT MATERIAL USED IN HIS TALKS SINCE  
 RETIREMENT FROM THE ARMY HAS BEEN OBTAINED SOLELY FROM PUBLICATIONS,  
 PAMPHLETS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF PUBLIC RECORD. HE FURTHER STATED HE  
 HAD NO PAPERS OR MATERIAL OF A CLASSIFIED NATURE AND HAD NO ACCESS TO  
 ANY SUCH MATERIAL. BIBB WAS QUESTIONED CONCERNING HIS STATEMENT THAT  
 HE HAD DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF ACHESONS AFFILIATION WITH CP AND HE STATED  
 THAT HE INTENDED TO POINT OUT THAT ANY REASONABLE PERSON READING  
 PUBLIC DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL COULD REACH THE SAME CONCLUSION THAT HE  
 DID. HE STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO INFER THAT HE  
 HAD ANY SECRET PROOF THAT ACHESON HAS EVER BEEN AFFILIATED WITH THE CP.  
 BIBB RELATED AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED AT GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHURS  
 HEADQUARTERS IN TOKYO IN EARLY NINETEEN FORTYSIX. BIBB STATED THAT

NO BELMONT

END PAGE ONE

121 - 22405 9

RECORDED - 58

INDEXED - 58

1121-22405-9  
APR 3 1951

25

PAGE TWO

UPON HIS RETURN FROM SEOUL HE PERSONALLY CONFRONTED ACHESON IN  
MACARTHURS HEADQUARTERS AT WHICH TIME HE DIRECTLY ACCUSED ACHESON OF  
BEING A COMMUNIST. ACCORDING TO BIBBS STATEMENT ACHESON MADE NO REPLY  
TO HIS ACCUSATION. BIBB BASES HIS BELIEF THAT ACHESON IS A COMMUNIST  
ON THE CONTINUOUS COURSE OF ACTION PURSUED BY ACHESON IN HIS OFFICIAL  
CAPACITY AS AN OFFICIAL OF THE STATE DEPT. DURING THE COURSE OF THE  
INTERVIEW, IT WAS ASCERTAINED THAT BIBB CONSIDERS HIMSELF A CRUSADER  
AGAINST COMMUNISM AND HE ADVISED THAT HE INTENDED MAKING A SERIES OF  
SOME SIXTEEN TALKS BEFORE GROUPS ALONG THE EASTERN SEABOARD. HE FURTHER  
STATES THAT HE DESIRES NO PUBLICITY OR PERSONAL GLORY BUT MERELY  
WISHES TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF THE FACTS CONCERNING COMMUNISM AS HE  
SEES THEM. HE FURTHER CLAIMS THAT HE DOES NOT DESIRE TO PROFIT FROM  
HIS RANK AS A RETIRED ARMY GENERAL AND WISHES TO BE HEARD MERELY AS  
A PRIVATE CITIZEN. BIBBS NEXT SCHEDULED TALK IS AT EIGHT THIRTY PM ON  
MARCH TEN BEFORE THE MINUTE WOMEN OF AMERICAN IN BALTIMORE AT THE  
ENOCH PRATT LIBRARY. HE FURNISHED A COPY OF A NINETEEN PAGE PAPER HE  
HAS PREPARED FOR USE IN HIS SPEECHES ENTITLED QUOTE CHINA UNQUOTE IN  
END PAGE TWO

121 - 22405 9

all be  
worst

also more and  
trouble.

The Secretary of State, Gen.  
Marshall, then had prepared, and  
with the approval of the President,

participation of... troops could effect a remedy. No  
battle has been lost since...  
arrival due to lack of ammunition

As the last note of this tragic  
story, I should like to read you

ing the Wage Stabilization Board.  
He suggested that any changes  
should wait on experience in the

Windsor in London  
LONDON, June 4 (AP). — The  
Duke of Windsor, in portly hat

PAGE THREE

WHICH HE PURPORTS TO ANALYZE THE CHINESE SITUATION. A COPY OF THIS PAPER WILL BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU. COMPLETE RECORDING OF BIBBS SPEECH FEB. TWENTY BEFORE THE LIONS CLUB, BALTIMORE, HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM RADIO STATION WFBR. STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPTION OF ABOVE RECORDING PRESENTLY BEING MADE AND SAME WILL BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU. IT HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED THAT FORMER FBI AGENT DONALD SURINE OF SENATOR MCCARTHYS STAFF HAS AN APPOINTMENT TO INTERVIEW GENERAL BIBB TONIGHT. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, BUREAU WILL BE FURNISHED WITH DETAILED RESULT OF INTERVIEW WITH BIBB BY BALTIMORE AGENTS TODAY. NO ACTION RE THIS MATTER PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED BY BALTIMORE UACB.

CARSON

END

AAD PLS

WA BA R QW 12 WA HK

121 - 22405 9 4

*cc: Mr. Ly and  
Mr. Logan*

SAC, San Francisco

February 14, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL  
SPECIAL DELIVERY

DEAN ACHESON  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
LGE

RECORDED - 63

121-22405-10

Reurlet February 6, 1951, furnishing two copies of Senate Joint Resolution No. 2 "relative to the impeachment of Secretary of State Dean Acheson."

You are instructed to attempt to ascertain through reliable contacts or through public source material the action taken by the California State Legislature concerning this resolution and advise the Bureau at once.

RHE:jag:js

121-22405-10

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
FBI  
RECEIVED-HVIF ROOM

FEB 12 3 58 PM '51

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_

COMM - FBI  
FEB 15 1951  
MAILED 18

66 APR 18 1951

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR  
FBI  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
FEB 14 6 25 PM '51  
RECEIVED  
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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
FEB 14 6 03 PM '51

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
RECEIVED - RECORDS SECTION  
FEB 14 4 00 PM '51

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI - AMSD  
FROM : SAC, San Francisco  
SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON, STATE  
LGE

DATE: 2-6-51

*Handwritten signature*

ReButel February 6, 1951 requesting two copies of Resolution sponsored by Senator TENNEY to impeach ACHESON.

There are enclosed herewith for the Bureau two copies of Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, "Relative to the impeachment of Secretary of State Dean Acheson," in accordance with the Bureau's request.

A copy of the above resolution is also being furnished herewith to the Los Angeles and San Diego Divisions for their information.

HMK:emb  
Enclosures 2  
cc San Diego (with encl.)  
Los Angeles (with encl.)

2) ENCL

*Handwritten notes:*  
with line.  
RECORDED - 63  
EX-1237  
KHF/rob

1-121-22405-10  
FEB 9 1951 - 22405 10

*Handwritten initials*



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

0-9a

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to: FEBRUARY 6, 1951 URGENT

121-22405-11

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

DEAN ACHESON, STATE, LGE. ARTICLE RECENTLY APPEARED IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER REFLECTING THAT TENNEY HAS SPONSORED RESOLUTION TO IMPEACH ACHESON. ARTICLE POINTED OUT THAT COMPLETE TEXT OF TENNEY'S RESOLUTION COULD BE OBTAINED AT SACRAMENTO. IMMEDIATELY FURNISH TWO COPIES OF RESOLUTION TO BUREAU. VIA AMSD.

RECORDED - 63

IV-123

HOOVER

RHE:dba

*No action  
Exp. was  
Herby*

121 - 22405 IT

FEB 6 2 05 PM '51  
RECEIVED READING ROOM  
FBI  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 6 1951

TELETYPE

66 APR 19 1951

Per





# KNICKERBOCKER

## Observes

**EXCLUSIVELY YOURS:** Perhaps there'll soon be an American citizen who can claim to be a direct descendant of King Solomon and Queen Sheba. It is the brand new granddaughter of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia who was born the other day in the American Hospital in Paris. Because of this the new little Princess, who is the daughter of the Ethiopian Crown Prince and Princess Medfariaeh, may later claim American citizenship and have a good chance to obtain it.



Cholly Knickerbocker

The Duchess of Windsor, Mrs. Angier Biddle Duke and James Donahue surprised Colony restaurant diners the other night when they arrived with a little string orchestra of their own. The trio sat in the back of the room and listened all evening to the music...

Gloria Swanson, who is five-foot-one with heels, received the other day an award as "the outstanding little woman of the year." The poll was conducted by fashion stylist Murray Sices who calls himself the champion of the little women. Other names prominent in the poll were Perle Mesta, Helen Hayes, Bette Davis, the Duchess of Windsor and Assistant Secretary of Defense Anna

Rosenberg. Incidentally did you know that the average American woman is slightly above five-foot-three?

Some UN members are very superstitious and do not like the idea of moving to the new building on the East River Drive. They remember the unhappy fate of the League of Nations which folded after moving to the Palais des Nations and are afraid the same thing will happen if they leave Lake Success.

There is talk that Blevins Davis, who became a millionaire when his enormously wealthy wife died, wants to produce a play starring his good friend Margaret Truman.

Sarah Churchill Beauchamps, who flew to Europe to be with her father, Winston Churchill, will be back here today to rejoin husband Tony Beauchamps. Despite all you hear, the

Continued on Next Page



Tea for three. Mrs. Juliette in a gown certain to draw raves from audience, chats with Mrs. Nat Mrs. Alfred de Liagre Jr. Sta



POCK GOLD

Short cut to all points south, out with double-dip pockets—in light fleece, just the ticket to see fast palmy days and nights. In yellow (news right now) or coral, pink. Sizes 10 to 16. Sorry, no mail order.

Coats, Second Floor

BERGDO G



Young-Trends

Henri Bendel

10 WEST 57  
NEW YORK 19 NY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

APRIL 10, 1951

DEFERRED

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, LOB. ADVISE IF CALIFORNIA STATE  
LEGISLATURE HAS ACTED ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NUMBER TWO "RELATIVE  
TO THE IMPACHMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON."

*was  
act.*

HOOVER

RHR:jk *jk*

G.I.R.-1

721 - 22405 12

*ark*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 11 1951

TELETYPE

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SENT VIA

6 APR 25 1951

Per \_\_\_\_\_

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
APR 20 1951  
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Gurnea.....
Mr. Harbo.....
Mr. Mohr.....
Mr. Pennington.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

G.I.R. 1

WASHINGTON FROM SFRAN S20  
DIRECTOR

4-20-51 4-34 PM RN  
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DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, LGE. RMYLET FEB. TWENTY AND BUTEL APRIL ELEVEN. SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NUMBER TWO RELATIVE TO IMPEACHMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON WAS HEARD BY SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE AT SACRAMENTO IN EVENING SESSION, APRIL NINETEEN, INSTANT, AND SHELVED BY THAT COMMITTEE. CONTACT IN STATE LEGISLATURE ADVISES THIS ACTION KILLED THE RESOLUTION AS FAR AS COMMITTEE CONCERNED, AND NO FURTHER ACTION CAN BE TAKEN UNLESS MEASURE AGAIN INTRODUCED.

HOLD  
62 MAY 5 1951

KIMBALL  
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EX-67

5  
APR 28 1951  
25

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *ok*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *W 10*

SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
Secretary of State  
LGE

DATE: April 26, 1951 *VI*

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ladd	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clegg	<input type="checkbox"/>
Glavin	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Harbo	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tracy	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Belmont	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

*G.I.R. 3 ch-1*

PURPOSE:

To advise you that a resolution introduced on January 15, 1951, by California State Senator, Jack Tenney, "relative to the impeachment of Secretary of State, Doan Acheson" has been "killed" by the California State Legislature.

BACKGROUND:

You will recall from my memorandum of February 12, 1951, that the San Francisco Office had made available two copies of Senate Joint Resolution #2 which had been introduced in the California State Legislature by State Senator Tenney calling for the impeachment of Dean Acheson. At that time, one copy of this resolution was sent to the Attorney General.

The San Francisco Office has now advised that this resolution relative to the impeachment of Secretary of State, Acheson, was heard by the Senate Rules Committee, California State Legislature, at Sacramento, California, in evening session, April 19, 1951, and shelved by that Committee. The San Francisco Office reported that a contact in the State Legislature had advised that this action killed the resolution as far as that Committee was concerned and no further action could be taken unless the measure was introduced again.

*121 - 22405 14*

ACTION:

1. This is for your information.
2. It is recommended that this information be furnished to the Attorney General and a suggested letter to the Attorney General is attached.

RECORDED - 121-22405-14  
APR 28 1951

RHE:dba

Attachment

MAY 4 1951

*EX-85*

*old*

*R*

## Acheson Describes Events Leading to Nationalist Defeat

(Continued From Page A-3.)

their guns on the ground and march to the coast at once, those areas would have been occupied by the Communists, and the Nationalist government forces would never have gotten in there without fighting.

**Marines Guarded Seaports.**  
Therefore the task was to have the Japanese evacuate the areas which they held at the time when the Government forces could be moved and were moved by us into those areas. That was the task to perform.

In order to do that we landed 50,000 Marines in China. The function of these Marines was to occupy the principal seaports, to guard the principal rail lines close to those seaports, and later to take over the areas along the eastern coast where coal was produced and the lines along which the coal came to the principal consuming centers. That was to allow the industrial life of China to continue, and those coal areas and the coal railroads were being constantly raided by the Communists.

At the same time our armed forces airlifted Chinese armies, whole armies, from South China into the areas to be evacuated, and which were being evacuated by the Japanese. Now that was a tremendous undertaking, most skillfully carried out, and it was that undertaking which permitted the Chinese government to really get back into areas of China which it would have had the utmost difficulty in even getting into without that colossal effort.

By the end of '46 we had received 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand under 3 million, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people.

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1943, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties, and both the government authorities, the Chinese government authorities and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

**Peace Was Major Objective.**

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the government forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying North China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became non-existent; and the possibility of really settling any reforms in South China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished. So the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese government.

It was in that situation that Gen. Marshall was asked by the President to go to China at the end of 1945.

## Story of Marshall's Instructions Told

At the outset I will go into a matter of detail which really is quite out of place in the broad picture which I am trying to paint for you here; but since it has been talked about a great deal, I think it is important to clear it up, and there is the preparation of the instructions which were issued to

changed from the agreements of December 8.

The President then had a meeting with Gen. Marshall, at which I was present—there were three of us at that meeting, the President, Gen. Marshall and myself—and at that point the signed letter and the inclosures were handed to Gen. Marshall.

It was ascertained by the President at that meeting that these papers were unanimously approved and agreeable to all concerned, and to himself.

Now that is the account of the preparation of these instructions. All the papers concerned are printed in the white book, with one exception. The press release, which I mentioned a moment ago, which was given out on the 18th of December—everything in the press release was in Gen. Marshall's instructions. In other words, the press release was a verbatim statement of what was in the instructions to Gen. Marshall, except that certain paragraphs in the instructions were omitted from the press release.

**One Omission Explained.**  
One of those omissions had to do with what is printed in the white paper and in the memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War. That was the discretion and authority given to Gen. Marshall in not moving Nationalist government troops into areas in which there was fighting until he thought that that was a wise thing to do. That was not to be stated and released because obviously it wouldn't work if it were.

Another omission, two other omissions had to do with things which we would do if the Chinese government asked us to do it. Obviously you do not print in the newspapers that you will do something if somebody else asks you to. You leave it to the other person to ask you to do that if they wish.

Gen. Marshall arrived in China at the very end of December, 1945. By February, 1946, three major agreements had been reached between the Chinese government and the Communists. These agreements grew out of the earlier agreements of October 11, 1945, which discussed the general principles for working out peacefully the differences between the Communists and the government. The agreements of January and February, 1946, carried into considerable detail how this should be done. In regard to these three agreements which I shall describe, Gen. Marshall had a part only in one, and that was in the first one.

## Marshall Played Prominent Role

The first agreement was for the cessation of hostilities. It provided that all fighting should cease, and it provided for the setting up of an executive headquarters in which there would be American chairmanship and Nationalist and Communist representation, the purpose of this executive headquarters being to bring the fighting to an end, and these tripartite teams were set up which went to every area where there was any clashing between the troops, and together they brought the fighting to an end and tried to have that peace develop into a more substantial truce.

Gen. Marshall played a very considerable part in working this out. The executive headquarters which set up and worked very well until the two parties fell apart—then nothing worked.

The second agreement was an agreement for governmental reorganization and for a constitutional government, and the third agreement was for a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into the national government.

The second agreement for working out a constitutional government recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the national government. It provided that there was to be an interim state council, sort of

legislative, judicial and executive, in which all parts of China would be represented, so that this country would have a government extending over all of the area.

The third agreement had to do with the amalgamation of the forces, and that was the most important one. It provided that there should be a great reduction in forces on both sides because China could not support the tremendous military establishments which existed on the Nationalist side and on the Communist side together.

**Army Set at 60 Divisions.**  
The army was to consist of 60 divisions. Of those 60 divisions, 50 were to be Nationalist government divisions and 10 were to be Communist divisions. These divisions were to be grouped together in armies, armies which would contain three divisions or whatever the Chinese military order of battle is. There would be several divisions in each army.

The divisions were to be stationed in certain numerical strengths in various parts of China.

The important thing here about the agreement, as we look back on it, was that so far as Manchuria was concerned, the agreement provided that in Manchuria there should be 13 divisions of the new government's troops. Of those 13 divisions, 14 should be national government divisions and one should be a Communist division. . . . If that could have been carried out, the whole situation might have been very different.

## Comparative Peace Deteriorated in '46

In 1946 the situation of comparative peace which had been brought about as a result of the agreements in the early part of the year began to deteriorate. Fighting broke out in various places.

Gen. Marshall, in trying to stop this fighting, through the executive headquarters, got drawn into greater detail in some of the political negotiations between the two parties, because this fighting rapidly took on political aspects.

Therefore, the whole discussions between the Communists and the Nationalists in the attempt to work out the interim government, and the long-term constitutional government, got into more and more confusion and trouble.

The result of the breakdown was that the situation developed into one of very considerable fighting by the end of 1946, and when Gen. Marshall left China in 1947, the American effort to mediate in this struggle between the Government and the Communists ended.

Gen. Marshall issued a long statement. . . . It sums up very clearly his understanding of the difficulties which brought failure to his mission, and his understanding of the difficulties in the Chinese government, which could not really permit it to function unless they were removed.

**Liberals Suffered Most.**  
These difficulties, in some respects, had their roots in the fact that the liberal elements in the Kuomintang Party were the ones who were dealt with much more severely by the war and the inflation and the war tend to eliminate the middle class and that is where the liberal elements came into the Kuomintang, and as the inflation and the war went forward, the power in the party shifted more to the extreme right wing, and Gen. Marshall, in his farewell message, spoke of the importance of more liberal leadership in the Kuomintang Party itself.

Until the end of '46 and the early part of '47, the gains, the military gains made by the Nationalist government appeared to be impressive, but in fact they were not, and Gen. Marshall repeatedly pointed out to the government that what it was doing was over-extending itself militarily and politically, since it neither had sufficient troops to

the side of the enemy without firing a shot, or sufficient of them so do that those who want to fight can't fight. . . .

At the end of '46 the government had 2.6 million men under arms and the Communists had about 1.1 million of regulars.

However, in firepower, in rifle firepower, the government still enjoyed a superiority of three or four to one over the Communists.

In '46, when this fighting started, Gen. Marshall was actively engaged. He called on both sides to stop the fighting. Both professed to want to do it, but did not do it.

Therefore, Gen. Marshall and for and obtained from this Government an embargo on the export of combat materials into China. That embargo lasted from the time it was imposed in '46, the exact date I do not have with me . . . until May 1947. During that time the Nationalists were winning the battles, they won the fights they had, they occupied the cities, but they immobilized themselves. . . .

## Wedemeyer Saw Peril in Civil War

After Gen. Marshall returned in the summer of 1947, the President, on the recommendation of Gen. Marshall, sent Gen. Wedemeyer to China on a fact-finding mission. Gen. Wedemeyer, before he left, stressed again, as he had in 1945, the great importance and the necessity for reform. . . .

Gen. Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the White Paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require Congressional authorization. Although his actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

However, Gen. Wedemeyer recognized the desirability and importance of avoiding direct United States involvement in the civil war in China by stating:

"Although the advice indicated above—that a technical military service—does provide advice directly to tactical force, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare."

The Secretary of State, Gen. Marshall, then had prepared, with the approval of the President, to send to Congress a recommendation for aid to China. He made before the Foreign Relations Committee a very frank statement of the problems facing the United States Government in considering aid to China.

**Marshall Also Gave Warning.**  
He said it clear that there were steps which had to be taken and could only be taken by the Chinese government, which were essential to meet the Communist threat.

And, he took the position strongly, that the United States Government had to be extremely careful that it did not commit itself to a policy involving the expenditure of its resources to an unpredictable extent by assuming a direct responsibility for the civil war in China, and for the Chinese economy.

He also pointed out that we must be prepared to face the possibility that the Chinese government might not be able to maintain itself against the Chinese Communist forces. . . .

Now the program of aid which Gen. Marshall presented was a program of \$370 million in economic assistance over a 18-month period. He pointed out that the experience gained by assuming a direct responsibility for the civil war in China, and for the Chinese economy.

The program was sufficient in size, it was thought, to free the major portion of the Chinese government's own foreign exchange assets for the purchase of such military supplies, from foreign sources as it might need.

considered by the 80th Congress. The Senate bill provided that I should not go over by the United States a whole long story—the time from 15 months to 12 months. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended \$122 million for economic aid and \$125 million as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese government.

The debate indicates that the Chinese government would probably use this \$125 million for military aid. In the course of the legislative history, the House put in a provision authorizing military advice on the so-called Greek model, that is having officers with troops in combat areas and strategic advice. That was stricken out by the Senate, and in speaking about it Senator Vandenberg said:

"At in the case of Greece and Turkey, your committee recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available at China's option. Your committee believes that as a matter of elementary prudence this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist government."

And, as I say, the House provision was stricken out.

**Fall of Tsinan  
Started Collapse**  
I said that the bill authorized \$338 million for economic aid. However, when it came to the appropriation process, Congress only appropriated \$275 million for military aid and \$125 million for economic aid. That was actually made available by the Congress of \$400 million as against \$570 million requested. . . . The real collapse of the government in a military way began in the latter part of 1948. The first large-scale defection and collapse occurred in September, 1948, with the fall of Tsinan, where government forces without any effort at all went over to the other side and surrendered with all their material. . . .

In mid-November, 1948, Gen. Barr, who was the head of the military mission to China, reported to the Department of the Army. . . .

"I am convinced that the military situation has deteriorated to the point where only the active participation of United States troops could effect a remedy. No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debt, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors which led to a complete loss of the will to fight."

In another report early in 1949, he explained some of the causes for the National government defeat. He says:

"The government committed its first politico-military blunder by concentrating on the purely military reoccupation of former Japanese-held areas. It failed to realize the realization of the regional administrations. Its strategy was burdened by an unsound strategy conceived by a politically influenced and militarily inept high command."

**Family Ties Hindered Regime.**  
Throughout the structure and machinery of the National Government there are interlocking ties of interest, family, financial and political. No Chinese, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority because he is the best qualified man. He must have other backing. In too many cases, the loyalty of the Generalissimo and his army comrades, which kept them in posts of responsibility, regardless of their qualifications. The direct result has been the unsound strategy and faulty tactics of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists. . . .

By the end of 1948 the struggle North China had virtually

dollar value. I should not go over by the United States a whole long story—the time from 15 months to 12 months. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended \$122 million for economic aid and \$125 million as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese government.

Second, in the Japanese troops. Third, in the North China areas and main lines of the government way lines. Fourth, in the United States group.

Apart from the States Government from VJ-day authorized about \$1.6 billion of which \$1 billion were on this total is equally between domestic aid. The United States property, except where on credit to surplus proper estimated proceeds over a billion of sold to China for allocation to the \$230 million, of which were on credit to the position of the Government collapse where the Chinese controlled the military population, and Manchuria, south of the military Chinese government most part, been of inept political leadership, and a to fight on the rather than used supplies.

It was at the considered judgment of United States Government in China that economic and military operations when the extensive government operations of the Nationalist to maintain a few China.

U. S. interests. It was believed States involvement in civil war under its conditions would be a serious interference to American interests. I should like to state the message of the President of China, Gen. Chiang, who had decided China during the war he had discussed after the war as I told you. He said:

"This policy of assistance was some years ago under instructions of myself took up the mediation in our Chinese Communist devoted painstaking this work was rendered fruitless sincerely on the then governing Chinese Communist Government. It is spite of this continued to extend its government. If, then going to the then government, delicious use of this a about appropriate economic and military assistance has not desired effect. To attribute the present in which our self."

Gen. Partridge.  
On Chest, Leave

TOKYO

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### Story of Marshall's Instructions Told

At the outset I will go into a matter of detail which really is quite out of place in the broad picture which I am trying to paint for you here; but since it has been talked about a great deal, I think it is important to clear it up, and there is the preparation of the instructions which were issued to Gen. Marshall...

At the end of November, 1945, Secretary Byrnes and Gen. Marshall met. This was after Gen. Marshall had been asked to go to China.

Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. Gen. Marshall did not approve of it.

Gen. Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with Gen. Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

On the 8th of December, Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to Gen. Marshall—that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by Gen. Marshall.

Gen. Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945 by Secretary Byrnes, Gen. Marshall, Mr. Caster Vincent, Gen. Hull and myself. I was then Undersecretary of State.

Marshall Approved Plans. Those of us went over the instructions. Gen. Marshall approved the suggestions made by Secretary Byrnes, and we then had a completely agreed draft.

In the course of that meeting the outline of a letter from the President to Gen. Marshall was discussed and directions were given for its preparation.

There was also approved at the meeting a memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War, requesting certain help in connection with the removal of the Japanese and the movement of Chinese armies into the north and laying down certain restrictions on these movements...

They were taken up by Secretary Byrnes with the President, who went over them; and they were put in final shape, un-

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**MEXSANA** A MEDICATED POWDER

Gen. Marshall played a very considerable part in working this out. The executive headquarters which set up and worked very well until the two parties fell apart—then nothing worked.

The second agreement was an agreement for governmental reorganization and for a constitutional government, and the third agreement was for a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into the national government...

The second agreement for working out a constitutional government recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the national government. It provided that there was to be an interim state council, sort of a provisional government, which would govern until the new constitution was established and elections were held throughout China and a constitutional government was set up in which all the people of China would have their representatives and which would function on a two-party or multiparty system.

Kuomintang Got Majority. The interim state council was to function in this interim period as the supreme organ of the state. The Kuomintang Party was given 20 of the 49 seats in this national council. The other 29 seats were distributed among the Communists and the other parties and to some non-party people. It was provided that... Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of China, should select all the members of the council, that is, he would select those from his own party and those from all the other parties. However, he would have to appoint a certain number from these other minority parties. That would leave him with 20 people whom he had selected from his own party, with 20 people whom he had selected from the other parties, including the Communists, and it would also leave him with a veto over any action of this council which could only be overridden by a three-fifths vote, which could not be done if his own party stayed with him.

Now, that, I say, was the temporary government. That was to continue until the constitution was to be agreed upon on May 4th, through the National Assembly, May 4th, 1946, and it was hoped that at an early date, some time in '46 or '47, I believe it was, there could be an election, and they would then set up a regular constitutional government with

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...Until the end of '46 and the early part of '47, the gains, the military gains made by the Nationalist government appeared to be impressive, but in fact they were not, and Gen. Marshall repeatedly pointed out to the government that what it was doing was over-extending itself militarily and politically, since it neither had sufficient troops to garrison this whole area nor did it have sufficient administrators to administer the areas that it was taking over.

...Therefore what it was doing by this military advance was weakening itself both militarily and through administrative ineptitude, because it didn't have the necessary administrators; it was not giving the people of the occupied areas what they had been led to expect when the Nationalist government came in, so politically it was doing itself harm, and militarily it was doing itself harm.

...Gen. Barr points out it was during this period that what he calls the war psychology took possession of the Chinese Nationalist army. He had pointed out over and over again that in modern warfare the most disastrous of all things to do is to retreat into a city behind walls and take a defensive position. Modern warfare must be a war of maneuver.

...Foreed Into Defensive. Therefore, time and time and time again these Nationalist lines got pushed forward, finally, the troops at the end take up defensive positions behind some kind of walls, a long line of communication has to be guarded, which eventually is out, and over and over again the troops at the end of the line either go over to

...Military Advisers on Hand. There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1945, and in 1946 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

...Therefore we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas. This recommendation was con-

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...The program was sufficient in size, it was thought, to free the major portion of the Chinese government's own foreign exchange assets for the purchase of such military supplies, from foreign sources, as it might need. It was not recommended that we should have military advisers in combat areas.

...It was not recommended that we should take measures of military aid which would lead to United States military intervention in China, or direct involvement in the civil war.

...Now, this question was very carefully considered in the Executive Branch, at a meeting in June, 1946, attended by Secretary Marshall, Secretary of the Army, Royal Gen. Bradley and Gen. Wedemeyer, and the decision which I have just spoken of was taken.

...Military Advisers on Hand. There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1945, and in 1946 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

...Therefore we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas. This recommendation was con-

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...Family Ties Hindered Regime. Throughout the structure and machinery of the National Government there are interlocking ties of interests, family, financial and political. No Chinese, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority because he is the best qualified man. He must have other backers. In too many cases, such backing was the support and loyalty of the Generalissimo and his army comrades, which kept them in posts of responsibility regardless of their qualifications.

...The direct result has been the unsound strategy and faulty tactics of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists. By the end of 1945 the struggle in North China had virtually ended with the complete collapse of the Nationalist armies. Eighty per cent of all the materiel which we had furnished, both during the war and after, to the National Government, that is estimated to have been captured by the Communists.

...One reason for this large capture of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists, Secretary of the Army, Royal Gen. Bradley and Gen. Wedemeyer, and the decision which I have just spoken of was taken.

...Now, at the very end of my remarks here, I briefly sum up some of the things, material and otherwise, which the United States did in aid of its policy in China. Speaking, first, of things on which it is impossible to put a

...Military Advisers on Hand. There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1945, and in 1946 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

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ammunition, military debn, can all world's worst any of other factors that as of the will early in 1949 of the cause- government de- committed it- y blunder by purely mili- former Japa- regional area. C efficient local strategy was- und strategy re- ally influ- inpt high C- ed Regime, structure and- ational Gov- erlocking ties- financial and- e, no matter- de for a posi- use he is the- He must have- many cases, id- support and- alisimo and- which kept- on- sibility re- ualifications, as been the- I faulty fac- i in their- onists." . . . the struggle- dete collapse- nies. Eighty- steel which- he during the- he National- and 75 per- ed to have- Communists- G- e large cap- t out, when- Chinese Na- to never de- terial, when- t under of- e seemed- c- destroy any- ip- e of my re- m up some- and other- I States did- P- China. "h- things on m- e to put a li-


more and a trouble. The breakdown was developed into a series of fighting and when Gen. Marshall came to the United States in 1947 . . . the Government- Communist ended. issued a long- sums up very- standing of the- brought failure- and his under- stances in the- nt, which could- it to function- moved. And, he took the position- strongly, that the United States- Government had to be extremely- careful that it did not commit- itself to a policy involving the- absorption of its resources to an- unpredictable extent by assuming- a direct responsibility for the civil- war in China, and for the Chinese- economy. He also pointed out that we- must be prepared to face the- possibility that the Chinese gov- ernment might not be able to- maintain itself against the Chi- nese Communist forces. . . . Now the program of aid which- Gen. Marshall presented was a- program of \$570 million in eco- nomic assistance over a 18-month- period. He pointed out that the- experience gained in the program- would throw light on the possi- bilities of future programs. The program was sufficient in- size, it was thought, to free the- major portion of the Chinese gov- ernment's own foreign exchange- assets for the purchase of such- military supplies, from foreign- sources, as it might need. It was not recommended that- we should have military advisers- in combat areas. It was not recommended that- we should take measures of mili- tary aid which would lead to- United States military interven- tion in China, or direct involv- ment in the civil war. Now, this question was very- carefully considered in the Exec- utive Branch, at a meeting in- June, 1948, attended by Secre- tary of the Army, Gen. Bradley and Gen- eral Marshall, Secretary of the Army- Marshall, Gen. Bradley and Gen- eral Wedemeyer, and the decision- which I have just spoken of was- taken. Military Advisers on Hand. There was already a United- States military advisory group in- China that had been established- in 1946, and in 1947 the com- manding officer of this group had- been authorized to give advice on- a confidential basis to the gener- alissimo, advice of a strategic na- ture, but the United States was- willing to assume responsibility- for the strategic direction of the- war. . . . Therefore we did not take re- sponsibility for the strategic direc- tion of the war, nor did we rec- ommend that American officers- should be with troops in combat- areas. This recommendation was con-

participation of United States- troops could effect a remedy. No- battle has been lost since our- arrival due to lack of ammunition- or equipment. Their military de- feat, in my opinion, can all be- attributed to the world's worst- leadership and many other- morale-destroying factors that- led to a complete loss of the will- to fight. In another report early in 1949, he- explained some of the causes- for the National government de- feat. He says: "The government committed its- first politico-military blunder by- concentrating on the purely mili- tary reoccupation of former Japa- nese-held areas. It gave very lit- tle realization to the regional area- or the creation of efficient local- administrations. Its strategy was- burdened by an unsound strategy- conceived by a politically influ- enced and militarily inept high- command. Family Ties Hindered Regime. Throughout the structure and- machinery of the National govern- ment there are interlocking ties- of interests, family, financial and- political. No Chinese, no matter- how efficient, can hope for a posi- tion of authority because he is the- best qualified man. He must have- other backing. In too many cases- such backing was the support and- loyalty of the Generalissimo and- his army comrades, which kept- them in posts of responsibility re- gardless of their qualifications. The direct result has been the- unsound strategy and faulty lead- ership of the Nationalists in their- fight against the Communists." By the end of 1948 the struggle- in North China had virtually- ended with the complete collapse- of the Nationalist armies. Eighty- per cent of all the materiel which- we had furnished, both during the- war and after, to the National- government, was lost; and 75 per- cent of that is estimated to have- been captured by the Communists. One reason for this large cap- ture, Gen. Barr points out, when- the Nationalist government never de- stroyed any of the materiel, when- they were about to surrender or- run. He says, "The Chinese seemed- inherently unable to destroy any- thing of value." Now, at the very end of my re- marks here, I briefly sum up some- of the things, material and other- wise, which the United States did- in aid of its policy in China. Speaking first of things on- which it is impossible to put a li-

As the last note of this tragic- story, I should like to read you- the message of the Acting Presi- dent of China, General Li Trum- jen. . . . He says: "This policy"- he had described our help to- China during the war, and then- he had discussed our aid to China- after the war as I have described- it to you. He says: "The policy of friendly as- sistance was continued when- some years ago Gen. Marshall- under instructions from your good- self took up the difficult task- of mediation in our conflict with- the Chinese Communists to which- he devoted painstaking effort. All- this work was unfortunately- rendered fruitless by the lack of- sincerity on the part of both- the then government and the- Chinese Communists. "In spite of this your country- continued to extend its aid to our- government. It is regrettable- that owing to the failure of our- then government to make ju- dicious use of this aid and to bring- about appropriate political, eco- nomic and military reforms, your- assistance has not produced the- desired effect. To this failure is- attributable the present predic- ment in which our country finds- itself." Gen. Partridge, New Medal- On Chest, Leaves Tokyo By the Associated Press TOKYO, June 2.—Lt. Gen. Earle K. Partridge, wearing a new- bronze star medal on his chest,- officially relinquished command of- the 8th Air Force in Korea yes- terday. A pooled dispatch from 8th Air- Force headquarters said that after- colorful departure ceremonies, Gen. Partridge left on the first- of a trip which will take him- to a new command in the United- States. The new commander, Maj. Gen. Frank P. Everest, ar- rived in the Far East last week. Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet,- commander of the 8th Army, pinned a second bronze star medal- with the device for heroic achieve- ment on Gen. Partridge's blouse- before he departed. Gen. Van Fleet thanked Gen. Partridge for his help, "which- has done a lot for our soldiers and- maybe has even spotted them a- little."

Windsor in London LONDON, June 4 (AP). — The- Duke of Windsor, in porkpie hat- and tweed topcoat, dropped in- from Paris today to see his folks. He expects to spend a few days- with his mother, Queen Mary, at- Marlborough House. His duchess- did not accompany him. She is- in Paris. ing the Wage Stabilization Board- He suggested that any changes- should wait on experience in the- working of the present act. He- did say, however, that the section- relating to the settlement of in- dustrial disputes might have to be- changed. Asked About Escalator Clause. Senator Capshaw asked when- a formula for escalator clause

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# Partial Text of Acheson's Statement on Policy in China and Defense of

## Secretary Reviews Internal Struggle After Defeat of Japs

Following is a partial text of today's testimony before a joint Senate inquiry into Far Eastern policy.

**Chairman Russell.**—Under motion made and passed at the last sitting of the committee, the Secretary of State was to make a statement to the committee this morning on China policy. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in your own way.

**Secretary Acheson.**—Now gentlemen, I will take advantage of the kindness of the committee in permitting me to make a somewhat extended statement on United States policy in regard to China.

I should like to state at the outset what I am going to try to do, and that is I want to present to the committee the problems which confronted the United States and China in 1945, and in doing that I shall have to give some of its roots in history.

I should like to point out what the times of decision were. There were moments of decision, and I should like to point out those moments. I should like to point out the considerations which were taken under advisement when decisions were made, and I should like to say what the decisions were and how they were made.

One further preliminary observation I think is important, and that is that I cannot in itself insure the survival of a recipient government or the arrival of a people that this Government is trying to help against aggression.

What our aid must do and can do is to supplement the efforts of that recipient government and of that people itself. It cannot be a substitute for those efforts. It can only be an aid and a supplement to them.

**Others Hold Power of Decision.** The United States Government, in aiding another government, does not have power of decision within that country or within that government. That power of decision remains with the government, the people in it. Those are the thoughts I think we should have in mind.

With those preliminary statements, we come to the problem which faced the Chinese and American governments in 1945. The Japanese had been defeated, and the Chinese government was in the extreme southwestern part of China. The task which had to be solved by the Chinese government was, in effect, how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese government exercised throughout that nation.

Now, I do not say recreate a nation; I say, advisedly, create a nation, because for almost an indefinite period in the past there had not been in our sense a nation in the territory which we call China, and I will come to and explain to you why that is so, a nation in the sense of a government in control throughout that area.

Therefore, the question which had to be faced was how to create that nation and how to create the authority of the nation in that area.

**Government Lacked Authority.** The Chinese government that we are talking about—the Nationalist government had not had



**DISCUSSES CHINA**—Secretary of State Acheson outlines the administration's policy in relation to China as he resumes testimony in the investigation into the removal of Gen. MacArthur.

on to the southeast and continuing far south and southeast into the south central and southern part of China was occupied by the Japanese, who had troops along the coast and for considerable areas inland and the government itself was, as I said before, in the extreme southwestern part of China.

Another important fact, which must never be lost sight in our consideration, is that in addition to these facts or to who actually occupied and exercised authority in certain parts of China, all of China was in the grip of a very profound social revolution.

**Social Revolution Gained Strength** The situation was stated in a nutshell by Gen. Wedemeyer in November, 1945, very shortly after V-J day, and I should like to read, not very much, but I should like to read from Gen. Wedemeyer's report in November, 1945.

"Chinese Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can, and probably still, if present activities are a reliable indication, resist and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign of logistical support for the National Government forces, and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there, prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this con-

texture of the population. They all we should clearly recognize were people who had a defined aim is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement was not worked over and over again and very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood face-

to face the Japanese. They discussed what could be done along that line. They also discussed the Communist problem, and the Generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communist were, as he stated it, not people of good faith, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said, "This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means."

He stated that he would not give any help from the United States in attempting that, to be proceeding into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reverted the position which he had taken earlier in which he had proposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdraw his course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military equipment to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria. That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

enough force available to take on the problems which I have already mentioned.

## Three Choices Left Open to America

Now, in that situation the United States Government had three choices open to it.

One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,233,000 Japanese troops in China, 233,000 in Manchuria, and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians—government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another—there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that by throwing its weight to either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and imposed in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military equipment to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreement which were so necessary to enable the Chinese government to re-establish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to set, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been.

Relations Have Long History. The relations between the Nationalist government and the Communists have had a long history in China. . . . Prior to 1927 there was a period of collaboration. From 1927 to 1937 there was a period of war. From 1937 on there was a period of collaboration in which the official attitude of both the government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means, and bestinizing in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in China. This official view was stated by the Generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said, "I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement was not worked over and over again and very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood face-

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the prospects for China were very difficult indeed. They discussed what could be done along that line.

## Chiang Reversed Opinion on Help

Now in the fall 1944 and after these discussions, the President sent another personal representative to China, and that was General Hurley. . . . He went out as the personal representative of the President in order to try and unify this military effort, and there with the consent and approval of his cabinet he undertook to act as mediator between the Yen'an Communist authorities and the Chungking Nationalist authorities, and they had meetings . . . in which they worked out a series of agreements.

Some of these agreements had to do with the conduct of the war, and then some of them went beyond that, and a very important and basic agreement was worked out. . . . It was announced on October 11, 1945, and that was the agreement on the general principles of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalist government. . . . This called for the formation of a National Assembly and for a political consultative conference of all party and non-party leaders.

It called for the inauguration of a constitutional government for all of China; for the formation of a committee of government and Communist representatives to discuss the case of the reduction of all the armed forces in China. Fixed Basis for Marshall Task. Now these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, they established the basis for the efforts which Gen. Marshall later took on. . . .

The problem between the Chinese government and the Communist differed in one important respect from the relations between— from the problems of government, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in their country, because in China the population was not scattered as in Europe. They all we should clearly recognize were people who had a defined aim is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement was not worked over and over again and very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood face-

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He stated that he would not give any help from the United States in attempting that, to be proceeding into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reverted the position which he had taken earlier in which he had proposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdraw his course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military equipment to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreement which were so necessary to enable the Chinese government to re-establish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to set, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been.

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has been refused and I shall not time these as entered into at know whether bomb or not. It until some more had one, and it considerably but It was the the concurred in the reduction of to be brought scale landing Japan, and the fighting, which the Pacific, indeed be a very big battle.

## Soviet Pact Action W

It was of the u that the Russia into the war in time.

Now, there was that they would have done as really wait until and until we no effort and blood and they would what they wanted. It was very in view of the miss the others, too, should come in it none of the 30 troops in Manch if possible, of the these troops in the back to strengthen the main islands that they would be the Russian effort land.

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to face the Japanese. They discussed what could be done along that line. They also discussed the Communist problem, and the Generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communist were, as he stated it, not people of good faith, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said, "This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means."

He stated that he would not give any help from the United States in attempting that, to be proceeding into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reverted the position which he had taken earlier in which he had proposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdraw his course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military equipment to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreement which were so necessary to enable the Chinese government to re-establish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to set, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been.

Relations Have Long History. The relations between the Nationalist government and the Communists have had a long history in China. . . . Prior to 1927 there was a period of collaboration. From 1927 to 1937 there was a period of war. From 1937 on there was a period of collaboration in which the official attitude of both the government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means, and bestinizing in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in China. This official view was stated by the Generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said, "I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

# ment on Policy in China, and Defense of Yalta

enough force available to take on the problems which I have already mentioned.

## Three Choices Left Open to America

Now, in that situation the United States Government had three choices open to it.

One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,233,000 armed Japanese troops in China, exclusive of Manchuria and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians—government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another—there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that throwing its weight to either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and Japan in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China. A result which we could not, of course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

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Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously at arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in-between—from the problems of China. This official view was stated by the generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said: "I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood face to one another and maneuvering against one another.

It was the effort of our Gov-

the prospects for China were very difficult indeed. They discussed what could be done along that line.

They also discussed the Communist problem, and the generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communist were, he stated it, not people of good faith, claimed that they were not Chinese, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said, "This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means."

He stated that he would not send any help from the United States into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

## Chiang Reversed Opinion on Help

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reversed the position which he had taken earlier in which he had opposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdrew his objection to that.

Now in the fall 1944 and after these discussions, the President sent another personal representative to China, and that was General Hurley. . . . He went out as a personal representative of the President in order to try and unify this military effort, and there-with the consent and approval of the Generalissimo and of his cabinet, he undertook to act as mediator between the Yenan Communist authorities and the Chungking Nationalist authorities, and they had meetings. . . . in which they worked out a series of agreements.

Some of these agreements had to do with the conduct of the war, and then some of them went beyond that, and a very important and basic agreement was worked out. . . . It was announced on October 11, 1945, and that was the agreement on the general principles of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. . . . This called for the convening of the National Assembly and for a political consultative conference of all party and non-party leaders.

It called for the inauguration of a constitutional government for all of China for the formation of a committee of government and Communist representatives to discuss the reorganization of the armed forces and the reduction of all the armed forces in China.

Fixed Basis for Marshall Task. Now, these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, and they established the basis for the efforts which Gen. Marshall later took on. . . . The problem between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communists differed in one important respect from the relations in-between—from the problems of governments, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in their country, because in China the Communists were not scattered throughout the population as an element of the population. They were people who had a defined area, with a large population subject to their control, 118 million.

They had a government of their own; they had an army of their own, and, in effect, they had a separate country within China. The task was to put these two things together so that there would be one country and one government. Now, that was what they were working on.

The Yalta agreements were made in the very early part of 1945. Later on, in August of '45, treaties were signed between the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet Union, which grew

has been referred to many times, and I shall make it brief—at the time these agreements were entered into at Yalta, we did not know whether we had an atomic bomb or not. That was not proved until some months later, that we had one, and it was not used until considerably later.

It was the then military opinion, concurred in by every one, that the reduction of Japan would have to be brought about by a large scale landing on the islands of Japan, and the forecast of that fighting, which came from the fighting on the other islands in the Pacific, indicated that it would be a very bloody and terrible battle.

## Soviet Pacific War Action Was Needed

It was of the utmost importance that the Russians should come into the war in the Far East, in time.

Now, there was very little doubt that they would come in, but the grave danger was that they would really wait until the war was over, and until we had expended our effort and blood to win the war, and they would come in and do what they wished.

It was very important, in the view of the military people, and the others, too, present, that they should come in in time, so that none of the 700,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, and none, if possible, of the 1,233,000 Japanese troops in China, would come back to strengthen the troops on the main islands of Japan; but that they would be occupied with the Russian effort on the mainland.

That was the purpose, and in

making the agreements, the price which was paid for the agreements was that three months after the end of European war, the Russians would enter the Far East war; that they should have the southern half of Sakhalin, Kuriles; that their former rights in Port Arthur and Dalren should be returned to them, and their former interest in the two railways in Manchuria. . . .

Russia made its claim for those rights, and the claims were granted at this meeting at Yalta. . . . At this point, Senator Hickenlooper attempted to interrupt and was overruled by Chairman Russell after Secretary Acheson said he wanted to avoid side discussions. . . . Secretary Acheson. . . . One of the other things that I should like to point out about Yalta was that unquestionably the Russians had it in their power not only to take what was conceded to them, but much more, besides.

## Gave Basis for Legal Claim

There was very little likelihood that anybody would have the will, and few people could have the power, to throw them out of any area on the mainland which they might wish to remain, so that this agreement gave them the basis for a legal claim to something considerably less than they might have taken without a legal claim.

I should also like to point out that at the time the Chinese entered into this treaty with the Russians, a few months after Yalta, that is, in August, 1945, they regarded the arrangements which they had made with the Russians on the basis of Yalta, as very satisfactory.

Such statements were expressed by the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and by the Chinese Foreign Minister. In fact, in 1947 the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed grave apprehension that the Soviet Union might cancel the treaty with China of 1945, in which China had conferred these rights to the bases in Port Arthur, the interests in Dalren, and the interest in the railway.

They regarded that as a very valuable treaty because it also carried with it the obligation of the Russians to evacuate Manchuria, to recognize the Chinese Nationalist government, and to aid in the re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. . . . Now these agreements, as I shall point out later on, did have a very important effect and bearing when it came to the question of the reoccupation of Manchuria by the Chinese, because it was on the basis of these agreements that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians agreed to occupation by the National Government's forces. . . .

I have pointed out to you the very great importance of the presence of the Japanese in China, the 1,233,000 troops, 1,700,000 civilians. It was decided very early in the game, between the Chinese government, the Nationalist government, and ourselves, that one of our major efforts must be to get these people out of China and back into Japan.

That wouldn't have been too hard a job to do if they were all just marching on to ships. The great difficulty about it was that these armed soldiers controlled most of the important cities in central China, in southeast China and east China, and also the main lines of communication.

If they had been told to drop

(Continued on Page A-4, Col. 1.)

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That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

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The Soviets in Japanese and the selling against one of a vast area in th Central and

the Communist relations—and at this great problem in thought and ships which was out all China.

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ment, the people in it. Those are the things that we should have in mind.

With those preliminary statements, we come to the problem which faced the Chinese and American governments in 1945.

The Japanese had been defeated. The Chinese government was in the extreme southwestern part of China. The task which had to be solved by the Chinese government was, in effect, how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese government exercised throughout that nation.

Now, I do not say recreate a nation. I say, advisedly, create a nation. It is a task which had to be solved in the past but had not been in our sense a nation in the territory which we call China, and I will come to and explain to you why that is so, a nation in the sense of a government in control throughout that area.

Therefore, the question which had to be faced was how to create that nation and how to create the authority of the nation in that area.

**Government Lacked Authority.**  
The Chinese government that we are talking about—the Nationalist government—had not had authority—indeed, no Chinese government had had authority, by which I mean substantial authority—throughout China since the period of the Manchus.

Here in the picture which confronted everybody at the time I am talking about, The great northern area of China, Manchuria, was occupied by the Soviet Union, with its own armed forces. In the second place, the north central and southeast parts of China were in the control of the Communists and the Japanese.

I say both the Communists and the Japanese because the Japanese held the cities and the major lines of communication; whereas, the surrounding areas were occupied by the Communists. That part of China included what we call North China, swinging down through Central China.

the depth and strength of this social revolution. It grew out of a similar experience in almost all wars, that as the governments concerned have to make tremendous efforts, as in some areas, the controls of government become weakened, and promises are made, people move forward socially, economic ways, at least they move forward in acquiring new social and economic rights; and this was going on in China, in the are-long battle between the peasants and the landlords.

The peasants had made advances and there was a new idea of profound importance. . . . An area containing 118 million people, which was one-fourth of the population of China. The geographical area was 13 per cent of the country we call China, exclusive of Manchuria.

This area included in it some of the most heavily populated areas of China, the area which had most of the railway communications, important industrial developments and important cities. . . . Manchuria, except in a wholly nominal way, and then only for a period of two or three years, part of '23, '29, '30 and part of '31, had never been in any way under the control of the present Nationalist government of China, and, until his death in 1927 or '28, the old marshal had been the war lord of Manchuria and controlled it absolutely.

**Adherence Was Nominal.**  
Upon his death, the young marshal took over his authority, and in 1928 after Chiang Kai-shek had taken Peking and defeated the Communists and the northern lords, the young marshal announced his adherence to the National government. That was a pretty nominal adherence.

It meant that he recognized the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the National government of China, but the administration in Manchuria did not change, and he continued to exercise the authority. . . . In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and set up their puppet state, and all Chinese authority disappeared from Manchuria. I mention this to point out to you that the National government had no roots of any sort in Manchuria. . . .

When we come to North China, we find that in 1927, the struggle between the left wing of the Kuomintang Party, which was established at Hankow, and the right wing of the party under Chiang Kai-shek came to a head. The Chiang Kai-shek forces won, the Russians, Borodin who was then advising the Government, had to flee from China, and in 1928 Chiang Kai-shek moved into Peking and there announced the official unification of China. That was in 1928.

The battle with the Communists which began in 1927 in open warfare continued until '36, and in the period of '34 and '35 the Communists were forced to make their long march from the southeastern portion of China to the northwestern portion of China. There they established themselves in the period '34-'35.

**Japanese Moved North.**  
In the meantime, however, the Japanese who were in Manchuria were moving into North China, and in 1933 the Japanese undertook to set up another puppet state in North China which would comprise the five northern provinces of China and at that time they had sufficient physical control of the area to do that.

I point all of this out to make clear to you that in North China the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's government, which was established in 1928, had been in very large part eliminated by 1935, and instead of his government having power in North China, that was in part controlled

period 1945 and 1946. Now, I do not mean for a moment that important decisions were not made before and after, but that was the first great moment of decision.

**Wedemeyer Report Cited.**  
The situation was stated in a dispatch by Gen. Wedemeyer in November, 1945, very shortly after VJ-day, and I should like to read, not very much, but I should like to read from Gen. Wedemeyer's report in November, 1945.

"Chinese Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can, and probably will, if present activities are a reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign. Logical support for the National Government forces, and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there, prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept."

Now, in short, what Gen. Wedemeyer reported and advised was first of all, that the Generalissimo must consolidate his own position in South China and to do that he must take into consideration this revolution that I have been talking about. And Gen. Wedemeyer stressed then—and you will see over and over again he stresses—the same point, that the reforms in order that the Chinese government might put itself at the head of this great demand for improvement, which was existing in China, and not allow the Communists or anybody else to take that advantage away from them.

In the second place he points out that to establish himself in North China he must come to agreement with the Communists. In the third place he points out the only way to establish himself in Manchuria is through agreement with the Russians. . . . He ends up by saying that the outlook on all of these fronts is dark, and he points out that force is not available to accomplish these efforts, partly because force cannot accomplish some of them, and secondly, because there is not

in which the official attitude of both the government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means; and beginning in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which never were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously at arrangements to bring about a settlement, by negotiation in settlement, by negotiation in settlement. This official view was stated by the generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said—and this is one of many times when he said this from 1937 on—"I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood facing one another and maneuvering against one another.

It was the effort of our Government throughout the war period to try and reach some kind of an arrangement so that these two forces instead of watching one another would both fight the Japanese. If they did that there was a very important contribution to the war. . . . In the spring of 1944 Vice President Wallace went on a mission for President Roosevelt. Among other places he went to China, and there he had talks with the generalissimo, and they talked about two of the great important problems that I have been discussing. One was Manchuria and the other was the Communists. Chiang Wanted U. S. Help. The generalissimo was most anxious to get help of the United States in improving relations, as he stated it, between the United States and the Soviet Union because without that improvement

Communist representatives to discuss the reorganization of the armed and the reduction of all the armed forces in China.

**Filed Basis for Marshall Task.**  
Now, these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, and they established the basis for the efforts which Gen. Marshall later took on. . . .

The problem between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communists differed in one important respect from the relations between—from the problems of governments, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in their country, because in China the Communists were not scattered through the population as an element of the population. They were people who had a defined area, with a large population subject to their control, 118 million. They had a government of their own; they had an army of their own; and, in effect, they had a separate country within China. The task was to put these two things together so that there would be one country and one government. Now, that was what they were working on. . . .

The Yalta agreements were made in the very early part of 1945. Later on, in August of '45, treaties were signed between the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet Union, which grew out of and were based upon these Yalta agreements.

Now, first of all, the Yalta agreements, from the point of view of the wartime effort, and the interest of the United States and its major fighting allies—I think this

**LOST.**

- KILLBUCK, black father in parking lot, Chevy, in 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 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...the official attitude of both the government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means, and beginning in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which never were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously at arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in 1937. This official view was stated by the generalissimo on September 13, 1942, where he said, "I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood facing one another and maneuvering against one another.

It was the effort of our Government throughout the war period to try and reach some kind of an arrangement so that these two forces instead of watching one another would both fight the Japanese. If they did that there was a very important contribution to the war.

In the spring of 1944 Vice President Wallace went on a mission for President Roosevelt. Among other places he went to China, and there he had talks with the generalissimo, and they talked about two of the great important problems that I have been discussing. One was Manchuria and the other was the Communists.

Chiang Wanted U. S. Help. The generalissimo was most anxious to get help of the United States in improving relations, as he stated it, between the United States and the Soviet Union because without that improvement

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Dr.

THE EVENING STAR  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
June 4, 1951

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PARTIAL TEXT OF ACHESON'S STATEMENT ON POLICY IN CHINA  
AND DEFENSE OF YALTA

THE EVENING STAR  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
June 4, 1951

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ACHESON—From Page 1

# Acheson Rebuts 12 Charges

law firm, and the firm got a \$50,000 fee.

The State Department said the "inferences" of this charge were "false" and based upon a "distortion of the public record."

Acheson, the State Department said, severed all connections with his law firm in 1941. The Polish loan negotiations began in 1945 and no member of the firm "approached Secretary Acheson in any way" while the loan was under study. As acting Secretary of State, on instructions of Secretary Byrnes, Acheson approved the loan after it had been "favorably considered" by responsible State Department officials. The loan finally was cut off in 1948 after Poland failed to produce the coal for Western Europe which was one of the goals of the deal, and after the Communists' grip on the country tightened.



Associated Press Wirephoto  
**LIEUT. GOV. KNIGHT**  
Critic of Dean Acheson

**3. CHARGE**—Acheson said July 20 there were no Communists in the State Department and "this statement has since proved to be completely false and untrue."

The State Department replied Acheson said only that he "knew of no Communists" in the State Department. Furthermore the department said a security investigation staff of 100 persons which has operated with the FBI also does not know of any Reds in the department.

**4. CHARGE**—Acheson "has never repudiated his support of Alger-Hiss."

The State Department said Acheson's answers to questions about Hiss, now in prison on a perjury conviction, had been "widely misinterpreted."

"He has never in any way condoned the offense of which Alger Hiss has been found guilty, x x x As far as he is concerned, the decision of the (Supreme) Court disposes of the matter."

**5. CHARGE**—Acheson "recommended the abandonment of Formosa" after the Chinese Nationalist government had fled there.

The State Department said that charge "is entirely false."

**6. CHARGE**—Acheson "joined with friends 'including Owen Lattimore' to encourage a Communist rebellion in China and they referred to the Communists as 'Agrarian reformers.'"

The State Department said that charge "is entirely false."

The State Department reviewed American aid to Chiang Kai-shek from the end of World War II. It said Acheson "has testified he does not remember even ever meeting Owen Lattimore; also that a check of his speeches shows he does not refer to the Chinese Reds as agrarian reformers."

**7. CHARGE**—Acheson acted as counsel to Lauchlin Currie when Currie appeared before a congressional committee looking into Communist espionage charges.

The State Department said Acheson was retained by Currie in connection with a volunteer appearance Currie made before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in August, 1948, to discuss statements made about him by Elizabeth Bentley. The department added: "The committee unanimously observed that no charge of Communist Party affiliation was made against Mr. Currie. . . . It is a fact that since Mr. Currie's testimony no further action has been taken" on the Bentley charges.

**8. CHARGE**—Acheson "told a Senate committee before he was confirmed as Undersecretary of State that Russia should share in the administration of Japan."

The State Department answered that the records showed no such statement by Acheson. It said he had testified in September, 1945, that the United States was trying to "go forward with the job" in Japan and had "no disposition . . . to exclude anybody."

The department added that the fact is the machinery for administration of Japan "completely recognized the major role of the United States."

**9. CHARGE**—Acheson insisted on a veto in UNRRA organization of please Russia and supported all Soviet demands "thus leaving the United States impotent to control UNRRA although the United States put up all the money."

The State Department replied that "this allegation is false." They said there was no veto in UNRRA decision-making except for a few specific matters such as amending the charter and nominating a director general.

**10. CHARGE**—Acheson "obtained appointment of Alger Hiss to Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta."

Asserting that Acheson never recommended Hiss for either of those missions to international conferences, the department said "this statement is false."

**11. CHARGE**—On December 16, 1945, Acheson "received Juan Negrin, head of the Spanish Communists, while he refused at the same time to meet Fernando de Los Rios, head of the anti-Communist group in Spain."

The State Department said Acheson did receive De Los Rios on December 21, and both the opposing Spanish leaders talked to him "in a private capacity."

**12. Charge**—Acheson gave an interview to "Millton Wolff, commander of subversive Abraham Lincoln Brigade and pro-Communist Vito Marcantonio, promising them to intervene with Franco on behalf of two condemned Communists in Spain."

To this the State Department said that Acheson had received a delegation of three House members—Healy of California, Savage of Washington and Marcantonio of New York—and five other persons including Wolff but that he "made no special promises of intervention to the group."

The State Department said Acheson explained that the two men were Argentine and Cuban nationals and any action by the State Department would have to be limited "to expressions of interest on humanitarian grounds."

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# 12 Charges Are Rebutted By Acheson

Secretary of State Acheson has denounced as "either entirely incorrect or distortions of the truth" 12 accusations made against him by Lieut. Gov. Goodwin J. Knight of California.

The criticisms range from his handling of Formosa policy through State Department security questions to the Alger Hiss case.

They were formulated by Knight, a Republican, after he had been challenged by John B. Elliott, Los Angeles civic leader and a Democrat, to back up criticisms of Acheson in a speech Knight made on April 17.

Knight's complaints were sent to the State Department by Elliott with a request that they be answered in detail. Acheson forwarded replies from his staff.

At one point in the exchange the State Department said approximately 90 million dollars in arms and ordnance had been given Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa, and 300 million dollars more was scheduled for this year.

In addition, the department mentioned a "600-man" United States military mission on Formosa "assisting in the reorganization of Chiang's forces."

On June 24, Maj. Gen. William C. Chase, head of the mission, said in Formosa the United States group had 1250 members.

Last night, in answer to a request for clarification, the Defense Department said it has announced that 500 to 600 men may be sent to Formosa—but only half that number, 250 to 300 men, are there now. There was no explanation of the variation.

Here is a summary of the charges and replies, as released by Elliott:

**1. CHARGE**—"On December 23 Acheson sent out instructions to diplomatic and consular personnel in Asia that Formosa was doomed and expendable."  
**REPLY**—"The reply is that what the department sent out was a propaganda directive designed to minimize the unfavorable reaction in case Formosa should fall."

**About Loan to Poland**  
**CHARGE**—"Knight also charged that Acheson had written President Truman that no amount of aid could have saved Chiang, but Acheson said what he wrote was that only 'full-scale intervention' by the United States might have produced a different result in China and such action would have been in support of a government repudiated by its own people."

**2. CHARGE**—"Acheson approved a 90-million-dollar loan to 'Communist Poland' in 1946 against the advice of United States Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane. Counsel in the deal was Donald Hiss, a brother of Alger Hiss and a member of Acheson's staff."  
**REPLY**—"See ACHESON, Page 7, Col. 3"

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*file 12-1 Acheson*

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# DOOMAN LINKS LATTIMORE TO SEC. ACHESON

Says 1945 Policy  
Same as Reds'

BY WILLARD EDWARDS  
State Secretary Acheson in 1945 was under the sway of Owen Lattimore, Far Eastern expert accused of communistic connections, a former high State department official testified yesterday.

Backstage intrigue in the State department, designed to bring about a Communist regime in Japan after its surrender in 1945, was revealed by Eugene K. Dooman, 61, former assistant director of the office of Far Eastern affairs, and a veteran of 33 years in the foreign service.

Dooman was forced to retire in 1945 along with Undersecretary Joseph Grew, former ambassador to Japan, after they fought the pro-Communist clique in the State department, the Senate internal security committee was told.

### Policy Identical 'to Reds'

The witness said American policy towards Japan under Acheson, Lattimore, and John Carter Vincent, a State department official recently cleared of disloyalty charges by the State department, was identical in the post-war period with that advocated by the Communist party. The Communist objective for Japan, he said, was to destroy the emperor, wipe out capitalism, create chaos and reduce the nation to "a future."

The powerful influence of Lattimore, now a Johns Hopkins University professor, in the State department, was revealed by Dooman, under questioning by committee counsel Robert Morris. Dooman said Lattimore opposed Grew because Grew opposed the communistic control of Japan.

When Vincent, then chief of the Far Eastern division, sought to have Lattimore appointed his assistant in 1943, Grew put a stop to it, Dooman testified. But a few months later, both Grew and Dooman were out of public service and their positions taken by Acheson and Vincent. Postwar policies for Japan, initiated by Grew, were quickly reversed to mesh with the Communist pattern by Acheson and Vincent, Dooman said.

### Acheson Quoted Lattimore

"There was a very striking similarity between American policy in Japan and the Russian program for its satellites in Europe," commented Sen. Eastland (D) of Mississippi.

"That's a fair judgment," said Dooman.

Telling of Lattimore's influence over Acheson, then an assistant secretary of State, Dooman described a State department meeting in the spring of 1945 at which Dooman outlined a Japanese policy.

Acheson, Dooman said, then dismissed Dooman's views with a contemptuous remark concerning "penny a dozen Far Eastern experts" and proceeded to quote at great length from Lattimore's book, "Solution in Asia," asserting he followed the Lattimore views.

In May, 1945, Grew instructed Dooman to draw up a paper outlining American post-surrender policies for Japan. When this document, proposing that the Japanese retain a constitutional monarchy if they wished it, was read at a State department meeting, violent objections were raised by Acheson and Archibald MacLelish, an assistant State secretary, Dooman said.

### Lattimore Visits Truman

But the paper was accepted by President Truman, provided the armed forces agreed, Dooman said, and it was then discussed at a secret meeting in the Pentagon building with War Secretary, Stimson, Navy Secretary, Forrestal, Gen. Marshall, and high-ranking military leaders. Stimson and Forrestal approved the document, Dooman said, but

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- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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file  
121-  
Dean Acheson  
5-11-45

- Page
- Times-Herald 1
  - Wash. Post \_\_\_\_\_
  - Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_
  - Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_
  - N.Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_
  - N. Y. Compass \_\_\_\_\_

63 SEP 27 1951

SEP 15 1951  
Date:

Elmer Davis, (now a left-wing commentator) present as the head of the office of war information, "reacted violently." Gen. Marshall then proposed that the paper be pigeon-holed as "premature."

Lattimore then called on President Truman at the White House, Dooman said, and "remonstrated very strongly" against any program permitting the monarchy to remain in Japan. Lattimore protested that "Fascists" in the State department wanted the emperor to remain in Japan, a statement similar to many appearing in the Communist press.

But the Dooman document, the witness said, was later taken to the Potsdam conference by Stimson, was indorsed by Truman, State Secretary Byrnes, and received the telegraphed indorsement of Chiang Kai-shek, and was issued, July 29, 1945, with minor changes, as the Potsdam declaration.

Dooman volunteered the information that a four-paragraph preamble to the declaration had been written by Douglas Fairbanks Jr., the movie star, then working in the psychological warfare branch of the Navy.

121 - 22405 - A

SAC, Denver

REGISTERED MAIL

October 17, 1951

Director, FBI

DEAN ACHESON;  
PHILIP CARYL JESSUP  
Information Concerning  
(Denver file 62-557)

Reference is made to your letter of October 1, 1951, furnishing material which had been made available to your office by Robert Dorner, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Pursuant to your request this material is attached herewith. A photostatic copy of this material has been made at the Bureau.

Enclosure

121-22405 -15

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EX-28  
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Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Mr. Quinn	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

*g/b* FROM : SAC, DENVER

*pc* SUBJECT: DEAN ACHESON  
PHILLIP CARYL JESSUP  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: October 1, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL  
REGISTERED MAIL

On September 26, 1951, ROBERT DONNER, Colorado Springs, Colorado furnished this office with the attached information concerning the captioned individuals. This material is being forwarded to the Bureau for its information and it is desired that the material be returned.

The Bureau has been previously advised that ROBERT DONNER is a wealthy individual residing in Colorado Springs, Colorado, who has in the past been collecting considerable material regarding Communism and Socialism and is violently opposed to Mr. ACHESON and Mr. JESSUP.

JCLGE  
62-557

ATT.  
REGISTERED - RRR

CC: 66-1437

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

*W.A.B.*

*Bureau*

*[Initials]*

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EX-79 ENCL. BEHIND FILE

5 ENCL.

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INDEXED 119

EX-79

121-22405-1  
OCT 6 1951  
19

*[Handwritten signature]*

THIS COPIED COPY FILED IN 121-22405-1

RE: Felix Somary

Norman Chandler Bursler

Reference is made to Hoc. 1619-1520 dated November 20, 1944, a two-part message setting forth information concerning Felix Somary received by the MGB from Nathan Gregory Silbermaster, who had obtained it from Norman Chandler Bursler.

FELIX SOMARY

In December, 1940, information was received from a source of unknown reliability that Dr. Felix Somary, resident of the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., was a close friend of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, head of the German Reichsbank. According to source, during the occupation of Belgium by the Germans in World War I, Somary and Schacht were assigned as financial governors of Belgium. Both have long histories in German banking circles, according to the source. Until a short time previously, it was said, Somary had been head of the Deutsche Bank of Tokyo. Source believed that Somary was posing as a Swiss citizen. It was also believed that Somary was in the United States for the supposed purpose of purchasing grain for Switzerland, which purchases were in fact being made for German interests.

(65-26010-1-1)

Information available at the Treasury Department as of February 4, 1941, was to the effect that Somary was an Austro-Hungarian by birth, Swiss by naturalization, and that Somary had at no time had German nationality. It was believed, however, that Somary had been a functionary in the Civil Administration of Occupied Belgium during World War I, and that he had been, at that time, associated with Dr. Hjalmar

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Schacht,  
65-26010(Somary)  
101-3874(Bursler)  
cc: 121-22405(Acheson)  
65-58068(Souza)  
E.J. VanLoon:mpa  
cc: Brent  
Lamphere

121-22405 18

ENCLOSURE

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red out.

It was reflected that Somary had visited the Treasury Department several times with the Swiss Minister as the latter's financial advisor. It was understood that Somary had been in very close relationship with M. Bachmann, former governor of the National Bank of Switzerland, and that he was, at that time, in equally close relationship with Bachmann's successor, M. Kober. It was reflected that a high official of the United States Government who had been in frequent contact with Somary described Somary as one of the most lucid and objective students of monetary and economic matters that he had ever encountered.

(65-28010-6)

Information from the State Department is that its oldest record concerning Somary goes back to February 25, 1940, when he applied for a visa in Zurich, Switzerland, for the stated purpose of coming to the United States in connection with financial negotiations concerning the import of raw materials into the Austrian Republic. The application of Somary at this time stated that he was born in Vienna, Austria, on November 20, 1891.

In October, 1939, the American Consul at Bern, Switzerland, reported the issuance of a visa to Dr. Felix Somary, bearer of special passport #5577 issued at Bern, Switzerland, on April 6, 1939. This passport reflected that Somary was on a special mission for the Swiss Government and was born November 20, 1891, in Switzerland, not in Austria. Somary was accompanied by his wife, May Somary, bearer of special passport #5847 issued at Bern, Switzerland, October 24, 1939, reflecting that she was born in Switzerland on November 17, 1900. The address of the Somarys in the United States was to be in care of the Swiss Legation, Washington, D. C., and they were to arrive in New York about November 10, 1939.

On March 16, 1940, diplomatic visa #53 was issued to Somary, who then possessed Swiss diplomatic passport #1349 issued by the Federal Political Department, Bern, on March 15, 1940. He was to proceed to the United States on an official mission, embarking at Genoa on March 20, 1940.

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Additional State Department information concerning Somary was that he was a private banker, being a member of the firm Blankert and Company of Zurich. He was also unofficial advisor to Dr. Hermann Obrecht, member of the Federal Council and head of the Department of Public Economy, and to Professor Buchmann, the President of the Swiss National Bank.

It was reflected that Somary's visit to the United States in 1939 was in an unofficial capacity on behalf of the Swiss Government to explore, among other matters, the possibility of purchasing essential materials such as wheat, gasoline, edible oils, and canned vegetables. After visiting officials in the Department of State and elsewhere in Washington, Somary expected to proceed to Canada to look over the wheat situation, and also on private business. During his two visits to the United States, Somary had many conversations with officials of the State Department and other departments of the Government. The records of the State Department contain no indication that his visits were not for the purpose which he claimed and, in fact, it appeared that the Swiss Minister in Washington actively associated himself with the purposes and work of Somary in this country. (65-28010-7)

State Department records reveal information concerning Somary obtained on September 27, 1945, from Dr. Adolf Ernst of the Union Bank of Switzerland, Basel, Switzerland. According to Ernst, Dr. Somary was born somewhere in Galicia and originally had a typical Galician-Hungarian name (in January, 1946, a newsletter release by Aufbau, New York, stated Somary's name was originally Szaragd). Ernst alleged that Somary was known to have a very clever head and to be absolutely unscrupulous. Ernst first heard of Somary when the latter was on the staff of the German Military Governor of Belgium in the first world war. Somary allegedly was cruel in his decisions affecting the Belgians and thus left a very bad name behind him. From Belgium, he went in one capacity or another to the Reichsbank in Berlin, where he served about 1915-16. Due to his cleverness, he was sought by several of the big German banks and he finally ended up in 1918-22 as a

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sort of connecting link between the Oestereichische Kreditbank, Vienna, and the Rothschild interests. Somary was believed to have been financial advisor of the Rothschilds since that time. In about 1927, he went to Zurich and purchased a controlling interest in the private firm of Blankart and Company. According to Ernst, it is reported that the money for this transaction came from the Rothschilds.

In connection with Somary's visit to the United States in 1940 on a Swiss diplomatic passport, Ernst advised that Somary had always been persona non grata to Swiss bankers, and people in Swiss banking circles were considerably surprised when they learned he had been given a diplomatic passport and they raised objections to it. Ernst claimed that it was proven that Somary had spread anti-Swiss propaganda in the United States and that Somary stands very badly in Swiss estimation. Ernst said that when he was in New York in 1940, it was common gossip in Swiss financial circles in New York that Somary had been able to run back and forth from Switzerland to Berlin on a number of occasions when he had undoubtedly been in contact with Schacht. Ernst believed that Schacht and Somary had undoubtedly come together through their services with the Reichsbank.

(65-26010-20)

Information was received in October, 1942, that according to a member of the Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C., a Dr. Somary, a Swiss residing at the Shoreham Hotel, had furnished the British with some rather amazing information concerning transportation facilities and various installations within Germany.

(65-26010-8)

Somary was investigated in 1943 for possible violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Walter F. Ostrom, Division of Monetary Research, United States Treasury Department, formerly a United States Vice Consul in Switzerland, advised that he had first become acquainted with Somary in Switzerland in 1936 in connection with his diplomatic work. He stated he had known Somary intimately since that time, and that Somary was one of his principal contacts in Switzerland between 1936 and 1941.

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Ostrow advised that Somary was born in Austria and became quite a prominent man in financial and economic matters. He said Somary became an economic and financial advisor to the German Imperial Government prior to the first world war but that difficulties arose between Somary and the Kaiser, as a result of which Somary moved to Switzerland and became a Swiss citizen in about 1920. In Switzerland, according to Ostrow, Somary was regarded very highly as an authority on finance and economics. Ostrow advised that after Somary completed a mission in the United States for the Swiss Government, he remained in this country because of war conditions in Europe. He said Somary brought his wife and two adopted children, as well as two sisters, to the United States to live and that since then they have lived at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C.

Ostrow, who advised that he had continued his association with Somary in the United States, stated that he had been informed that Somary was financing Archduke Otto of Austria. He stated that he inquired of Somary about this and Somary denied it. He said Somary mentioned that he had given financial aid to Madame Tabouis, former editor of a "leftist" newspaper in France, to prevent her from committing suicide. This was pointed out by Somary, according to Ostrow, to show that he, Somary, was just philanthropically inclined in certain instances. Somary also told Ostrow that he had given money to the Norwegian Government in Exile.

Ostrow advised that Somary had been opposed to the Hitler Regime in Germany. As reasons that convinced him that Somary was actually opposed to Hitler, he pointed out that Somary was of Jewish descent, and had built up a fortune of about several million dollars which would be taken away from him if Hitler decided to invade Switzerland. Ostrow further stated that Somary, even though of Jewish descent, was a Catholic and had married a Catholic woman. He said that Somary had always been of a liberal and democratic nature and apparently had nothing in common with the Azis philosophy of government.

Ostrow related an incident told him by Somary to the effect that Somary and Dr. Brueking, former Chancellor of the German Government under the Weimar Republic and then a professor

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at Harvard University, had endeavored to bring to the United States one Hilferding, the Social Democratic Minister of Finance in the German Government during the Weimar Republic who was a refugee from the Nazis. Somary had described Hilferding as a bitter enemy of the Nazis who had fled to France where, after the German occupation, Laval had surrendered Hilferding to the Nazis. Somary indicated that his efforts in this regard were blocked by Breckenridge Long of the State Department. Somary contended, according to Ostrow, that he had had Bruening go to the White House to intercede for Hilferding.

Ostrow advised that since coming to the United States Somary had become a Consultant for the War Department, Office of Industrial Information, which was engaged in highly confidential work for General Somervell. He stated that Somary was introduced into the work of this office by Alfred Bergman, Vice President of the Royal Typewriter Company, in charge of exports, who took Somary to one of the weekly round-table discussions held by this office.

(65-28010-11)

In a personal interview on October 6, 1940, Somary advised that, prior to 1939, he had made many trips to the United States for the purpose of business and economic study. In May, 1939, he stated, he came to the United States on a secret mission of a commercial nature for the Swiss Government, but that his dealings were with the State Department and more particularly with Francis Sayre and Herbert Feis, as well as with Cordell Hull.

Somary explained that after the completion of his mission for the Swiss Government at the end of 1940, he soon returned to the United States with his family because of war conditions in Europe. He stated he intended to remain for the duration of the war, and that he might even remain after the war as his family was beginning to like this country better than Switzerland.

Somary related that, since the end of 1940, he had not been the representative of any foreign government or any foreign principal, either corporate or individual. He said he was a

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special partner in the firm of Blankart and Company of Switzerland but that he had done nothing whatsoever for this company while in the United States. He said he had not worked for compensation since the completion of his mission for the Swiss Government and that his only activity had been to act as a consultant for the United States War Department. He said the committee headed by General J. E. Dutton which was engaged in secret work concerning European matters. He produced a letter from General Dutton on the stationery of the U. S. Army, Headquarters of Service of Supply, on which Dutton was listed as Chief of Conservation Branch, which letter thanked Somary for his valuable services rendered to this Committee.

Somary also stated that he had been consulted by other United States departments and agencies in regard to European economic and financial matters and other matters within his knowledge, but that all his services for the government have been gratuitous. He said he had also been consulted by certain officials of the Norwegian Government in Exile and by certain officials of other Allied governments.

Concerning his activities at the then present time, Somary stated that he and certain other individuals, including a Mr. Hughes, son of Chief Justice Hughes, Dr. Ernest Wittman, New York, former attorney in Budapest who acted as a correspondent for Wendell Willkie's law firm, and a Mr. Walton of Wendell Willkie's law firm, had gathered together for the purpose of planning an organization to study the possibility of obtaining restoration and reparation for property expropriated by the Axis governments during the war. The organization was said to be merely in the formative stages and Walton was then studying the legal problems involved. This committee, according to Somary, had a meeting at the State Department in the office of Dean Acheson. He said the State Department approved the organization but advised that it should be a private organization and not connected with the United States Government. Somary displayed a copy of a letter from Dean Acheson to Wendell Willkie verifying this information.

(65-26010-15)

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On June 2, 1945, Sonery executed an application to depart from the United States for a visit to Zurich, Switzerland, not to exceed six months duration, to investigate and prepare studies relating to economic conditions in Switzerland and to ascertain the condition of his personal interests in that country. He indicated that he had applied for a re-entry permit and that his wife and children would not accompany him.

In the application, he gave his date and place of birth as November 20, 1901, in Vienna, Austria. He indicated he last entered the United States on March 11, 1941, at El Paso, Texas. As references, he gave the names of Dr. Charles Brugmann, Minister of Switzerland to the United States, and Mr. John J. O'Connor, Financial Secretary of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

(40-79372)

On April 1, 1948, it was determined from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that May Bomblin Sonery, born November 17, 1900, at Vienna, Austria, wife of Felix Sonery, was an applicant for naturalization.

(89-0-2679)

The Registration Act investigation of Sonery was instituted at the request of the Department of Justice and the reports of this investigation were furnished to the Department for the attention of the Special War Policies Unit on July 8, 1943, and October 19, 1943. On March 4, 1944, the same reports were furnished to Mr. Edward J. Innis, Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice. On March 14, 1944, Mr. Sims Carter, Department of Justice, inquired regarding information on Sonery and was referred to the Registration Act investigative reports. Carter advised that in connection with a study being made concerning Swiss banks and Swiss holding companies suspicions concerning Sonery had been aroused.

NORMAN CHANDLER BURSLE

Norman Chandler Bursler was born February 28, 1904, at Wilmington, Delaware. According to information furnished by Bursler himself in employment applications, he received his

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preliminary education in the elementary schools in Wilmington, Delaware. He also attended the Beacon Business School, Wilmington, and for a brief period in 1929 attended Antioch College. The records of the University of California reflect that he attended that university from January 27 to May 11, 1930, at which time he received an A.B. degree. They also reflect that he attended the graduate school, taking courses in economics, during the 1932-34 and the 1937-36 terms.

The United States Civil Service Commission records and information furnished by Bursler in personal history statements reflect that he was employed as follows:

1918-1925 and Summer, 1937, E. I. Dupont de Nemours Company, Wilmington, Delaware, as office boy, clerk, stenographer;

October 16, 1931, to May 31, 1932, United States Commerce Department, Shanghai, China, as a clerk;

May 6, 1935, to November 11, 1935, National Recovery Administration, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Advisor;

November 11, 1935, to June 14, 1936, Works Project Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, National Research Project, as Assistant to Director;

June 15, 1936, to December 31, 1936, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., as an economist;

June 5, 1938, to June 30, 1938, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., as an economist.

On August 5, 1938, Bursler entered the employ of the United States Department of Justice. On March 1, 1940, he was transferred to New York City. He was inducted into the United States Army on October 8, 1942, but on his release returned to the Department of Justice in New York in January, 1943. On

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January 1, 1944, he was transferred to Washington, D. C., where he occupied the position of expert in the Anti-Trust Division. In March 1, 1946, he became employed by the University of Chicago as a research associate with the rank of Assistant Professor in the Law School. Bursler is still so employed.

(101-9274-8-40)

Investigation of Bursler developed information regarding Communist Party activity and included the fact that Bentley advised that, in 1942, Helen Silvermaster related that she was acquainted with Norman Bursler, an attorney in the Anti-Trust Division, U. S. Department of Justice, and indicated that Bursler might be a good prospect for intelligence work. Bentley advised that this proposal was taken up with Jacob Golos. Bentley stated that she subsequently instructed Helen Silvermaster to handle Bursler personally and that apparently an arrangement of some sort was made between Helen Silvermaster and Bursler because in the Summer of 1944 Bentley reportedly received reports concerning certals among material turned over to her by the Silvermasters. Bentley recalled that Helen Silvermaster had advised that work in the Anti-Trust Division concerned principally the investigation of the German certals. Bentley further stated that she had indicated to Helen Silvermaster that she was the source of the certal reports and that Helen Silvermaster admitted that they were from Norman Bursler. Bentley advised that she has never personally seen nor met Bursler.

In an interview in June, 1947, Bursler advised that he first met the Silvermasters at the home of a faculty member of the University of California just prior to the time that he, Bursler, left California in 1934. He said he did not see the Silvermasters until some time later in Washington, D. C. He admitted some contact with the Silvermasters but denied that they had ever questioned him concerning his work. He stated that they had never asked him for any reports concerning his work and that he had never given them any nor had he ever left any of his papers or documents at the Silvermasters at any time. Bursler stated that nothing occurred during his relationship with the Silvermasters which would indicate to him that they were pro-Russian or were members of the Communist Party.

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Burkler presently resides at the Quadrangle Club, 1155  
East 57th Street, Chicago, Illinois, where, as mentioned  
previously, he is employed by the University of Chicago.

CHICAGO, ILL.

(101-3274-40)

Walter F. Ostrow appears to be the United States  
Vice Consul in Zurich referred to in Nos. 1619-1650 as an  
official of the Treasury Department.

Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State in 1941,  
would appear tentatively to be Coliph, who was contacted by  
Sewery apparently in connection with some matter involving the  
firm of Filkie, Owen and Gallagher.

Burkler, in view of his position as an expert in the  
Anti-Trust Division of the Department and Bentley's information  
that the work of the Anti-Trust Division was principally the  
investigation of German cartels, may have worked on the study  
of Swiss banks and holding companies referred to by Mr. Sims  
Carter, or possibly had access to the finished report.

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American

# MERCURY

Why cannot the people in authority see this man for what he really is Felix Wittmer  
 That something to save our country be done now  
 before it is too late he drawing money for representing our enemy while our boys

## ***Freedom's Case***

are spilling their young blood in Korea. It is a crying shame and a terrible injustice to the American people. Yes he has brains but so did Lucifer.

## ***Against***

# **DEAN ACHESON**

723

22405-17

*For Mr. Acheson  
 Attorney General*

A REPRINT

Felix Wittmer

# Freedom's Case Against DEAN ACHESON

ON JANUARY 3, 1946, with about sixty other lecturers, many of them college professors,\* I was seated in the old State Department Building in Washington being "briefed" by spokesmen for the government of the United States. One of the "briefing officers" was the Under Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Gooderham Acheson. He stood there before us, with his English tailoring, his clipped mustache, and his somewhat smug but direct manner, describing the world as he saw it.

"Now about these Russians," he

\*After the Second War the State Department continued a practice begun during the war of inviting groups of college professors and itinerant lecturers to Washington to enjoy the privilege of "confidential and highly authoritative information." This was another of the semi-secret activities by the government lobby to sell the government "line."

said. "I don't believe the Soviet leaders are bad men. They are like little boys who enjoy throwing brickbats at other people's greenhouses."

There were smiles, chuckles, and nodding heads about the room, and I was appalled. As a naturalized citizen I felt it might be impertinent for me to speak out, but I rose to my feet.

"Mr. Secretary," I said, "did it ever occur to your sir, that that is exactly what the Soviet leaders want you to believe?"

He shrugged and shook his head condescendingly as he turned to me and asked: "Must every Russian move — every rock through a greenhouse — be the result of conspiracy? After all, what's the difference between Russia and America?"



"There is a great deal of difference," I replied, "and I'm amazed that you don't seem to see it. The difference between Russia and America is the difference between slavery and freedom."

"Freedom?" he quipped. "Isn't that rather vague?"

"No, sir, it isn't vague," I said. "If the victims of the concentration camps could speak to you — or perhaps if some of the lads who died at Iwo Jima could speak to you — they could tell you, sir, that freedom is most specific, most concrete."

There was an embarrassed silence while the Secretary adjusted his cravat. Then he faced the other side of the room and said: "Next question, please."

That night, riding back on the train to New Jersey, I felt depressed. I contemplated with a shudder the record of these Soviet leaders who, to Mr. Acheson, were "like little boys": uncounted millions of human beings enslaved and murdered; whole nations robbed of their identities; everywhere, the cruel, systematic destruction of human dignity. Yet here in the United States, in the nation which was the last great bulwark of liberty, the man who spoke for the government believed that "the Soviet leaders are not bad men; they are like little boys who enjoy throwing brickbats at other people's greenhouses!"

What hope could there be left on earth, I asked myself, if here in

America the Under Secretary of State cast a puzzled look at you and asked: "Freedom? Isn't that rather vague?"

No wonder, I decided, that our government was distributing pamphlets to our own soldiers saying: "When we speak of the Chinese 'Communists' we should remember that . . . they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word 'Communist.' . . . Their program is a moderate one . . . quite in accord with what we think of as a liberal democracy." (Official USA indoctrination publication, issue dated April 7, 1945.)

No wonder that it was the policy of the United States to force free men in Poland and free men in China to coalesce with the Communist "little boys" whose first intent was the destruction of freedom!

No wonder that President Truman would declare: "I like old Joe!"

What made all this so tragic was that Mr. Acheson was not only himself confused: he possessed the power and the talent to impose his confusion on the President, on the Secretary of State, and on numerous lecturers and teachers assembled at the invitation of their government to enjoy the privilege of "confidential and highly authoritative information"!

I concluded then that Mr. Acheson, however "liberal" and well-

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meaning he might consider himself to be, was a man with an enormous capacity for disservice to the human race; I have, therefore, observed him closely from that date; and after six years my conclusion remains unchanged. I believe that most well-intentioned Americans will subscribe to the same conclusion if they will cut through all the confusing propaganda and patiently examine the record.

**A**CHESON'S RECORD OF DISSERVICE to the cause of freedom begins at least nineteen years ago when he became one of Stalin's *paid* American lawyers. Acheson was on Stalin's payroll even before the Soviet Union was recognized by the United States. Before such agencies as the U. S. Tariff Commission, it was Acheson who appeared as counsel for the Soviet delegations, trying even then to win favors for Stalin.

On May 16, 1933, the United States Senate was considering Acheson's fitness for the position of Under Secretary of the Treasury. There was opposition to him because, since he had been the legal representative of the Soviet Union, there was fear that he might be pro-Communist. The opposition was led by Senator James Couzens, of Michigan; the defense was led by Acheson's sponsor, Senator Millard E. Tydings, of Maryland.

Senator Tydings made a vigorous

speech in Acheson's defense, assuring the senators that even though "*Mr. Acheson has represented the USSR*" (italics mine), he deserved the appointment.

Senator Couzens then withdrew his opposition with this statement: "I have been encouraged to withdraw my objection to Mr. Acheson on the alleged statement that he is a Socialist." (*Congressional Record*, May 16, 1933, p. 3484.)

There is no denial on the record by either Senator Tydings or Acheson that he was a Socialist.

(It probably never occurred to Senator Tydings in 1933, when he first began defending Acheson, that Acheson in 1950 would be the instrument for his own defeat. For trying to whitewash Acheson's State Department of the pro-Communist charges by Senator Joe McCarthy, Tydings was repudiated by his own constituents.)

So it is no wonder that Acheson was frequently at the side of Maxim Litvinoff in 1933 when Mr. Litvinoff was negotiating with our government for the official bestowal of this country's favors on the Soviet Union. (See State Department's own report on Soviet recognition.) Acheson and his closest friends, including Alge Hiss and his son, were dedicated to the success of the Socialist revolution. And Litvinoff was only Stalin's ambassador; Acheson was Stalin's lawyer.

Just why, among all the American

lawyers, did the Soviet leaders hire these two: Acheson and Lee Pressman? It's easy to explain why they hired Pressman: he was a Communist and a member of the Ware cell organized for espionage in the government. The Soviet Union, of course, followed a general policy in all countries of hiring sympathetic lawyers.

Then why did Stalin hire Acheson?

To understand their Secretary of State in 1952, Americans must understand that he began seeking favors for Soviet Russia as a *paid advocate*. He was *selected* and hired by the Soviet leaders to promote their cause. He believed that the cause of Soviet Russia was a good and hopeful cause; and for most of his life he has been trying to prove that his clients, the Soviet leaders — if only they can be made to feel secure in the affections of free men — will be good little boys.

Acheson's case is just that simple.

TO UNDERSTAND HIM FURTHER, Americans must get a clear picture of his law activities. He shuttles in and out of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, O'Brien, & Shorb in Washington, D. C., which until 1949 also carried his name. He was "in" the firm from 1921 until 1933 when he became Under Secretary of the Treasury. He lasted only a few months in the Treasury: Roosevelt called him a "light-

weight" — so he went back "in" the firm. He remained "in" until 1941 when he got "out" to go into the State Department. When he was "out" of the State Department in 1947-48, he was back "in" the firm; then he got "out" of the firm again to become Secretary of State in January, 1949. Whenever he is "out" it is understood that he is only temporarily "out," and he receives mail at both the law office and the State Department.

Acheson's son, David C. Acheson, and his good friend, Donald Hiss, brother of his close friend, Alger Hiss, both are permanently connected with the firm. Donald Hiss was with Acheson in the State Department until 1945 when Acheson arranged his transfer to the law firm.

And what does this firm specialize in? It specializes in representing foreign governments. It now represents seven foreign governments at enormous retainers: Pakistan, Iran, Greece, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. Since Acheson became Secretary of State in January, 1949, the firm has collected over \$235,000 from foreign governments.

If a foreign government is seeking a loan or some other favor from the government of the United States, would it be smart for that government to retain the law firm from which the Secretary of State is temporarily on leave? The law firm

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with which the son of the Secretary of State is permanently connected?

Here is how the Acheson set-up works. In 1946 the Soviet satellite government of Poland applied to the United States for a loan of \$90,000,000. Acheson was then Under Secretary of State and, on occasion, Acting Secretary of State. And what law firm did the Reds retain to get the loan? The Acheson firm, with Donald Hiss assigned directly.

Our ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, pleaded with the State Department *not* to approve the loan. Mr. Lane pointed out that American citizens were being mistreated in Poland; that the Red terror was destroying all freedom. "With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable," Mr. Lane declared, "I beg the department not to approve the extension of any credits at this time."

On April 24, 1946, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the loan, to be made through the Export-Import Bank, had been approved. The fee paid by the Communists through the puppet government of Poland to the Acheson law firm was \$51,653.98.

The loan was used to consolidate Soviet control of Poland; and in 1949 when he heard that Acheson had been appointed Secretary of State, Mr. Lane declared: "God help the United States!"

And here are some fair questions:

1. Since it is a matter of record

that Acheson was retained by the Soviet Union before he became Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933; and since not until 1938 did the government require American law firms to disclose their foreign connections; did Acheson, after he left the Treasury Department, receive pay from the Soviet Union between 1934 and 1938?

2. Since the Acheson law firm was still being paid large sums by foreign Communists in 1946, is it possible that directly or indirectly — to Acheson himself, to the firm, or to some other member of the firm — is it possible that the Soviet Union continued payments from 1932 to 1946 and perhaps even later?

**Qualification—  
Ignorance**

*The following dialogue occurred during Acheson's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee considering his nomination as Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933:*

SENATOR REED: Mr. Acheson, what finance experience have you had?

MR. ACHESON: I have had practically none, Senator.

SENATOR REED: Have you made any study of public finances at all?

MR. ACHESON: None at all.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 16, 1933, p. 3483

3. And just how much money has Acheson or his firm been paid by foreign Communists since Acheson was first retained by the Soviets in the 1930's?

These are questions to which Americans, whose sons are dying in battle with Mr. Acheson's former clients, deserve answers.

ONCE IT IS UNDERSTOOD that Acheson has made a career out of advocacy of Soviet causes, that either he directly or his law firm has been paid vast sums for services rendered to Communism, then the man's actions and attitudes become readily understandable.

No sooner had he entered the State Department in 1941 than he became the leader of the pro-Soviet cabal. What other position could "Stalin's lawyer" have taken? Almost immediately he was warned by Adolf A. Berle, in charge of State Department security, that the Hiss brothers, then in obscure positions in the department, had been alleged to be Communists. Acheson resented the warning; he made Alger Hiss his number one confederate and brought him to positions of power; and ultimately he made Donald Hiss an associate of his law firm. Other confederates that would soon gather around him included Owen Lattimore, John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, Lauchlin Currie — all the gentlemen who believed that "the future of Asia

belongs to the Chinese Reds" and that the Soviet leaders were not "bad men."

Inside the State Department the enemies of the Acheson-Hiss-Currie-Vincent-Service cabal were the men who wanted this nation to maintain an objective attitude toward the Communists — to cooperate with Russia but to regard Russia with healthy suspicion. Among these men were Joseph C. Grew, Eugene Dooman, Stanley Hornbeck, James C. Dunn, Berle, and others.

On October 4, 1942, the Communist *Daily Worker* denounced the Grew-Berle group as "fascists" and "champions of Munich," and Acheson and Hiss launched the campaign to drive the Grew-Berle group out of the department and seize control.

A report on the battle between these two groups was given to the House Un-American Activities Committee on August 30, 1948, by Mr. Berle:

As I think many people know, in the Fall of 1944 there was a difference of opinion in the State Department. I felt that the Russians were not going to be sympathetic and cooperative. Victory was then assured, though not complete, and the intelligence reports which were in my charge indicated a very aggressive Russian policy, not at all in line with the kind of cooperation everyone was hoping for, and I was pressing for a pretty clean-cut showdown then when our position was strongest. The opposite group in the State Depart-

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ment was largely the men—Mr. Acheson's group, of course, with Mr. Hiss as his principal assistant in the matter . . . I got trimmed in that fight, and, as a result, went to Brazil, and that ended my diplomatic career.

So Mr. Berle, who wanted only to have a showdown with Soviet Russia in 1944 "when our position was strongest," was cut down and forced out by Acheson and Hiss.

Another noteworthy point is this. Even though Acheson had no Far Eastern background at all, he interested himself from the beginning in Chinese matters. It may be only a coincidence that both Lenin and Stalin, as has been extensively documented, always regarded possession of China as the key to the triumph of the Socialist world revolution; the Communist Party line, beginning October 2, 1942, was anti-Chiang Kai-shek, and from the summer of 1943, many of the messages to our representatives in China were drafted by Acheson. His initials can still be discerned on the blue archive copies.

Acheson's second most valued confederate was John Carter Vincent, and another was John Stewart Service. Both these men moved to power steadily under Acheson's aegis. By 1943 Vincent had become assistant to Mr. Grew and special assistant to the powerful Acheson confederate, Lauchlin Currie, head of the Foreign Economic Administration,

who later under oath was to be identified as a member of a Communist spy ring. By 1944, when the State Department was moving ever faster toward support of the Chinese Communists, Vincent was chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs; and by 1945 he headed the office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Service was one of the Acheson group who worked in China. He was attached to General Stilwell's staff until he was sent back to Washington by Ambassador Patrick Hurley because of his incessant activity in favor of the Chinese Reds.

In 1943 Acheson, directly, was able to render the Soviet leaders another tremendous service. The big relief agency, UNRRA, was being set up, and all pro-Soviets saw in it a chance to make it a tool of Soviet conquest. The trick was to deny UNRRA itself any right of supervision over the distribution of its food and other relief supplies.

The UNRRA staff was quickly infiltrated by Stalinists, and Russia put forth a plan to allow the "recipient governments" to distribute the food without any interference from the outside—the United States. The British and other anti-Soviet factions opposed this plan, but Acheson not only threw American influence behind the Russian plan but also forced the British to accept it. (See *Defeat in Victory*, by the former Polish ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski.)

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The power of food distribution was the power of life and death in Central Europe in 1944-47; and thanks to their advocate, Acheson, the Communists were able to use American food as a weapon against patriots trying to resist Soviet enslavement of Europeans.

WITH BERLE'S HEAD on a platter, the Acheson clique's next target was Under Secretary Grew. And by 1945 they had to get Grew — and quickly — because on June 6, 1945, the FBI arrested Acheson's boy, Service, and the *Amerasia* case was threatening to inform the country.

The FBI had recorded, verbatim, a meeting of John Stewart Service in Washington with Philip Jaffe and Andrew Roth, since identified as Communist agents, in which Service had revealed to them what he himself described at the time as "top secrets." In addition, the FBI had seized in the New York office of the pro-Communist magazine, *Amerasia*, 540 government documents classified as follows: Restricted — 119; Confidential — 208; Strictly Confidential — 59; Secret — 153; and Very Secret — 1.

It was imperative for the Acheson clique to stop prosecution of the *Amerasia* case. Under Secretary Grew was insisting on vigorous prosecution; therefore the Acheson clique had to oust Grew at once.

Acheson succeeded Grew as Un-

der Secretary in August, 1945, and two days later he reinstated Service to the State Department and promoted him! And what do you suppose was Service's new job? Mr. Hurley had sent Service out of China because he was openly supporting the Chinese Reds. The FBI had overheard Service spilling secret information to Red agents. So Acheson put Service in charge of placing State Department personnel in the Far East so that the Acheson cabal could eliminate every "anti-Communist" and place more and more pro-Communists in strategic positions.

Between 1945 and 1951 every effort to remove Service from the Department of State was denounced by the pro-Acheson press; and it was not until the Fall of 1951 that a Federal Loyalty Review Board finally forced his resignation.

Acheson's number one man, Hiss, went to jail for denying that he had passed secret papers to Communist agents. Acheson has been able to keep his number two man, Vincent, by hiding him in Tangier, by "clearing" him with meaningless "State Department Boards," and by delaying investigation by the Federal Loyalty Review Board. It was John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore, whom the boss of Siberian slave camps, Goglidze, toasted in 1944 as those "on whom rests the responsibility for the future of China."

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On June 7, 1945, the *Daily Worker* called Acheson "one of the most forward-looking men in the State Department."

When, in September, 1945, the House Un-American Activities Committee prepared to hold hearings relative to one Sam Carp, Acheson's office prevailed upon the committee to drop the proceedings. Carp, a filling station operator in Bridgeport, Connecticut, had been discovered dispensing large amounts of money under suspicious circumstances. But it developed that he was the brother-in-law of Molotov, the Russian foreign Minister, so Acheson got the case dropped "in the interest of smoother relations with the Soviet Union."

After eliminating Grew, the Acheson clique next managed to oust Eugene Dooman, head of the important Interdepartmental Committee, the agency through which the State Department seeks to impose its policies on the Defense Department. And who replaced Dooman? John Carter Vincent.

And what was Vincent's first action in his new position of power? Arriving in Tokyo in September, 1945, was the most implacable foe of Sovietism on earth: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. So Vincent's first chore was to change the directives of MacArthur concerning Japan; and on September 20, 1945, Acheson publicly rebuked MacArthur and announced that our

Japanese policy would be made exclusively by the State Department.

The Associated Press called Acheson's statement "more pugnacious than diplomatic."

The Communist *Daily Worker* applauded the clipping of MacArthur's wings by Acheson and Vincent: "The forces in the State Department which are relatively anti-imperialist have been strengthened."

The pro-Communist newspaper *PM* observed: "What the government seeks now is to develop a diplomacy based on better appreciation of what the Soviet Union wants."

On November 14, 1945, Acheson appeared triumphantly at Madison Square Garden in New York to receive the applause of all his press clique: the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, *PM*, the *New York Times*, and *Herald-Tribune*, and, of course, also the *Daily Worker*. The occasion was the joyous welcoming to American soil of the Red Dean of Canterbury. Acheson proclaimed:

Never in the past has there been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the American and Russian peoples have clashed or even been antagonistic . . . and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should be such a place. We understand and agree with the Soviet leaders that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world.

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The Communist press around the world applauded this statement by America's "great forward-looking statesman." Incidentally, other speakers on that program, who sat by Acheson, were Paul Robeson, Corliss Lamont, Joseph E. Davies, and Dr. William Howard Melish.

Contemplating that statement in Madison Square Garden, is it possible that any American today can fail to understand its awful meaning to all the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Germans, Roumanians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Albanians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese — not to mention Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians — all the people around the periphery of Russia who have been enslaved? Here was a spokesman for the United States, not only expressing friendship for and approval of the Soviet Union, but also placing this nation's approval on the enslavement — actual and projected — of all the satellite nations!

Acheson was standing there in Madison Square Garden, surrounded by America's Communists and pro-Communists, arrogantly informing all the peoples of the earth within the reach of Soviet Russia that they could expect neither help nor hope from America in any efforts to maintain their freedom from Soviet slavery.

Acheson was saying in effect: It is proper for the Soviet leaders to enslave all the peoples within their reach. This country understands

and approves that process. And this process of enslavement is essential "both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world."

The day that Acheson made that speech was probably the blackest day for freedom in the world since the end of the Second War. Stalin hadn't yet managed to seize China and Czechoslovakia when Acheson spoke; Acheson invited him to go ahead and do so with this country's approval.

IN THAT SAME MONTH, November, 1945, the Acheson clique, by their maneuvers, caused the resignation of our anti-Soviet Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley's removal was essential to prepare the ground for the Marshall Mission of 1946 — the tragic mission on which General Marshall was to demand of Chiang Kai-shek that he cease fighting the Communists.

On November 20, 1945, Acheson received Congressman Marcantonio with Milton Wolff, head of the Communist Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish war, and on November 21 the *Daily Worker* reported that Acheson had offered to intervene with Franco on behalf of condemned Communists in Spain. Previously Acheson had refused to receive Fernando de los Rios, head of the anti-Communist group of Spanish Republicans; but on December 16, 1945, Acheson received Juan

Negrin, head of the pro-Communist group of Spanish Republicans.

On December 22, 1945, as Acting Secretary of State, Acheson extended this government's recognition to the Communist regime of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. And this, despite the fact that only two months earlier in his Navy Day speech, President Truman had assured the world that the United States would never recognize a regime that was not elected by the people.

(When the American Legion protested against further UNRRA aid to Tito after American planes were shot down over Yugoslavia, Acheson declared that the United States had no authority to withhold supplies. [He had arranged it that way.] And in August, 1949, when a headstone was unveiled in Arlington Cemetery for the five young American fliers shot down over Yugoslavia, Acheson saw to it that no official representative of the United States Government attended the unveiling. [Reported by Columnist Ernest K. Lindley.]

It was on January 3, 1946, as noted in my opening paragraph, that I had my exchange with Acheson — in which he found no difference between America and Russia, thought freedom rather vague, and insisted that the Soviet leaders were the little boys tossing brickbats at greenhouses.

All the tragic aspects of General

Marshall's Mission to China in 1946 need not be reviewed here. What does need to be noted is that the instructions for General Marshall were formulated by Acheson and Vincent and mostly, as he himself admitted, written by Vincent. Every objective student of this period now concedes that the Acheson clique used General Marshall to halt the fighting in China and assure the victory of the Chinese Reds.

While Marshall was carrying out his mission, so costly to the cause of freedom, Acheson, on May Day, 1946, announced that the Soviet government had been invited to send observers to the Bikini tests of our newest atomic weapons.

In March, 1946, Acheson snubbed Winston Churchill after Mr. Churchill delivered his Fulton, Missouri, speech warning the world against the Soviet threat. After the speech had been assailed by the Communists, Acheson refused to appear at a New York dinner in Churchill's honor.

On June 3, 1946, the Coordinating Committee of the State Department, with Acheson, Hiss, and Vincent pulling the strings, recommended that the Chinese Communist troops be trained and armed by American Army personnel before they were "integrated with the Nationalist forces."

On June 19, 1946, Acheson was asked by Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers if he saw any danger

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of a future attack upon us by the Chinese Communist troops that he proposed to train and arm.

Acheson turned on all his charm to answer the lady. "Oh, no, Mrs. Rogers," he replied. "We can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that." (H.R. 6795, 79th Congress.)

On July 20, 1946, Acheson reassured the country that there were no Communists in the State Department. (*Congressional Record*, p. 9716.)

In October 1946, without the knowledge of either James F. Byrnes or Bernard Baruch, who was then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to the United Nations, Acheson proposed David Lilienthal as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The so-called Acheson-Lilienthal atomic energy report had recommended that we "exchange atomic knowledge with the Soviet Union," and that our mutual endeavors be guaranteed by "international agreement."

On March 20, 1947, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Acheson flatly declared that there was no danger of a Communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek. "The Chinese government is not approaching collapse," he said. "It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists." On July 30, 1949, in a letter to President Truman which served as a preface to the White Paper on China, Acheson

opined that "no amount of aid could have saved Chiang."

On April 18, 1947, Acheson again "cleared" Vincent of all charges of pro-Communism.

On May 10, 1947, Acheson, according to the United Press, took the lead "to shift the emphasis in the Truman Doctrine from an ideological crusade against Communism to an economic program for rebuilding Western Europe and the Far East into healthy, democratic areas."

In June, 1947 a Senate appropriations subcommittee addressed a secret memorandum to General Marshall, then Secretary of State:

It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson. It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity. On file in the department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United States which involves a large number of State Department employes, some in high official positions. This report has been challenged and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the department with the apparent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case be before the

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State Department acts, it will be a national disgrace. Voluminous files are on hand in the department proving the connections of the State Department employes and officials of this Soviet espionage ring.

General Marshall received this secret memorandum — and did nothing.

In June, 1947, over Congressional opposition, Acheson insisted that the United States deliver \$17,000,000 worth of postwar lend-lease supplies to Russia. Since, under the Truman Doctrine, we had already begun fighting Soviet aggression in Greece, Congressmen asked why we should continue sending lend-lease to our enemies. Acheson forced delivery of the supplies.

This period saw the genesis of the Marshall Plan, and Acheson apologists like to point to his support of this plan as evidence of his anti-Sovietism. What must be remembered is this: the plan as originally worked out by Acheson included aid for Russia and the East European satellites as well as for the nations of Western Europe.

During the first weeks that the Marshall Plan was under discussion, it seemed that the Communist Party policy would be to endorse the plan. But when the Czech coalition government in Prague accepted the proposed aid, Moscow decided that the plan was a Wall Street plot and a device for "safeguarding Western Europe from Communism." Czechoslovakia was forced to withdraw from the Paris aid Conference.

slovakia was forced to withdraw from the Paris aid Conference.

IN THE SUMMER OF 1948 Acheson's old confederate, Lauchlin Currie, came before the House Un-American Activities Committee. He was accompanied by counsel, one Dean Acheson, temporarily "out" of the government. Both Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, under oath, identified Currie as a Soviet agent. Currie, closely counseled by Acheson, admitted only that he had used his considerable influence to save the government job of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, who was identified under oath as a member of a Soviet spy ring in Washington.

On December 16, 1948, Acheson's intimate friend, Alger Hiss, was indicted for perjury in denying under oath that he had handed secret government documents to the agents of a foreign power. Acheson had done a lot for Hiss. He had secured him the appointment of Executive Secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944; sent him to Yalta in 1945 as adviser to President Roosevelt; pushed him to high distinction as Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. When in January, 1950 Hiss was convicted, Acheson, Secretary of State of the nation the perjurer had betrayed, announced: "I will not turn my back on Alger Hiss."

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In January, 1949, when Acheson became Secretary of State, some of the chickens had started coming home to roost. So Acheson quickly brought forward Professor Philip C. Jessup as his first lieutenant, and set Doctor Jessup to preparing the "Whitewash Paper" on China. Jessup's affiliations with the Communist fronts are a matter of record. He signed the atom bomb letter in the *New York Times*, February 16, 1946, which urged us to quit making atomic bombs and leave the disposal of our stockpile to the United Nations. He had been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations with Owen Lattimore and Frederick Vanderbilt Field; he was a member of the committee which had appointed Alger Hiss head of the Carnegie Endowment; and he appeared in court as a witness for Hiss.

The White Paper on China, issued August 5, 1949, could be called an outright fraud, or it can be left to the judgment of the *New York Times*, often an Acheson apologist:

This inquest on China is not the work of a serene and detached coroner but of a vitally interested party in the catastrophe. Unfortunately, at this point one of these vital interests is self-justification, which certainly is the enemy of objective analysis.

In 1948 we had begun withdrawing our army from South Korea, though it was known that for years the Soviet training schools in Si-

beria had been training and arming the North Koreans. The Korean National Assembly, on November 20, 1948; begged that we remain.

A secret memorandum to the State Department from Lattimore proposed that Korea should be allowed, as he subsequently stated more succinctly in the fellow-traveling *Daily Compass*, "to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed it." Acheson announced that no policy decisions could be made until "after the dust has settled."

In the Spring of 1949 the State Department recommended that economic aid *only*, to the extent of \$150 million, be extended to South Korea. Congress demanded that military aid be included; the provision for military aid was included; but no military aid was shipped.

On December 23, 1949, Acheson instructed all diplomatic and consular personnel that Formosa had no strategic value. But in May, 1951, under oath, Acheson stressed Formosa's "strategic importance."

On January 5, 1950, the British extended recognition to Red China with the full knowledge and approval of our State Department. (Statement by Beverly Baxter, Member of Parliament.) On this same day President Truman declared: "The United States government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."

On January 12, 1950, in a speech

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to the National Press Club in Washington, Acheson discussed our defensive policy for Asia. "Our defensive perimeter," he said, "runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus." This policy abandoned Asia to the Communists and invited them to seize both South Korea and Formosa, since these areas lay outside the announced perimeter.

In this same speech Acheson jeered at Senator Robert A. Taft's proposal that we send a fleet to protect Formosa against Red invasion. He said he didn't realize that Mr. Taft was a military expert.

On June 10, 1950, speaking in St. Louis, Truman said: "We are closer to world peace now than at any time in the last three years."

On June 25, 1950, the Communists invaded South Korea, and three days later American troops began their "police action" on Korean soil.

On June 27, 1951, Acheson stated we would be satisfied if the Communists withdrew behind the 38th

Parallel. On August 2, 1951, he declared that the 38th Parallel "as a line of demarcation" was "unacceptable."

On September 13, 1951, President Truman said that Dean Acheson will be Secretary of State "as long as I am President of the United States."

THAT'S THE RECORD of Dean Gooderham Acheson as a fighter for freedom. Only one additional entry need be made.

On March 5, 1952, Acheson scolded Washington reporters for inquiring why he had single-handedly "cleared" Oliver Edmund Clubb, whom the State Department's own board had judged a security risk. "In the future," he announced, "I hope you will understand that always the responsibility for these decisions must rest with me."

During the period of Acheson's stewardship at the State Department, more than six hundred million human beings have been dragged into Soviet slavery. Soviet power has mushroomed until it now threatens the existence of freedom everywhere on earth. It therefore seems fair to ask this question: have the actions and attitudes of Dean Acheson aided the cause of freedom in its struggle against Soviet slavery, or have they impeded it?

On November 4, 1952, the American people will have the opportunity to answer this question.

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J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the F. B. I.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

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~~Personal and Confidential~~

Senate Joint Resolution

No. 2

Introduced by Senator Tenney

January 16, 1951

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON RULES

*Senate Joint Resolution No. 2—Relative to the impeachment  
of Secretary of State Dean Acheson.*

1 WHEREAS, Secretary of State Dean Acheson has been the  
2 chief architect of the policy which has brought us, in five years,  
3 from the unconditional victory of 1945 and sole possessor of the  
4 atom bomb, to the verge of national ruin; and

5 WHEREAS, Over 40,000 American boys are dead, missing or  
6 wounded in action in Korea and the forces of the United Na-  
7 tions are retreating under the impact of Kremlin directed com-  
8 munist North Korean and Chinese armies; and

9 WHEREAS, Under the guidance of Dean Acheson, the United  
10 States of America has acquiesced in the conquest of one-third  
11 of the world's population by communist imperialism; and

12 WHEREAS, Dean Acheson and his clique encouraged a weak  
13 communist rebellion in China, armed and directed by the Soviet  
14 Union, to take over the key to all Asia, resulting in the death and  
15 mutilation of American troops in Korea; and

16 WHEREAS, On July 31, 1946, Mr. Acheson stated in writing  
17 that " . . . General Marshall . . . is exerting every effort to  
18 fulfill the American Government's desires by bringing the two  
19 major Chinese political factions peacefully together to form a  
20 united and representative government."; and

21 WHEREAS, Secretary of State Acheson recommended the  
22 abandonment of Formosa after the legitimate government of  
23 China had been forced to flee to the island under the impact  
24 of Soviet directed Red Chinese armies; and

25 WHEREAS, The Department of State, under the direction of  
26 Mr. Acheson, sent out secret instructions on December 23, 1949,  
27 to all diplomatic and consular personnel to promote the view  
28 that Formosa was doomed and expendable; and

29 WHEREAS, On June 19, 1947, before the House Foreign Af-  
30 fairs Committee, Mr. Acheson declared that there was no danger

1 of a communist defeat of Chiang Kai-shek which statement he  
2 contradicted in his letter to the President of the United States  
3 on July 30, 1949, prefacing the White Book, by declaring that  
4 "no amount of aid could have saved Chiang"; and

5 WHEREAS, On August 24, 1949, answering Congressman  
6 Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, Mr. Acheson denied that Vice  
7 President Wallace had made a written report to President  
8 Roosevelt on his return from China in 1944, contradicted since  
9 by the release of portions of two such reports by Mr. Wal-  
10 lace; and

11 WHEREAS, In the issuance of the White Paper on China,  
12 August 5, 1949, Mr. Acheson declared that all important docu-  
13 ments were included, which statement was contradicted by for-  
14 mer Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley testifying before the Senate  
15 Foreign Relations Committee in 1945; and

16 WHEREAS, Dean Acheson approved the Chinese communist  
17 demands for hostages to guarantee Americans' leaving Red  
18 China; and

19 WHEREAS, Mr. Acheson paid communist China to get Con-  
20 sul General Angus Ward out of China, and then only after a  
21 newspaper campaign had aroused public opinion; and

22 WHEREAS, Dean Acheson stated, under questioning by  
23 a Senate committee before his confirmation as Under-Secretary  
24 of State in 1945, that Russia should share in the administration  
25 of Japan; and

26 WHEREAS, Dean Acheson sponsored the Hiss brothers un-  
27 reservedly to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, although  
28 Whittaker Chambers had denounced them as Soviet agents;  
29 and

30 WHEREAS, Dean Acheson, in 1946, used his influence with  
31 the F. B. I. to save Alger Hiss and publicly and officially refused  
32 "to turn his back on Alger Hiss" after 20 jurors had found  
33 him guilty of perjury; and

34 WHEREAS, Dean Acheson acted as counsel for Laughlin  
35 Currie, former administrative assistant to Presidents Roosevelt  
36 and Truman, when Currie appeared before a congressional  
37 committee, charged by both Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth  
38 Bentley with having aided their espionage network; and

39 WHEREAS, On April 18, 1947, without investigation, Dean  
40 Acheson cleared John Carter Vincent, chief of the vitally  
41 important Far Eastern Division of the State Department, of  
42 charges of procommunism filed by a United States Senator, and  
43 professed complete ignorance of official published communist  
44 programs for world-wide conquest, especially in the Far East;  
45 and

46 WHEREAS, Mr. Acheson, heading the American delegation  
47 in the formation of UNRRA, insisted on the veto to please the  
48 Soviet Union, and, according to former Polish Ambassador  
49 Jan Ciechanowski, steadily supported all Soviet demands, thus  
50 rendering the United States impotent to control or investigato

1 UNRRA, although the United States supplied the overwhelm-  
2 ing bulk of its funds; and

3 WHEREAS, As head of the State Department unit arranging  
4 for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Mr. Acheson secured the  
5 appointment of Alger Hiss as Director of the Division of  
6 International Security in charge of American preparations for  
7 the United Nations, as adviser to Secretary Stettinius and  
8 President Roosevelt at Yalta, and, first Secretary General of  
9 the United Nations; and

10 WHEREAS, On July 20, 1949, Mr. Acheson stated that there  
11 were no communists in the State Department, which statement  
12 proved to be untrue; and

13 WHEREAS, In spite of documented charges of softness  
14 toward communism against Ambassador Philip Jessup, Mr.  
15 Acheson made him top American foreign policy adviser, both in  
16 Europe and Asia; and

17 WHEREAS, Speaking in welcome to the "Red Dean" of  
18 Canterbury at Madison Square Garden on November 14, 1945,  
19 Mr. Acheson, then Under-Secretary of State, stated: " . . .  
20 never in the past has there been any place on the globe where  
21 the vital interests of the American and Russian peoples have  
22 clashed or even been antagonistic—and there is no objective  
23 reason to suppose that there should . . . be such a place . . .  
24 We understand and agree with them that to have friendly  
25 governments along her borders is essential both for the security  
26 of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world."; and

27 WHEREAS, On December 22, 1945, without demanding the  
28 free elections provided for at Yalta, Mr. Acheson recognized  
29 Tito's communist government of Yugoslavia; and

30 WHEREAS, Against the advice of Ambassador Arthur Bliss  
31 Lane in 1946, Mr. Acheson approved a "loan" of ninety million  
32 dollars to communist Poland, then represented by Donald Hiss  
33 of the Acheson law firm; and

34 WHEREAS, Without the knowledge of his superior, Secre-  
35 tary of State Byrnes, or of Bernard Baruch, who headed the  
36 Atomic Commission to the United Nations, the Lillenthal Atomic  
37 Energy Committee was appointed on Mr. Acheson's recom-  
38 mendation in October, 1946; and

39 WHEREAS, It was Secretary of State Acheson who fronted  
40 for the Acheson-Lillenthal atomic energy report, which pro-  
41 posed turning over atomic secrets to the Soviet Union on promise  
42 of peaceful uses, but without inspection; and

43 WHEREAS, On May 17, 1946, Acting Secretary of State  
44 Acheson announced that invitation to attend the Bikini A-Bomb  
45 tests on July 1st had been extended to the Soviet Govern-  
46 ment; and

47 WHEREAS, On December 16, 1945, Under-Secretary of  
48 State Acheson received Juan Negrin, head of the communist  
49 group of Spanish Loyalists while refusing to receive Fernando  
50 de los Rios, the head of the anti-communist group; and

1 WHEREAS, On December 20, 1945, Under-Secretary of  
2 State Acheson received Milton Wolff, commander of the sub-  
3 versive Abraham Lincoln Brigade and Congressman Vito  
4 Marcantonio, promising them, according to the Daily Worker,  
5 to intervene with Franco on behalf of two condemned com-  
6 munists; and

7 WHEREAS, Mr. Acheson permitted Chinese communist  
8 delegates to accuse the United States of aggression in Formosa  
9 while American soldiers were waiting for permission to fight  
10 the enemy with all means at MacArthur's command; and

11 WHEREAS, It is known to everybody that the communist  
12 forces in China and North Korea are armed and directed by  
13 the Soviet Union; that American prisoners are executed by  
14 order of the Soviet Union; exactly as the Polish prisoners were  
15 executed in the Katyn Forest; and

16 WHEREAS, While American boys are dying and mutilated  
17 at the hands of communist Chinese armies, Dean Acheson stands  
18 idly by while the United Nations fails to declare Red China an  
19 aggressor; and

20 WHEREAS, The armies of Chiang on Formosa and millions  
21 of Chinese Nationalist guerrilla forces on the mainland of China  
22 stand willing, able and eager to relieve the pressure on the  
23 United Nations forces in Korea, Dean Acheson refuses or ignores  
24 this friendly support and succor for outnumbered American  
25 forces in Korea; and

26 WHEREAS, The foregoing is thoroughly documented and  
27 established and constitutes but part of the inefficiency, incom-  
28 petence, pro-Soviet and procommunist blunderings of the Sec-  
29 retary of State, Dean Acheson; and

30 WHEREAS, Section 603 at page 288 of Jefferson's Manual  
31 and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States,  
32 under the caption "Inception of Impeachment Proceedings in  
33 the House," provides that among the "various methods of set-  
34 ting an impeachment in motion" is "by charges transmitted  
35 from the Legislature of a State"; now, therefore, be it

36 *Resolved by the Senate and the Assembly of the State of*  
37 *California, jointly,* That the House of Representatives is  
38 respectfully memorialized to immediately institute impeach-  
39 ment proceedings against Secretary of State Dean Acheson,  
40 basing said Bill of Impeachment on the charges hereinabove  
41 set forth and made part hereof by reference together with such  
42 other charges now in the possession and knowledge of the mem-  
43 bers of Congress and its several committees; and be it further

44 *Resolved,* That the Secretary of the Senate is directed to  
45 transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice  
46 President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of  
47 Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from  
48 California in the Congress of the United States.

September 24, 1971

PHILIP CARL JESUP (1949)

On February 10, 1949, Truman appointed Philip C. Jessup, Jr., to new post of Ambassador-at-Large to represent the United States at major international conferences and Special United Nations meetings, and act as diplomatic trouble shooter.

The agreement to lift the Berlin blockade was confirmed on May 4, 1949, and it was Jessup who negotiated the terms with Jacob A. Malik of Russia.

Jessup was one of the fifteen top U.S. Advisors to the Foreign Ministers in Paris in May 1949.

Jessup was a character witness for Alger Hiss, defending him by deposition on June 20, 1949, and on 22 June, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who recommended Hiss as a law clerk to the late Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1929, and Stanley F. Reed, for whom Hiss worked in the Justice Department, lauded Hiss' character and record.

On July 27, 1949, State Department Secretary Dean G. Acheson announced that a thorough review of U.S. policy toward the Far East would be made under Ambassador-at-Large Jessup's direction. Non-government members of the Far East Study group named 30 July 1949 were: Raymond B. Feedick, ex-president of the Rockefeller Foundation and who was its president when the Foundation made a grant of \$20,160 to the marxian socialist New School for Social Research for the benefit of communist Hans Kiefer to do some research in music for the movies; and Everett Case, President of Colgate University.

The U.S. delegation to the United Nations Assembly was confirmed Sept. 26, 1949, and included: Warren R. Austin, delegation chief; Philip C. Jessup; Mrs. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt; and ex-Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, with alternates: Benjamin V. Cohen, Charles Fahy, John D. Richardson, and Mrs. Ruth Rohde.

On September 30, 1949, at the UN Assembly, Jessup recommended Libyan independence within three or four years.



PHILIP C. JACOBY - September 24, 1951 - page 2

On November 17, 1949, the White House announced that Ambassador-at-Large Jacoby, in charge of a review of U.S. Far Eastern policy, would meet at Bangkok late in January 1950, with U.S. diplomats from throughout the Far East.

On November 20, 1949, Jacoby offered a much weaker resolution against the Communists on the China Issue.

On December 4, 1949, the U.N. named as its members of the new U.N. panel of persons available to serve on conciliatory field missions in international disputes: Ambassador-at-Large Jacoby, Ralph J. Bunche, Mark F. Ethridge, Sen. Frank P. Graham, and H. Merle Cochran.

Among the character witnesses for Alger Hiss were: U. S. Ambassador-at-Large Jacoby, Dec. 8, 1949; Stanley K. Hornbeck, former Ambassador to the Netherlands, Dec. 12 and 13, 1949; John W. Davis and Gerard Swepe, Jr., Dec. 13, 1949; and Francis B. Sayre, Hiss' boss in the State Department, Dec. 14, 1949.

Of those mentioned in this memorandum, the following are members of the Council on Foreign Relations, an America Last Internationalist organization:

Philip C. Jacoby	Raymond B. Fealick	Stanley K. Hornbeck
Alger Hiss	Everett Case	John W. Davis
Felix Frankfurter	Benjamin V. Cohen	Gerard Swepe, Jr.
Dean Acheson	Ralph J. Bunche	

In the 1949-50 Annual Report of the Executive Director (Walter H. Mallory) of the Council on Foreign Relations, at pages 39 and 40 it is stated: "But very often the groups serve, as well, as training ground for members called upon to serve the government in important positions. Such instances are too numerous to record here, but members who have recently undertaken official posts include: Thomas K. Finletter, Philip C. Jacoby, Charles M. Spofford, and George H. Shuster."

Perusal of C.F.R. Reports for years back shows that it is internationalist and America Last in character. It never extols the foundations upon which the Republic of the U.S.A. has thrived. Its members, like Dean Acheson, Alger Hiss, Lamelin Currie, Lawrence Duggan, Owen Lattimore, Frederick V. Field and others

PHILIP C. JESSUP - September 24, 1951 - page 2

have done much to underwrite the very foundations upon which our Republic has been built.

Jessup is a Director of C.F.R., as is Thomas K. Finletter, U.S. Air Force Secretary (1949), and John W. Davis, according to this Annual Report (1949-1950).

Other names on Jessup will be worked up and sent to you as verified on other years as the details assembled.

Those names included who are members of the Council on Foreign Relations will have the letters (CFR) following their name.

ALL THE  
FACTS  
THAT  
SHOULD BE  
PRINTED

# HEADLINES

AND WHAT'S BEHIND THEM

FOR  
STUDENTS  
WRITERS  
AND  
SPEAKERS

VOL. III, NO. 1

FEB. 1, 1951

TEN CENTS A COPY

## Uncle Sam's Acheson Used to Work for Uncle Joe

### Acheson O.K.'d Big U. S. Loan For Red Poland

Brother of Alger Hiss,  
Partner of Acheson, Acts  
For Stalin's Polish Puppets

WASHINGTON—One of the most shameful episodes in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's disgraceful career was the U. S. loan of \$90,000,000 to the Communist puppet government of Poland in 1946.

These American funds enabled the bloody Red regime to continue in power in the face of the overwhelming opposition of the Polish people.

Acheson was then Undersecretary of State, and it was his responsibility to make final decisions on all foreign loans.

The Polish Communists made certain that the loan would be pressed at the State Department by the right people by engaging the appropriate Washington lawyers. They selected Acheson's own law firm—Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb.

The lawyer whom the firm designated to handle the case was Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss, who, with his brother, was a member of the Communist-front coterie in the Government in Washington during the 1930's. Donald had become a particular protégé of Dean Acheson's, and had been made a partner in Acheson's law firm after leaving the Government service.

#### Our Ambassador Opposed Loan

Arthur Bliss Lane, American Ambassador to Poland, opposed the loan, but Mr. Acheson decided in favor of the Polish Communists. Later, when the loan was exposed by Congressman Paul W. Shafer, Acheson denied that he had profited financially from the deal.

The important thing is that Acheson, in this instance, supported Communism to the tune of \$90,000,000 with American taxpayer's money, for which his law firm received a fee of \$50,000.

## THE CASE AGAINST SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON

### WANTED!

#### A Pro-American Secretary of State

Congressman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., on his recent return from Korea, told us that one of the questions asked him by our G. L. on the firing line was:

"How about this guy Acheson, is he on our side?"

It is a question which is being increasingly asked at home as the American people awake to a realization of who is responsible for the fearful national humiliation which we have suffered in the Far East.

With American soldiers dying miserably in Korea before the shock troops of Communism, America confronts the grim fact that its foreign policy is in the hands of a man whose entire career reeks with pro-Communism.

In the whole roll call of Washington officialdom there is probably no man more unfit to hold public office at a time like this than Dean Acheson as Secretary of State.

And yet, in the face of an almost nation-wide demand for his dismissal, President Truman stubbornly persists in retaining him, and in following his advice.

So this life-long Stalin appeaser continues arrogantly to chart American foreign policy.

Nothing is more important to the American people, if they want to stop Russia, than to know the truth about Acheson.

Some of the truth has already penetrated the public consciousness. A deep and smoldering distrust of the State Department is spreading, with prairie fire intensity, over the entire nation.

But there is still much which is misunderstood.

When we examine the indictment against Acheson, the thing which strikes us between the eyes is the blasting weight of the evidence against him.

Dean Acheson stands convicted of incompetence or worse, not upon a single count, but upon wholesale malfeasance and nonfeasance. When we total the evidence, it is damning in its completeness.

In November, 1945, Mr. Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, appeared with Paul Robeson at New York's Madison Square Garden, under the auspices of an organization which has since been cited by the Attorney General of the United States as a Communist front, and declared that—

"There is no specific reason to suppose (that) the vital interests of the American and Russian people will ever be opposed."

This false picture of the relationship between the United States and Communist Russia has

(continued on page two)

### SERVICE FOR RUSSIA WAS 'QUALIFICATION' FOR GOVERNMENT JOB

Senator Millard Tydings  
of 'Operation Whitewash'  
Revealed an Acheson's  
First Political Sponsor

WASHINGTON—It is a matter of public record in Congressional archives that Dean Acheson—the man whom President Truman recently hailed as the "foremost foe of Communism"—was once on the payroll of the President's one-time pal "Good Old Joe" Stalin. Secretary of State Acheson was legal counsel to Soviet Russia before he entered our Government's service.

Paradoxically, the man who revealed this skeleton in Acheson's past was Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, who recently achieved notoriety as the Secretary's most unrestrained defender against

(continued on page seven)

### Legion Head Asks Removal of Dean Acheson

Declares American People  
Have Lost Confidence in  
State Department "Fish"

INDIANAPOLIS, Sept. 21.—The dismissal of Dean G. Acheson as Secretary of State was demanded today by George N. Craig, National Commander of the American Legion, in a speech delivered at a Constitution Day meeting here.

"It is increasingly apparent," said Commander Craig, "that the people of the United States have lost confidence in the trustworthiness of our State Department. Its officials must be replaced if that confidence is to be restored."

"Replacement of Dean Acheson and his pink cohort would be a welcome relief to the American people. It should be demanded at once."

## Plan Acheson Buried Could Have Prevented Korean War

Far East Expert Buried Too

**SAN FRANCISCO.** The forgotten man of the Korean war is Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who is sitting out the war in the Army Post at the Presidio here.

General Wedemeyer, the Army's greatest China expert, is the man who could have halted the Communist conquest of China, and prevented the Korean war.

The Big Brain in Washington who shelved General Wedemeyer while there was still a chance to stop Mao Tse-tung was Dean G. Acheson.

Gen. Wedemeyer concededly did a brilliant job in China in 1944 and '45. He ended the war enjoying the full confidence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the other principal Chinese leaders. He was America's most valuable ace in China affairs.

In 1947, while the Chinese Communists were still contained by General Chiang north of the Yellow River, General Wedemeyer was sent to survey the military situation. It was one of the few really intelligent moves made in the Far East since V-J Day.

Wedemeyer expertly performed his mission and came out of China with a detailed plan which could have saved Manchuria and all of China south of the Yellow River from Red conquest. The plan involved American financial and supply aid to China, but without American ground forces. Following his China survey, he made a similar survey of the military situation in Korea.

At this point, Undersecretary, Dean G. Acheson and his

### ACHESON WANTED TO ARM CHINESE COMMUNISTS

It is a grim reflection today, when Chinese Communists are killing American boys, that less than five-years ago Dean G. Acheson appeared before the House Foreign Relations Committee with a plan to contribute American money to arm the Chinese Communist armies. On June 19, 1946, at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Acheson championed a program for a ten year lend lease set-up for China which included money to arm the Chinese Red army.

Leftist clique in the State Department stepped in.

Before he left China, General Wedemeyer was gagged, but a press release was issued in his name in which the National (Chiang) Government was pointedly criticized. On his return he was forbidden to release any part of his report until it had been cleared by the State Department.

What followed was almost incredible in its stupidity. The Wedemeyer report was buried in the locked files of the State Department. Even Congress was refused a peep at its contents.

It remained a tight secret until July, 1949, when it was finally published. In part, as a section of the notorious State Department 'White Paper.' Meanwhile all China had been taken over by the Communists. Mr. Acheson waited until it would no longer do the anti-Communist forces any good, then he made some of it public.

The Korea section of the Report is still a secret.

As in his China recommendations, General Wedemeyer gave specific suggestions as to what should be done to safeguard Korea against Communist aggression. Had his advice been followed, the present Korea disaster could never have occurred.

Manifestly, Mr. Acheson does not dare release the Wedemeyer Korean report because it would show the nation that by his suppression of the report in 1947, he and his Russia-first group in the State Department are directly responsible for the ghastly Korean situation.

## Acheson Shields Brother-in-law of Russia's Molotov

Tells Un-American Activities Committee that Investigation of \$100,000,000 Deal Would Hurt Friendly Relations With Soviet Russia

The Sam Carp mystery first struck Washington on September 13, 1939 when the Committee on Un-American Activities discovered that this obscure individual — a filling station operator in Bridgeport, Conn. — had credentials authorizing him to spend \$100,000,000 of Russian money in the United States for Russian equipment, including two battleships.

Carp, it turned out, was a brother-in-law of V. M. Molotov, Premier in the Soviet Government.

Carp had paid a fee of \$32,000 to a member of the Democratic National Committee and a fee of \$25,000 to an assistant publicity director of the Democratic National Committee to get Administration clearance of his battleship orders.

This was as far as the Committee got in its quiz of Sam Carp in 1939. It was apparent that he had powerful friends in high places.

The second chapter came in September, 1945, when Congress decided to look into Carp's war-time activities.

At this point, Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, entered the case.

Acheson made a peremptory request of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (continued on page seven)

## GRIM HUMOR DEPARTMENT

FRANKFURTER IS PAL OF ACHESON SAYS HAMBURGER

Where Dean G. Acheson gets some of his unfortunate ideas for State Department policy was revealed by Phillip Hamburger, in the awe-touched Acheson profile he did for the New Yorker Magazine in 1949.

It appears that Acheson has a daily confab with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. The Justice, who was a character witness for Alger Hiss, and who was also the sponsor for a government post for Leo Treisman, self-confessed former Communist member, lives near Acheson in Georgetown.

Each morning, if the weather permits, the two



FRANKFURTER

master-minds of the Truman Administration meet and walk together the mile and a half between the Acheson home and the State Department.

On these walks, Mr. Hamburger explains, Acheson is able to thrash out with the omniscient Frankfurter the problems which are facing the State Department.

## Veterans Demand Acheson Ouster

ST. LOUIS, August 30. — Representing 1,250,000 organized veterans who have seen overseas service, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, at its 1950 encampment today, demanded that President Truman fire Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and condemned his policy "endangering our beloved country."

## WANTED! A Pro-American... Cont.

been continuously painted by Dean Acheson during his career in the State Department... until the very recent past.

It has been echoed by his yes-men in the Department.

It has immobilized the American will to resist Russia during the all-decisive years when Stalin was preparing for his present hostilities against our nation.

Had Russia been able to place its own agent as head of our State Department, he could not have served Communist interests more surely than has our present apostle of Red appeasement.

The end of the ghastly road down which Acheson has led our nation is now facing us in East Asia.

It is being crimsoned by the blood of American boys who are paying the price for Mr. Acheson's incredible machinations.

To continue this misleader in this exalted office, in the face of what has happened, is a gratuitous slap in the face of every loyal American.

To allow the fate of our country to rest in his stupid, bungling hands, in the perilous weeks and months ahead, would be an invitation to disaster.

**DEAN ACHESON MUST GO!**

*His successor must be a man unreservedly pro-American.*

# State Department Encouraged Chinese Reds Earl Browder Reveals

## Communists Not 'Serious Menace' Said Note to Mao

Hurt Our Ally and Delayed U. S. Victory Against Japan

WASHINGTON — That the State Department, while pretending to be devoted to the National Government in China during the war, was privately negotiating with the Chinese Communists, who were impeding the war against Japan, was the bomb-shell revelation which Earl Browder, ex-Communist, dropped before the Tydings Committee on April 26, 1950.

Browder testified that on October 12, 1942, when Dean Acheson was Assistant Secretary of State, he and Robert Minor were invited to come to the State Department. There they met, among others, Lauchlin Currie.

They were handed a confidential message to be sent to Madame Sun Yat-sen (now an official of the Communist Government in Peiping) for forwarding to Mao Tse-tung, now directing Red China's war against us.

In this message, Mao was advised that a change had been made in America's China policy. The United States, said the memorandum, was not supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists.

The memorandum further stated: "This Government has in fact viewed with apprehension many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of Communism in China."

### AMERICA BETRAYED

This 68-page Report is crammed full of facts on the betrayal of American interests by the Acheson State Department clique. It reveals FBI secrets in State Department files and names more than 100 Reds who got on the State Department payroll.

Fifty Cents a Copy

Order from  
Constitutional Educational League  
312 Madison Ave., New York 17



ACHESON



HISS

### Quote-of-the-Year

"I refuse to turn my back on Alger Hiss."

## Amerasia 'Cover-up' Masks Real Red Agents in the Government

Case Was Acheson's Springboard to Power in State Department

One of the most impudent, arrogant and sinister episodes of Mr. Acheson's service in the State Department was the cover-up conspiracy in the AMERASIA spy case in 1945.

To this day, the real truth about the AMERASIA scandal has not been disclosed to the public. When the Tydings Committee had a chance to get at the truth last year, Chairman Tydings conducted the major hearings in secret and declined to subpoena witnesses who could have presented damaging facts about State Department complicity in protecting the Red spies, or about Department of Justice duplicity in handling the case.

The AMERASIA case developed out of raids by O.S.S. officers and F.B.I. agents on the AMERASIA offices in 1945 in the course of which they recovered 1,700 Government secret documents, which had been illegally removed from State Department and other agency files. Also found in the magazine office was elaborate photographic reproducing equipment.

Thanks to the vigilance of then Undersecretary Joseph C. Grew, the State Department insisted that the Department of Justice make a thorough probe of the case. F.B.I. agents arrested six persons for guilty

participation in the theft of State Department documents—Philip J. Jaffe and Kate L. Mitchell, publisher and editor of AMERASIA, Mark Gayn and Andrew Roth, writers, and John Stewart Service and Emmanuel S. Larsen, State Department employees.

The case was half-heartedly presented to the Grand Jury by Asst. Attorney General Robert M. Hitchcock, who later left the Government service to join the Buffalo law firm of Miss Mitchell's uncle.

The upshot was that Gayn, Service and Miss Mitchell were not indicted, Roth was indicted but the indictment was later quashed, and Jaffe and Larsen were allowed to plead guilty and get off with fines of \$2,500 and \$500 each.

What makes the AMERASIA case smelly is the fact that Dean Acheson and his Leftist

### ACHESON PREVENTS F.B.I. ARREST OF 22 RED RUSSIAN SPIES

Dean Acheson has stopped the F. B. I. from making 22 arrests of known Russian spies.

In each case, the F. B. I. had prepared a night case against the enemy agent. But under the plea of not embarrassing Soviet-American diplomatic relations, Acheson halted the arrests.

## Red Spy Guilty Gets 15 Years Freed by Acheson

The arrest on March 5, 1949 of Valentin Gubitchev, United Nations Soviet staff member, who was apprehended in the act of receiving stolen U. S. documents from Judith Coplon, centered national attention upon the possibility that the U. N. was sheltering numerous Red spies carrying on espionage in this country.

After the Gubitchev arrest, Secretary Acheson was urged from all sides to develop a policy for screening U. N. staff members, to prevent the U. N. from being used as a sanctuary for espionage. Mr. Acheson declined to take such action.

On March 7, 1950, Gubitchev, after a trial with Miss Coplon in the Federal District court in New York, was found guilty of espionage and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

At the request of Soviet Ambassador Panyushkin, Acheson arranged for Gubitchev's release, and he returned to Russia.

In discussing Acheson's action, Senator George W. Malone of Nevada declared:

"It means that the United States will be thrown wide open to Russian and other spies and there are a great many more like Gubitchev now facing no greater danger than to get caught at it."

coterie used the case as a means of pressuring President Truman to drop Grew from the Undersecretaryship and to appoint Acheson in his place.

Philip J. Jaffe commented on this coup: "At least, we got Grew."

Since Acheson's arrival at the top in the State Department, every effort to have a thorough and honest ventilation of the AMERASIA case has been skillfully thwarted.

A searching inquiry into the true facts behind the AMERASIA case and the 'cover-up' conspiracy, would certainly lead to the revelation of the real pro-Soviet forces in the State Department, and in other Government agencies, which have been continuously betraying us to communist Russia.

Dean Acheson does not dare permit such a disclosure.

## HEADLINES

AND WHAT'S BEHIND THEM

Published in the Interest of Speakers,  
Writers, Students, and everyone in search  
of the facts.

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## Making America Grovel

Even if there were no other impellent reasons for Dean Acheson's speedy replacement, his cringing irrefutable stand, as America's spokesman in the United Nations, convicts him as an incredible misfit as Secretary of State.

There is an increasing belief among clear thinking Americans that the United States made a fearful blunder in 1945 in launching the U. N. The fact that Alger Hiss was the Secretary General of the San Francisco meeting which spawned it is indicative of the dark forces which got us into this deadfall.

But since we are trapped in the U. N., it might at least be hoped that our State Department spokesmen would use its platform to defend courageously American interests and objectives.

Unhappily, Dean Acheson and his underlings have not done so.

The tortuous Acheson twists and turns, on the simple issue of declaring Communist China an aggressor, reflect a man who is painfully unsure both of himself and his country. The United States in the U. N., holding every ace in its hands, has played a fearful, vacillating and dishonorable role. Under Acheson's palated direction, the American delegation has permitted U. N. leadership to pass to India and to Great Britain on every vital issue. The American voice has muffled down into an abject echo of the British Socialists.

The ultimate touch was the humiliating State Department acceptance of the 'cease fire' proposal of January 13 which would have committed the United States to a doomed negotiation with Red China on the fate of Formosa and Red admittance to the U. N.

It remained for General Carlos Romulo, the unfrightened spokesman of the Philippines, to express the depth of national degradation to which we had sunk in this Acheson surrender. In accepting the cease-fire proposal, America seemed to say, Romulo declared:

"You may stop hitting and killing my boys so that we can discuss how to reward you with the gift of Formosa and a seat in the United Nations."

Dean Acheson's career in the U. N. has been a record of appeasement and crawling before Soviet Russia which has made Americans ashamed.

As the most powerful nation in the world, we had no need to plead in the U. N., we could, at all times, have exerted red-blooded leadership.

Instead, Dean Acheson has chosen to make America grovel.

## Gunning for MacArthur

The most dismayed thing about Dean Acheson's ascendancy in Washington is the fact that he is not satisfied to confine his pathetic blunders to the field of diplomacy.

He also insists upon dominating the nation's military policy as well.

In his midnight dreams he envisages himself, not only as a Talleyrand, but also as a Napoleon.

Ever since his rise to domination in the State Department in 1945, he has treated the Pentagon as a mere rubber stamp to the Great Brains at Foggy Bottom. And he has been able to get away with it, thanks to the discreet alliance which he has maintained with the aging General Marshall.

Only two serious threats to Acheson's rule over the American defense establishments have arisen since 1945.

One of these was Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense from 1949 to 1950; the other was General Douglas MacArthur.

Acheson got rid of Johnson in the Fall of 1950 when President Truman needed a whipping boy to fire just before the elections.

MacArthur has proved a more formidable obstacle to the Acheson machinations, but the redoubtable Dean is still gunning for him.

The web of intrigue is being continuously spun at the State Department to trap and destroy America's greatest military leader.

The fruit of Acheson's long rule over American foreign and military policy is the ghastly situation which now yawns in East Asia.

If Acheson succeeds in pulling down MacArthur—and he has powerful British as well as Fair Deal support in his attempt—the collapse of our whole American security position in the Pacific will surely follow.

## Why Wait, Mr. President?

The defiant stubbornness with which President Truman clings to Secretary of State Acheson is one of the most frightening portents of the war crisis facing the United States.

It is a performance almost childish in its peevishness.

With one breath, the President calls on all the American people to close ranks and prepare to make incredible sacrifices for the defense effort.

In the next breath, he declares that Dean Acheson will remain in the Secretaryship of State as long as he is President, despite the fact that one of the most formidable groundswells of public opinion in American history is roaring for Acheson's resignation, dismissal, or impeachment.

A Kansas City politician should know better. A patriotic statesman would not make such a mistake . . . for long.

There might be some feeble excuse for the Truman attitude if Dean Acheson was a capable Secretary of State who had honestly served his country.

Unfortunately, Acheson represents an almost all-time low among our forty-nine Secretaries of State, both as to



Col Alley—Memphis Commercial Appeal  
"ATTACK!!!"

ability and integrity. During his years in the State Department he has been the conscious architect of the greatest national humiliation which a proud America has been called upon to suffer.

To objectively the disaster which has come to America, we have only to recount how our power has receded in the last five years.

When Acheson became Undersecretary in 1945, the United States headed an invincible alliance of 1,700,000,000 people in the free nations of the world. Our enemy, Soviet Russia, could count upon the support of only 200,000,000 against us.

Today, the population count of the nations which purportedly stand with the United States in the world struggle has dwindled to only 580,000,000.

Soviet Russia heads a population bloc against us which has risen to the staggering total of 830,000,000.

In five years, after one of the most smashing military victories in history, we have tossed away, by a craven policy of Russia appeasement, our military hegemony over the world.

The Secretary of State who has presided over this catastrophe has been Dean Acheson.

If confronted by such stupendous failure on the part of an employer, any corner businessman, even a haberdasher, would know what to do.

He would cut his unworthy, unsuccessful servant off the payroll without a second's hesitation. He would not keep him around to do further damage.

But President Truman, in the face of Acheson's appalling record, holds onto him as the chief of his Cabinet with a grim and sullen obstinacy.

The next few months may decide the whole future of America's political and economic existence.

Can we afford to go into that perilous future with a man directing our foreign policies who has forfeited every iota of official and public confidence?

That is the question which President Truman must answer as he communes with himself in the silent night hours in the Blair House.

Why wait, Mr. President?

# WHEN DEAN ACHESON TRIED TO SOVIETIZE JAPAN

**State Department Red Clique Planned to Socialize Japan as 'Bridge of Friendship' Between U. S. and Moscow**

If and when General MacArthur writes his memoirs, an important chapter will tell of the continuous struggle which he has waged with Dean Acheson and his pro-Communist coterie to prevent them from giving Russia a fatal foothold in Japan.

Had Acheson had his way, Stalin would already have a puppet in the Emperor's palace.

Fortunately, this is one part of the world where the Hislaving Dean hasn't been able to get away with his scheming.

It is now apparent that Stalin's plans, after V-J Day, called for a quick absorption of Japan into the Russian sphere of influence. He was strengthened in this purpose by belief that the appease-Russia policies which had dominated Washington during the war would continue long enough into the peace to enable him to swallow up Japan.

But two men stood in Stalin's way. One was General Douglas MacArthur. The other was Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary of State on V-J Day, a man who knew the score, particularly when it came to Red Russia.

**Acheson Clique Wanted to Coarsen Business and Redistribute Land**

The directives which MacArthur was to follow in Japan were based upon the Grew-MacArthur plan of preserving the monarchy and the existent social and economic order in Japan, pending the return of peace.

But this proposal ran counter to the thinking of Acheson and his Far East advisers — Lauchlin Currie, Owen Lattimore

and John Carter Vincent. The Left Wingers were thinking in terms of a social revolution in Japan, with abolition of the monarchy, confiscation of large business holdings, and widespread redistribution of the land.

Through a State Department intrigue in August, 1945, the new President Truman was induced by the Left Wingers to drop Grew and appoint Dean Acheson in his place. The pro-Communist newspaper P. M. greeted this change with the boast, "Now State Department policy has a better appreciation of what the Soviet Union wants."

Acheson almost immediately came to a clash with MacArthur over Soviet-American relations in Japan.

At the time, Russia was endeavoring to pressure MacArthur into accepting a joint set-

## Acheson Defended Roosevelt Aide Accused As Source For Red Spies

**Currie Had Overruled Army by Destroying Arms for Anti-Reds**

Dean Acheson's famous assertion, "I will not turn my back upon Alger Hiss" has become a national byword.

It is not so well known that Acheson fronted for another extremely important Government Leftist who was accused before the un-American Activities Committee of having supplied secret war information for the Soviet spy ring.

This is Lauchlin Currie, White House Administrative Secretary under Roosevelt. In 1948, Elizabeth Bentley, self-confessed former Communist spy ring agent, named Currie as one of those who had given her confidential information which she had transmitted to the Russians.

When Lauchlin Currie appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee to answer the Bentley charges, Dean Acheson appeared as his counsel.

Currie's role in the ruin of China has been central. He was sent twice to China by President Roosevelt during the war as American adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Posing as a friend of the Chiangs, he worked stealthily to aid the Chinese Communists. He was responsible for the incredible selection of Owen Lattimore in 1941 as President Roosevelt's personal adviser to the Generalissimo. He selected Solomon Adler, identified by Miss Bentley as a Communist Party member, for a \$10,000 a year high financial post in China.

The most notable of Currie's services to Communism, was his order, in June, 1945, on White House stationery, to destroy the surplus American arms which were earmarked for delivery to Chiang Kai-shek. The U. S. chiefs of staff and General Eisenhower had agreed that this immense stockpile of arms should be given to our Chinese allies. Had China received them, Chiang could easily have suppressed the Chinese Communists; and there would have been no Korean war.

Instead, by Currie's order, they were dumped into the Indian Ocean. Eighteen Liberty ships were kept busy for eight months after V-J Day dumping these munitions. A total of 120,000 tons was destroyed.

issued a public rebuke to MacArthur, informing him that Japan policy would be made by the State Department and not by the Commander.

Sometime later, John Carter Vincent got into the act with a second rebuke. MacArthur had made a sharp criticism of the Communists in Japan. Vincent issued a press statement admonishing MacArthur that he was not reflecting State Department policies. The State Department, he said, planned to use Japan to build a "bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union."

Simultaneously, Owen Lattimore was shipped to MacArthur as a Reparations Commissioner, to add to the weight of the pro-Soviet factor in Japan.

Had MacArthur been a lesser man, he would perhaps have buckled under the Acheson pressure. But he was then, at the peak of his prestige. With the support of Secretary James A. Forrestal, he rejected the Acheson-Vincent revised directives with such vigor that Acheson was forced to retreat.

The policy which Acheson has used toward MacArthur since 1945 has been one of constant pin-pricking. Unable to hamstring him in Japan, Acheson has been studious to ignore MacArthur's ideas in other points of the Far East. Japan has been conceded as MacArthur's show, but the Administration has resisted any proposal to give MacArthur a voice in China or Korea. These areas have been strictly State Department. Since the Far East problem is interlinked and cannot be intelligently handled by such divided policies, American interests have cruelly suffered from this exclusion of MacArthur.

**Loss of China to Communism and Disastrous Korean War Fruits of Acheson Policy**

The present catastrophe in Korea stems directly from State Department blundering. The loss of China is another tragic monument to Acheson stupidity.

It is a glaring commentary on Acheson that the one area in the Far East where he has been halted from exercising authority — Japan — is the one shining American Far East success.



up in Japan under which Russia would have a veto over all American occupation policies. MacArthur was firmly resisting this demand and conceding to the Russians only consultative powers.

Then John Carter Vincent was appointed as head of the interdepartmental committee on Japan policy in place of Grew's man, Eugene Dooman. On September 6th, Vincent convened the committee and drastically altered MacArthur's directives, adding Owen Lattimore's plan to dethrone the Mikado. The new directives were rushed to MacArthur.

Meanwhile, the Acheson clique determined to give MacArthur a lesson which would make him realize who was boss. The General had issued a statement in Japan declaring that an occupation force of 200,000 would be sufficient for the peace period. Acheson, who was contemplating elaborate policing of Japan while the social revolution was under way, bristled at this statement. On September 30th, he

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## SOME OF DEAN ACHESON'S 'BOYS'

### Philip S. Jessup

Philip S. Jessup is a man after Acheson's heart. Under the nurturing hands of the Secretary, Jessup has been advanced rapidly until he is now recognized as the No. 2 man in the Department.

He is generally looked upon as the man who has the say-so in Far East policy.

In 1949, after the National Government in China had fallen, Jessup was announced with a grand flourish by Secretary Acheson as the man who was going to reconstruct an American policy in the Far East. While Jessup was still reconstructing, the Communists struck in Korea, and America and its allies have been in steady retreat in Asia ever since.

If Philip S. Jessup is a 'Far East expert,' his record doesn't show it. The high light of his Far East activities was the preparation of a pro-Communist smear story against Chiang Kai-shek's government which was released on July 14, 1943 by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Jessup was then Chairman of the Research Advisory Committee of the American Council of the Institute, and in direct supervision over the FAR EASTERN SURVEY in which the smear article appeared.

To author the smear, the I.P.R. selected T. A. Blison, a man who had been on the editorial board of an official Communist Party publication, and who had spoken with Earl Browder and other Party celebrities at Red meetings in New York.

Jessup's understanding of China, may be seen in the following statement which climaxed the article:

"There are two Chinas. One is now generally called Kuomintang China; the other, is called Communist China. However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other democratic China."

This, of course, is the familiar Moscow lie, which Dean Acheson and Owen Lattimore accepted, that the Chinese Communists are just agrarian democrats.

On February 16, 1946, Jessup signed a letter which was published in the New York TIMES, urging that the United States should discontinue making atom bombs, and that the disposal of our existent stockpile of bombs should be

left to the decision of the United Nations. This was before Russia had the bomb, and at a time when Soviet representatives were working desperately to persuade the United States to give up voluntarily its atom bomb advantage.

In the Department of State, Jessup was the man who prepared the infamous 'White Paper' in 1949, in which the Administration unctuously washed its hands of any responsibility for the stopping of Communism in China. The 'White Paper' was worth fifty divisions to Mao Tse-tung in killing the Chinese will to resist Communism.

But the shining moment in Jessup's career came in June, 1949, when he appeared in court in New York as a character witness for Alger Hiss.

At the time Jessup endorsed Hiss, all the treasonable facts about Hiss's activities were a matter of public record.

In the face of these facts, he declared Hiss a good American.

The performance is a measure of the Americanism of Mr. Jessup himself.

### Owen Lattimore

Owen Lattimore's connection with the State Department under Acheson is unofficial but important.

Professionally, Lattimore is the head of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations in Baltimore which trains young men for State Department careers. Actually, until the McCarthy expose made both Acheson and Lattimore more cautious, Lattimore was in and out of the State Department at all times as Acheson's top adviser on Far East matters.

All the evidence connecting Lattimore with the Communist Party was not developed fully at the Tydings Committee hearings. No honest effort was made to pursue the Lattimore trail to its relentless conclusion.

But this much was adduced. Louis F. Budenz, former top Communist, testified unqualifiedly that Lattimore had been identified to him, in several meetings of top officers of the Party, at the head of the Communist 'cell' in the Institute of Pacific Relations. He named Earl Browder, Jack Stachel and Frederick Vanderbilt Field as those who had named Lattimore as an undercover Com-

munist.

A large number of confirmatory facts were brought out, then or later.

Lattimore had visited the Chinese Red capital, Yenan, in June, 1937, in company with T. A. Blison and Phillip J. Jaffe, who were both identified officially with the Communist Party front, the Friends of the Chinese People.

That same year, in an editorial in PACIFIC AFFAIRS, organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, he justified Stalin's Moscow trials—an issue



LATTIMORE

which has always been regarded as a litmus paper test of actual Communist allegiance.

Lattimore has admitted that his secretary in the I.P.R. was Harriet Levine, niece of the Communist, Phillip J. Jaffe, and wife of Chao Ting-chi, now one of the top Chinese Communist leaders.

Lattimore was listed as one of the original editors of AMERASIA, Jaffe's magazine, which was implicated in the State Department spy case of 1945, in which Jaffe pleaded guilty.

In 1947, Lattimore's wife, Eleanor, in cooperation with a curious group of Communist suspects, left-wingers and fellow travelers launched the Washington radio station, WQQW, and was a member of the board of directors. Behind the station was the mysterious Rodman family of Washington, members of which have frequently been charged, in hearings of the Un-American

Activities Committee, with membership in the Communist Party. Bella Rodman, sister-in-law of the present president of WQQW is now under the citation of contempt by the Un-American Activities Committee.

Significantly Lattimore's office address in Washington in 1947, 1710 G Street, N.W., was the same office that was used by the Committee of a Thousand, a Communist Party front which was organized to smear the Un-American Activities Committee. The building at 1710 G Street is owned by Samuel J. Rodman, of WQQW.

In 1943, when Lattimore was Deputy Director of Pacific Operations for the O.W.I., he wrote a letter to Joseph Barnes, in the Washington O.W.I. office, instructing him to secure Chinese personnel for the O.W.I. staff from the NEW CHINA DAILY NEWS, the New York Chinese Communist newspaper.

Another lead which was not developed at all at the Tydings hearings seem to indicate communication with Dr. Richard Sorge, top Russian Communist spy in Japan who was executed by the Japanese in 1944. This allegation has been made by Willy Rudolph Forster, now in Switzerland, a self-admitted Russian espionage agent whose wife is alleged to have been the bearer of a letter from Sorge to Lattimore. The whole Sorge spy case has been investigated with mystery, but Army records in Japan have a fat dossier on Sorge which has never been opened to the press.

The bits of evidence connecting Lattimore with the Communists are too numerous to be brushed aside, as Senator Tydings and other Administration spokesmen have tried to do.

Lattimore's revealed advice to the State Department on Far East policy convicts him as an undisguised appeaser of

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Communism. In his memorandum to the State Department in August, 1949, Lattimore recommended three steps for the United States:

- (1) American recognition of Communist China;
- (2) Admission of Communist China to the United Nations;
- (3) The United States should get out of Korea.

It is significant to note that these are the identical three demands which the Chinese Communist delegation recently served upon the United Nations.

Had Acheson followed Lattimore's advice — and we now know that he came very near doing so — America would have headed to Red China on a plateau just what Mao Tse-tung wants.

**John Carter Vincent**

John Carter Vincent is presently the American Minister to Switzerland.

He stepped into this post after four years as Assistant Chief, Head of the China Desk, and finally Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State. During these four years, he was Acheson's "boy" and he faithfully and relentlessly carried out the Acheson-Lattimore China policies which have brought America to disaster in the Far East.

In the loyalty records of the State Department, Vincent has an extremely large question mark behind his name, although he was not brought into the Tydings Committee investigations.

The most questionable incident in his record occurred in 1945 when certain top secret information, which the State Department was closely guarding, turned up in Moscow. Investigation of the possible leak pointed directly to Vincent as the only person who

had access to the data at the moment. With the powerful backing of Acheson, Vincent was able to avoid a public quiz on the incident, although an O.S.S. official issued a warning at the time against allowing him to have contact with any more confidential material.

Vincent will go down in history as the man who wrote the instructions for General Marshall on December 15, 1945, obligating him to go to China and insist that Chiang Kai-shek form a coalition government with the Chinese Communists.

General Marshall, in his recent confirmation hearings after appointment as Secretary of Defense, disclaimed any personal responsibility for the coalition policy.

"The policy had been drawn up in the State Department," he stated. "That policy of course speaks for itself."

The man who drew up the policy was John Carter Vincent, with the cooperation of Dean G. Acheson.

We now know that it was this fatal Vincent-Acheson policy, requiring Chiang Kai-shek to disarm part of his Army

and accept a series of truces with the Communists when he was at the peak of his strength, that actually won the Chinese. (continued on page eight)

**Case of Sam Carp**

(continued) that it abandon its plan to hold public hearings on Carp. Such a course, he declared, would hurt friendly relations between the United States and Russia.

How Russia could take offense, if Carp's activities had been proper, Mr. Acheson did not make clear. However, in view of the earnestness with which Acheson opposed the inquiry, the Committee acceded to his wishes.

It has never been explained why Stalin gave Carp \$100,000,000 to spend independently of Amtorg, the official above-board Soviet purchasing agency. Is it possible that he had other functions in America apart from Soviet procurement?

Mr. Acheson is determined that the American people are not going to find out.

**Why HEADLINES?**

In 1933, the Constitutional Educational League started the publication of a bi-monthly guidepost on Communist and other un-American activities. During the ensuing months, this little newspaper was greeted widely as the most authoritative searchlight on the facts about Communism.

Few activities, in the 32 year career of the League, have had such an important impact on public thinking. But the demands upon our time of other tasks, intensified by the war urgencies, made it necessary to discontinue HEADLINES in its second year.

It has always been our cherished intention to resume publication when facilities would permit. New circumstances demand it.

Today, with our Country poised upon the brink of world-wide conflict with Communism, the need of such a truth-telling, hard-hitting newspaper, which can clarify confused public thinking, is imperative.

With this issue, HEADLINES begins its fight to enlighten and enlarge constructive American opinion.

One unique feature of this little newspaper is the fact that most numbers will be built around a single aspect of America's struggle against the subversive danger. Hence, readers will find it useful to retain their issues as a permanent ready-to-use reference file on un-American forces in our national life.

HEADLINES will have as its particular task the unmasking of the hidden and unsuspected allies of Communism who, today, constitute America's major problem. These saboteurs of American freedom — more dangerous than admitted Communists — masquerade under attractive and disarming "Liberal" and Socialist names. HEADLINES will turn the X-Ray of scrutiny upon their anti-American activities in every field.

HEADLINES will pull no punches. Big names and big reputations will not deter us from the pitiless exposure of all enemies of our American way of life.

HEADLINES is not interested in any man's creed, color, or racial origin. In its showdown fight against Communism it will be guided by only one consideration — are the individuals or groups for, or against, America? More specifically, do they uphold, or would they destroy, our cherished institutions?

HEADLINES will do its utmost to encourage the things which unite us as a free people, rather than to emphasize the things which divide.

To be a strong voice of Americanism, HEADLINES must receive the widest possible national circulation. How successful it will be will depend upon the active interest, cooperation, and loyalty of its readers.

**Uncle Sam's Acheson Worked for Uncle Joe**

(continued)

charges of pro-Communism in his Department of State.

Acheson's Russian employment was brought to light in the course of a Senate Committee hearing on his confirmation as Undersecretary of the Treasury, a post to which President Roosevelt had named him. The case is set forth in the Congressional Record, May 16, 1935; page 3484.

The late Senator James Couzens of Michigan strenuously opposed Acheson's confirmation on the grounds that his Washington law firm had many big business clients who would have income tax refund cases during Acheson's tenure. He questioned whether Acheson could be impartial.

Senator Tydings came to Acheson's defense:

"It has not been said," declared Tydings, "but should be said, that Mr. Acheson has represented the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It might be contended that because he represented modern Russia, that because the Soviets have been his clients, therefore he is a 'Red' or 'radical' or unfit to hold the office to which he has been nominated."

"Mr. Acheson is not a reactionary. I think he is a progressive-minded man. I do not think he is a member in any sense of the word, and I do not think the connections with large financial interests which he has had, together with connections with labor and Communist interests, have in any way altered his viewpoint of life or of government."

After Senator Tydings' vigorous defense the Senate confirmed Acheson's appointment.

In the same Senate discussion it was brought out clearly that Tydings was sponsoring Acheson's political career.

Asked if he had sponsored Acheson for the Treasury post, Tydings replied in the negative, adding: "I had recommended Mr. Acheson for Solicitor General of the United States."

The incident is revealing in view of Tydings' recklessly biased conduct of the Senate investigation last year into Senator McCarthy's State Department charges. The selection of the man who originally brought Acheson into the Government to act as an 'impartial' judge of the charges against his protégé was obviously the result of political fixing. Senator Tydings' acceptance of the Chairmanship of the investigating committee was contemptuous of Senatorial integrity, and a fraud upon the American people.

**ACHESON'S 'BOYS' - cont.**

civil war for the Communists. The Red victory was made all the more certain when Marshall proclaimed an embargo on further grants of American arms to Chiang's army. Obviously Acheson and Vincent planned it that way.

**John Stewart Service**

John Stewart Service, now a State Department Foreign Service officer in India, was one of the most insolent of the State Department clique which plotted the ruin of war-time China's anti-Communist government.

Attached to General Stilwell's staff in 1943-44, he persuaded the General to take the disastrous step of advocating direct American military aid to the Chinese Communists, over the Generalissimo Chiang

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Kai-shek's head. This Stilwell blunder resulted in his recall in 1944.

While China was fighting for its life against the powerful Japanese offensive in 1944, Service was sending back poison pen letters to the State Department in Washington blackguarding the Generalissimo and urging the United States to prepare for cooperation with Chinese Communists. This stab-in-the back of America's ally may be read, in part, in pages 564-576 of the 'White Paper.'

In 1945, Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley found Service's activities so intolerable that he sent him home as 'useless' in China in view of his pro-Communist bias.

On June 6, 1945, Service was arrested by the F.B.I. for complicity in the AMERASIA State Department spy case. Although evidence was in the hands of the F.B.I. showing that Max Granich, a Russian agent, working under Vassili M. Zubelin, Secretary General of the Russian Embassy at Washington, had been assigned as a go-between for Service and Philip J. Jaffe, Communist publisher of AMERASIA, and that Service had turned over State Department data to Jaffe, Service was mysteriously cleared by the Grand Jury.

Through every effort to rid the State Department of this equivocal character, Dean Acheson has stood staunchly behind Service. In 1945, after Service's case had been dismissed by the Washington Grand Jury, Acheson persuaded Secretary of State Byrnes to write a letter of confidence to Service — a letter which Mr. Byrnes today profoundly regrets.

In 1950, when Service was called back from India by the Loyalty Review Board for a re-hearing, after Senator McCarthy had revived the charges against him, Acheson authorized a State Department statement declaring that the McCarthy charges were "dead, discredited and disproven." The statement said that "the sympathy and good wishes of the whole Department go out" to Service and his family.

**John J. Muccio**

One of the architects of the American disaster in Korea is John J. Muccio, American Ambassador. After the departure of General Hodge's occupation army in 1948, Ambassador Muccio was the ranking American in Korea. He faithfully carried out Secretary Acheson's directives.

For this reason, the state of mind of Mr. Muccio on Far



BUT ON THE OTHER HAND!

—N. Y. Daily Mirror

Eastern matters should be extremely enlightening.

On December 7, 1950, Representative Hugh D. Scott Jr. of Pennsylvania told the House of the conversation which he had with Mr. Muccio in Pusan, Korea, on his recent visit to the front.

"Let me tell you a few things Ambassador Muccio said at that time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Latham) and myself in the presence of a number of witnesses. The American Ambassador to Korea said, and I am now quoting him, We are not fighting Communism.

"I said to him, What are we fighting, Mr. Ambassador? He said, We are fighting aggression.

"But you have not heard by any means the worst, nor will time permit me to tell you all of that conversation, I would, however, like to say what

**Acheson Fronted For Alger Hiss**

Vouched for Hiss Loyalty

— Could Have Prevented the Great Yalta Betrayal

WASHINGTON — Former Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle told the House Committee on Un-American Activities on Feb. 12, 1948, that in 1941 he had called the attention of Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, to the charges made by Whitaker Chambers that Donald and Alger Hiss were members of an under-cover Communist cell operating within the United States Government. Alger Hiss was serving with Acheson at the time.

Testifying under oath, Mr. Berle said that Mr. Acheson was unimpressed, that he declared he knew the Hisses well, and that he "would vouch for them absolutely."

Leading members of Congress acknowledge that if Mr. Acheson had done his duty and investigated the charges, the subsequent theft of secret Government documents, and their transmittal to Russia, as well as the Yalta betrayal, could have been prevented.

shocked me most of all was the statement by Ambassador Muccio as follows, and I quote, The Russians had every right to arm the North Koreans.

"I asked him, Why do you say that, Mr. Ambassador? He replied, Because we armed Chiang Kai-shek and that bunch of crooks."

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(15 May 1951)

MRS. ROGERS OF MASSACHUSETTS: "The hearings to which I refer were on H.R. 6795 (Seventy-ninth Congress), a bill presented by the Secretary of State, which purported to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China, but which, the hearings brought out, was designed also to give military training and equipment to Chinese Communist forces. . . . The hearings were never published, and for that reason I think it is particularly pertinent to bring portions of the testimony to the attention of the House today. . . ."

MRS. ROGERS: "Mr. Secretary, the War Department did not write this bill?"

SECRETARY PATTERSON: "I believe this bill was prepared in the State Department, is that not right?"

MR. ACHESON: "In the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee, by the three Departments. . . ."

"Mr. Speaker, my Congressional Directory for June 1946, the time these hearings were in progress, fails to list a State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee. It does list a State Department Coordinating Committee with Dean Acheson as Chairman. Among its members were Alger Hiss and John Carter Vincent. . . . Mr. Acheson presented a telegram from General George C. Marshall, then in China, dated June 18, 1946, . . . in which General Marshall stated:

"The purpose of the bill presented to the Congress by the Secretary of State is to support the American program of creating a stable and friendly China. Without passage of the bill the President and myself would lack authorization to carry out a phase of American policy toward China which appears vital to the success of our announced policy. . . ."

"I continue to read from the official transcript of Mr. Acheson's testimony:

"The Communist leaders have asked, and General Marshall has agreed, that their integration with the other forces be preceded by a brief period of United States training, and by the supply of minimum quantities of equipment. . . ."

"The Communist forces were lacking in the type of organization, training, and equipment which would have made practical their integration into a new nonpolitical national army. . . ."

MRS. ROGERS: "Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be trained under the proposed plan?"

MR. ACHESON: "I think that they will try to take all the units that are going to be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army and give them a 60- or 90-day schooling. . . ."

MRS. ROGERS: "Is there any way we could have an agreement with China - and remember we are talking about training and military equipment for the Chinese Communist forces - Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?"

MR. ACHESON: "Well, I suppose that we may, that in the United States, under the principles and procedure of the charter, if anyone tried to force against us, I am sure we would get that. They will not do it, the technical and legal answer to your question. I think we can find out that the Chinese will not do that."

MR. ROBERTS: "I suppose a right could be before that was decided, could it not?"

MR. ACHESON: "Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think so. I am sure that we do not need to worry."

Congressional Record, May 15, 1941, p. 4000

Vol. 2, p. 16

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- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# 12 Charges Are Rebutted By Acheson

Dean  
By The Associated Press

Secretary of State Acheson has denounced as "either entirely incorrect or distortions of the truth" 12 accusations made against him by Lieut. Gov. Goodwin J. Knight of California.

The criticisms range from his handling of Formosa policy through State Department security questions to the Alger Hiss case.

They were formulated by Knight, a Republican, after he had been challenged by John B. Elliott, Los Angeles civic leader and a Democrat, to back up criticisms of Acheson in a speech Knight made on April 17.

Knight's complaints were sent to the State Department by Elliott with a request that they be answered in detail. Acheson forwarded replies from his staff.

At one point in the exchange the State Department said approximately 90 million dollars in arms and ordnance had been given Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa, and 300 million dollars more was scheduled for this year.

In addition, the department mentioned a "600-man" United States military mission on Formosa "assisting in the reorganization of Chiang's forces."

On June 24, Maj. Gen. William C. Chase, head of the mission, said in Formosa the United States group had 1250 members.

Last night, in answer to a request for clarification, the Defense Department said it has announced that 500 to 600 men may be sent to Formosa—but only half that number, 250 to 300 men are there now. There was no explanation of the varia-

Here is a summary of the charges and replies as released by Elliott:

1. CHARGE—"On December 23 Acheson sent out instructions to diplomatic and consular personnel in Asia that Formosa was doomed and expendable."

The reply is that what the department sent out was a propaganda directive designed to minimize the unfavorable reaction in case Formosa should fall.

About Loan to Poland

Knight also charged that Acheson had written President Truman that no amount of aid could have saved Chiang, but Acheson said what he wrote was that only "full-scale intervention" by the United States might have produced a different result in China and such action would have been in support of a government repudiated by its own people.

2. CHARGE—Acheson approved a 90-million-dollar loan to "Communist Poland" in 1946 against the advice of United States Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane. Counsel in the deal was Donald Hiss, a brother of Alger Hiss and a member of Acheson's

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ACHESON—From Page 1

# Acheson Rebuts 12 Charges

law firm, and the firm got a \$50,000 fee.

The State Department said the "inferences" of this charge were "false" and based upon a "distortion of the public record."

Acheson, the State Department said, severed all connections with his law firm in 1941. The Polish loan negotiations began in 1945 and no member of the firm "approached Secretary Acheson in any way" while the loan was under study. As acting Secretary of State, on instructions of Secretary Byrnes, Acheson approved the loan after it had been "favorably considered" by responsible State Department officials. The loan finally was cut off in 1948 after Poland failed to produce the coal for Western Europe which was one of the goals of the deal, and after the Communists' grip on the country tightened.



Associated Press Wirephoto  
LIEUT. GOV. KNIGHT  
Critic of Dean Acheson

**3. CHARGE**—Acheson said July 20 there were no Communists in the State Department and "this statement has since proved to be completely false and untrue."

The State Department replied Acheson said only that he knew of no Communists in the State Department. Furthermore the department said a security investigation staff of 100 persons which has operated with the FBI also does not know of any Reds in the department.

**4. CHARGE**—Acheson "has never repudiated his support of Alger Hiss."

The State Department said Acheson's answers to questions about Hiss, now in prison on a perjury conviction, had been "widely misinterpreted."

"He has never in any way condoned the offense of which Alger Hiss has been found guilty. x x x As far as he is concerned, the decision of the (Supreme) Court disposes of the matter."

**5. CHARGE**—Acheson, "recommended the abandonment of Formosa" after the Chinese Nationalist government had fled there.

The State Department said that charge "is entirely false."

**6. CHARGE**—Acheson joined with friends "including Owen Lattimore" to encourage a Communist rebellion in China and they referred to the Communists as "Agrarian reformers."

The State Department reviewed American aid to Chiang Kai-shek from the end of World War II. It said Acheson has testified he does not remember even ever meeting Owen Lattimore; also that a check of his speeches shows he does not refer to the Chinese Reds as agrarian reformers.

**7. CHARGE**—Acheson acted as counsel to Lauchlin Currie when Currie appeared before a congressional committee looking into Communist espionage charges.

The State Department said Acheson was retained by Currie in connection with a volunteer appearance Currie made before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in August, 1948, to discuss statements made about him by Elizabeth Bentley. The department added: "The committee unanimously observed that no charge of Communist Party affiliation was made against Mr. Currie . . . It is a fact that since Mr. Currie's testimony . . . no further action has been taken" on the Bentley charges.

**8. CHARGE**—Acheson told a Senate committee before he was confirmed as Undersecretary of State that Russia should share in the administration of Japan.

The State Department answered that the records showed no such statement by Acheson. It said he had testified in September, 1945, that the United States was trying to "go forward with the job" in Japan and had "no disposition . . . to exclude anybody."

The department added that the fact is the machinery for administration of Japan "completely recognized the major role of the United States."

**9. CHARGE**—Acheson insisted on a veto in UNRRA organization of please Russia and supported all Soviet demands "thus leaving the United States impotent to control UNRRA although the United States put up all the money."

The State Department replied that "this allegation is false." They said there was no veto in UNRRA decision-making except for a few specific matters such as amending the charter and nominating a director general.

**10. CHARGE**—Acheson obtained appointment of Alger Hiss "to Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta."

Asserting that Acheson never recommended Hiss for either of these missions to international conferences, the department said "this statement is false."

**11. CHARGE**—On December 16, 1945, Acheson "received Juan Negrin, head of the Spanish Communists, while he refused at the same time to meet Fernando de Los Rios, head of the anti-Communist group in Spain."

The State Department said Acheson did receive De Los Rios on December 21, and both the opposing Spanish leaders talked to him "in a private capacity."

**12. Charge**—Acheson gave an interview to "Milton Wolff, commander of subversive Abraham Lincoln Brigade and pro-Communist Vito Marcantonio, promising them to intervene with Franco on behalf of two condemned Communists in Spain."

To this the State Department said that Acheson had received a delegation of three House members—Healy of California, Savage of Washington and Marcantonio of New York—and five other persons including Wolff but that he "made no special promises of intervention to the group."

The State Department said Acheson explained that the two men were Argentine and Cuban nationals and any action by the State Department would have to be limited "to expressions of interest on humanitarian grounds."

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## The Record of Dean Acheson

**T**HE principal target of your criticism has been Dean Acheson. Will you give the record—not your opinion—to prove that Acheson has aided the Communist cause?

Following is the documented record of Acheson's aid to international Communism over the past 20 years.

On the opposite page there is reproduced a confidential memorandum from a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1947 to the then Secretary of State, George Marshall. It will be noted that the Senate subcommittee warned that "under the administration of Dean Acheson" there was being carried out "a deliberate, calculated program . . . to protect Communist personnel in high places." The memorandum included the names of 10 State Department officials and warned that "the network extends into the office of the Assistant Secretary Benton [now Senator Benton]."

This warning was disregarded by Marshall.

### *Communist Russia Hires Acheson and Pressman*

Before Russia was recognized by the United States in 1933, Dean Acheson was paid by the Soviet Union to act as Stalin's lawyer in this country.<sup>43</sup> Lee Pressman, an admitted member of the Communist Party, also was on Stalin's payroll as one of his American lawyers.<sup>44</sup> Some of Acheson's duties were to appear before such agencies as the U. S. Tariff Commission.<sup>45</sup>

Felix Wittmer in the *American Mercury* asks:

"Just why among all the American lawyers, did the Soviet leaders hire these two: Acheson and Lee Pressman? It's easy to explain why they hired Pressman: he was a Communist and a member of the Ware cell organized for espionage in the government. The Soviet Union, of course, followed a general policy in all countries of hiring sympathetic lawyers. Then why did Stalin hire Acheson?"<sup>46</sup>

This has never yet been satisfactorily explained by our Secretary of State whose job it is to "fight" the Communist threat to this country.

### *Communist Infiltration of Government Commences*

Acheson first entered the government in 1933, when he was appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury. It was in 1933 also that the Communist Party began the systematic infiltration of our government under the direction of Harold Ware, son of Ella Reeve Bloor, the so-called "mother" of the American Communist Party. Alger Hiss, in those early days, was a member of the Ware cell. The far-reaching importance of this Communist cell in the U. S. government was described by Whittaker Chambers who said that its members have "helped to shape the future of every American now alive and indirectly affected the fate of every man now in uniform."<sup>47</sup>

After leaving the Treasury Department, Acheson served in the Attorney General's office for one year. In 1941 he entered the State Department.

### *Vouched for Hiss in 1941 When Told Hiss Was a Communist*

Adolph Berle, the State Department official in charge of security, has testified that he notified Acheson (both before and after Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State) of a conversation he had in 1939 with Whittaker Chambers about Alger Hiss and his brother, Donald. Chambers had advised Berle that the Hiss brothers were underground Communists. Assistant Secretary of State Berle's notes on Chambers' knowledge of the Hiss brothers' Communist activities were headed "Underground Espionage Agent."<sup>48</sup> At the time Berle warned Acheson, Acheson ridiculed the fears of this State Department security officer and stated that he "could vouch for them absolutely."

Following is Berle's testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities:

"Specifically, I checked with Dean Acheson and later I checked when Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State [1941] and Alger Hiss became his executive assistant. That, to the best of my knowledge, was the first time when Hiss would have been in a position to do anything effective. Acheson said he had known the family and these two boys from childhood and could vouch for them absolutely."<sup>49</sup>

### *Ignored Reports on Hiss*

Acheson ignored loyalty reports on Alger Hiss and continued to help him up the ladder of success. It is interesting to note that Hiss' meteoric rise in government began *after* Acheson was advised that Hiss had been named as an underground Communist.

Hiss moved up the ladder, first becoming attached to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Next he became Special Assistant to the Adviser on Political Relations; Special Assistant to the Office of Special Political Affairs; Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs; and finally Director, Office of Special Political Affairs.<sup>50</sup>

In addition Acheson helped secure for Hiss the appointment as Executive Secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which laid the foundation for the United Nations.

### *Sends Hiss to Yalta*

At Yalta, Hiss was one of the chief advisers to the

<sup>43</sup> *American Mercury Magazine*, "Freedom's Case Against Dean Acheson," Felix Wittmer, April, 1952, p. 5; Congressional Record, May 16, 1933, p. 3484.

<sup>44</sup> House Un-American Activities Committee, Hearings on Communism in the United States, Pt. 2, August 28, 1950, pp. 2843-2901.

<sup>45</sup> *American Mercury*, April, 1952, p. 5.

<sup>46</sup> *American Mercury*, April, 1952, pp. 5, 6.

<sup>47</sup> Whittaker Chambers, *Saturday Evening Post*, "I Was The Witness," February 23, 1952, p. 22.

<sup>48</sup> Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (Random House, 1952), pp. 466-469.

<sup>49</sup> Hearings on Communist Espionage in United States, House Committee on Un-American Activities, August 30, 1948, pp. 1291-1300.

<sup>50</sup> Letter from Department of State to Library of Congress. (Author has copy).

President, and with Gromyko of Russia and Jebb of England drafted major portions of the Yalta Agreement. It was at Yalta that China and Poland were sold out to Communist Russia and the stage was set for the present war in Korea. As Hiss said about his activities at Yalta:

"I think it is an accurate and not immodest statement to say that I helped formulate the Yalta agreement to some extent."<sup>50-A</sup>

In 1945, Hiss reached the heights when he was made Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. There he presided during the drafting of the United Nations Charter.

### **"I Do Not Intend to Turn My Back on Alger Hiss"**

In 1950, after serving Communist Russia well for many years as an agent, Hiss was convicted of perjury in connection with his espionage activities. Acheson then called a press conference and announced to the world that "whatever the outcome" of Alger Hiss' appeal, "I do not intend to turn my back on him."<sup>51</sup>

This statement is significant not because it expressed undying support for an old friend who was a convicted traitor. Acheson's statement was extremely important because it served public notice on every other "Hiss" in the State Department that he could bank upon the powerful backing of the Secretary of State if he were caught and accused or convicted of treason.

Donald Hiss, brother of Alger, who was also named by Chambers in 1939 as an underground Communist, remained in the State Department until 1945 when it was arranged for his transfer to the Acheson law firm. Donald Hiss is today a member of the Acheson law firm.

### **Acheson and Hiss Head Pro-Communist Group in State Department**

On August 30, 1948, Adolph Berle, former Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities as follows:

"... In the fall of 1944 there was a difference of opinion in the State Department... the intelligence reports which were in my charge indicated a very aggressive Russian policy... and I was pressing for a pretty clean-cut showdown then when our position was strongest. The opposite group in the State Department [the pro-Communist group] was largely the men—Mr. Acheson's group, of course—with Mr. Hiss as a principal assistant in the matter... I got trimmed in that fight and, as a result, went to Brazil and that ended my diplomatic career."<sup>52</sup>

### **Communist Party Campaign To Remove Anti-Communists from State Department**

According to the testimony of Louis Budenz, former editor of the *Daily Worker* and a former member of the American Communists' national committee, the Communist Party mapped out a campaign in 1942 which "began with an attack on Mr. Adolph Berle... to clean the State Department of all anti-Soviet elements."<sup>53</sup> Berle

at that time was the official in charge of security matters in the department.

According to Budenz' testimony, word was sent out through the *Daily Worker* to all loyal Party members to attack and demand the resignation of "those who were considered to be against Soviet policy in the Far East."<sup>54</sup> As a result, there was unloosed a barrage of insidious smear attacks and an all-out attempt to discredit the anti-Communists in the State Department. This was done through Communist front organizations and by the "liberal" elements of press and radio.

The Communist Party, according to the testimony, also used men within the State Department to sabotage the work of the anti-Communists. In this they had the active assistance of Acheson's group. Budenz cited one example:

"The Communists relied very strongly on Service and John Carter Vincent in the campaign against Ambassador Hurley."<sup>55</sup>

Budenz testified that the Communist Party's opening attack—a speech delivered by Earl Browder to the Young Communist League on October 2, 1942—was "prepared through an arrangement with Lauchlin Currie [Administrative Assistant to the President who was named under oath as "a full fledged member" of a Communist spy ring]<sup>56</sup> in order to smoke out the people who were opposed to Soviet policy in the Far East in the State Department."<sup>57</sup>

Following the reprinting of this speech in the *Daily Worker*, on October 4, Earl Browder, the head of the Communist Party in the United States met with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Lauchlin Currie and secured from Welles a statement on State Department policy on China that was acceptable to Browder. Welles' memorandum to Browder, which was then published in the *Daily Worker* of October 16, stated:

"With regard to the specific charge that 'these officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China,' this government has had no such policy, either 'old' or new. *This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'Communism' in China.* We have, for instance, as is publicly and well known, declined to be moved by Japanese contentions that presence and maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China were and would be desirable for the purpose of 'combating Communism.' With regard to the specific charge that officials of this Government 'tell Chungking [headquarters of the anti-Communist government of China] it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States friendship,' the simple fact is that no official of this government ever has told Chungking either that it must fight or that it must continue to fight the 'Communists'; this government holds no such belief..." (Emphasis mine)<sup>58</sup>

Asked what anti-Communist officials in addition to Berle

<sup>50-A</sup> Testimony before House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1948, quoted by The Freeman, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 617.

<sup>51</sup> World Almanac, 1951, p. 208.

<sup>52</sup> Hearings on Communist Espionage in United States, House Committee on Un-American Activities, August 30, 1948, pp. 1291-1300.

<sup>53</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, August 23, 1951, Pt. 2, p. 602.

<sup>54</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 602.

<sup>55</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 624.

<sup>56</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 14, 1951, p. 423.

<sup>57</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 594.

<sup>58</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, pp. 599, 600.

were slated for removal by the Communist Party, Budenz replied:

"Joseph C. Grew, Under Secretary of State; Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, not technically with the State Department but connected at least diplomatically with the State Department relations; Eugene C. Dooman, who was head of the Far Eastern Division, if I remember correctly, at least he was in control of the details of far eastern policy; and Gen. Patrick Hurley, Ambassador to China, who particularly was under attack from the Communists."<sup>59</sup>

In all cases the Communist Party, with the aid of their friends within the department, was successful.

It is interesting that in almost every case the men singled out for removal by the Communist Party were in bitter conflict with Acheson, particularly over his Far Eastern policy.

### **Grew Resigns after Insisting on Prosecution in Amerasia Case**

Joseph Grew was one of the State Department officials on the Communist black list. Budenz testified that "the Politburo laid plans against Mr. Grew" because:

"... he didn't have the right policy in China, and secondly, as we approached the question of what to do with Japan, he favored a soft peace with Japan.

"The Communists wanted a tough peace just as there was to be the Morgenthau plan in Germany. They didn't hesitate in their own discussions to show that this would tend to drive the Japanese into the hands of the Soviet Union."<sup>60</sup>

According to Freda Utley, author of *The China Story*, "so long as Grew was in charge of Far Eastern affairs at the State Department, the Communists had comparatively little influence there." To circumvent Grew, who stymied the pro-Communists' attempts to send their reports into the White House, Acheson had already made State Department official John Carter Vincent a special assistant in the White House to Lauchlin Currie<sup>61</sup> (named under oath as a Communist and as a member of a Communist spy ring respectively).

Grew's final anti-Communist act in the State Department came in 1945 when he insisted upon prosecution in the *Amerasia* case. The *Washington Daily News* has reported that Grew insisted on the arrests because he was under the "certain impression at that time that the case against the 6 persons arrested was so air tight as to make convictions all but assured."<sup>62</sup> According to Fred Woltman's newspaper series "The Amerasia Case," this assurance came to Grew from the FBI.<sup>63</sup> John Stewart Service was one of the State Department officials arrested in this case. The FBI had wire recordings of Service visiting the hotel room of Philip Jaffe (who has been named as a Soviet agent) and turning over to him military information which Service warned Jaffe was secret.<sup>64</sup> Soon after Grew insisted that the cases go to trial, he resigned from the State Department because of "bad health."

### **Communists Praise Acheson**

Acheson then replaced Grew as Under Secretary of

State. Service was reinstated in his State Department job and later put on the board which had charge of placements and promotions of State Department personnel in the entire Far Eastern area.

The official publication of the Communist Party, the *Daily Worker*, had already praised Acheson on June 7, 1945, as "one of the more forward-looking men in the State Department." In the same article the *Daily Worker* stated that the real test of the President's concern over anti-Soviet policies would be "what he does about it, whether he removes those in the State Department responsible for anti-Soviet policies, whether he finds solutions for outstanding points of friction with the Soviet Union . . ." When Grew resigned and Acheson replaced him, *PM* (which John L. Lewis has described as the "up-town edition of the *Daily Worker*") wrote:

"What the government seeks now is to develop a diplomacy based on a better appreciation of what the Soviet wants . . . That explains in part the search for liberals . . ."<sup>65</sup>

### **Removes Anti-Communist Who Opposed Him**

The day after Acheson replaced Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, he announced he was replacing Eugene Dooman, long-time Far Eastern expert, with John Carter Vincent.<sup>66</sup> It was little wonder, for Dooman, who was another anti-Communist official slated for removal by the Communist Party, had just run head-on into Acheson's vigorous attempts to inject the Lattimore line into postwar policy toward Japan.

This occurred during a meeting of the powerful inter-departmental committee representing the State, War and Navy Departments, known as SWINK. Dooman, who was chairman of the Far Eastern subcommittee of SWINK, had just made his report on proposed postwar policy toward Japan. At the end of that report, according to Dooman's testimony before the McCarran Committee, Mr. McCloy, chairman of the full committee, turned to Dean Acheson and said:

"Dean, you are a great authority on Far Eastern matters. What do you think of what we have just heard?"

Acheson's answer was:

"I have discovered that Far Eastern experts are a penny a dozen. And you can find some experts who will support any point of view that you care to have. And I, myself, do not go along with what we have just heard. I prefer to be guided by experts who think more along my point of view."

Dooman testified that Acheson from then on:

"... quoted virtually textually from this *Solution in Asia* by Dr. Lattimore."<sup>67</sup>

Lattimore, in *Solution in Asia*, had advocated the

<sup>59</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 604.

<sup>60</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 604.

<sup>61</sup> Freda Utley, *The China Story* (Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1951), pp. 117, 118.

<sup>62</sup> *Washington Daily News*, June 7, 1950, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup> Fred Woltman, "The Shocking Story of The Amerasia Case," Pamphlet, Scripps-Howard, 1950, p. 14.

<sup>64</sup> Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, June 26, 1950, p. 1404.

<sup>65</sup> *PM*, October 7, 1945, p. 6.

<sup>66</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, September 14, 1951, p. 716.

<sup>67</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, September 14, 1951, p. 723.

straight Communist Party line on Japan, namely, that we should force a "hard" peace on Japan—remove the emperor, destroy all successful business, confiscate all private property, in short, reduce Japan to a weak state which would be ripe for Communist conquest.

In a government policy-making meeting, Professor William McGovern of Northwestern University heard Lattimore argue the Acheson-Lattimore case for a "hard" peace against Japan. Testifying under oath before the McCarran Committee, Professor McGovern said:

"I was somewhat shocked and horrified, not only as to his [Lattimore's] views with regard to the emperor, but he wanted to have not only a strict and stern policy, but a bloody peace in Japan . . . he wanted to completely reduce Japan to beggary and impotence."<sup>68</sup>

The Acheson-Lattimore plan for Japan was the same as the plan masterminded for postwar Germany by Harry Dexter White, named under oath by government witnesses as having aided a Communist spy ring in Washington.

Shortly after Dooman opposed Acheson's attempts to inject the Communist Party line into postwar U.S. policy toward Japan; Dooman was removed by Acheson from the State Department. Acheson then promoted John Carter Vincent to Dooman's job.

#### *State Department Document Altered to Conform to Communist Line*

Once Vincent came into power as chairman of the subcommittee which was setting up postwar policy on Japan, he immediately set out to inaugurate policies for Japan which, according to the sworn testimony of Eugene Dooman, were the same as Russia dictated for satellite countries.<sup>69</sup>

Vincent's first act, according to Dooman's testimony, was to alter an official program entitled "U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan"—a program which had already been officially adopted by the government and telegraphed to General MacArthur "as firm United States Policy for Japan."<sup>70</sup>

The testimony was that the major surgery which Vincent performed on that already adopted policy was to inject into it the Communist Party objective of destroying and eliminating the capitalist class in Japan.

Following are some excerpts from Dooman's testimony, appearing on pages 718 to 720 of the McCarran hearings, in which he explains the changes made by Vincent:

DOOMAN: "The first thing that was done, and this was in 1946, was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent on all property in excess of \$1,000 . . . That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalistic class . . . The next thing was to appropriate all land in excess of 5 acres held by any one owner."

SENATOR EASTLAND: "That was a Communist system, was it not? . . . they were following now the Communist system, were they not?"

DOOMAN: "Yes . . . Then all holdings by any one individual in any large corporation in excess of 3 percent were confiscated . . . They were transferred to a government pool. And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell those shares . . . [and] ordered

to disregard any relationship between the price offered and the real value . . . Practically the whole white-collar element in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke. Not because there was any record against them, but because they occupied certain positions . . . It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate the brains of Japanese business.

" . . . The net result was then to destroy the previously existing capitalist class . . . Their places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and . . . thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit trade of various kinds and have then amassed this enormous fortune. The net result was to replace people who had traditionally had property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of various kinds."

#### *Service Recommends "Sympathetic Support" For Japanese Communists*

In this connection there should be recalled the views on Japan of Acheson's protégé John Stewart Service. One of the State Department documents picked up by the FBI in the Amerasia offices was an official report on Japan by John Stewart Service. Following is an excerpt from that report, S187 with "Q" number 524:

"The Japanese Communist Party is still small (Mr. Okano himself does not claim more than 'a few thousand members'), but it has the advantages of strong organization and loyal, politically experienced membership. If its policies as claimed, seek to achieve our own hopes of a democratic, non-militaristic Japan, we may wish to consider the adoption toward it of an attitude of sympathetic support."

#### *Acheson and Vincent Attack MacArthur's Anti-Communist Policies in Japan*

General Douglas MacArthur vigorously opposed the State Department's plans and its attempts to Communize or create a fertile ground for the Communization of Japan. He was viciously attacked by both Vincent and Acheson. Vincent accused MacArthur of violating State Department directives to use Japan for "building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union." The *New York Times* of September 20, 1945, printed the following story of Acheson's rebuke of MacArthur:

"The State Department revealed today a decision for a social and economic revolution in Japan and emphasized that it would be carried out regardless of what might be said about slashing the American army of occupation.

"Secretary Acheson said that the United States government and not General MacArthur was determining American policy toward Japan."

#### *Communist Press Hails Acheson's Attack on MacArthur*

For Acheson's public criticism of MacArthur's anti-Communist policies, the Communist *Daily Worker* applauded "the repudiation of General MacArthur by Dean Acheson of the State Department . . ."<sup>71</sup>

*PM*, the "uptown edition of the *Daily Worker*," hailed Dean Acheson's action with the following editorial:

<sup>68</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 4, Sept. 28, 1951, p. 1016.  
<sup>69</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 718.  
<sup>70</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 7, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 717.  
<sup>71</sup> *Daily Worker*, Sept. 20, 1945.

"Acheson is the leader of the younger, more progressive men in the State Department."<sup>72</sup>

### **General Wedemeyer on Communist Black List**

Another man on the Communist black list was General Albert Wedemeyer. He was scheduled to be removed from the scene, because, as Budenz testified:

"... the Communists viewed General Wedemeyer as the enemy of the Soviet interests in the Far East."<sup>73</sup>

After Wedemeyer's return from China where he was sent on a special mission by the President, he submitted his report containing his recommendations on how China could be saved from Communist conquest. This report was steadfastly denied the Congress. When the Senate Armed Services Committee asked General George C. Marshall, "Why did you join in the suppression of the Wedemeyer Report on China?" Marshall replied:

"I did not join in the suppression of the Report. I personally suppressed it."<sup>74</sup>

### **Communists Select Ambassador to China**

When Wedemeyer was scheduled to be Ambassador to China, Marshall and Acheson vetoed his appointment because the Chinese Communists objected. In July, 1946, Wedemeyer's appointment was on Truman's desk and Wedemeyer was awaiting his commission when Acheson sent for him to say that his appointment had been cancelled. He read Wedemeyer a telegram from Marshall saying, "The Communists are protesting violently." Upon the recommendation of Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist leader, Marshall and Acheson secured the appointment instead for Dr. Leighton Stuart, an educator who had at one time taught Chou En-lai.<sup>75</sup>

### **Ambassador Lane Next on Communist Black List**

Arthur Bliss Lane was another intelligently anti-Communist State Department official on the Communist black list. Lane, like other anti-Communists in the department, had learned from bitter experience that Dean Acheson was a tough man to reckon with when the chips were down.

### **Acheson Grants Communists in Poland \$90,000,000 U. S. Loan**

In 1946 the Communist-controlled government of Poland requested a \$90 million loan from the United States. Ambassador Lane protested strongly against this loan. "With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable," he cabled the State Department, "I beg the department not to approve the extension of any credits at this time."<sup>76</sup> Lane pointed out the terroristic activities of the Communists, the imprisonment of American citizens and the fact that much of the loan was slated to equip the Communist terror police. Nevertheless, Acheson granted the loan.

### **Acheson Law Firm Gets \$50,000 Fee from Communist Loan**

Acheson reluctantly admitted to a Senate committee

that he, as Under Secretary of State, had the power of decision in the matter and was responsible for granting the loan. He further admitted that his own law firm had handled the private end of the negotiation for the loan, with Donald Hiss personally in charge, and that the Acheson law firm had received a fee of over \$50,000 when the loan was granted by Acheson. He stated, however, that he personally received no part of the fee.<sup>77</sup>

### **Another Anti-Communist Purged**

After the Polish loan was granted, Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane resigned. He has since told the sordid story of how the State Department betrayed Polish and American interests in a book entitled, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*.

Acheson's action on the Polish loan could not have come as too great a surprise, however, because in 1945 he gave the world fair warning of what his policy toward Communist aggression would be.

### **Speaks to Communists At Madison Square Garden Rally**

On November 14, 1945, Acheson traveled to New York City to address a rally at Madison Square Garden which was called for the purpose of welcoming to American soil the Red Dean of Canterbury, a loud supporter of Communist Russia.<sup>79</sup> The rally was sponsored by the National Council of Soviet-American Friendship, which more than a year before (March 29, 1944) had been cited as subversive by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. It has also been listed as subversive by the Attorney General (December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948.)

On the speakers platform with Acheson were Paul Robeson, Corliss Lamont, Albert Fitzgerald, and Joseph E. Davies. Paul Robeson is the noted Negro singer, active in a vast number of Communist fronts, who has stated he would never bear arms against Soviet Russia. Corliss Lamont was so well known as a spokesman for Communist fronts that the House Committee on Un-American Activities stated in Appendix IX, page 1471, that when Lamont's name appeared on the speakers program for a suspected Communist front, that fact could be considered as part of the proof that the organization was in fact doing the work of the Communist Party. Albert J. Fitzgerald, who also appeared on the speakers platform with Acheson, was president of the Communist-controlled United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, which was expelled by the CIO for being Communist dominated. Joseph E. Davies, of *Mission to Moscow* fame, while Ambassador to Moscow, revealed confidential information to the Kremlin, according to the sworn testimony of Igor Bogolepov, former Red army Colonel.<sup>80</sup>

Such were Acheson's platform and speaking companions

<sup>72</sup> PM, September 21, 1945, p. 13.

<sup>73</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 22, 1951, p. 623.

<sup>74</sup> Hearings on Nomination of Gen. George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Sept. 19, 1950, p. 22.

<sup>75</sup> Constantine Brown, Column of June 13, 1951, Washington Star, Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 11, 1951, pp. 2311-2312.

<sup>76</sup> Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948), p. 237.

<sup>77</sup> Hearings on Nomination of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Jan. 13, 1949, pp. 2-6.

<sup>78</sup> Daily Worker, Nov. 16, 1945, p. 8.

<sup>79</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, April 7, 1952 (now being printed).

when he addressed the Madison Square Garden Rally of left-wingers and Communists.

### **Favors "Friendly Borders" for Soviet Union**

In addressing this audience of Communists and Communist sympathizers, Acheson served public notice that we would approve Communist Russia's conquest or control of her neighbors. Acheson said:

"We understand, and agree with them [Communist Russia] to have friendly governments along her borders is essential, both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the World."<sup>81</sup>

It is easy to understand how the "security" of Communist Russia has been enhanced by the enslavement of the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, China, North Korea, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But even the most tortured reasoning cannot support the view that the terroristic Communist rule in those satellite countries has promoted the "peace of the world" or the security of America. Certainly, the people of those countries would not agree with Acheson. It would be impossible to over-estimate the awful and terrifying effect upon Russia's neighbors of this statement by the United States Secretary of State that we would not only abandon our friends along the borders of Communist Russia but actually approve of their conquest by Russia.

### **State Department Honors Communist Picket of Churchill**

While going out of his way in 1945 to assure Communist Russia that her aggressive plans were acceptable to America, Acheson made it clear to Winston Churchill the following year that his Fulton, Missouri, speech warning the world of the Communist threat, was distasteful to him.

The Communist Party showed its disapproval of Churchill's Fulton speech by throwing a picket line around the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel when a dinner was later given there in Churchill's honor.<sup>82</sup> Acheson honored that picket line and showed his disapproval of Churchill's warning of the Communist threat, and according to the *New York Times* of March 15, 1946, "abruptly cancelled" the speech he was scheduled to give at the dinner.<sup>83</sup>

### **Turns His Back on Anti-Communist Governments**

Acheson's attitude toward anti-Communist Spain stands in sharp contrast to his 1945 speech approving of Communist Russia's conquest or control of her neighbors.

When the United Nations proposed in 1946 that all UN members recall their ambassadors from Spain in protest to the "non-free" government of Spain, the United States voted in favor of the proposal. However, we retained an ambassador to Russia.

Acheson's attitude toward anti-Communist governments was further illustrated when, as Acting Secretary of State, he refused to see the anti-Communist representatives

of the Spanish Republican government, but granted an appointment to the pro-Communist elements of the Spanish government-in-exile.<sup>84</sup> According to the *Daily Worker* of December 21, 1945, Acheson also received Congressman Vito Marcantonio and Milton Wolff, head of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade which recruited Americans to fight illegally on the side of the Communists during the Spanish Civil War. He promised those visitors, according to both the *New York Times* and the *Daily Worker*, that he would intervene with Franco in behalf of imprisoned Communists in Spain.<sup>85</sup>

### **Civil Service Loyalty Review Board Says State Department Has Worst Record in Loyalty Cases**

Acheson's record of intervening in behalf of State Department officials under suspicion of Communist activities is a long one. His protection of those whose activities caused Congress and even the government's top Loyalty Review Board to call for investigation, is recorded throughout his years in government in numerous government documents.

The official minutes of a secret meeting of the Loyalty Review Board on February 13 and 14, 1951, make note of this record which Acheson has made on Acheson.<sup>86</sup> At one point during the meeting of the board, Chairman Bingham said, "The State Department . . . has the worst record of any department in the action of its Loyalty Board . . . The State Department has not found anyone . . . disloyal under our rule." Additional excerpts from those minutes are quoted on page 14.

### **Halts Investigation by Un-American Activities Committee**

The April, 1952, issue of *American Mercury* describes Acheson's assistance to Russian Foreign Minister Molotov's brother-in-law as follows:

"When, in September, 1945, the House Un-American Activities Committee prepared to hold hearings relative to one Sam Carp, Acheson's office prevailed upon the committee to drop the proceedings. Carp, a filling station operator in Bridgeport, Connecticut, had been discovered dispensing large amounts of money under suspicious circumstances. But it developed that he was the brother-in-law of Molotov, the Russian foreign Minister, so Acheson got the case dropped . . ."<sup>87</sup>

### **Refuses to Fire Loyalty Suspects**

In 1946 Acheson told a Congressional committee that many persons who had been listed as loyalty suspects or security risks were affiliated with "progressive organizations" and that he would not fire "progressives." Many of those "progressive organizations" have been cited as subversive and Communist by the Attorney General.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>81</sup> *Daily Worker*, Nov. 15, 1945, p. 3.

<sup>82</sup> *New York Times*, March 16, 1946, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>83</sup> *New York Times*, March 15, 1946, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>84</sup> Victor Lasky, "The Case Against Dean Acheson," *Congressional Record*, Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16338.

<sup>85</sup> *Daily Worker*, Dec. 21, 1945, p. 16; *New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1945, p. 8.

<sup>86</sup> *Congressional Record* (Unbound), Jan. 15, 1952, pp. 192-194.

<sup>87</sup> *The American Mercury*, April, 1952, p. 11.

<sup>88</sup> *Congressional Record* (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16338.

### *Was Lawyer for Lauchlin Currie, Who Was Named as Member of Soviet Spy Ring*

In 1948 Acheson acted as the lawyer for Lauchlin Currie before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, after Currie had been named as a member of a Soviet spy ring in Washington.

While Currie denied that he was a Communist or an espionage agent he did admit that he used his powerful influence in government to save the government job of Gregory Silvermaster, also named under oath as a member of a Soviet spy ring.

While Acheson did not appear publicly at the hearing to represent Currie, he did personally go to the office of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and as Currie's lawyer discussed the case with the Committee staff.

### *Defends John Service*

In 1950, after I brought the Service case up to date and presented the facts to the Tydings committee, Service was recalled from India by the Loyalty Review Board.

When I told the Tydings Committee that the Loyalty Review Board had ordered Service recalled, the State Department issued a statement saying that this was untrue. When I suggested that I was about to make public the Loyalty Board order providing for Service's recall, the State Department reversed itself, and admitted that the Loyalty Review Board had demanded Service's recall. Thereafter the following statement was authorized for release by Acheson:

"... I can't refrain from calling attention at this time to the spectacular way in which the so-called 'case' of John S. Service dramatizes the harmful results of such techniques as the Senator [McCarthy] is using in an effort to bolster up his attack on the Department—results that are harmful both in terms of the day-to-day conduct of the foreign relations of United States Government and in terms of human relations.

"Here, in the person of Jack Service, we have an able, conscientious, and—I say again, as I've already said many times before—a demonstrably loyal foreign service officer, a veteran of 17 years with the Department, and one of our outstanding experts on Far Eastern affairs.

"As I've recounted in considerable detail more than a month ago, when Mr. Service's name was first mentioned by Senator McCarthy, this isn't the first time that his loyalty has been questioned. On the same basis of implied 'guilty-by-association' that has been used in most of the other 'cases' thus far presented to the Senate subcommittee, he underwent a Grand Jury investigation back in August 1945, in connection with charges that he had transmitted classified material to unauthorized persons.

"He had the satisfaction at that time, though, of having the Grand Jury return a 'no true bill' and of being notified of his full reinstatement to the Department in a personal letter from then Secretary of State James F. Byrnes himself and also a similar letter from the then Under Secretary, Joseph C. Grew.

"As a matter of Departmental routine, Mr. Service's file has been reviewed 5 times during the ensuing 5 years, and in each instance the findings of the reviewing agents have been completely favorable.

"But now, as a result of Senator McCarthy's resuscitation of these dead, discredited, disproven charges against him, Mr. Service finds his character once more called into question, his name once more blazoned in headlines of the whole country's press, and his brilliant career as a diplomat once more interrupted so that he can be defended, and can defend himself, against such baseless allegations all over again."

"... it's a shame and a disgrace that he and his family should have to face, once again, such humiliation, embarrassment, and inconvenience; and I'd like to say that the sympathy and good wishes of the entire Department go out to them."<sup>89</sup>

The State Department Loyalty Board then held a secret hearing and cleared Service. However, after the Loyalty Review Board examined the evidence in the case, they ordered Acheson to discharge Service.

### *Acheson Law Firm Defends Loyalty Case Before Acheson Loyalty Board*

One of the many loyalty cases defended by Acheson's law firm before Acheson's State Department Loyalty Board was that of Edward Posniak. Dean Acheson states that he is no longer a member of the firm but that his son is.

In 1948 Letters of Charges were filed against Posniak after the reports of 9 FBI investigators were presented to the State Department. Posniak thereupon retained Attorney Westwood of Acheson's law firm to represent him. Westwood succeeded in getting the charge against Posniak reduced before any evidence was taken. At the hearing he was cleared by a 2 to 1 vote of the State Department loyalty panel. After I gave the Senate a resume of the 9 FBI reports on Posniak,<sup>90</sup> his loyalty-security case was reopened and he was allowed to resign while his case was pending. He has since been before a federal grand jury, but as far as is known at the time this is written, no action has been taken on his case.

The acting chairman of the State Department loyalty panel which heard the Posniak case was Darrel St. Clair. St. Clair cast the deciding vote clearing Posniak. At the time this is written he is the chief clerk of the Senate Rules Committee and is helping to write a report on the Benton Resolution which asks that McCarthy be expelled from the Senate because of his activities in connection with exposing Communists and fellow travellers in the State Department.

### *Clears Clubb After State Department Loyalty Board Had Unanimously Ruled Against Clubb*

Oliver Edmund Clubb was a top State Department official against whom the State Department Loyalty Board had ruled. Acheson overruled his own Loyalty Board, in early 1952. After being "cleared" by Acheson, Clubb resigned with a lifetime pension of \$5,800 a year.

Clubb was chief of the China Division of the State Department. Evidence on Clubb was given to the Tydings Committee, but he was not called to testify, nor was any of the evidence checked by the committee. He was part

<sup>89</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 560, March 27, 1950, pp. 479, 480.  
<sup>90</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), July 25, 1950, pp. 11105-11114, 11120-11122.

of the group given a blanket clearance by the Tydings committee. He was later called before both the McCarran committee and the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Following is the Washington *Times-Herald's* report of some of Clubb's testimony and of the contents of his diary:

"The diary revealed Clubb's meetings with the following persons:

"Whittaker Chambers, admitted spy for the Soviet Union in the 30s, whose testimony resulted in the conviction of Alger Hiss for prejury to conceal espionage.

"Agnes Smedley, identified by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, Gen. MacArthur's intelligence chief, as a member of the celebrated spy ring headed by Richard Sorge, executed by the Japanese in 1944.

"Michael Gold, a well-known Communist writer and revolutionary.

"Lawrence Todd, Washington correspondent for *Tass*, Soviet News agency.

"Under prolonged questioning, Clubb admitted a long and friendly relationship with Owen Lattimore, State department consultant identified as a Soviet agent by Gen. Alexander Barmine, Russian intelligence agent; and John Carter Vincent, State department official repeatedly accused in Congress of pro-Communist operations.

"He also conceded an acquaintance with Philip Jaffe, center of the Amerasia stolen documents case of 1945 and other figures in that incident.

"When Clubb had been questioned secretly by the committee last March, he denied recalling a meeting with Chambers in the office of *New Masses*, a Communist magazine, in July 1932. Chambers had previously testified to this meeting.

"But Clubb later informed the committee that an entry in his diary had refreshed his recollection and that he had talked with Chambers on July 9, 1932, according to the diary. A subpoena was then issued for the entire diary but Clubb brought in only two volumes.

"Another diary entry dated in Washington, July 7, 1932, revealed Clubb's seeking out of Todd, the *Tass* correspondent . . . [Tass is the official Soviet newspaper which has been described, under oath, by a former Russian Army Intelligence Officer as a front for Russian espionage.]

"I went with Todd to the State department press room and was introduced to several journalists, among them, Drew Pearson, the entry said. I had dinner at the Press club with Todd and also had dinner in Pearson's home with Lawrence Duggan of the Latin-American section . . . [Duggan, who has been named as a Communist spy, either committed suicide or was murdered after it became apparent he would be called during the House investigation of the Hiss case.]

"Clubb said his relationship with Lattimore extended over a long period, beginning in 1929 or 1930 and extending to the present date. In 1935, Clubb was the certifying officer on an affidavit signed by Lattimore, who declared he had lost his passport at the headquarters of Communist leader Ten Wang in Inner Mongolia. Lattimore was then issued a new passport."<sup>91</sup>

The State Department's Loyalty Board held a hearing on Clubb, and on February 11, 1952, Acheson's publicity office called in the press. The head of the office announced

that Clubb had been "cleared on both loyalty and security."

The following questions were asked of him by newsmen:

Q. "Did you say he was cleared of these charges?"

A. "Absolutely cleared, —cleared on loyalty and security."

Q. "If there were loyalty charges, this new standard was used and he was judged innocent?"

A. "That is right."

Q. "Mac, you say he was cleared on both loyalty and security charges, —then there were both charges against him?"

A. "He was cleared on both loyalty and security. It doesn't say charges. There is no question about either one and he was restored to duty."<sup>92</sup>

Clubb's clearance was headlined throughout the country. Clubb thereupon resigned, indicating that the reason for his resignation was that his usefulness in the State Department had been greatly impaired by the unfounded charges made against him.

Senator Homer Ferguson and I then revealed that Clubb had not been cleared by the State Department's Loyalty Board, but that the Loyalty Board by a verdict of 3 to 0 had ruled against him, and that this ruling was approved by Assistant Secretary of State Humelsine who is in charge of Security, but that Dean Acheson reversed his own Loyalty Board and his top security officer and ordered Clubb restored to active duty.

When questioned by the press as to whether his press office had attempted to deceive the American people or whether Senators Ferguson and McCarthy were in error, Acheson first refused to answer. Finally, on March 5, 1952, he called a press conference and admitted (1), that his own Loyalty Board had unanimously ruled against Clubb, (2) that his security officer, Humelsine, had approved of that ruling, and (3) that he, Acheson, had reversed the decision and cleared Clubb.

Acheson, however, refused to discuss his reason for clearing Clubb, stating, "I did not study the record because as I have said I do not have time to do that."<sup>93</sup>

#### *Refuses to Fire William Stone Even Though Security Office Requested His Dismissal*

Another typical case of State Department "clearance," is that of William T. Stone. On March 22, 1946, the State Department Security Office made the following recommendation on Stone:

"In behalf of the above-mentioned, it is recommended that action be instituted to terminate his services with the State Department immediately. It is suggested, to achieve this purpose, that an appropriate officer of the Department should inform Mr. Stone that his continued employment in the Department is embarrassing to the Department and he should be given an opportunity to resign. If he should not resign voluntarily, action should be immediately instituted under Civil Service Rule No. 3 to termi-

<sup>91</sup>Washington *Times-Herald*, August 21, 1951, pp. 1, 4.  
<sup>92</sup>For a full story, see "Loyal Press Clearance of Michael McDermott, Special Agent in Charge, by the Secretary for Press Relations, Feb. 11, 1952, pp. 3, 4.  
<sup>93</sup>Press Conference of Secretary of State Dean Acheson (No. 171), March 5, 1952, p. 3.



nate his service with the Department." (Emphasis Mine)<sup>94</sup>

Stone's immediate superior was William Benton (now Senator from Connecticut) who was at that time Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of International Information and Cultural Program.

Stone remained and was promoted.

Six years later, on February 2, 1952, Stone "voluntarily" resigned. His resignation came when his case was being considered by the Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board. I pointed out at the time that Stone's "voluntary resignation," coming at the time the Loyalty Review Board was considering his case, was for the purpose of saving the State Department the possible embarrassment of another Service case. Stone called me a liar and threatened to sue, saying that he had been cleared. The State Department also issued a statement that Stone had been fully cleared.

However, under cross-examination the State Department Security Officer, Humelsine, admitted before the Senate Appropriation Sub-Committee that Stone resigned after the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board (which had previously ordered Service fired after he was "cleared" by the State Department) had ordered a loyalty board panel to hear the evidence on Stone's case and had requested the State Department for additional investigation and information on Stone.<sup>95</sup>

It is impossible to know how many times and in how many cases the State Department has followed the same pattern of issuing false press releases and making misleading statements calculated to deceive the public as they did in this case.

#### *Promotes Man Named as Member of Communist Party*

Haldore Hanson is another young man who was rapidly promoted under Acheson. He is now holding a vitally important position in the State Department high in the Point IV Program. In 1949 he was designated by Acheson as head of the Technical Staff of Point IV. As pointed out on page 76, Hanson was named under oath by a government witness as a member of the Communist Party. He had once been arrested with a Communist group in China according to his own book, *Humane Endeavor*. In that book he extolled the virtues of the Communist leaders and the Communist movement in China. He has never repudiated that book.

#### *Vouches for Man Named as Communist*

Another of the men whom Acheson refused to turn his back upon was Harold Glasser. Glasser had been Acheson's technical adviser at the founding meeting of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, known as UNRRA. Glasser also was named under oath by a government witness as a Communist.<sup>96</sup> Thereafter Acheson wrote a letter of recommendation stating that Glasser "was a good working companion." Glasser used

this letter to obtain a high post in a New York charitable organization.<sup>97</sup>

#### *Former Law Partner Attempts to Smear FBI*

A former law partner of Dean Acheson, Charles A. Horsky, circulated a petition in February, 1950, demanding a public investigation of the FBI and accusing the FBI of "lawless conduct, of illegal wire tapping, rifling private mail, destroying evidence, and advising false sworn testimony by FBI agents."<sup>98</sup> He did this after the Communist Party had launched its own anti-FBI campaign in which it constantly refers to the FBI as a "Nazi Gestapo" and as a "collector of . . . political garbage, rumors on the political thinking of millions of citizens . . . junk and filthy scandal." Acheson's former partner, Horsky, was of course "against Communism," but he was much more against the FBI's "lawless and illegal methods" of fighting Communism.

#### *Punishes Anti-Communist Expert on China and Russia*

A State Department officer who would appear to be the direct opposite of Service, Clubb, Lattimore, Stone, etc., is Angus Ward. Ward slowly worked his way to an important post in the State Department. When the Communists took over in China he was the Consul General at Mukden. Being anti-Communist he was arrested by the Chinese Communists and held for 13 months until he was convicted by the Chinese Communists and ordered out of China.

After Ward returned to this country, he clearly and intelligently spoke out, warning the world of the terrors and dangers of Communist conquest. Instead of using Ward in the State Department in a position where his vast knowledge of China and Communism could be utilized to the benefit of China and the U. S., he was assigned by Acheson to a remote post in East Africa—Nairobi, Kenya—where there is no current Communist drive and where he can do the least amount of damage to the Communist movement.

#### *Sends \$17,000,000 Lend-lease to Russia After the War*

Two years after World War II had ended, Acheson insisted, over Congressional protests, that the United States deliver \$17,000,000 of lend-lease to Russia. This included oil-refinery equipment, electric motors, locomotive parts and other machinery.<sup>99</sup> At this same time, under the Forrester Plan, we were giving military aid to Greece and Turkey in their fight against Communism. Fortunately, the will of Congress prevailed.

<sup>94</sup> Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill 1951, Senate Appropriations Committee, April 17, 1951, p. 403.

<sup>95</sup> Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings on State Dept. Appropriations, March 25, 1952, p. 333.

<sup>96</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336.

<sup>97</sup> Author has Photostat of letter.

<sup>98</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336.

<sup>99</sup> Congressional Record (Bound), April 21, 1947, p. 3738; Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16338.

***Calls Russian Communists  
"Little Boys"***

During a 1946 State Department lecture, Acheson told a group of college professors:

"I don't believe the Soviet leaders are bad men. They are like little boys who enjoy throwing brickbats at other people's greenhouses."<sup>100</sup>

***Invites Soviet to Bikini Tests  
and Recommends We Turn Atomic Secrets  
Over to Russia***

Perhaps this was the reasoning that prompted Acheson in that same year to invite Communist Russia to send observers to U. S. atomic bomb tests at Bikini.

Together with David Lilienthal, he prepared an Atomic Energy Report which recommended in effect that we exchange atomic knowledge with the Soviet Union. "When the plan is in full operation," the Acheson-Lilienthal Report stated, "there will no longer be secrets about atomic energy."<sup>101</sup>

***Allows Soviet Espionage Agents  
to Enter U. S.***

Acheson's description of the Soviet leaders as "little boys who enjoy throwing brickbats at other people's greenhouses" cannot, however, explain all of his actions. It cannot, for example, explain why it was that he allowed foreign agents of the Soviet to enter and leave the United States freely for years, even though he was warned about their espionage missions. This fact was made public in November, 1951, by the McCarran Internal Security Committee.

***Admits Soviet Agent to U. S. Who Stole  
A-Bomb and Bacteriological Warfare Secrets***

From 1948 to 1951 Colonel Otto Biheler was given visas by the State Department to enter this country and travel between the U. S. and Mexico, Canada, and Czechoslovakia. This was done despite warnings that Biheler was a "high ranking member of the counter-intelligence corps of Czechoslovakia and had a notorious record of Communist activity abroad."<sup>102</sup> According to Senator O'Connor, Chairman of the Senate subcommittee that investigated this matter, Biheler was a "key figure in the Communist espionage apparatus in the United States . . . engaged in the procurement of information concerning atomic energy, the uranium stock of the United States and bacteriological and chemical warfare."<sup>103</sup>

Senator O'Connor also stated that:

"In April, 1950, he is reported to have been the mastermind behind a plot to effect the assassination of Major Carlos y Paz-Tejuda, Chief of the Army of Guatemala, and is reported to have given the instructions to two Soviet nationals in Guatemala to effect the assassination."<sup>104</sup>

***Allows Professional Killer for  
Communist Russia to Enter U. S.***

Another such case was that of Jiri Stary, head of a Czechoslovakian spy ring. Senator Pat McCarran on

November 21, 1951, described Stary as "a man trained in 'silent killing' by a Communist spy school, [who] has been harbored in the United States for more than two years . . . a director of an espionage network . . . in charge of the discipline of Czechoslovakian nationals who stray from the Communist influence."<sup>105</sup>

There was also a Communist espionage agent attached to the UN Information Section with a long record of "Communist associations and of indicated espionage services for the Soviet Union in southeastern Europe." "Despite this record," Senator McCarran said, "the State Department has consented, time and again, to her accreditation as a press correspondent by the United Nations and has evaded a request of the Immigration Service to order her deported."<sup>107</sup>

***State Department Breaks Promise and  
Forces Deportation of Anti-Communist  
Who Worked for U. S.***

While those known agents of the Soviet were being allowed to enter and leave the United States freely under Acheson's administration of the State Department, in 1947 Acheson refused entry to Dr. Karl von Kleczkowski. Kleczkowski had been recruited in the Balkans for anti-Communist counter-espionage work for the U. S. by Governor George H. Earle of Pennsylvania, wartime undercover representative of the President. Earle promised Kleczkowski and his wife asylum in the U. S. in return for their anti-Communist work. However, when the Kleczkowskis arrived in the U. S. aboard an army plane, the State Department denied them entrance. Governor Earle charged that Communist influences in the State Department sought their deportation. Acheson accused them of being "dangerous aliens," and the Kleczkowskis were deported to South America.<sup>108</sup>

**You have said that Acheson followed the Communist Party line in Asia. What was the major aim of Communism in Asia?**

The major aim of international Communism in Asia was stated by Lenin decades ago. It has been restated at Comintern meetings year after year. That aim was the creation of a Red China as a necessary prelude to the creation of a Red Asia and then a Red Pacific prior to the assault upon America. As Lenin said, "He who controls China can control the world."

**Who were Acheson's advisers on China?**

Acheson, who said he preferred "to be guided by experts who think . . . along my point of view,"<sup>109</sup> selected the following men as his advisers and policy-makers on China:

**(1) Alger Hiss, on whom Acheson declared he "would**

<sup>100</sup> American Mercury, April, 1952, p. 3.

<sup>101</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336.

<sup>102</sup> Press Release of Senator Herbert O'Connor, Nov. 8, 1951; Testimony taken in Executive Session, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Nov. 7, 1951.

<sup>103</sup> Press Release of Senator Herbert O'Connor, Nov. 8, 1951; Testimony taken in Executive Session, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Nov. 7, 1951.

<sup>104</sup> Press Release of Senator Pat McCarran, Nov. 21, 1951; Testimony taken in Executive Session, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Nov. 19, 1951.

<sup>105</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), Oct. 17, 1951, pp. 13501-13503; Press Release Senator Pat McCarran, Oct. 17, 1951.

<sup>106</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336.

<sup>107</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 723.

not turn his back" even after Hiss was convicted of perjury in connection with Soviet espionage;

(2) *Owen Lattimore*, who has been named under oath as a member of the Communist Party and as a Soviet agent;

(3) *Lauchlin Currie*, who has been named under oath as a "full-fledged member" of the Silvermaster spy ring;

(4) *John Stewart Service*, who was arrested in connection with the *Amerasia* espionage case, then cleared of disloyalty charges by Acheson, but finally dismissed on orders of the Loyalty Review Board;

(5) *John Carter Vincent*, who has been named under oath as a member of the Communist Party, but who was recently cleared of disloyalty charges by Acheson;

(6) *John P. Davies*, who was accused by General Hurley of operating behind his back to support the Communists and who, in his official reports to the State Department, adopted the thinking of Agnes Smedley, a known Communist agent, whom he described as one of the "pure in heart" in China; and

(7) *Edmund Oliver Clubb*, who was ordered discharged by the State Department loyalty board which decision was reversed by Acheson.

The names of all of the "experts" chosen by Acheson to form our policy toward China are too numerous to list in this book. Many of them were supplied to the State Department by the Institute of Pacific Relations, which has been labeled by Senator Pat McCarran as an organization "taken over by Communist design and made a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning of American thinking and American policy with regard to the Far East."<sup>110</sup>

**What part did the Yalta Agreement play in the Communist conquest of China?**

The Yalta Agreement contained two major provisions insofar as China was concerned: (1) surrender of Manchuria to Russia, (2) arrangements for the United States to arm and equip a Russian army. At the time of the Yalta Agreement Chiang Kai-shek was not informed that we were offering control of Chinese territory to Stalin. The loss of Manchuria meant that the Chinese Communists were given a gateway to Russian arms and supplies in their war against him.

In return for those concessions, Stalin "promised" to enter the Pacific War at some undetermined time.

The Yalta Agreement was confirmed at Potsdam by Truman against the urgent advice of fifty of the Army's top intelligence officers. On April 31, 1945, three months before the Potsdam Conference, those fifty high-ranking Army officers reported to General Marshall, who was the military adviser at both Yalta and Potsdam, as follows:

"The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades to come . . . [it] would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed in Europe east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic.

"If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose her independence, to become the Poland of Asia; Korea, the Asiatic Rumania; Manchukuo, the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal China will exist after the impact of the Russian armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may well have to depart and a Chinese Soviet government may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recognize.

"To take a line of action which would save few lives now, and only a little time—at an unpredictable cost in lives, treasure, and honor in the future—and simultaneously destroy our ally China, would be an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce.

"Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to destroy China. This would certainly injure the material and moral position of the United States in Asia." (Emphasis Mine.)<sup>111</sup>

Thus the treason which Hiss advised at Yalta was confirmed and brought to full bloom at Potsdam against the advice of Army Intelligence.

**While the State Department was trying to sell the idea that the Chinese Communists were "agrarian reformers" and not really Communists, were Chinese Communist leaders denying that they were Communists?**

This is perhaps best answered by Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Chinese Communists, in his book *The New Democracy*, published in 1940 and sold in the *Daily Worker* bookshop in New York City. Mao said:

"We cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union."

"No matter who you follow so long as you are anti-Communist, you are traitors."

**What part did General Stilwell play in the Communist conquest of China, and who were his advisers?**

In China, Stilwell was surrounded by a group of foreign service officers supplied by the State Department, including John Stewart Service, since ordered discharged under the loyalty program, and headed by John Paton Davies, whose case has been referred to the Attorney General.

The ground for Communist conquest was cultivated from 1942 to 1944 by General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell (a close friend and protege of General George C. Marshall.) Stilwell's bitter hatred of Chiang, the leader of the anti-Communist forces of China, is well-known and seems matched only by his infatuation with the Chinese Communists.

Agnes Smedley, although not a State Department employee, was part of that tightly knit group which was so close to Stilwell. For example, Davies who was referred to as "Stilwell's Secretary of State," referred to Smedley as "one of the pure in heart." Writers, such as Freda Utey, who visited China reported the mutual admiration between Smedley and Stilwell. Smedley has been exposed by General MacArthur's Intelligence Headquarters as an important cog in a Communist international

<sup>110</sup> Interview with Senator Pat McCarran, U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 16, 1951, p. 27.

<sup>111</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 4, June 21, 1951, p. 2916.

spy ring which was headed by Richard Sorge who was later convicted of being a Communist spy and hanged by the Japanese.

A letter which Stilwell wrote a friend while in China casts much light on his attitude toward the Communists. The letter reads in part as follows:

"It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh."<sup>112</sup>

Chu Teh, with whom Stilwell, the American Commander in China, wanted to "shoulder a rifle" was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Armies. He is now Commander-in-Chief of the Red Armies warring with us in Korea.

General Claire Chennault, of Flying Tiger fame, has told part of the story of Stilwell's activities in China in his book, *Way of a Fighter*. On page 317 Chennault, in describing how Stilwell in the spring of 1944 sent a mission to Communist headquarters in Yen-an, had this to say:

"The American mission to Yen-an was hardly established before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime over the Chungking government. No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists, whom, they said, were really only 'agrarian reformers,' and more like New Dealers than Communists. The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo with 'hoarding lend-lease arms' to fight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor . . .

"Then Yen-an Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese Red armies . . . Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking government, it was a common joke (in Chungking) that Stilwell's headquarters were developing a private foreign policy with John Davies as secretary of state.

"During this period there was a strong group of left wingers in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department who used Stilwell's sympathy for the Chinese Communists and his violent antipathy to the generalissimo as a lever to shift American policy in favor of the Communists . . ."<sup>113</sup>

The tremendous hatred which Stilwell had for Chiang Kai-shek, the anti-Communist leader, is described in John T. Flynn's book, *While You Slept*. On page 164 he quotes what Stilwell entered in his diary after he had personally delivered a message apparently instigated by Marshall and sent by Roosevelt to Chiang. The message was understood by both Chiang and Stilwell as an ultimatum demanding Stilwell be put in "unrestricted command" of all Chinese forces. Stilwell describes Chiang's reaction to the message in the following language:

"At long last . . . FDR has spoken plain words . . . with a firecracker in every sentence . . . I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and then sank back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger right in the solar plexus and went right through him. It was a clear hit. But beyond turning green and losing the power of speech, he did not bat an eye."

General Patrick Hurley, who was present when Stilwell delivered Roosevelt's ultimatum to Chiang, gave a detailed account of the incident in his testimony before the Russell Committee. Hurley stated that after Stilwell's temporary victory he expressed his feelings in a poem.

Hurley stated, ". . . that night, when I saw Stilwell, . . . he read it to me with great glee, it was supposed to be humorous."

"I've waited long for vengeance—  
At last I've had my chance.  
I've looked the Peanut in the eye  
And kicked him in the pants.  
The old harpoon was ready  
With aim and timing true,  
I sank it to the handle  
And stung him through and through.  
The little bastard shivered,  
And lost his power of speech.  
His face turned green and quivered  
As he struggled not to screech.  
For all my weary battles,  
For all my hours of woe,  
At last I've had my innings  
And laid the Peanut low.  
I know I've still to suffer,  
And run a weary race,  
But Oh; the blessed pleasure!  
I've wrecked the Peanut's face."<sup>114</sup>

The contents of the message which Stilwell delivered have been inserted in the record of the Russell Committee on Pages 2867 and 2868. They ordered Chiang to appoint Stilwell Commander-in-Chief of all the Chinese armies. But Stilwell's gloating was premature. On this point John T. Flynn quotes Admiral Leahy as follows:

"The Generalissimo 'was willing and anxious to meet Roosevelt's wishes' that an American officer command all Chinese forces. But he insisted that 'it must be one in whom I can repose confidence . . . The officer must be capable of frank and sincere co-operation, and General Stilwell has shown himself conspicuously lacking in these indispensable qualifications.'"

Flynn then goes on to say:

"Admiral Leahy writes that Marshall even after this made an effort to dissuade Roosevelt but without success. Stilwell himself committed his sentiments to another poem about his downfall in unprintable English (though it appears in his posthumous papers) and disappeared from the scene."<sup>115</sup>

After Stilwell left China, those whom the State Department had selected as his advisers remained on to continue the job.

Thus was the soil carefully cultivated by Stilwell and his staff for the disastrous Marshall Mission to China which finally ripened into the Communist conquest of China and eventually into the Korean war.

<sup>112</sup> Daily Worker, Jan. 26, 1947, p. 7.

<sup>113</sup> General Claire Chennault, *Way of a Fighter*, p. 317.

<sup>114</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 4, June 21, 1951, p. 2872; Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (William Sloan Associates, 1948), p. 334.

<sup>115</sup> John T. Flynn, *While You Slept* (The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1951), p. 165.

Service and Davies were both named by you before the Tydings Committee. You claimed they helped to betray China. Will you give the facts?

Since I gave the cases of Service and Davies to the Tydings Committee, Service has been discharged from the State Department upon orders of the Loyalty Board; Davies' case has been referred to the Justice Department by the McCarran Committee.

Both Service and Davies spent considerable time in China as State Department officials. In their recommendations to Washington both followed the Communist Party line.

For example, on November 7, 1944, Davies submitted a memorandum to the State Department stating that the Communist Party in China was "a modern dynamic popular government." At the same time he referred to the anti-Communists as "feudal." "The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs," said Davies.<sup>116</sup> As if predicting the argument to be used seven years later in the Korean debate, Davies warned that the United States might become involved in a war with Russia if we continued to support the anti-Communist government of China.<sup>117</sup> On December 12, 1944 he urged that we supply the Chinese Communists with arms—a proposal which Dean Acheson two years later requested Congress to approve.<sup>118</sup>

#### *Service Labels Communists "Democratic"*

Acheson's protégé, John Stewart Service, reported from China that the Chinese Communists were "moderate and democratic."<sup>119</sup> The anti-Communist government he described as "... a decadent regime which by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems."<sup>120</sup>

In describing the Communist movement in China, Service, on October 9, 1944, reported:

"It has improved the economic condition of the peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform and good government. It has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness and a sense of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self-respect, self-reliance, and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for."<sup>121</sup>

Service made no mention of the fact that more Chinese starved and were beheaded under Communist control than under any comparable period in China's ageless history.

In his dispatches, Service argued against aid to the anti-Communists. But he was not blind to the fact that the life of the anti-Communists depended upon our assistance. "The Kuomintang," he reported on October 10, 1944, "is dependent on American support for survival."<sup>122</sup>

Both Service and Davies, were charged by Ambassador-to-China Hurley with supporting the Communists and sabotaging his anti-Communist policies in China. Hurley stated that Davies had one day flown off to Yenan

to tell Mao Tse Tung, the Communist leader, that Hurley, our Ambassador (an anti-Communist), did not represent the American viewpoint.<sup>123</sup> Hurley had John Service recalled from China because, according to Hurley, his pro-Communist activities were disrupting Hurley's anti-Communist program in China. Later Hurley objected because men like Service whom he had asked to have recalled from Asia were returned to Washington and promoted.<sup>124</sup>

In 1945 Service was arrested in the *Amerasia* case which involved the theft of hundreds of secret and other classified documents found in the office of the magazine, *Amerasia*. Service admitted giving secret government documents to Philip Jaffe,<sup>125</sup> the editor of the magazine, who has been named by a government witness as a Soviet agent.<sup>126</sup>

#### *Did Hiss play a part in the betrayal of China?*

In 1944 Hiss was Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. He later was director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, which office was responsible for the development and coordination of American foreign policy.

Thereafter Hiss was sent to Yalta where he, Gromyko of Russia, and Jebb of England drafted major portions of the Yalta Agreement which so greatly contributed to the betrayal of China.

Two years ago you named Vincent as one of those whom you considered bad for America and good for Communist Russia. What, if any, part did he play in the China picture?

John Carter Vincent worked with Hiss on the China phase of our foreign policy. In 1947 Vincent was under such heavy Congressional attack for his pro-Communist views and activities that Acheson removed him from the Washington scene by sending him to Switzerland. In 1950 when Vincent was again under fire, Acheson sent him to Tangiers.

Back in 1943 Vincent was appointed Assistant in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and at the same time Special Assistant to the President's Administrative Assistant, Lauchlin Currie, who has been named under oath as a member of a Communist spy ring.<sup>127</sup>

The following year he and Owen Lattimore accompanied Henry Wallace to China and assisted in drawing up the Wallace Report which recommended that we withdraw any support we had been giving the anti-Communists and give our support to the Chinese Communists. During this visit to China, Vincent and Lattimore were toasted at a dinner by Sergei Godlize, high Soviet official, as

<sup>116</sup> White Paper on United States Relations With China (The Department of State, 1949), p. 573.

<sup>117</sup> Utley, *The China Story*, p. 112.

<sup>118</sup> White Paper on China, pp. 574, 575.

<sup>119</sup> White Paper on China, p. 565.

<sup>120</sup> White Paper on China, p. 573.

<sup>121</sup> White Paper on China, p. 565.

<sup>122</sup> White Paper on China, p. 574.

<sup>123</sup> Utley, *The China Story*, p. 110.

<sup>124</sup> (Released names of Service and Acheson in Oct., 1945): White Paper on China, p. 582.

<sup>125</sup> Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, June 22, 1950, p. 1233.

<sup>126</sup> Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 431.

<sup>127</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423.

the men "on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."<sup>128</sup>

In 1945 Vincent was made head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. Together with Service and Davies, Vincent contended Chiang should be forced to stop fighting the Communists and take them into his government. This was the basis of the Marshall Mission to China and of State Department policy toward China which General MacArthur has described as "one of the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history for which the free world is now paying in blood and disaster and will in all probability continue to do so indefinitely."<sup>129</sup>

In September, 1946, when General MacArthur issued a warning against the danger of Communism in Japan, Vincent publicly rebuked MacArthur and was quoted in the New York *Herald-Tribune* as accusing MacArthur of initiating an anti-Communist campaign.

When in December of 1946 Russia violated a provision of the Yalta agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 by ordering an American Naval vessel out of the port of Darien, Vincent authorized a statement that Russia was acting within her rights.<sup>130</sup>

**Lauchlin Currie has been described as a member of a Communist spy ring. What if any influence did he exert on State Department policy in China?**

Lauchlin Currie, another member of the Acheson China group, has been named under oath by Elizabeth Bentley, (a former Communist who has been of great value to the government) as a member of the Silvermaster spy ring. Asked under oath if Currie was a full-fledged member of the Silvermaster spy ring, Miss Bentley replied, "Definitely."<sup>131</sup> The House Committee on Un-American Activities in a pamphlet entitled *The Shameful Years*, states that "Miss Bentley has stated that all individuals working in the apparatus were under the direction of the NKVD [the Russian Secret Police]."<sup>132</sup>

Miss Bentley, who was formerly a courier for a Soviet spy ring in Washington, testified as follows about Currie's assistance to the ring:

**SENATOR FERGUSON:** "Can you give us any information on what you received through Currie?"

**MISS BENTLEY:** "Most of it was Far Eastern. There was the time when he relayed the information that the Soviet code was about to be broken."

**MR. MORRIS:** "Broken by whom?"

**MISS BENTLEY:** "The United States authorities."

**MR. MORRIS:** "He discovered that the United States authorities had broken the code, and he relayed it to you?"<sup>133</sup>

Miss Bentley explained that Currie had advised her the Soviet code was about to be broken and that she relayed this information to her "Russian head."

**MR. MORRIS:** "Was that a highly classified fact at the time?"

**MISS BENTLEY:** "Definitely. I don't know enough about Government labelings, but it was certainly something you wouldn't pass around."<sup>134</sup>

According to her sworn testimony, Currie was always willing to help members of the spy ring—"bailing them

out when they were in trouble, when they were being fired for disloyalty, or when they needed help to get a job."<sup>135</sup>

In addition, Currie was able to exert considerable influence on our Far Eastern policy through his friendship with Acheson and Hiss and through Vincent, who was assigned to Currie's White House office. It was through Currie's office that the Acheson group reached the White House with the pro-Communist reports and dispatches from China which anti-Communist Joseph Grew tried to pigeonhole in the State Department. The testimony before the McCarran Committee showed that Currie has worked closely with the Communist-front Institute of Pacific Relations.

Following is a letter written by E. C. Carter, head of the Communist-front IPR, to Joe Barnes, one-time head of the New York office of OWI, who has been named under oath as a Soviet agent:

"New York, N.Y., October 27, 1942.

"JOSEPH BARNES, Esq.

New York, N.Y.

"DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day soon when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

"His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

"Sincerely yours,  
"EDWARD C. CARTER."<sup>136</sup>

**Has the Communist Party admitted that the State Department was following the Communist line on China?**

Yes. For example, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party until 1945, testified before the Tydings Committee as follows:

**SENATOR HICKENLOOPER:** "Now then, you have testified here, as I understand your testimony, . . . that you worked ceaselessly over a period of years, perhaps beginning in the thirties and continuing up until at least 1942, for the adoption of a definite policy on the part of the United States toward China, and the Chinese Communists."

**MR. BROWDER:** "That is correct."

**SENATOR HICKENLOOPER:** "And you were working on that policy as a Communist policy, were you not? That was the policy of the Communists that you were working on."

**MR. BROWDER:** "That was the policy of the Communist Party."

**SENATOR HICKENLOOPER:** "Then I believe that you said that in 1942, that policy upon which

<sup>128</sup> Henry Wallace, *Soviet-Asia Mission* (Cornwall Press, Inc., 1946), p. 172.  
<sup>129</sup> General Douglas MacArthur by Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, (Henry Holt & Co., 1952), p. 127.  
<sup>130</sup> Ullery, *The China Story*, p. 119.  
<sup>131</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423.  
<sup>132</sup> *The Shameful Years, Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States*, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Dec. 30, 1951, p. 59.  
<sup>133</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423.  
<sup>134</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423.  
<sup>135</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423.  
<sup>136</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423.

you had been working was adopted as the policy of the United States toward China."

MR. BROWDER: "... I would say that the central points of that policy ... were identical with the policy of the Communist Party."

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "... the substance of the important views advocated by the Communist Party up to 1942, were in fact adopted by the State Department, toward the Communists in China at about 1942—is that correct?"

MR. BROWDER: "In October 1942."

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "So, to that extent, regardless of the necessities of the situation or the explanations, you were successful or success met your efforts in getting that policy established?"

MR. BROWDER: "The policy which we had advocated was substantially incorporated into the policy of the United States Government."<sup>137</sup>

This statement of Browder's was confirmed by Louis Budenz, former editor of the *Daily Worker* and member of the Communist national committee.

Asked whether the Communist Party tried to influence the Far Eastern policy of the United States, Budenz replied:

"Yes, sir; that was one of our main assignments from the international Communist organization ... Successes were reported on a number of occasions."<sup>138</sup>

**Do you think Acheson realized he was following the Communist Party line in Asia?**

Either he knew what he was doing or he was incompetent beyond words. As late as November, 1945, William Z. Foster, head of the Communist Party of the United States, notified the world that China was the prime target of the Soviet Union. He said:

"On the international scale, the key task ... is to stop American intervention in China ... The war in China is the key of all problems on the international front."

Less than a month after this Communist proclamation, Marshall embarked upon the "Marshall Mission to China." The testimony before the Russell Committee was that this mission was an Acheson-Marshall-Vincent project. Before Marshall went to China the Communists occupied a very small portion of China. Their Army numbered less than 300,000 badly equipped troops. When Marshall returned from China to be rewarded by Truman with an appointment as Secretary of State, the Communist-controlled area had greatly increased and the Communist Army had grown from 300,000 badly equipped troops to an Army of over 2,000,000 relatively well-equipped soldiers.

**What about the State Department's excuse that we withdrew aid from Chiang Kai-shek because his government was corrupt?**

Chiang Kai-Shek had been engaged in conflict and warfare since 1927—first with the Communists, then with Japan, then simultaneously with the Communists and Japan, and after Japan's defeat, again with the Communists. During that time, all the disruption of war

beset Chiang's Government. Under the circumstances it would be a miracle if there were no corruption or incompetence in his government.

But if corruption and incompetence are grounds for turning an administration over to the Communists, then Earl Browder should be President of the United States, Harry Bridges should be Secretary of Labor, and Alger Hiss should be Secretary of Defense.

**What about Acheson's claim that we gave Chiang Kai-shek every help which he could utilize, including \$2 billion worth of aid since the end of World War II?**

That is untrue. Acheson made this claim in a letter to Senator Pat McCarran on March 14, 1949, in arguing against any further aid to anti-Communist China, which according to Acheson, "would almost surely be catastrophic."

Of the phony \$2 billion figure, \$335,800,000 was for repatriating Japanese soldiers in China and transporting Chinese Nationalist armed forces to accept the surrender of the Japanese. Even President Truman declared that those expenditures should properly have been charged to World War II. The \$2 billion also included UNRRA payments, part of which went to Red China.<sup>140</sup>

Nationalist China was also charged for war materials never received—no one will ever know how much. For example, 120,000 tons of ammunition were dumped in the Bay of Bengal shortly after Japan's surrender, and China's Lend-Lease account was charged at the rate of \$1,000 per ton for this ammunition. (See pages 39, 40.)

China was charged unreasonably high prices for the material we did deliver. Some slight idea of the fantastic prices we charged China can be obtained from the following figures quoted on page 47 of Freda Utley's book, *The China Story*:

	"Surplus" price to other nations	List Price	Price to China
Bazookas .....	\$3.65	\$36.25	\$162.00
Rifles, .30-caliber .....	5.10	51.00	51.00
Rifle ammunition (per 1,000 rounds) .....	4.55	45.55	85.00
Machine-gun ammunition (per 100 rounds) ....	4.85	45.85	95.00

And so runs the sordid story of the dishonest book-keeping which is the basis for Acheson's claim that China fell to the Communists despite our "two-billion-dollar" generosity. Left-wing radio commentators and newspaper columnists have parroted this attempted deception.

**The year 1949 marked the Communist conquest of China. Will you list a few of the events which might help explain that victory?**

Certainly. Following are a series of a few of the events which took place in 1949. They illustrate how Acheson

<sup>137</sup> Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 27, 1950, p. 686, 687.  
<sup>138</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 23, 1951, p. 593.  
<sup>140</sup> Utley, *The China Story*, pp. 32-49.

made it impossible for the anti-Communists in China to withstand the determined drive of the Communists.

#### Event No. 1

Senator Pat McCarran, an intelligently courageous anti-Communist fighter, introduced a bill on February 25, 1949, to provide aid to our anti-Communist friends in China.

#### Event No. 2

On March 1, 1949, the Communist Party of New York State directed all of its members to write their Congressmen and Senators and demand:

“... an end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid elements and remnants of the Kuomintang.”

Continued aid to the anti-Communists, the Communist Directive stated, would cause “frictions and misunderstandings.”<sup>141</sup>

#### Event No. 3

On the same day the Communist directive was issued, Drew Pearson reported that the Secretary of State thought the anti-Communist leaders of China were cheap petty crooks and thieves. Acheson, according to Pearson, said that much of the past aid which America had given the anti-Communists “wasn’t used to fight Communism, but went into the pockets of Chiang Kai-shek’s lieutenants.” The Chinese embassy patiently replied to this attack by saying that they could not believe the Secretary had actually said this because the great bulk of American aid to China had been spent and distributed under direct American supervision.<sup>142</sup>

#### Event No. 4

On March 13, 1949, Acheson wrote Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that McCarran’s Aid to China Bill:

“... would only prolong hostilities and the suffering of the Chinese people and would arouse in them deep resentment against the United States.”<sup>143</sup>

In arguing against aid to the anti-Communists, Acheson said, “the outcome . . . would almost surely be catastrophic.”

The anti-Communist government, Acheson wrote, “does not have the military capability of maintaining a foothold in South China against a determined Communist advance.”

Acheson then went on to state that aid to China since V-J Day had reached a point “over \$2 billion.”<sup>144</sup>

#### Event No. 5

After making an analysis of all aid to China since V-J Day, Senator McCarran released a statement to the press on April 17, 1949, declaring that Acheson’s letter was both “inaccurate and misleading.” McCarran went on to state: “The State Department Division of Far Eastern Affairs is definitely soft to Communist Russia.” Senator McCarran pointed out that “realistic analysis

shows that post V-J Day effective military aid has totaled only \$110 million—not the \$2 billion implied in the Secretary’s letter.”<sup>145</sup>

#### Event No. 6

On May 10, 1949, General Claire Chennault, a military man of many years experience in China, set forth his views in his “Summary of Present Communist Crisis in Asia.” They were far different from those of Mr. Acheson’s in Washington. While Acheson felt that the anti-Communists did not have the “military capability of maintaining a foothold in South China,” General Chennault stated that some 150 million people in southern and western China—described by Chennault as “hardy mountaineers with a tradition of warlike defense of their native provinces against all invaders”—could supply “effective resistance to the Communist advance.” Chennault wrote:

“Both the people and their leaders are prepared to resist the Communists and will in any case resist whether we help them or not. *But what we give in aid will make the difference between a hopeless and an effective resistance.*”

A few months later Acheson was to claim in his letter of transmittal of the *White Paper* that the anti-Communists had lost because “its troops had lost the will to fight, and its government had lost popular support.”<sup>146</sup>

#### Event No. 7

On December 23, 1949, the State Department announced it had refused a permit for a New York firm, the Driggs Engineering Company, to ship 100,000 Springfield rifles “for the defense of Formosa.” The company was acting as an agent for the Chinese Nationalists.

This was not a request for money. Chiang had the funds to pay for the rifles. It merely involved the granting of a permit by the State Department so the rifles could be shipped.

**Did Acheson and Marshall recommend that we aid the Chinese Communist army?**

Yes. This was recommended after the war with Japan had ended.

On June 19, 1946, Acheson appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and requested that the United States Government arm 10 Chinese Communist divisions.<sup>147</sup>

At that time, Acheson reported that General Marshall had agreed to assign 69 U. S. officers and 400 tons of American equipment to train the Chinese Communist armies.

Ten months previously the war with Japan had ended. Acheson did not say who was to be fought by this American-equipped Communist army.

**Is it true that Marshall, under State Department instructions, signed an order cutting off not only**

<sup>141</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 25, 1951, pp. 55-57.

<sup>142</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), March 5, 1949, p. 1937.

<sup>143</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), April 22, 1949, p. 5005.

<sup>144</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), April 22, 1949, p. 5005.

<sup>145</sup> Press Release of Senator Pat McCarran, April 17, 1949; New York Times, April 17, 1949, p. 25.

<sup>146</sup> White Paper on China, p. XIV.

<sup>147</sup> House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings on H.R. 6795, June 19, 1946.



arms to our friends in China, but also all ammunition so that the arms they had would be useless?

Yes. The embargo on all arms and ammunition to China began in 1946 and continued into 1947.

Those were crucial years, and China's plight was so bad that even the *New York Times* reported on June 22, 1947, that the guns of the anti-Communists were so worn and burned out that "bullets fell through them to the ground."

The Communists, on the other hand, were kept well supplied by the Russians. Admiral Cooke has so testified before the McCarran Committee.

SENATOR FERGUSON: "What effect would the arming of the Nationalists have had as far as the Communists were concerned?"

ADMIRAL COOKE: "Of course, the Communists were being very well supplied in Manchuria by the Russians from arsenals and from captured Japanese guns and ammunition. We were practically certain that was going on, and, of course, in our *White Paper* reported from our diplomatic representatives in Moscow that it was going on."

SENATOR FERGUSON: "So we knew that the Communists were getting arms and ammunition and also it was our policy . . . to put an embargo on the Nationalists?"

ADMIRAL COOKE: "That is right."<sup>148</sup>

During the time that arms were completely denied the anti-Communists, as above stated, Acheson urged the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that we arm and train Communist divisions.<sup>149</sup>

Did the truces between the anti-Communist Chinese and the Chinese Communists which were arranged by Marshall help the Communists or our friends, the anti-Communists?

After Marshall arrived in China he succeeded in arranging four truces—four cease-fire orders. In each case, as I have documented in my book, *The Story of General George Marshall—America's Retreat From Victory*, the truce played into the hands of the Communists. It gave them time to rebuild their forces, and in each case denied the anti-Communists a military victory which was within their grasp. This same truce technique, incidentally, is now being used in Korea against us.

To illustrate the significance of those truces demanded by Marshall: When Chiang's anti-Communists were about to take Kalgan Mountain pass, which lead into Russian-controlled Manchuria, Marshall, on the request of the Communists, demanded a truce. Chiang Kai-shek in reply to Marshall's demand said that:

"It was absolutely essential to the national welfare that the government gain control of Kalgan and that the occupation of that city by the government would do much to prevent further military action by the Communists."<sup>150</sup>

When Chiang refused to leave Kalgan to the Reds, Marshall threatened to have himself recalled from China—which carried the threat of United States abandonment of China. Chiang thereupon yielded to Marshall's demands.

The fact that the Marshall-arranged truces helped deliver China into Communist hands was testified to by Admiral Cooke before the McCarran Committee.<sup>151</sup> Admiral Cooke was chief of staff to Admiral Ernest King during World War II. He served as chief strategic and policy adviser to Admiral King during the entire war, and later participated in the formulation of U. S. policy on the Far East when the war was brought to an end. Cooke commanded the 7th Fleet stationed in Chinese waters and then commanded all U. S. combat forces in China when General Wedemeyer returned to the U. S. His testimony that the Marshall truces helped deliver China into Communist hands is, therefore, the opinion of a real expert both on the Far East and on military matters.

Do you claim that General Marshall, who has long worked with Acheson, was knowingly working for the Communist cause in China?

As I stated in my book, *The Story of General George Marshall—America's Retreat from Victory*, I cannot delve into the mind of Marshall. I can only present the facts to the American people. Whether Marshall knowingly betrayed China or whether he honestly thought that he was helping China, the results are equally disastrous for America.

What about your charge that the United States dumped into the ocean 120,000 tons of ammunition which had been earmarked for China?

This is true. It is documented.

Following is the story of the attempt of the State Department and the left-wing press to keep those facts from the American people. First let me quote my speech of October 10, 1950, in San Diego, California:

"When the war with Japan ended, there was stored in India—as a way station to China—hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of lend-lease arms and ammunition.

"For months, Liberty ships were being loaded with those mountains of ammunition. Loaded they left the port and returned empty, time after time, to be reloaded and leave again. 120,000 tons of ammunition those ships took from the ports of India, yet every day during this period the artillery of Chiang Kai-shek remained silent for lack of ammunition.

"Why? Because under State Department expert planning, the orders were—dump this ammunition 200 miles at sea, dump it in the Bay of Bengal.

"All of the vast amount of ammunition which was destroyed by us is still carried on the Administration's books as aid which we gave China.

"When I heard this story of 120,000 tons of ammunition being dumped in the sea, I could not believe it. We sent investigators over to check and we found that it was true. Finally, we got a letter from Major General Edward F. Witsell. General Witsell admitted that this ammunition actually was dumped in the Bay of Bengal. But, of course, there was the usual double-talk, and the claim that the ammuni-

<sup>148</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 5, Oct. 19, 1951, p. 1486.

<sup>149</sup> House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings on H.R. 6795, June 19, 1946.

<sup>150</sup> White Paper on China, p. 190.

<sup>151</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 5, Oct. 19, 1951, p. 1502.

tion was corroded—as though a rusty bomb wouldn't kill a Communist as dead as a shiny bomb."

### *Milwaukee Journal Lies to Readers in an Attempt to Discredit Anti-Communist Fight*

Several months later the left-wing *Milwaukee Journal* ran an editorial entitled, "How Big Can a Lie Get?" That editorial is reproduced herewith:

## Milwaukee Journal Editorial

### How Big Can a Lie Get?

Nobody is much surprised any more at Senator McCarthy's careless use of what he calls "facts," but he can still startle you with his ability to multiply misinformation.

How big can a lie get? There's a good answer in a story about a statement by McCarthy on page 42 in today's *Journal*.

Just before election McCarthy hysterically told a Washington audience (and Wisconsin audiences as well) that 120,000 tons of ammunition the United States had earmarked for the Nationalist regime in China had, under "state department planning," been deliberately dumped by our army into the Indian ocean—a waste of billions of dollars.

Peter Edson, highly reputable Washington correspondent, was flabbergasted and looked up the record. Ammunition was dumped, all right, back in 1945—120 tons of it, not 120,000 tons. It was dumped after the Chinese Nationalists had authorized its destruction because it had been damaged and corroded and was dangerous to have around.

How big can a lie get? McCarthy can multiply it 1,000 times and assess it as "billions of dollars" without the bat of an eyelash. Read Mr. Edson's story and see Senator McCarthy's method in action—inventing untruths and multiplying them to infinity.

### *Senate Investigating Committee Report*

I already had a letter from General Witsell admitting that the ammunition which had been earmarked for Chiang Kai-shek was dumped in the ocean. Nevertheless, in order to nail down the lie I wrote to the Chief Counsel of the Senate Special Investigating Committee and asked him to check into this matter for me. His answer to my request is reproduced on the opposite page.

**Did not the United States send a sizable military mission to aid Chiang Kai-shek?**

Yes, but, as Ambassador Bullitt said: "Nearly half of the 1,500-man military 'mission' was composed of fellow travelers and Communist sympathizers."<sup>152</sup>

**Since the fall of China has Acheson ever admitted that his China policy was a failure?**

No. There is no indication that Acheson considers the loss of China to Communism a "failure." Instead, he hailed it as "a new day which has dawned in Asia."

About a month after the Communist conquest of China had been completed, Acheson declared in a speech before the National Press Club in Washington:

"... what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between East and West are gone, relationships which at their best were exploitation and which at their worst were paternalism."

Nine months after the Communist conquest of China, Acheson, on September 10th, during an interview over a CBS television program, said:

"We do not think that any part of Asia is lost to the free world."

Owen Lattimore, who has been referred to as the State Department's Architect of Far Eastern Policy, had this to say after the Communist victories in China:

"Through Asia today there prevails an atmosphere of hope, not despair . . ."

"What they see opening out before them is a limitless horizon of hope—the hope of peaceful, constructive activities in free countries and peaceful cooperation among free people."<sup>153</sup>

On December 7, 1949, less than a month before Acheson described the Communist conquest of China as the dawning of a new day, Radio Moscow had this to say about the Communist victory:

"The Chinese people have dumped Chiang Kai-shek into the garbage can of history. The same fate awaits the United States puppets in other countries. Inspired by the grand historical victory of the Chinese people, the people of Indonesia and Viet Nam, the Philippines, Southern Korea and Burma, are intensifying their national liberation struggle. The democratic movement is gaining ground and strength in Japan where people refuse to be tools in implementation of the plan cooked up by Wall Street."

A report to the State Department, stamped secret, dated March 3, 1950, and entitled "Current Soviet Tactics," contains the following:

"Recent Soviet press and official statements have been marked by a new note of confidence in the advance of world-wide Communist revolution, emphasizing the theme that Communism is now moving at an accelerated pace for a final victory over capitalism everywhere . . ."

"While Soviet propaganda has consistently echoed the classical Marxist-Leninist dogma that capitalism is doomed to destruction, the line is now being followed that the end of the capitalist world is 'approaching with unprecedented rapidity.' The heavy

<sup>152</sup> Utley, *The China Story*, pp. 41, 42.

<sup>153</sup> Owen Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1949), p. 238.

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## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON  
EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE  
DEPARTMENTS

SENATE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 52, 81ST CONGRESS)  
January 16, 1951

Honorable Joseph R. McCarthy  
United States Senate

Dear Senator McCarthy:

In accordance with your previous oral request, the staff of this Subcommittee has made preliminary inquiries of the Army concerning the alleged dumping of United States and Chinese Lend-Lease ammunition in the India Burma Theatre shortly after the end of World War II. In response to your letter of January 9, wherein you asked to be specifically advised as to the amount, type, and condition of the ammunition which was destroyed, please be advised that the following information was furnished to us by the Army.


An unspecified amount of ammunition was on hand in the India Burma Theatre after the cessation of hostilities at the end of World War II. Some of this material was Chinese Lend-Lease ammunition, some was United States stock, and the remainder was American ammunition earmarked for Lend-Lease to China. It was stated that some of the ammunition had deteriorated, although no specific information as to the amount or extent of deterioration was furnished to the Subcommittee, nor has the Subcommittee made any inquiries concerning the amount of deteriorated ammunition on hand at that time.

Some of the above mentioned ammunition stocks were demilitarized on land. However, due to the lack of experienced personnel and the danger involved in demilitarizing ammunition it was found that this was a formidable task. Furthermore, while demilitarizing ammunition at the Kanchrapara Ammunition Depot an explosion occurred which took the lives of nine Americans and fifty-five Indians. Under these circumstances, it was decided to dump the remainder at sea.

In response to your specific inquiry the Subcommittee has not been informed as to the amount of ammunition which was demilitarized prior to the decision to dump the material at sea, nor have we been advised as to the specific types of ammunition involved. However, the Army has stated that approximately 120,000 short tons of this ammunition at an estimated value of 120 million dollars was dumped in the Bay of Bengal under the supervision of the Army.

The above information was furnished to us by the Department of the Army and no independent inquiry has been made by the Subcommittee staff in connection with this matter.

Very truly yours,

  
Chief Counsel

play being given by Soviet propaganda to the 'peace front' suggests that it is serving as the chief propaganda facade for the program of world revolution . . .

*"The Communist conquest of the mainland of China and the conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of alliance constitute the greatest advance which Soviet imperialist expansion has achieved since the war, and this advance is no doubt a major factor behind the attitude of confidence which appears to characterize the current Soviet outlook."*<sup>155</sup>

The above report was made to Acheson. However, he was subsequently to state, at the height of the UN debate over Korea, that:

" . . . the Soviet Government may not be inherently and unalterably committed to standing in the way of peace, and that it may some day accept a live-and-let-live philosophy."

**How did Acheson explain the sell-out of China?**

He attempted to explain it in the *White Paper*, which was edited by Ambassador-at-large, Philip Jessup.

The *White Paper* obviously misstates the facts. Professor Kenneth Colegrove of the Political Science department at Northwestern University testified before the McCarran committee that the *White Paper* "was one of the most false documents ever published by any country."<sup>156</sup> Even that was an understatement.

In regard to Acheson's letter of transmittal of the *White Paper*, Professor Colegrove said:

"That letter of transmittal was thoroughly dishonest, especially the paragraph of the letter that says that . . . the United States had left nothing undone that might have saved him [Chiang Kai-shek] and kept the Communists from winning the victory . . . That obviously was a lie."<sup>157</sup>

**Senator McCarthy, why do you concern yourself so much with the betrayal of 400 million Chinese who have been sold behind the Iron Curtain? In what way does that concern your people of Wisconsin and the people of the United States?**

The Communist conquest of China concerns the people of Wisconsin because, for one thing, it means that the Communists were able to send thousands upon thousands of Chinese soldiers into Korea to kill American boys—some of them were Wisconsin boys. This not only concerns the mothers, fathers, and the wives of Wisconsin, but the mothers and fathers from every state in the union. The war in Korea is only one of the stepping stones to Communist world conquest. Another stepping stone will be Indo-China. And after Indo-China, the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be remembered that America has had a consistent over-all year to year, decade to decade foreign policy—a sound, long-time foreign policy—starting with Secretary of State John Hay's "open door" policy in China and followed by every Democrat and Republican President up to the time that Dean Acheson assumed command of our foreign policy.

Simply stated, that long-time foreign policy was to maintain a free, friendly China which completely protected our Pacific backdoor. Neither the Democrats nor

Republicans of this nation ever voted a change in that long-time successful foreign policy. No Democrat or Republican convention ever went on record for a change in that policy.

The abandonment of that foreign policy has already had a disastrous effect on America. The Korean war has cost us over 107,000 casualties. As to the future effect of the loss of China, let me quote General Douglas MacArthur, America's No. 1 expert on the Far East:

"It is my own personal opinion that the greatest political mistake we made in a hundred years in the Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grow in power in China . . . I believe we will pay for it for a century."<sup>158</sup>

Perhaps the best answer to the question: "In what way does the betrayal of China concern the people of Wisconsin," was given by Lenin when he said: "*He who controls China will control the world.*"

**Most Americans know the significance of Formosa. I don't. Will you tell me about it?**

Formosa is an island about 250 miles long and 70 miles wide. It is located about 100 miles off the coast of Communist-held China. Prior to World War II the Japanese spent vast amounts of money and effort to make Formosa the most important air and naval base in the western Pacific. From it was launched the air attacks upon the Philippines at the beginning of World War II. It served as a Japanese submarine and surface ship base for years.

When the anti-Communist forces were defeated in China in 1949 they retired to Formosa. As of today there are roughly 600,000 friendly anti-Communist Chinese soldiers on the island of Formosa. Those soldiers represent the only sizable anti-Communist Asiatic military force in all of the Pacific area. The significance of Formosa is well covered by the quotation from General MacArthur in answer to the next question.

**You have said that Acheson represents the pro-Communist point of view and that MacArthur represents the American point of view. In what way and to what extent do they differ about Formosa?**

I shall let General MacArthur and Secretary Acheson answer that question.

On December 23, 1949, Acheson sent the following secret memorandum to all overseas State Department officials telling them to prepare for the fall of Formosa and to pass the word that no aid would be sent to the anti-Communists on Formosa. When the memorandum was made public, Acheson admitted he was responsible for it.

The message said:

"American criticism of American policy over Formosa has come largely because of a *mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to the United States defense in the Pacific*. The loss of the Island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expecta-

<sup>155</sup> Author has photostatic copy.

<sup>156</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 25, 1951, p. 922.

<sup>157</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 25, 1951, p. 923.

<sup>158</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 32.

tion. *All available material should be used to counter false impressions that the retention of Formosa would save the Chinese Nationalist Government, or that its loss would seriously damage American interests. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese government. Formosa has no special military significance.*" (Emphasis Mine.)<sup>159</sup>

General MacArthur discussed the military significance of Formosa in a message to the National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. After first outlining our chain of Pacific Island defenses, he had this to say:

"Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.

"It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. *If we hold this line we may have peace—lose it and war is inevitable.*

"The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments—Okinawa and the Philippines—than any point in continental Asia.

"At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration of the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Straits of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities.

"An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available could increase by 100 percent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based on the mainland and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fighter-type aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful.

"As a result of its geographic location and base potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States frontline position.

"Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counter-offensive operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.

"This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity to operate from ten to twenty air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B-29 type bombers as well as to provide forward operating facilities for short-range coastal submarines.

"In acquiring this forward submarine base, the efficacy of the short-range submarine would be so enormously increased by the additional radius of activity as to threaten completely sea traffic from the south and interdict all set lanes in the Western Pacific. Submarine blockade by the enemy, with all its destructive ramifications, would thereby become a virtual certainty.

"Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come into the hands of a potential enemy of the United States, the latter will have acquired an additional

'fleet' which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost than could its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders.

"Current estimates of air and submarine resources in the Far East indicate the capability of such a potential enemy to extend his forces southward and still maintain an imposing degree of military strength for employment elsewhere in the Pacific area.

"Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for just such military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 it played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys. The supporting air forces of Japan's Army and Navy were based on fields situated along southern Formosa." (Emphasis Mine.)<sup>160</sup>

In testifying before the Russell Committee on May 3, 1951, MacArthur as usual was consistent. He said:

"I believe that from our standpoint we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa . . . Formosa should not be allowed to fall into Red hands."<sup>161</sup>

Acheson, who on December 23, 1950, instructed State Department personnel that "Formosa has no special military significance," testified on June 2, 1951 under oath before the Russell Committee that:

"I never had the slightest doubt about the fact that it [Formosa] was of strategic importance."<sup>162</sup>

**You have stated that Acheson practically invited the Communists to take over South Korea and Formosa. What is the basis of that statement?**

On January 20, 1950, a month after Chiang was driven off the mainland of China and onto Formosa, Acheson made a very significant speech before the National Press Club in Washington. He first hailed the Communist victory in China as "a new day which has dawned in Asia." Acheson then went on to outline those areas of the Pacific which if attacked would be defended by the United States. He made it clear that the United States would not come to the defense of either Formosa or Korea—an engraved invitation to the Communists to move on South Korea and Formosa. This invitation was accepted by the Communists six months later when they invaded South Korea.

On April 3, 1950, three months after Acheson's Press Club speech, he threatened to withdraw all economic aid from South Korea if its budget were not balanced.<sup>163</sup> South Korea's budget was unbalanced because of the money being spent on the military. Acheson's ultimatum, in effect was that unless South Korea ceased preparing to defend herself from the imminent Communist invasion, all U. S. economic aid would be withdrawn.

The aid which Acheson was going to withdraw was the balance of the \$150 million of economic aid which had been requested by the State Department to "contain Communism." Lattimore had approved of the economic aid in

<sup>159</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 1, 1951, pp. 1667-1669.

<sup>160</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Appendix, Pt. 5, Aug. 17, 1951, pp. 3477-3480.

<sup>161</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 53.

<sup>162</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 2, 1951, p. 1205.

<sup>163</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 563, April 17, 1950, p. 602.

an article in the *Compass* of July 17, 1949, as a means of allowing the South Koreans to fall without having it appearing that we pushed them. A sizable number of Congressmen voted against the economic aid on the ground that it would be useless unless military aid were also granted to South Korea. It will be recalled that without State Department approval the sum of \$10,300,000 military aid was voted for South Korea. As set forth on page 62, the State Department saw to it that none of the military aid was granted except the sum of \$200 which was spent to load some wire on a ship on the West Coast.<sup>164</sup>

Acheson's threat to cut off economic aid to South Korea unless she balanced her budget by reducing military expenditures becomes doubly significant when viewed in relation to the sabotage of the Congressional military aid plan. Acheson, of course, did not order the South Koreans in so many words to reduce their military spending. However, as Acheson was fully informed, the major part of the budget was for military spending. Therefore, if the budget was to be balanced, South Korea had to greatly impair her defense program.

**How can you intimate that Acheson invited the Communists to take over South Korea in view of the fact that the State Department approved sending American troops into Korea to fight the Communists?**

If we were trying to win the war in Korea, this question could not be answered. However, the Administration spokesmen testifying before the MacArthur Ouster Hearings agreed that we could not risk winning the war or Russia might enter the war. When questioned as to our objective in Korea, the answer was: To kill enough Chinese Communists so that they will get sick of the war and call it off.

The Acheson-directed Administration has taken steps which make it difficult, if not impossible, to win that war. For example, when the United Nations called upon its members to supply fighting forces in Korea, the only member other than the United States which offered a substantial number of soldiers was China, whose troops are located on Formosa just a stone's throw from Korea. Acheson rejected that offer of troops.

General MacArthur, testifying at the investigation into his firing, gave an example of an unbelievable assist which Washington gave the Chinese Communists during the war. MacArthur told how, when the Chinese Communists started to pour men and weapons across the Yalu River bridges to kill American men, he ordered our air force to bomb those bridges. MacArthur stated that his order was countermanded from Washington.<sup>165</sup> It is impossible to even guess how many Americans died as a result of Washington's insistence that the Yalu River bridges be kept intact so the Chinese Communists could swarm into North Korea. Only after MacArthur "protested violently" was he allowed finally to bomb the bridges.

The Racine story is another example of shooting American soldiers in the back from Washington. Racine is a city in North Korea which was used as a staging

point and supply depot for the Communist armies. MacArthur testified that he and the head of the air force in Korea agreed that Racine was an important military objective and should be bombed. Again the State Department said "No!"<sup>166</sup> No one can possibly estimate how many Americans died because of that "fantastic favoritism of war" to the enemy.

MacArthur also urged that he be allowed to bomb the enemy's air bases from whence came their planes to kill our men in Korea. He also asked permission to destroy the enemy's supply lines in Manchuria—the bridges, the railroad tunnels, the rail lines—in order to keep the Chinese Communists and their military supplies out of Korea. The State Department refused to allow him to do this on the theory that if we fought back effectively we might make the enemy angry and he would exert more effort against us. This reasoning would be difficult to explain to the families of the 107,371 United States casualties\* of the Korean war. It would be difficult to convince the mothers of the dead, that their boys were killed by friendly bullets.

In discussing this situation MacArthur said:

"Now that China is using the maximum of her force against us is quite evident; and we are not using the maximum of ours against her in reply.

"The result is—we do not even use, to the maximum, the forces at our disposal, the scientific methods, and the result is that for every percentage you take away in the use of the Air and the Navy, you add a percentage to the dead American infantrymen.

"It may seem emotional for me to say that, but I happen to be the man that had to send them into it. The blood, to some extent, would rest on me; and with the objectives, I believe I could stop them. It seems terrific to me that we should not attempt something.

"The inertia that exists! There is no policy. There is nothing. I tell you, no plan or anything.

"When you say merely, 'we are going to continue to fight aggression,' that is not what the enemy is fighting for.

"The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose—to destroy our forces in Korea."<sup>167</sup>

When our troops were ordered into Korea, the anti-Communist Chinese air force located on Formosa had 200 to 250 planes. That air force was doing a fairly good job of blockading the Communist ports of China. Chiang's anti-Communist army numbered about 600,000. The military forces on Formosa had immobilized the 3rd and 4th Chinese Communist field armies on the mainland of China opposite Formosa. Whether they could have moved across the 100 miles of water against Formosa was questionable in view of the fact that Chiang's air force had prevented their assembling any sizable amount of shipping in the area.

This situation was certainly a favorable one for us and an unfavorable one for the Communists. But the United States 7th Fleet was ordered to change the situation. It was ordered (1) to break Chiang's blockade of the Communist ports of China, (2) to prevent any assault by

\*As of this writing.

<sup>164</sup> Congressional Record (Bound), August 16, 1950, p. 12600.

<sup>165</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 20.

<sup>166</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, pp. 17, 18.

<sup>167</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 68.

Chiang's anti-Communist forces on the mainland of China, and (3) to prevent any attack on Communist shipping by Chiang's Navy. The fleet was also ordered to prevent any attack on Formosa by the Communist troops.

According to General MacArthur's testimony at the MacArthur Hearings, the fact that our 7th Fleet was ordered to protect the Communist mainland from any attacks by Chiang's forces released the 3rd and 4th Chinese Communist Field Armies for action in Korea.

Testimony before the MacArthur hearings was to the effect that this order to the 7th Fleet to break the blockade of the Communist ports resulted in huge amounts of war material flowing into Communist China. The testimony was that \$40 million worth of material moved through one Communist port in one month after our 7th Fleet broke Chiang's blockade.<sup>168</sup>

Another result of the order to the 7th Fleet was described by former Ambassador William Bullitt on April 8, 1952, when testifying before the McCarran Committee. He was asked about Chiang's Navy.

SENATOR WATKINS: "They do have a Navy?"

MR. BULLITT: "Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, it has been quite an efficient force, although it is forbidden to act in any way by fiat of our government which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it from stopping the Communist supply ships going up to Korea. They sail right by Formosa, equipped with Soviet munitions put in the Polish Communist ships in Gdynia. They come all the way around and go right by Formosa and sail past there taking those weapons up to be used to kill American soldiers in Korea, and by order of our government the Chinese Navy is flatly forbidden to stop them on their way up there."

SENATOR WATKINS: "Would the Chinese Navy have the power, except for that order, to intercept them and capture them?"

MR. BULLITT: "Certainly, without question, without question."<sup>169</sup>

**Have any American boys been killed because the 7th Fleet is protecting the Communist coastline of China?**

In answer to that question let me quote a statement made by General MacArthur during his testimony at the MacArthur hearings. MacArthur stated that after the 7th Fleet began to protect the Communist coastline, the 3rd and 4th Red Field Armies were released from coastline duty and then "showed up in North Korea" where they fought and killed American soldiers. MacArthur testified:

"As soon as it became known these troops had moved up north and were attacking me—the Third and Fourth Field Armies—I recommended to Washington that the wraps be taken off the generalissimo, that he be furnished such logistical support as would put these troops in fighting trim, and that he be permitted to use his own judgment as to their use. The slightest use that was made of those troops would have taken the pressure off my troops. *It would have saved me thousands of lives up there—even a threat of that.*

"We were at that time with the 7th Fleet supporting my fighting line and doing everything else in Korea that was possible, bombarding and everything

else, at the same time with the other hand they were holding back these troops, which, if they had been used, or even threatened to be used, would have taken pressure off my front.

"It was at that time that I made the recommendation that the generalissimo's troops be brought into play against the common enemy."<sup>170</sup>

**Could Russia as a member of the United Nations have vetoed the use of UN troops in Korea?**

Yes.

**Is there any logical explanation of why Russia didn't veto the use of UN forces in Korea?**

The only explanation I can think of is that Russia knew that her friends in our government would not let us win that war.

Russia has gained much in the Korean war up to this time. There has been siphoned from America billions of our wealth and the blood of over 100,000 of our young men. Much of our air force has been destroyed. Our economy has been disrupted, and we have been forced nearer to a semi-socialistic state.

In addition, every other nation within the path of Communist conquest has been taught a bitter lesson—the lesson that if she resists Communist aggression, her fate will be the same as that of Korea; namely, destruction. General MacArthur witnessed that destruction. This is what he had to say when he testified before the Senate Committee investigating his ouster:

"The war in Korea has already almost destroyed that nation of 20 million people.

"I have never seen such devastation.

"I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited.

"Now are you going to let that go on, by any sophistry of reasoning or possibilities? They may be there, but this is a certainty.

"What are you going to do? Once more, I repeat the question: What is the policy in Korea?

"If you go on indefinitely, you are perpetuating a slaughter such as I have never heard of in the history of mankind."<sup>171</sup>

There is nothing new about this pattern of conquest by terror. Genghis Khan was a past master at it. Early in the 13th century when his Mongolian hordes swept through the mountain passes out upon the eastern plains, his orders were to cut down every living thing that stood higher than the hub of a wagon wheel in any city or village which dared to resist him. This was done as a lesson and a warning to other lands in his path of conquest. Hitler, likewise, attempted to destroy the entire Jewish race and the Polish nation because they dared to resist him. This time, however, the United States is aiding Communist Russia in a campaign of conquest by terror, by insisting that the war be fought only in the country which we are allegedly helping. Not a single

<sup>168</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 62.

<sup>169</sup> McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, April 8, 1952 (now being printed).

<sup>170</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 22.

<sup>171</sup> Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 82.

bomb must be dropped upon the land of the enemy. In Korea, according to the Administration, we dare not win but will continue a killing contest with two vast armies rolling back and forth across that unhappy land and destroying every city and village—destroying a whole race of people.

Thus we are doing much to convince any other nation which might be inclined to resist Communism that the cost of United States-UN "protection" is too high—that Russian conquest is far less painful than Acheson's brand of "liberation."

**You state that we have aided Communism in Asia. How could this be done without the American people knowing it?**

The best answer is perhaps contained in an article written by Owen Lattimore for the *Sunday Compass* on July 17, 1949. This, in my opinion, is the most revealing and sinister picture of the State Department's *modus operandi* that I have ever seen.

In it he points out that the State Department's big problem in China was how to allow China to fall to the Communists without having it appear that we pushed her.

In discussing South Korea, he said:

"The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation for a parting grant of \$150,000,000."

It will be noted that there was no recommendation for military aid—merely economic aid. It was, in effect, the Marshall Plan for South Korea—no military aid but unlimited economic aid in order to fatten the goose before the Communists took over.

#### *Acheson Asks Economic Aid Only for Korea*

Acheson had very dutifully come before a Congressional committee and made a glowing speech on how \$150,000,000 of economic aid should be given if we were to "contain" Communism in Korea. This was done, knowing, of course, that Communist Russia was supplying the North Koreans from the arsenals of Manchuria and that *economic* aid would, as Lattimore said, let them fall but keep the American people from knowing we pushed them.

#### *Congress Earmarks Military Aid for Korea*

Some Republican House members pointed out the ridiculousness of giving only economic aid to South Korea and no military aid while the North Koreans were building up their military forces. They were castigated and pilloried by the left-wing press as "opposing the fight against Communism."

The Congress—not upon the recommendation of the State Department—then appropriated and earmarked \$10,300,000 for military aid for South Korea. This was months before the North Koreans moved. Whenever any Congressman or Senator tried to find out how the \$10,300,000 was being spent and what military equipment was being sent to Korea, he was told that the informa-

tion must be withheld "in the interest of national security."

#### *Sabotage*

Finally, however, months later, after the North Koreans invaded South Korea, it was discovered that of the \$10,300,000 only \$200 had been spent—for wire which had been loaded aboard a ship on the west coast but which never arrived in Korea.<sup>172</sup>

#### *Communist Line on China Applied to Korea*

When the North Koreans started to cut through the South Korean army, the same cabal of Communist camp-following news and radio commentators who had sold the American people on the idea that the anti-Communist Chinese had not been willing to fight, took up the hue and cry that the South Koreans were well-armed and well-equipped but did not have the will to fight.

They would have gotten away with this, except that when American troops moved into Korea, American newspapermen also moved in with them. Honest reporting showed that the South Koreans had only a police force equipped to keep order in South Korea. For example, while they had American bazookas, they had no bazooka ammunition. The South Korean "air force," which left-wing writers talked about, consisted of five planes. None of them were combat planes.

Thus the stage had been set, but the Communist plans were disrupted by Truman's last-minute decision that he had to prove to the American people before the election that he was truly anti-Communist—the first apparent, but not real, doublecross of Stalin. Acheson and the rest of Hiss' friends in the State Department promptly set about the task of nullifying Truman's decision by preparing the infamous order to the 7th Fleet, by tying MacArthur's hands, and by the decision that was to control so many of our actions in the war—namely, that we could not risk a victory in Korea or we might make Russia mad.

**Do the facts prove that Acheson followed Lattimore's advice of "let them fall but not to let the American people know we pushed them?"**

According to Ambassador Patrick Hurley, "secret diplomacy enabled pro-Communists . . . in the American State Department to distort the truth and mislead the people."<sup>173</sup>

Acheson withheld from the American people and the Congress the warnings and advice of real *American* experts on China whom he ignored, such as General Hurley and General Wedemeyer. He also falsely denied he was following the advice of men such as Henry Wallace<sup>174</sup> Owen Lattimore.<sup>175</sup>

At the very time he was withholding from the Congress and the American people the reports of anti-Communist experts, and either denying or withholding the

<sup>172</sup> Congressional Record, (Bound), August 16, 1950, p. 12600.

<sup>173</sup> Washington Times-Herald, Feb. 18, 1947.

<sup>174</sup> Press Conference of Dean Acheson, Aug. 24, 1945; White Paper on China, p. 55.

<sup>175</sup> Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 2, Appendix, pp. 1839-1840.



fact that he was following the advice of pro-Communists, Acheson, on March 20, 1947, was assuring Congress:

"The Chinese government . . . is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war is going on much as it has for the last twenty years."<sup>176</sup>

On February 24, 1949, in answer to fifty-one Republican members of the House who asked, "What is our policy for China?", Acheson said we would have to "wait until the dust settles" before deciding upon a policy. Acheson did not mention that his policies had already determined exactly how the dust would settle.

After a Red dust had settled over China, Acheson, on August 5, 1949, released the *White Paper*, and declared in the letter of transmittal:

"Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result [the Communist victory in China]."

Acheson, who in 1947 declared there was no danger of Communist conquest of China and in 1949 said it was too late to fight Communism in China, has never explained when it was—between March 20, 1947, and August 5, 1949—that he discovered Communism was a serious threat to China.

**Do you feel that Acheson is knowingly working toward the triumph of Communism? In other words, do you feel that he is a traitor?**

I cannot plumb Acheson's mind to discover what prompts him, but his actions have resulted in great damage to America.

I do not know whether he is in the same category as his great friend, Alger Hiss, or whether all his blunders were honest mistakes. The thought occurs, however, that if Acheson were honestly mistaken, at some time he would make a mistake in America's favor.

**What about Europe? Do you think that Acheson has aided Communism in Europe as well as in the Far East?**

I do not *think* Acheson aided Communism in Europe, I know he did. The record is clear on that point.

While Alger Hiss and other State Department officials played important roles in the sell-out of Poland, it was Acheson who played the leading role. It was Acheson who helped secure for Alger Hiss his appointment as an adviser to the President at Yalta. The Yalta agreement has been described by former Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane as "the deathblow to Poland's hopes for independence and for a democratic form of government."<sup>177</sup>

It was Acheson who, over the protests of his own ambassador to Poland, granted a \$90 million United States loan to the Communist-controlled government of Poland, thus supplying the Communist Secret Police with the weapons to control Poland.

It was Acheson who, over the protests of China and Britain, agreed to the Soviet aim of making the United

Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, an innocent-looking relief organization (known as UNRRA), into a tool for Soviet conquest.

At the time each of those acts took place, urgent objections were made by both Americans and Poles who recognized in each the pattern of Communist conquest.

Arthur Bliss Lane, who was present when the Yalta Agreement was signed, spoke out and said:

"As I glanced over it, I could not believe my eyes. To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<sup>178</sup>

After Yalta came Potsdam, when Truman met with Stalin and agreed to the Yalta betrayal of Poland. Jan Ciechanowski, ambassador of the anti-communist government of Poland, has told of his last days in Washington just before the die was cast.

"During this last stage of my official mission in Washington, I did my utmost to persuade the State Department that it was clearly in the interest of the United States at least not to grant full *de jure* recognition to the so-called Polish provisional government [the Communist-controlled government] . . . Despite all my insistent efforts, I found it impossible to get any consideration at the State Department for this suggestion."<sup>179</sup>

Even before Yalta our State Department was doing its part to Communize Poland. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, prime minister of the anti-communist Polish government and leader of the Polish Peasant Party, tells of his vain pleas to the State Department to stop pro-Communist broadcasts into Poland by the Office of War Information, which was headed by Elmer Davis.

"We finally protested to the United States State Department about the tone of the OWI broadcasts to Poland. Such broadcasts, which we carefully monitored in London, might well have emanated from Moscow itself. The Polish underground wanted to hear what was going on in the United States to whom it turned responsive ears and hopeful eyes. It was not interested in hearing pro-Soviet propaganda from the United States, since that duplicated the broadcasts sent from Moscow . . .

"I mentioned . . . the tone of OWI broadcasts to Poland. They had been following the Communist line consistently, which made our job more difficult.

"It's unwise to adopt this approach to the Polish people," I told the Under Secretary. "If you continue to call Russia a "democracy," you may eventually regret that statement, and your people will condemn you.

"Your government once called Poland "the inspiration of the nations," but now the OWI calls the Communist forces just that." [Emphasis mine.]<sup>180</sup>

The Polish Prime Minister concluded his appeal to the State Department by saying, "Poland just does not want to become another Red satellite."<sup>181</sup>

The question naturally arises as to whether the State Department was aware of the Communist rule of terror

<sup>176</sup> House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 20, 1947.

<sup>177</sup> Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 306.

<sup>178</sup> Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 80.

<sup>179</sup> Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory* (Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1947), p. 383.

<sup>180</sup> Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, pp. 25, 58.

<sup>181</sup> Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, p. 59.

at the time it was initiating Communist propaganda in Poland and acceding to Communist demands.

This is best answered by considering the situation in Poland when Acheson granted the Communist-controlled government a \$90 million United States loan. In March, 1946, U. S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane learned that the State Department planned to grant a \$50 million loan to the Communist-controlled government. He cabled his protests, but on Easter morning he learned that the loan was to be increased to \$90 million. Lane immediately cabled again, urging that United States funds not be granted until “. . . the terroristic activities of the Security Police come to an end, and freedom of the press is restored, and American citizens are released from Polish prisons.”<sup>182</sup>

But, as Lane has said, “My advice was in vain.”<sup>183</sup>

Much of the \$90 million U. S. loan was to be used to equip the UB, the Communist Secret Police—or “Security” police as they called themselves—in Poland. The activities of the Secret Police and the conditions in Poland when the loan was granted by Acheson are described by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the Polish Peasant Party, who was in Poland at that time. He describes the Communist “campaign of terror” at that time as follows:

“On January 26 [1946], in the village of Gorniki Nowe, near Zamosc, twenty-five Security Police appeared at the farm of Jan Senderek, a Peasant Party member. His brother Stanislaw opened the door at their knock and was promptly annihilated by gunfire. When their hysterical mother kept crying, ‘What have you done to my son?’ the police answered, ‘Be satisfied your other son is still alive.’ Jan was taken from the house, mauled for two weeks in a Security Police station, then released, a physical wreck.

“Shortly thereafter in Grojec, near Warsaw, the Security Police seized five citizens, including a local judge, took them outside the town, shot them and shoveled them into a single grave.

“One man, however, lived. Knowing the butchering methods of the NKVD [the Communist Secret Police], this man dropped at the first rifle fire, pretending to be dead. He was buried alive in the pit with the others. Terribly wounded, he clawed his way up through the dirt and out of his tomb. He made his way to Warsaw, where he gave me a firsthand account of the shooting and named several of the assassins.

“I took these horrifyingly macabre facts to the next cabinet meeting, confronted the Communists with them, and demanded that the investigating commission be put to work immediately. The only result I obtained was this: the Peasant Party [anti-Communist] in the Grojec district was one of the first of thirty-six district organizations later dissolved by official decree.”<sup>184</sup>

And what about the government to which Acheson gave a \$90 million United States loan?

Mikolajczyk writes:

“The government [to which Acheson granted the loan in April, 1946] took no official notice of our congress [anti-communist] or its resolutions for several days. Then it acted. Through its controlled So-

cialist Party it sent word to the party that either we must join the government bloc by March 1, 1946, or face political annihilation.”<sup>185</sup>

Less than two months later the \$90 million loan was granted to this terroristic Communist government in Poland.

While the Russian-trained “Security” Police in Poland shot down private citizens on their doorsteps, imprisoned American citizens and carried on a rule of terror throughout Poland, Dean Acheson agreed to have Communist Russia and one other representative control the distribution of UNRRA food and relief in Poland and the entire European region.<sup>186</sup>

The power to control the distribution of food at that time was the power to control and direct hungry people. Arthur Bliss Lane in his book, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, has told how this food, which was so desperately needed by the war-torn, starving areas of Poland, was used by the Communists as a political weapon. He tells how American-supplied food was withheld from all those who opposed Communism.<sup>187</sup>

In his book, *Defeat in Victory*, Jan Ciechanowski, former Polish ambassador to the U. S., tells the part Acheson played in this picture. About the time that Stalin defeated Hitler at Stalingrad and began to turn his attention away from the war at hand and toward his plans for world conquest, Acheson together with the representatives of Russia, Britain, and China, held a series of “top secret” meetings to plan the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, known as UNRRA. Since the United States was to pay the major portion of the bill for UNRRA food and relief, Acheson held the position of greatest power in those meetings.

“The story as it unfolded at those five fateful meetings at the State Department,” writes Ciechanowski, “has too great bearing on the present world setup to be left untold.”

Here is the story of how UNRRA was turned into a tool for Soviet conquest and how it was used to subjugate the people of Poland.

At the first of those five meetings at the State Department, Acheson proposed that UNRRA be controlled by only four powers—Communist Russia, the United States, China, and Great Britain. China and Britain both protested, saying that all countries contributing to and receiving aid from UNRRA should have a voice in its affairs. Russia, however, agreed with the Acheson proposal. Russia then added a new twist. The veto of any one of the four powers could block any proposal made by the other three. China strongly protested and urged that the democratic rule of the majority be used. “Mr. Acheson,” Ciechanowski writes, “then declared his support of the Soviet suggestion, while Lord Halifax [the British representative] did not appear to oppose it.”

On March 24 Acheson finally secured the agreement of China and Britain for both Soviet proposals. Next the Soviet demanded that no outsider be permitted to enter

<sup>182</sup> Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 237.

<sup>183</sup> Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 237.

<sup>184</sup> Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, pp. 153, 154.

<sup>185</sup> Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, p. 153.

<sup>186</sup> Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, p. 256.

<sup>187</sup> Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, pp. 214-215, 224.

Russia to handle UNRRA aid to the Soviet or be permitted in any way to regulate food and relief sent to Russia. When China and Britain finally agreed with Acheson on this point, "Litvinoff's triumph was complete," writes Ciechanowski.

But even this was not enough. Russia then demanded that of the two officials who were to control UNRRA in the European region, one should be a Soviet official. Britain asked why Russia should be concerned with having a Soviet official distribute food for the entire European region since, unlike any other nation, it would have exclusive control over the aid going to its own country, Russia. The Communists replied that Russia "had a real interest in the measures to be undertaken elsewhere in Europe."

And what was Acheson's reaction when the Russians thus put their cards on the table? Acheson was representing the country which was to pay practically the entire cost of UNRRA. Ciechanowski reports: "Mr. Acheson curtly expressed the hope that the British government would be able to accept the Soviet proposal." Throughout the five meetings Ciechanowski states that "the Soviet demands were steadily supported by Mr. Acheson on behalf of the United States."<sup>188</sup>

Arthur Bliss Lane, who was in Poland as our ambassador at this time, tells how the Soviet used the power given them at those meetings in Acheson's office to distribute food in Poland "for their own political advantage." Schools, orphanages, and churches opposed to the Communist rule of terror, received no UNRRA aid. It was little wonder, for Acheson had made the rules and the director of the first UNRRA mission to Poland—appointed, despite the strong protests of Ambassador Lane, by UNRRA Director General Herbert H. Lehman, now Senator from New York—was a Soviet official.<sup>189</sup>

**How do you explain your statement that Acheson is aiding Communism in Europe when he has made so many speeches urging that we fight Communism in Europe and that we send American troops to Europe?**

Hisss also publicly proclaimed his love for the American flag. I can perhaps best answer this question by quoting from a speech which I made in the Senate on this subject on March 14, 1951.

"I realize that some of my good friends feel that the problem in Europe can be settled merely by the decision of whether we shall send an additional six or eight or ten American divisions to Western Europe. Would that it were that simple. Keep in mind that the group which is doing the planning for Western Europe is the identical group which has been doing the disastrous planning for Asia—the same group that did the planning for the sellout of Poland and China. Again without concerning ourselves over whether their actions are the result of treachery or incompetence, let's look at the unquestioned facts. Those facts speak for themselves.

#### ***Eisenhower's Hands Tied***

"Those who have confidence in General Eisenhower as a great soldier should realize that Eisen-

hower's hands are also tied by the same crowd that has tied the hands of MacArthur in the East, and if good-natured Ike isn't careful, he is going to be taken for an awful ride. You know a good soldier does not have time to learn the ways of crooked, backroom diplomacy, and if he has spent enough time soldiering to be the good soldier that Eisenhower is, he cannot cope with unprincipled, crooked, clever diplomats. It is difficult for a soldier of integrity who has not had time off to study the ways of traitors to bring himself to believe that people in high positions could be actually disloyal to this nation.

#### ***Failure to Make West German Troops Available For Defense of Western Europe***

"The Senate will recall that when the General appeared before the Joint Session of the Congress, he said he was unable to discuss the use of German manpower until the policies of the situation were cleared up by the diplomats. And for five years those diplomats have done nothing to clear up the situation. Periodically our State Department talks of re-arming Western Germany to counter the army built up by the Russians in East Germany. But it is nothing but talk—words apparently planted to lull the American people into a sense of security that we are going to do something in West Germany to counter the threat of what Russia has been doing in East Germany. Clever administration of sleeping tablets, if you please!

#### ***Two Wells of Manpower for Defense of Europe***

"When Eisenhower went to Europe to plan the defense of Western Europe, he wasn't even allowed to visit one of the greatest potential sources of manpower for a Western European Army—a country that has long been dedicated to fighting Communism—namely, Spain. I am not going to argue that Spain has or has not the kind of government of which we should approve. The point is we cannot make over that Spain's government. I am not going to argue that we should or should not love the 48 million people of Western Germany. But it takes no argument, it follows as the night follows the day, that there is no way on God's earth to defend the richest prize for which Communist Russia is aiming—the industrial heart of Europe—unless we use those two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower, Western Germany and Spain. The talk of doing otherwise is either the talk of those who know not what they say or the talk of traitors planning a phony defense.

#### ***"Let Them Fall, but Don't Let American People Know We Pushed Them"***

"When I hear Administration spokesmen urging that the solution to the whole problem lies in drafting and sending to Europe another six, eight or ten American divisions, there is called vividly to my mind an article which appeared in the *Compass* on July 17, 1949. The *Compass*, incidentally, is not exactly a conservative paper. It contains an article by that great expert on the Far East, the adviser to two Presidents and the man long referred to as the Architect of our Far Eastern Policy, the man who was called upon to give secret advice to our Roving Ambassador Philip Jessup before he started to rove.

"Let me read it to you and see if it doesn't give you an idea of what may be happening insofar as West-

<sup>188</sup> Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, pp. 251-257.  
<sup>189</sup> Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 143.

ern Europe, as well as Asia, is concerned.

"Here Mr. Lattimore, the State Department's adviser, praises the State Department for having succeeded in allowing China to fall to the Communists without letting it appear to the world that we have shoved her. He then goes on to state and I quote: 'The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150 million.'

"The picture in Western Europe, gentlemen, is much the same. We are preparing to allow Western Europe to fall without having it appear that we pushed her. It matters not whether we send one American division or ten. It matters not whether Eisenhower is the most brilliant military genius the world has ever produced. He cannot defend Western Europe without the manpower of Spain and Western Germany. It just is not in the cards.

#### *Communist Victory Inevitable Unless Immediate Reversal*

"If we continue with the same type of planning, and argue over whether six divisions or ten or twenty American divisions should be sent to Europe and neglect the important question of utilizing the manpower of our allies, then Communist victory in Western Europe is just as certain as Communist victory was in China.

#### *Amount of Time Left to Rearm Western Europe*

"There are those who say if we start to rearm Western Europe that the Russians will promptly move in. This may well be. However, there is one condition which exists today which discourages that—a condition which may not exist a few years hence. As of today our long-range bombers using the atomic bomb could wipe Russian industry off the face of the earth. I do not believe Russia will move while that condition continues.

"We also know, of course, that Russia with a vast number of captured German scientists, is working feverishly to perfect that guided missile of the air, a missile which will track and destroy planes in the air. If and when this is accomplished—and it is only a matter of time—our atom-carrying bombers will act as no deterrent to Soviet Russia. They will be useless.

"My estimate of the situation is that we have a limited time to rearm Western Europe—the time during which it will take the Russian scientists to perfect a defense to our atom-carrying bombers. When that they have, they will be able to move on the ground unless in the meantime we have built up in Europe ground forces of sufficient power to deter them.

#### *Armies of Western Europe Potentially Stronger Than Soviet Russia*

"Now there are those who say that it is impossible for Western Europe to compete with the land armies of Russia. Gentlemen, this just is not true. Remember that German armies nearly destroyed Russia in the last war and now, with the exception of the 10 million Germans under Russian domination, we have not only Germany, but also Spain, France, the other small European nations and England.

"It seems that the time is long past due to build up in Western Europe, not an American Army, but a Western-European Army for peace. If this is done, peace may well be prolonged for another 15 or 20 years. In the meantime, Communism may rot from

the inside out to the end that a peaceful world will then be possible.

"With the manpower of our friends in Asia and the manpower of our friends in Europe and the industrial capacity of this Nation, we are far more powerful still than the Communist countries. But we may not be more powerful tomorrow or the next day. If they take over Western Europe, if they take over Japan, then they will be far stronger in productive capacity, raw materials and manpower.

#### *Aggression in Cause of Freedom and Justice*

"There are those who say we should do nothing aggressive. This just does not make sense. There is no reason why free men should not be aggressive in the cause of freedom and justice.

#### *Necessity of Recreating A Free Democratic China*

"We should be aggressive in giving all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek, to the end that China may again be a free, friendly, and a neutral China, that the peace of the Pacific may be assured.

#### *Necessity of Recreating A Free Democratic Poland*

"Aid should be given to anti-Communist forces in the Russian satellite nations—especially the anti-Communist forces in Poland when the opportunity presents itself, to the end that there may again be in Europe the stabilizing influence of a free, independent, democratic Poland. Now I do not propose to send American troops into China or Poland. But I do propose that we give the anti-Communist forces in those countries necessary aid when the opportunity presents itself, so that they themselves can strike the chains from the wrists and ankles that should never have borne them except for the actions of our planners.

#### *SUMMARY*

##### *Phony Planning for Phony Defense*

"In summary, I propose that we stop the phony planning for a phony defense of Western Europe and American interests. I propose that we restate our aims and then follow through with policies that will achieve those aims rather than what we have been doing in the past—namely, stating great and desirable aims and then putting into effect policies designed to accomplish the direct opposite result of those aims . . .

##### *Must Make Use of Four Great Untouched Wells of Manpower*

"Regardless of whether we send two or six or ten or twenty divisions to Europe, we are doomed to fail unless we promptly make use of the four great wells of manpower which we are now deliberately ignoring—namely, the manpower of Japan, the manpower of the anti-Communist Chinese, the Spanish, and the 48 million West Germans.

##### *Use of American Troops*

"In closing let me make it clear that I do not object to using American divisions in Europe. America has a heavy interest in keeping Western Europe from falling under Communist control. I do not object, that


is, if we plan a real defense of Western Europe and not a phony defense under which those American troops will be condemned to death or permanent slavery in some Siberian prison camp.

"Before we send more American troops into Western Europe, we must reverse the Administration's virtual ban upon the use of Western German and Spanish soldiers in the defense of Western Europe. Then and only then can we hope for a real and not a phony defense of Western Europe."<sup>190</sup>

**If you could replace Acheson, what would you most want in a Secretary of State?**

Intelligent concern for America. Our State Department must be led by a man who thinks as an American, who represents America, and who will not allow himself, either through ignorance or design, to further the Communist cause.

<sup>190</sup> Congressional Record (Unbound), March 14, 1951, pp. 2461-2475.



Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup and Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

161-47-35

# Partial Text of Acheson's Statement on Policy in China and Defense of Yalta

## Secretary Reviews Internal Struggle After Defeat of Japs

Following is a partial text of today's testimony by Secretary of State Acheson before a joint Senate inquiry into Far Eastern policy:

Chairman Russell—... Under motion made and passed at the last sitting of the committee, the Secretary of State was to make a statement to the committee this morning on China policy. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in your own way.

Secretary Acheson—... Now gentlemen, I will take advantage of the kindness of the committee in permitting me to make a somewhat extended statement on United States policy in regard to China.

I should like to state at the outset what I am going to try to do, and that is to present to the committee the problem which confronted the United States and China in 1945, and in doing that I shall have to give some of its roots in history.

I should like to point out what the times of decision were. There were moments in this period from 1945 on, moments of decision, and I should like to point out those moments. I should like to point out the considerations which were taken under advisement when decisions were made, and I should like to say what the decisions were and how they were made.

One further preliminary observation I think is important, and that is that American aid cannot in itself insure the survival of a recipient government or the survival of a people that this Government is trying to help against aggression.

What our aid must do and can do is to supplement the efforts of that recipient government and of that people itself. It cannot be a substitute for those efforts. It can only be an aid and a supplement to them.

Others Hold Power of Decision. The United States Government, in aiding another government, does not have power of decision within that country or within that government. That power of decision remains with the government, the people in it. Those are thoughts I think we should have in mind.

With those preliminary statements, we come to the problem which faced the Chinese and American governments in 1945.

The Japanese had been defeated. The Chinese government was in the extreme southwestern part of China. The task which had to be solved by the Chinese government was, in effect, how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese government exercised throughout that nation.

Now, I do not say recreate a nation, I say defend the people and



DISCUSSES CHINA—Secretary of State Acheson outlines the administration's policy in relation to China as he resumes testimony in the investigation into the removal of Gen. MacArthur. —AP Photo.

on to the southeast and coming quite far south and southeast in China. The south central and southern part of China was occupied by the Japanese, who had troops along the coast and for considerable areas inland and the government itself was, as I said before, in the extreme southwestern part of China. Another important fact, which must never be lost sight of our consideration, is that in addition to these facts or to who actually occupied and exercised authority in certain parts of China, all of China was in the grip of a very profound social revolution.

### Social Revolution Gained Strength

Secretary Acheson—Gen. MacArthur has spoken to you about the depth and strength of this social revolution. It grew out of a similar experience in almost all wars, that as the governments concerned have to make tremendous efforts, as in some areas, the controls of government become weakened, and promises are made, people move forward in social economic ways, at least they move forward in acquiring new social and economic rights; and this was going on in China, in the age-long battle between the peasants and the landlords. The peasants had made advances and there was a new idea

through Japanese puppets, Japanese, and in part was controlled by the Communists in the northwest. With this review then, let us just mention once more the principal problems which confronted the Chinese government and confronted the American Government in its efforts to help the Chinese government. These were: The Soviets in Manchuria, the Japanese and the Communists struggling against one another to control a vast area in Northwest, North Central and Southeast China—the Communists I have already mentioned—and at the same time this great problem of the revolution in thought and in social relationships which was going on throughout all China.

So the first period of decision, the first time after the war when important decisions were made and had to be made was the period 1945 and 1946. Now, I do not mean for a moment that important decisions were not made before and after, but that was the first great moment of decision. Wedemeyer Report Cited. The situation was stated in a nutshell by Gen. Wedemeyer in November, 1945, very shortly after VJ-day, and I should like to read, not very much, but I should like to read from Gen. Wedemeyer's report in November, 1945. "Chinese Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if present activities are a reliable indication, restrict and arrest the movements of Nationalist

forces available to take on the problems which I have already mentioned. Three Choices Left Open to America. Now, in that situation the United States Government had three choices open to it. One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,235,000 armed Japanese troops in China, exclusive of Manchuria, and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians—government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another—there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that by throwing its weight either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and Japan in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China, a result which we could not, of course, help to bring about. The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria. That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests. The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreements which were so necessary to enable the Chinese government to re-establish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to set, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been. Relations Have Long History. The relations between the Nationalist government and the Communists have had a long history in China. Prior to 1927 there was a period of collaboration. From 1927 to 1937 there was a period of war. From 1937 onward there was again a period in which the official attitude of both the government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means; and beginning in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which never were very effective, but were agreements between them. Let us as you will see, they began working so vigorously as to bring about a settlement in China. This official view was stated by the generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said:

the prospects for China were very difficult indeed: They discussed what could be done along that line. They also discussed the Communist problem and the generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communist were, as he stated it, not people of good faith, claimed that they were not Chinese, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said, "This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means." He stated that he would not read any help from the United States in attempting that, to be meddling into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

### Chiang Reversed Opinion on Help

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reversed the position which he had taken earlier in which he had opposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdraw his objection to that. Now in the fall 1944 and after these discussions, the President sent another personal representative to China, and that was Gen. Hurley. He went out as the personal representative of the President in order to try and unify this military effort, and there, with the consent and approval of the Generalissimo and of his cabinet he undertook to set as a mediation between the Yenan Communist authorities and the Chungking Nationalist authorities, and they had meetings... in which they worked out a series of agreements. Some of these agreements had to do with the conduct of the war, and then some of them went beyond that, and a very important and basic agreement was worked out. It was announced on October 11, 1945, that was the agreement on the general principles of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. This called for the convening of the National Assembly and for a political consultative conference of all party and non-party leaders. It called for the inauguration of a constitutional government for all of China; for the formation of a committee of government and Communist representatives to discuss the reorganization of the arms and the reduction of all the armed forces in China. Fixed Basis for Marshall Task. Now, these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, and they established the basis for the efforts which Gen. Marshall later took on. The problem between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communists differed in one important respect from the relations between—between the problems of governments, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in that country because in China the

making the agreements, the price which was paid for the agreements was that three months after the end of European war, the Russians would enter the Far East; that they should have the southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles; that their former rights in Port Arthur and Dalren should be returned to them, and their former interest in the two railways in Manchuria. Russia made its claim for those rights, and the claims were granted at this meeting at Yalta. (At this point, Senator Hickenlooper attempted to interrupt and was overruled by Chairman Russell after Secretary Acheson said he wanted to avoid side discussions.) Secretary Acheson—... One of the other things that I should like to point out about Yalta was that unquestionably the Russians had it in their power not only to take what was conceded to them, but much more, besides. Gave Basis for Legal Claim. There was very little likelihood that anybody would have the will, and few people could have the power, to throw them out of any area on the mainland which they might occupy, and where they might wish to remain, so that this agreement gave them the basis for a legal claim to something considerably less than they they might have taken without a legal claim. I should also like to point out that at the time the Chinese entered into this treaty with the Russians, a few months after Yalta, that is, in August, 1945, the 1,235,000 Japanese troops in China, would come back to strengthen the troops on the main islands of Japan; but that they would be occupied with the Russian effort on the mainland. Such statements were expressed by the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and by the Chinese Foreign Minister. In fact, in 1947, the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed grave apprehension that the Soviet Union might cancel the treaty with China of 1945, in which China had conferred these rights to the bases in Port Arthur, the interests in Dalren, and the interest in the railway. They regarded that as a very valuable treaty because it also carried with it the obligation of the Russians to evacuate Manchuria, to recognize the Chinese Nationalist government, and to aid in the re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. Now these agreements, as I shall point out later on, did have a very important effect and bearing when it came to the question of the reoccupation of Manchuria by the Chinese, because it was on the basis of these agreements that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians agreed to occupation by the National Government's forces. I have pointed out to you the very great importance of the presence of the Japanese in China, the 1,235,000 troops, 1,700,000 civilians. It was decided very early in the game, between the Chinese government, the Nationalist government and ourselves, that one of our major efforts must be to get these people out of China and back into Japan. That wouldn't have been too hard a job to do if they were all just marching on to ships. The great difficulty about it was that these armed soldiers controlled most of the important cities in central China, in southeast China and east China, and also the main lines of communication. If they had been told to drop

### Soviet Pacific War Action Was Needed

It was of the utmost importance that the Russians should come into the war in the Far East, in time. Now, there was very little doubt that they would come in, but the grave danger was that they would really wait until the war was over, and until we had expended our effort and blood to win the war, and they would come in and do what they wished. It was very important, in the view of the military people, and the others, too, present, that they should come in in time, so that none of the 700,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, and none, if possible, of the 1,235,000 Japanese troops in China, would come back to strengthen the troops on the main islands of Japan; but that they would be occupied with the Russian effort on the mainland. That was the purpose, and in

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tion in the territory which we call China, and I will come to and explain to you why that is so, a nation in the sense of a government in control throughout that area.

Therefore, the question which had to be faced was how to create that nation and how to create the authority of the nation in that area. . . .

**Government Lacked Authority.**  
The Chinese government that we are talking about—the Nationalist government—had not had authority—indeed, no Chinese government had had authority, by which I mean substantial authority—throughout China since the period of the Manchuria.

Here is the picture which confronted everybody at the time I am talking about. The great northern area of China, Manchuria, was occupied by the Soviet Union, with its own armed forces. In the second place, the northern and southeast parts of China were in the control of the Communists and the Japanese.

I say both the Communists and the Japanese because the Japanese held the cities and the major lines of communication; whereas, the surrounding areas were occupied by the Communists. That part of China included what we call North China, swinging down through Central China,

population of China. The geographical area was 15 per cent of the country we call China, exclusive of Manchuria. This area included in it some of the most heavily populated areas of China, the area which had most of the railway communications, important industrial developments and important cities. . . .

Manchuria, except in a wholly nominal way, and then only for a period of two or three years, part of '28, '29, '30 and part of '31, had never been in any way under the control of the present Nationalist government of China, and, until his death in 1927 or '28, the old marshall had been the war lord of Manchuria and controlled it absolutely.

**Adherence Was Nominal.**  
Upon his death, the young marshall took over his authority, and in 1928 after Chiang Kai-shek had taken Peking and defeated the Communists and the northern war lords, the young marshall announced his adherence to the National government. That was a pretty nominal adherence.

It meant that he recognized the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the National government of China, but the administration in Manchuria did not change, and he continued to exercise the authority. . . .

In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and set up their puppet state, and all Chinese authority disappeared from Manchuria. I mention this to point out to you that the National government had no roots of any sort in Manchuria. . . .

When we come to North China, we find that in 1927, the struggle between the left wing of the Kuomintang Party, which was established at Hangkow, and the right wing of the party under Chiang Kai-shek came to a head. The Chiang Kai-shek forces won, the Russians, Borodin who was then advising the Government, had to flee from China, and in 1928 Chiang Kai-shek moved into Peking and there announced the official unification of China. That was in 1928.

The battle with the Communists which began in 1927 in open warfare continued until '36, and in the period of '34 and '35 the Communists were forced to make their long march from the southeastern portion of China to the northwestern portion of China. There they established themselves in the period '34-'35.

**Japanese Moved North.**  
In the meantime, however, the Japanese who were in Manchuria were moving into North China, and in 1933 the Japanese undertook to set up another puppet state in North China which would comprise the five northern provinces of China and at that time they had sufficient physical control of the area to do that.

I point all of this out to make clear to you again that in North China the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's government, which was established in 1928, had been in very large part eliminated by 1935, and instead, of his government having power in North China, that was in part, controlled

Government support for the National Government forces, and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there, prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept. . . .

Now, in short, what Gen. Wedemeyer reported and advised was, first of all, that the Generalissimo must consolidate his own position in South China and to do that he must take into consideration this revolution that I have been talking about. And Gen. Wedemeyer stressed that—and you will see the same point, that there must be political, economic and social reforms in order that the Chinese government might put itself at the head of this great demand for improvement, which was existing in China, and not allow the Communists or anybody else to take that advantage away from them.

In the second place he points out that to establish himself in North China, he must come to agreement with the Communists. In the third place he points out the only way to establish himself in Manchuria is through agreement with the Russians. He ends up by saying that the outlook on all of these fronts is dark, and he points out that force is not available to accomplish these efforts, partly because force cannot accomplish some of them, and secondly, because there is not

all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem, and should be solved by political means. . . .

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood facing one another and maneuvering against one another.

It was the effort of our Government throughout the war period to try and reach some kind of an arrangement so that these two forces instead of watching one another would both fight the Japanese. If they did that there was a very important contribution to the war. . . .

In the spring of 1944 Vice President Wallace went on a mission for President Roosevelt. Among other places he went to China, and there he had talks with the generalissimo, and they talked about two of the great important problems that I have been discussing. One was Manchuria and the other was the Communists.

**Chiang Wanted U. S. Help.**  
The generalissimo was most anxious to get help of the United States in improving relations, as he stated it, between the United States and the Soviet Union because without that improvement

were people who had a defined area, with a large population subject to their control, 116 million. They had a government of their own; they had an army of their own; and, in effect, they had a separate country within China, and the task was to put these two things together so that there would be one country and one government. Now, that was what they were working on. . . .

The Yalta agreements were made in the very early part of 1945. Later on, in August of '45, treaties were signed between the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet Union, which grew out of and were based upon these Yalta agreements.

Now, first of all, the Yalta agreements, from the point of view of the wartime effort, and the interest of the United States and its major fighting allies—I think this

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HAPPY, lost in vic. Rock Creek Park, around G. ave. Reward. Please call OW. 6182.  
MAN'S RING in box, lost between Commerce Bldg. and 6th and N. Y. ave. a. w. (Reward by Victor Reed) name "John N. Schuchman" Reward. MI. 5143.  
O'REAR GLASSES in brown leather case, 13 or near Constitution Hall, Sat. 1946. Reward. RA. 8330.  
FAKE COCKER, red female, lost in silver hill, name "Quay". Call HI. 6100. Reward.  
FIN hat, brown, silver with case and white ribbon; sentimental value. Reward. HO. 3475.  
PUPPY, tan cocker spaniel, male, 3 mos. old; no tag or collar; children's pet; strayed from home, 1947. Park 4. Reward BU. 4671.  
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would be greatly diminished. The peace became a major objective of both the Chinese government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese government.

It was in that situation that Gen. Marshall was asked by the President to go to China at the end of 1945.

### Story of Marshall's Instructions Told

At the outset I will go into a matter of detail which really is quite out of place in the broad picture which I am trying to paint for you here; but since it has been talked about a great deal, I think it is important to clear it up, and there is the preparation of the instructions which were issued to Gen. Marshall.

At the end of November, 1945, Secretary Byrnes and Gen. Marshall met. This was after Gen. Marshall had been asked to go to China.

Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. Gen. Marshall did not approve of it. Gen. Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with Gen. Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

On the 8th of December, Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to Gen. Marshall—that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by Gen. Marshall.

Gen. Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945, by Secretary Byrnes, Gen. Marshall, Mr. Carter Vincent, Gen. Hull and myself. I was then Undersecretary of State.

Marshall Approved Plans. Those of us went over the instructions, Gen. Marshall approved the suggestions made by Secretary Byrnes, and we then had a completely agreed draft.

In the course of that meeting the outline of a letter from the President to Gen. Marshall was discussed and directions were given for its preparation.

There was also approved at the meeting a memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War, requesting certain help in connection with the removal of the Japanese and the movement of Chinese armies into the north and laying down certain restrictions on these movements.

They were taken up by Secretary Byrnes with the President, who went over them; and they were put in final shape, un-

So far into a more substantial truce.

Gen. Marshall played a very considerable part in working this out. The executive headquarters was the really great instrumentalities which set up and worked very well until the two parties fell apart—then nothing worked.

The second agreement was an agreement for governmental reorganization and for a constitutional government, and the third agreement was for a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into the national government.

The second agreement for working out a constitutional government recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the national government. It provided that there was to be an interim state council, sort of a provisional government, which would govern until the new constitution was established and elections were held throughout China and a constitutional government was set up in which all the people of China would have their representation and which would function on a two-party or multiparty system.

Kuomintang, Got Majority. The interim state council was to function in this interim period as the supreme organ of the state. The Kuomintang Party was given 20 of the 40 seats in this national council. The other 20 seats were distributed among the Communists and the other parties and to some non-party people. It was provided that . . . Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of China, should select all the members of the council, that is, he would select those from his own party and those from all the other parties. However, he would have to appoint a certain number from these other minority parties. That would leave him with 20 people whom he had selected from his own party, with 20 people whom he had selected from the other parties, including the Communists, and it would also leave him with a veto over any action of this council which could only be overridden by a three-fifths vote, which could not be done if his own party stayed with him.

Now, that, I say, was the temporary government. That was to continue until the constitution was to be agreed upon on May 4th, through the National Assembly, May 4th, 1946, and it was hoped that at an early date, some time in '46 or '47, I believe it was, there could be an election, and they would then set up a regular constitutional government with

them. . . .

They were taken up by Secretary Byrnes with the President, who went over them; and they were put in final shape, un-

tion in China, and for the Chinese economy.

He also pointed out that we must be prepared to face the possibility that the Chinese government might not be able to maintain itself against the Chinese Communist forces. . . .

Now the program of aid which Gen. Marshall presented was a program of \$570 million in economic assistance over a 15-month period. He pointed out that the experience gained in the program would throw light on the possibilities of future programs.

The program was sufficient in size, it was thought, to free the major portion of the Chinese government's own foreign exchange assets for the purchase of such military supplies, from foreign sources, as it might need.

It was not recommended that we should take measures of military aid which would lead to United States military intervention in China, or direct involvement in the civil war.

Now, this question was very carefully considered in the Executive Branch, at a meeting in June, 1946, attended by Secretary Marshall, Secretary of the Army Royal, Gen. Bradley and Gen. Wedemeyer, and the decision which I have just spoken of was taken.

Military Advisers on Hand. There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1946, and in 1947 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the generalissimo's advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

Therefore we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas.

This recommendation was con-

tion in China, and for the Chinese economy.

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Family Ties Hindered Regime. Throughout the structure and machinery of the National Government there are interlocking ties of interests, family, financial and political. No Chinese, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority because he is the best qualified man. He must have other backing. In too many cases, such backing was the support and loyalty of the Generalissimo and his army comrades, which kept them in posts of responsibility regardless of their qualifications.

The direct result has been the unsound strategy and faulty tactics of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists. . . .

By the end of 1948 the struggle in North China had virtually ended with the complete collapse of the Nationalist armies. Eighty per cent of all the material which we had furnished, both during the war and after, to the National government, was lost; and 75 per cent of that is estimated to have been captured by the Communists.

One reason for this large capture, Gen. Barr points out, when he says, "that the Chinese Nationalist government never destroyed any of the material, when they were about to surrender or run."

He says, "The Chinese seemed inherently unable to destroy anything of value."

Now, at the very end of my remarks here, I briefly sum up some of the things, material and otherwise, which the United States did in aid of its policy in China.

Speaking, first, of things on which it is impossible to put a little.

"In spite of this your country continued to extend its aid to our government. It is regrettable that owing to the failure of our government to make judicious use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic and military reforms, your assistance has not produced the desired effect. To this failure is attributable the present predicament in which our country finds itself."

### Gen. Partridge, New Medal On Chest, Leaves Tokyo

TOKYO, June 3.—Lt. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, wearing a new bronze star medal on his chest, officially relinquished command of the 5th Air Force in Korea yesterday.

A pooled dispatch from 5th Air Force headquarters said that after colorful departure ceremonies, Gen. Partridge left on the first leg of a trip which will take him to a new command in the United States. The new commander, Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, arrived in the Far East last week.

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, commander of the 8th Army, pinned a second bronze star medal with the device for heroic achievement on Gen. Partridge's blouse before he departed.

Gen. Van Fleet thanked Gen. Partridge for his help, "which has done a lot for our soldiers and maybe has even spoiled them a little."

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## Acheson Describes Events Leading to Nationalist Defeat

(Continued From Page A-3.)

their guns on the ground and march to the coast at once, those areas would have been occupied by the Communists, and the Nationalist government forces would never have gotten in there, without fighting.

Marines Guarded Seaports. Therefore the task was to have the Japanese evacuate the areas which they held at the time when the Government forces could be moved and were moved by us into those areas. That was the task to perform.

In order to do that we landed 50,000 Marines in China. The function of these Marines was to occupy the principal seaports, to guard the principal rail lines close to those seaports, and later to take over the areas along the eastern coast where coal was produced and guard the lines along which the coal came to the principal consuming centers. That was to allow the industrial life of China to continue, and those coal areas and the coal railroads were being constantly raided by the Communists.

At the same time our armed forces airlifted Chinese armies, whole armies, from South China into the areas to be evacuated, and which were being evacuated by the Japanese. Now that was a tremendous undertaking, most of which was carried out, and it was that undertaking which permitted the Chinese government to really get back into areas of China which it would have had the utmost difficulty in even getting into without that colossal effort.

By the end of '48 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand under 3 million, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people. After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties, and both the government authorities, the Chinese government authorities, and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

Peace Was Major Objective. If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the government forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying North China became much diminished.

changed from the agreements of December 8.

The President then had a meeting with Gen. Marshall, at which I was present—there were three of us at that meeting, the President, Gen. Marshall and myself—and at that point the signed letter and the instructions were handed to Gen. Marshall.

It was ascertained by the President at that meeting that these papers were unanimously approved and agreeable to all concerned, and to himself.

Now that is the account of the preparation of these instructions. All the papers concerned are printed in the white book, with one exception. The press release, which I mentioned a moment ago, which was given out on the 15th of December—everything in the press release was in Gen. Marshall's instructions. In other words, the press release was a verbatim statement of what was in the instructions to Gen. Marshall, except that certain paragraphs in the instructions were omitted from the press release.

One Omission Explained. One of those omissions had to do with what is printed in the white paper and in the memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War. That was the discretion and authority given to Gen. Marshall in not moving Nationalist government troops into areas in which there was fighting until he thought that that was a wise thing to do.

That was not to be stated and released because obviously it wouldn't work if it were.

Another omission, two other omissions had to do with things which we would do if the Chinese government asked us to do it. Obviously you do not print in the newspapers that you will do something if somebody else asks you to. You leave it to the other person to ask you to do that if they wish.

Gen. Marshall arrived in China at the very end of December, 1945. By February, 1946, three major agreements had been reached between the Chinese government and the Communists. These agreements grew out of the earlier agreements of October 11, 1945, which discussed the general principles for working out peacefully the differences between the Communists and the government.

The agreements of January and February, 1946, carried into considerable detail how this should be done. In regard to these three agreements which I shall describe, Gen. Marshall had a part only in one, and that was in the first one.

Marshall Played Prominent Role

legislative, judicial and executive branches in which all parts of China would be represented, so that this country would have a government extending over all of the area.

The third agreement had to do with the amalgamation of the forces, and that was the most important one. It provided that there should be a great reduction in forces on both sides because China could not support the tremendous military establishment which existed on the Nationalist side and on the Communist side together.

Army Set at 68 Divisions. The army was to consist of 60 divisions. Of those 60 divisions, 50 were to be Nationalist government divisions and 10 were to be Communist divisions. These divisions were to be groups together in armies, armies which would contain three divisions or whatever the Chinese military order of battle is. There would be several divisions in each army.

The divisions were to be stationed in certain numerical strengths in various parts of China.

The important thing here about the agreement, as we look back on it, was that so far as Manchuria was concerned, the agreement provided that in Manchuria there should be 15 divisions of the new government's troops. Of those 15 divisions, 14 should be national government divisions and one should be a Communist division.

... If that could have been carried out, the whole situation might have been very different.

## Comparative Peace Deteriorated in '46

In 1946 the situation of comparative peace which had been brought about as a result of the agreements in the early part of the year began to deteriorate. Fighting broke out in various places.

Gen. Marshall, in trying to stop this fighting, through the executive headquarters, got drawn into greater detail in some of the political negotiations between the two parties, because this fighting rapidly took on political aspects.

Therefore, the whole discussions between the Communists and the Nationalists in the attempt to work out the interim government, and the long-term constitutional government, got into more and more confusion and trouble.

The result of the breakdown was that the situation developed into one of very considerable fighting by the end of 1946, and when Gen. Marshall left China in 1947.

... the American effort to mediate in this struggle between the Government and the Communists ended.

the side of the enemy without firing a shot, or sufficient of them do so that those who want to fight can't fight.

At the end of '46 the government had 2.8 million men under arms and the Communists had about 1.1 million of regulars.

However, in firepower, in rifle firepower, the government still enjoyed a superiority of three or four to one over the Communists.

In '48, when this fighting started, Gen. Marshall was acting as mediator. He called on both sides to stop the fighting. Both professed to want to do it, but did not do it.

Therefore, Gen. Marshall asked for and obtained from this Government an embargo on the shipment of combat materiel into China. That embargo lasted from the time it was imposed in '48, to the exact date I do not have with me... until May 1947.

During that time the Nationalists were winning the battles, they occupied the cities, but they immobilized themselves.

## Wedemeyer Saw Peril in Civil War

After Gen. Marshall returned in the summer of 1947, the President on the recommendation of Gen. Marshall, sent Gen. Wedemeyer to China on a fact-finding mission.

Gen. Wedemeyer, before he left, stressed again, as he had in 1945, the great importance and the necessity for reform.

Gen. Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the White Paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require Congressional authorization.

Although his actual recommendations do not call for grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

However, Gen. Wedemeyer recognized the desirability and importance of avoiding direct United States involvement in the civil war in China by stating:

"Although advice indicated above—that is, technical military advice—does provide advice indirectly to tactical force, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare."

... the 80th Congress. The 80th Congress—and I shall not go through a whole long story—the Senate bill reduced the period of time from 15 months to 12 months. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended \$358 million for economic aid and \$125 million as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese government.

The debate indicates that the Chinese government would probably use this \$125 million for military aid. In the course of the legislative history, the House put in a provision authorizing military advice on the so-called Greek model, that is having officers with troops in combat areas and strategic advice. That was stricken out by the Senate, and in speaking about it Senator Vandenberg said:

"As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your committee recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available at China's option. Your committee believes that as a matter of elementary prudence that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist government."

... and, as I say, the House provision was stricken out.

## Fall of Tsinan Started Collapse

I said that the bill authorized \$338 million for economic aid. However, when it came to the appropriation process, Congress only appropriated \$275 million for economic aid and \$125 million for military aid. So a total was actually made available by the Congress of \$400 million as against \$570 million requested.

The real collapse of the government in a military way began in the latter part of 1948. The first large-scale defection and collapse occurred in September, 1948, with the fall of Tsinan, where government forces without any effort at all went over to the other side and surrendered with all their material.

In mid-November, 1948, Gen. Barr, who was the head of the military mission to China, reported to the Department of the Army:

"I am convinced that the military situation has deteriorated to the point where only the active participation of United States troops could effect a remedy. No battle has been fought since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debacles, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of the will to fight."

In another report early in 1949, he explained some of the causes for the National government defeat. He says:

"The government committed its first politico-military blunder by concentrating on the purely military reconquest of former Japanese-held areas. It gave very little realization to the regional areas or the creation of efficient local

dollar value. First, is the aid rendered by the United States forces in China in planning and in carrying out the movement of the Chinese government forces into the areas occupied by the Japanese.

Second, is the evacuation of the Japanese troops from those areas.

Third, is the aid rendered by the United States Marines in the North China; in occupying key areas and maintaining control of the government of essential railway lines until the government was able to take over.

Fourth, the aid provided by the United States military advisory group.

Apart from this, the United States Government in the period from VJ-day until early 1949, authorized grants and credits to China totaling approximately \$2 billion, of which approximately \$1.6 billion were grants and \$400 million were on credit terms.

This total is divided almost equally between military and economic aid. The amounts do not include United States surplus property, except where the sales were on credit terms.

Surplus property, with a total estimated procurement cost of over a billion dollars, has been sold to China for the agreed realization to the United States of \$230 million, of which \$95 million were on credit terms.

By the spring of 1949 the military position of the Chinese government collapsed to the point where the Chinese Communists controlled the major centers of population, and railroads from Manchuria south to the Yangtze.

The military collapse of the Chinese government had, for the most part, been the consequence of inept political and military leadership, and a lack of the will to fight on the part of its armies, rather than inadequate military supplies.

It was at that time the considered judgment of responsible United States Government observers in China that only the extension of unlimited American economic and military aid involving the use of our troops and operations which might require the extensive control of Chinese government operations would enable the Nationalist government to maintain a foothold in South China.

U. S. Interests Put First. It was believed that United States involvement in Chinese civil war under the existing conditions would be clearly contrary to American interests.

At the last note of this tragic story, I should like to read you the message of the Acting President of China, General Li Tsung-shen. ... He says: "This policy" he had described our help to China during the war, and then he had discussed our aid to China after the war as I have described it to you. He says:

"This policy of friendly assistance was continued when some years ago Gen. Marshall under instructions from your good self took up the difficult task of mediation in our conflict with the Chinese Communists to which he devoted painstaking effort. All

## Reuther Urges Equality In Securities Under Economic Controls

(Continued From First Page.)

... as the tool of Soviet imperialism?"

Mr. Reuther maintained that proposals of sales taxes and the shifting of corporation taxes to ultimate consumers were a "cold-deck proposition to pay the costs of this national emergency by soaking the poor and sparing the rich."

He said credit controls, which fall chiefly on low-income groups do little to limit inflation while "unrestrained bank credits" continue.

As for price controls, Mr. Reuther said the OPA beef regulation has been made a testing ground for all price control.

He contended that "if the meat industry succeeds in destroying the beef regulation the public will lose all confidence in the ability and willingness of the Government to protect the interests of consumers."

Wants Credit Flexibility. Mr. Reuther said he favors credit controls but believes that regulation W is being administered in a rigid manner by the Federal Reserve Board. Under Regulation W down payments on installment purchases were increased and the pay-out period was shortened.

Mr. Reuther said the regulation should be flexible so as to take care of the present situation in which the automobile industry has used cars. He suggested that the regulation should be administered by the Economic Stabilization Agency.

He also said that he feels, although he could not categorically say it is true, that steel and other scarce materials are being allotted to defense production before they can be used in such production and that output of civilian goods is suffering for that reason.

He said that this question will come up tomorrow in the President's Advisory Committee on Mobilization Policy. Senator Capehart, Republican of Indiana suggested that the joint committee on defense production should have an observer at that meeting.

Dr. George W. Taylor, chairman of the Wage Stabilization Board, advocated no change in the provisions of the present act regarding the Wage Stabilization Board. He suggested that any changes should wait on experience in the working of the present act. He did say, however, that the section relating to the settlement of industrial disputes might have to be changed.

Asked About Escalator Clause. Senator Capehart asked whether a formula for escalator clause

increases should be written into the law. Dr. Wagner replied that he believed escalator clause questions should be handled on an administrative basis and that more flexibility was needed than would be possible if Congress set out a formula.

Stanley H. Rutenberg, CIO director of education and research, was another scheduled witness at today's hearing. His prepared statement declared that the Defense Production Act, as it now stands, has failed as a weapon against inflation.

"Its loopholes must be plugged," he stated. "Its inadequacies must be replaced with authority for firm action. The American people deserve assurance from their representatives that the menace of the inflation fifth column will be combated vigorously."

He urged "firm price and rent controls and a fair wage stabilization policy as well as equitable taxes, credit controls and a savings program."

Other scheduled witnesses today included spokesmen for the National Association of Real Estate Boards and the National Apartment Owners Association, Inc.

## Trial of Trenton Six Hears Alibi Witness

By the Associated Press

TRENTON, N. J., June 4.—The final defense witness in the "Trenton Six" murder case testified today that one of the defendants was working in a butcher shop the morning of the crime.

Mrs. Anna Binder, a former Trenton resident who now lives in Brooklyn, N. Y., said McKinley Forrest cleaned a chicken for her before noon on January 27, 1948.

That was the day the State contends Forrest and five other Negroes engaged in the holdup-slaying of a shopkeeper, William Horner, at about 10:30 a.m. They were convicted once and all sentenced to the electric chair but State Supreme Court ordered a new trial.

The retrial, going into its 14th week, is expected to wind up in about two weeks after rebuttal testimony and summations to the jury.

The defendants are Forrest, Ralph Cooper, Collis English, John McKenzie, James Thorpe and Horace Wilson.

Windsor in London

LONDON, June 4 (P).—The Duke of Windsor, in porkpie hat and tweed topcoat, dropped in from Paris today to see his folks. He expects to spend a few days with his mother, Queen Mary, at Marlborough House. His duchess did not accompany him. She is in Paris.

The Most Useful Gift for  
Graduate or Bride

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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FOI/PA# 1417688-0

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12/8/60

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TO SACS, WFO (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER) ENC. (2)  
NEW HAVEN  
BOSTON  
ST. LOUIS  
CHICAGO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI  
DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACHESON HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOTKNOWN. HE IS EX-SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE QUOTE WHO'S WHO UNQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. DUE TO PROMINENCE OF ACHESON, IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT NEIGHBORHOOD INVESTIGATIONS OR CHECK EDUCATIONAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENTS, UNLESS SOME REASON FOR DOING SO ARISES, AT WHICH TIME YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU AUTHORITY. YOU SHOULD INTERVIEW A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED. CHICAGO CHECK ABA. CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT YOUR REPORTS ARE ACCURATE. COMPLETE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLOSE RELATIVES SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED BY ACTIVE INVESTIGATION AND APPROPRIATE CHECKS MADE CONCERNING EACH. ASSIGN IMMEDIATELY, AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, AND SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE. ASSIGN TO SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUREAU DEADLINE OF DECEMBER ONE THREE NEXT IS MET WITHOUT FAIL.

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- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
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- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
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DHY:mm

Note: Request received from Lawrence O'Brien by Mr. Evans.

*Stamp:* REC-161-47-1

JAN 23 1961

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

12-8-60  
3-15 PM

URGENT 12-8-60

3-15 PM

JS

TO SACS, WASHINGTON FIELD, NEW HAVEN, BOSTON, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO  
FROM DIRECTOR 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACHESON HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX-SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE QUOTE WHO-S WHO UNQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. DUE TO PROMINENCE OF ACHESON, IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT NEIGHBORHOOD INVESTIGATIONS OR CHECK EDUCATIONAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENTS, UNLESS SOME REASON FOR DOING SO ARISES, AT WHICH TIME YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU AUTHORITY. YOU SHOULD INTERVIEW A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED. CHICAGO CHECK ABA. CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT YOUR REPORTS ARE ACCURATE. COMPLETE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLOSE RELATIVES SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED BY ACTIVE INVESTIGATION AND APPROPRIATE CHECKS MADE CONCERNING EACH. ASSIGN IMMEDIATELY, AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, AND SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE. ASSIGN TO SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUREAU DEADLINE OF DECEMBER ONE THREE NEXT IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. END ACK PLS AND HOLD FOR THIRD MESGS  
OK FBI SL GH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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TO SACS, WASHINGTON FIELD, NEW HAVEN, BOSTON, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO  
FROM DIRECTOR 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACHESON HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX-SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE QUOTE WHO-S WHO UNQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. DUE TO PROMINENCE OF ACHESON, IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT NEIGHBORHOOD INVESTIGATIONS OR CHECK EDUCATIONAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENTS, UNLESS SOME REASON FOR DOING SO ARISES, AT WHICH TIME YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU AUTHORITY. YOU SHOULD INTERVIEW A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED. CHICAGO CHECK ABA. CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT YOUR REPORTS ARE ACCURATE. COMPLETE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLOSE RELATIVES SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED BY ACTIVE INVESTIGATION AND APPROPRIATE CHECKS MADE CONCERNING EACH. ASSIGN IMMEDIATELY, AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, AND SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE. ASSIGN TO SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUREAU DEADLINE OF DECEMBER ONE THREE NEXT IS MET WITHOUT FAIL.

END PLS HOLD

OK CG

URGENT 12-8-60

2-53 PM

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TO SACS, WASHINGTON FIELD, NEW HAVEN, BOSTON, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO  
FROM DIRECTOR 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACHESON HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX-SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE QUOTE WHO-S WHO UNQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. DUE TO PROMINENCE OF ACHESON, IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT NEIGHBORHOOD INVESTIGATIONS OR CHECK EDUCATIONAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENTS, UNLESS SOME REASON FOR DOING SO ARISES, AT WHICH TIME YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU AUTHORITY. YOU SHOULD INTERVIEW A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED. CHICAGO CHECK ABA. CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT YOUR REPORTS ARE ACCURATE. COMPLETE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLOSE RELATIVES SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED BY ACTIVE INVESTIGATION AND APPROPRIATE CHECKS MADE CONCERNING EACH. ASSIGN IMMEDIATELY, AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, AND SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE. ASSIGN TO SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUREAU DEADLINE OF DECEMBER ONE THREE NEXT IS MET WITHOUT FAIL.

END ACK PLS

OK FBI NH CAL

TU DISC PLS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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JS

TO SACS, WASHINGTON FIELD, NEW HAVEN, BOSTON, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO  
FROM DIRECTOR 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACHESON HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX-SECRETARY OF STATE. SE QUOTE WHO-S WHO UNQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. DUE TO PROMINENCE OF ACHESON, IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT NEIGHBORHOOD INVESTIGATIONS OR CHECK EDUCATIONAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENTS, UNLESS SOME REASON FOR DOING SO ARISES, AT WHICH TIME YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU AUTHORITY. YOU SHOULD INTERVIEW A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED. CHICAGO CHECK ABA. CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT YOUR REPORTS ARE ACCURATE. COMPLETE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLOSE RELATIVES SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED BY ACTIVE INVESTIGATION AND APPROPRIATE CHECKS MADE CONCERNING EACH. ASSIGN IMMEDIATELY, AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, AND SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE. ASSIGN TO SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUREAU DEADLINE OF DECEMBER ONE THREE NEXT IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. PLS HOLD FOR ANOTHER MMSG  
END ACK PLS ADXXX AND HOLD  
THIS OK FBI BS CAP

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5

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (File ) DATE: 12/13/60

*Wuyf/aw*  
FROM : SAC, WFO (File 161-23 )

SUBJECT: *Dean Gooderham Acheson*  
*SPI*

This case will be delinquent.

Date of Bureau deadline: 12/13/60

Reason for the delinquency: *Incident weather on 12/11/60 & 12/12/60  
delayed completion of investigation. Report  
is in dictation.*

Date the report or necessary communication  
will reach the Bureau: 12/14/60

AEC zone designation, e.g., OR, CH, etc.:  
(This applies only to 116 cases.)

JWB/

*No Administrative  
action recommended.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA

# Memorandum



Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 12/8/60

FROM : Mr. Rosen *JRM*

SUBJECT: SPECIAL INQUIRIES  
(KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION)

# 245,118

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9/17/84 BY SP-6 BJA/RBG

91451 CE/gtt 1/23/85

# 245,422

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien has requested 21 investigations for the Kennedy Administration. He desires these handled expeditiously.

These cases are being ordered today on a special and expeditious basis and the following limitations are being placed on the investigations of the 8 persons mentioned below. Educational background will not be checked, there will be no neighborhood investigations made and inquiries concerning previous employment will be dispensed with unless some reason develops which would require such inquiries.

Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State

Dr. Ralph Bunche, of the United Nations

Orville Freeman, Governor of Minnesota

Herschel Loveless, Governor of Iowa

George S. McGovern, Member of Congress, South Dakota

William R. Poage, Member of Congress, Texas

Adlai E. Stevenson, former Governor of Illinois

Thomas J. Watson, President, International Business Machines

161-46-  
 161-38-  
 161-44-  
 161-51-  
 161-49-  
 161-48-  
 161-50-

RECOMMENDATION:

That approval be given to handle the above 8 investigations in the manner described because of their prominence.

EX-113

B DEC 22 1960

50 DEC 29 1960

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(6)

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 DEC 23 1960  
*WMM*

*A*  
*JRM*  
*OK. expeditious*  
*G. W. W.*

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

# Memorandum

G

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12/14/60

*msj*  
*YST*

FROM : SAC, WFO (161-23)

~~SECRET~~

*msj*

SUBJECT: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPI

Rerep of SA [redacted] dated and captioned as above at WDC.

b6  
b7c

The anonymous source referred to in rerep is known to SAs [redacted] and [redacted] W. H. CORRIGAN and T. W. DAWSEY. This information is located in WFO file 100-283-15, page 100 and 100-283-1C1.

2-Bureau  
1-WFO

JWB:cak  
(1)

*W*

*[Handwritten signature]*

161-47-3

NOT RECORDED

3 JAN 18 1961

59 FEB 13 1961

*7347*

6 FEB 8 1961



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: December 8, 1960

FROM : A. Rosen *R* ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-15-80 BY SP-1 GSK/BJA  
*comp # 90, 166*

SUBJECT: SPECIAL INQUIRY - WHITE HOUSE  
(KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION)

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

The detailed information which was available on Dean Rusk (the 7/20/60 summary) was furnished to Lawrence O'Brien, Assistant to the President-elect. He was most appreciative of the response to his special request. He read the summary and started to put in a call to the President-elect at New York but before actually putting the call through, changed his mind. O'Brien stated that the information he felt should be most fully studied by him before he made any recommendation to the President-elect and he was going to study the material and take it up with Kennedy on the morning of 12/8/60 as he felt Kennedy would undoubtedly want to read the summary himself.

O'Brien has made available a list of 21 names of prominent individuals of whom the new administration would like to have investigations. All are being considered for responsible positions in the incoming administration. The list is as follows:

- Dean Acheson                      Former Secretary of State
- Dr. Ralph Bunche                Of the United Nations
- Abram Chayes                    Professor at the Harvard Law School
- Archibald Cox                    Professor at the Harvard Law School
- Paul Freund                      Professor at the Harvard Law School
- Orville Freeman                 Governor of Minnesota
- Roswell Gilpatric                Of New York City
- Arthur Goldberg                 Prominent labor lawyer
- Fred Heinkel                      Of Columbia, Missouri, a leader of agricultural groups

*Acheson, Dean Gooderham*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

CAE:ers  
(9)

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#245,118  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/17/84 BY SP-6 BJA/RSB  
9145/ae/gsk 11/23/85  
#245422

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-209-1001  
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-209-1001

Memorandum for Mr. Parsons  
RE: SPECIAL INQUIRY - WHITE HOUSE

Phillip Klutznick	Chicago businessman
Herschel Loveless	Governor of Iowa
George Stanley McGovern	Member of Congress from South Dakota
Newton Minow	Lawyer associated with Adlai Stevenson's firm
William Robert Poage	Member of Congress from Texas
Frank Reeves	Washington lawyer and prominent Negro leader
James Rowe	Washington, D. C. lawyer and former Justice Department official
Adlai Stevenson	
Thomas J. Watson, Jr.	President of the International Business Machines Corporation
Byron White	Denver lawyer who was active in the Kennedy campaign
Harris Wofford	Currently employed by the Democratic National Committee
Adam Yarmolinsky	Now employed by the Democratic National Committee.

The foregoing investigations are being ordered today for immediate handling.

*Expedite.*  
*K.*

In addition to the requests actually made, O'Brien has a list containing 88 other names of individuals who are being considered for appointments by the President-elect. O'Brien is having his files checked for identifying information concerning these 88 individuals and indicated that investigation on them would be requested within the next day or so. You will be promptly advised when these additional investigations are requested.

FBI

Date: 12/9/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. W.C.Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SACS, NEW YORK, KANSAS CITY, AND CINCINNATI

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (161-23)

*smk*

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. BUDED DECEMBER THIRTEEN. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACHESON RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE QUOTE WHOS WHO ENQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. BUREAU INSTRUCTS A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED. AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, SET OUT LEADS BY TELETYPE, ASSIGN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUDED IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. ROBERT A. LOVETT, WHO WAS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WHEN ACHESON WAS SECRETARY OF STATE, FROM FORTYNINE TO FIFTYTHREE, RESIDES LOCUST VALLEY, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK. JESSE M. DONALDSON, FOUR SEVEN ONE TWO ROANOKE PARKWAY, PLAZA HOUSE, KANSAS CITY, WAS FORMER POSTMASTER GENERAL. CHARLES SAWYER, FORMER

- 3- Bureau
- 1- Teletype Unit
- 1- WFO

JWB:pac  
(5)

*Memo to Rosen  
12/9/60*

161-47-5  
NOT RECORDED  
3 JAN 18 1961

Approved: [Signature] Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)WFO 161-23  
PAGE TWO

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, RESIDES NINE FIVE EAST FOUNTAIN AVENUE, GLENDALE, OHIO, AND HAS OFFICE AT DIXIE TERMINAL BUILDING, CINCINNATI, OHIO. ALL OFFICES HANDLE RESPECTIVE LEADS. FOR INFO BUREAU, FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMAN APPOINTED ACHESON SECRETARY OF STATE AND WAS THEREFORE ONLY SUPERIOR. ACHESON ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT HERBERT HOOVER ON COMMISSION ON ORGANIZING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, HOOVER BEING CHAIRMAN AND ACHESON VICE CHAIRMAN. ACHESON ALSO IS REPORTEDLY ASSOCIATE OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE FELIX FRANKFURTER. THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER INTERVIEWING TRUMAN, HOOVER, AND FRANKFURTER.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

*[Signature]*  
F B I

*4*

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Casper  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

Date: 12/9/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (161-23)

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. BUDED DEC. THIRTEEN. RUSH

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION,  
POSITION FOR WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX DASH  
SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE QUOTE WHOS WHO END QUOTE FOR BACKGROUND  
DATA. AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, SET OUT ALL LEADS BY  
TELETYPE AND ASSIGN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN  
BUDED IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. JAMES E. WEBB, FORMER UNDER  
SECRETARY OF STATE, UNDER ACHESON FROM NINETEEN FORTYNINE TO  
NINETEEN FIFTYTWO, CAN BE CONTACTED UNTIL NOON SATURDAY,  
DEC. TEN, AT LAKE TEXHOMA LODGE, KINGSTON, OKLAHOMA, PHONE  
JORDAN FOUR TWO THREE ONE ONE, ACCORDING TO HIS SECRETARY.  
HANDLE.

*[Handwritten initials and scribbles]*

3-Bureau  
1-Teletype Unit  
1-WFO

JWB:pam  
(5)

*161-47-6*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

Approved: *[Signature]*  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI

Date: 12/9/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Trotter  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Ingram  
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SACS NEW YORK, SAVANNAH, BOSTON,  
NORFOLK AND DENVER

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (161-23)

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. BUDED DEC. THIRTEEN. RUSH  
INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, POSITION FOR  
WHICH BEING CONSIDERED NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX DASH SECRETARY OF  
STATE. SEE QUOTE WHOS WHO ENQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. BUREAU  
INSTRUCTS THAT A REPRESENTATIVE NUMBER OF ASSOCIATES AND  
MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH HE IS AFFILIATED SHOULD BE  
INTERVIEWED. AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, SET OUT LEADS BY  
TELETYPE, ASSIGN TO SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT  
BUDED IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE ASSOCIATED  
AT DEPT. OF STATE DURING LATE FORTIES WITH ACHESON COLON DR.  
PHILIP C. JESSUP, FORMER AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, NOW COLUMBIA  
UNIVERSITY, NYC. WILLARD L. THORP, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, NOW AT AMHERST COLLEGE, AMHERST, MASS.  
DEAN RUSK, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,

- 3- Bureau
- 1- Teletype Unit
- 1- WFO

JWB:mro  
(4)

161-477

Approved: [Signature] Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)WFO 161-23  
PAGE TWO

NOW PRESIDENT, ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, NYC. CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE, FORMER DEPUTY UNDER DASH SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION, NOW PRESIDENT OF COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG, WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA. JAMES F. BYRNES, WHO RESIDES COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, WAS FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE DURING TIME ACHESON WAS UNDER DASH SECRETARY. ALSO, DENVER REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW CHARLES F. BRANNAN, WHO WAS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE WHEN ACHESON WAS SECRETARY OF STATE, NOW LOCATED AT ONE FIVE SEVEN FIVE SHERMAN STREET, DENVER, COLORADO. ALL OFFICES HANDLE RESPECTIVE LEADS.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date: 12/9/60

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SACS, NEW YORK AND LITTLE ROCK

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (161-23)

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. BUDED DEC. THIRTEEN. RUSH INVESTIGATION REQUESTED FROM KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION FOR UNKNOWN POSITION. SEE QUOTE WHOS WHO UNQUOTE FOR BACKGROUND DATA. AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE, ASSIGN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUDED IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. ACHESON FORMERLY VICE CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION ON ORGANIZING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (HOOVER COMMISSION). FOLLOWING TWO UNITED STATES SENATORS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH HIM ON SAME COLON GEORGE AIKEN, VERMONT, WHO CAN BE CONTACTED AT UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK CITY, PHONE MURRAY HILL THREE SIX EIGHT ONE ZERO, EXTENSION ONE SIX EIGHT. AIKENS ADDRESS IS TWO PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY. ALSO JOHN MC CLELLAN, ARKANSAS, WHO CAN BE CONTACTED AT HIS OFFICE ON TENTH FLOOR OF UNION LIFE BUILDING, LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, ON SATURDAY, DEC. TEN, PHONE FRANKLIN FOUR FOUR SEVEN SEVEN FOUR. HANDLE.

③-Bureau  
1-Teletype Unit  
1-WFO

JWB:pam  
(5)

101-47-8  
NOV 28 1960

Approved: Miss Gandy Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 9 1960

TELETYPE

*G*

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. McGuire	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

URGENT 12-9-60 10-29 AM SFW

TO DIRECTOR, FBI AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM SAC, ST. LOUIS 161-15 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPECIAL INQUIRY. RE BUREAU

TELETYPE DECEMBER EIGHT SIXTY. PERSONNEL GSA, MPRC,

ST. LOUIS ADVISED DECEMBER NINE SIXTY THAT NAVY RECORDS

FOR ACHESON NOT LOCATED THIS CENTER AND SHOULD BE ON

FILE AT NAVAL ANNEX, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA. WASHINGTON FIELD

HANDLE. RUC.

END AND ACK PLS

11-31 AM OK FBI WA JS

RECORDED  
JAN 18 1961

REC'D

*WTF*

*47-9*  
*161-47-9*  
*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 12-9-60

FROM : C. H. Stanley *CHS*

SUBJECT: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPECIAL INQUIRY

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

On 12-8-60, we instituted an investigation of Acheson for the Kennedy Administration. The position for which he is being considered is not known.

The field has raised the question of possible interview of former President Harry Truman who appointed Acheson to Secretary of State and who was, therefore, his immediate superior. The question has been raised also of possible interview of former President Herbert Hoover who was Chairman of the Commission on Organizing the Executive Branch of the Government when Acheson was Vice-Chairman of the same commission. Field points out also that Acheson is reportedly an associate of Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court.

In an interview today with Oscar Chapman, former Secretary of Interior, Chapman advised that Mr. Justice Frankfurter is one of Acheson's closest associates.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is believed desirable that we interview former President Hoover and Justice Frankfurter in view of their association with Mr. Acheson.

With reference to former President Truman, it is believed the Bureau should contact Mr. Truman to give him an opportunity of furnishing any information he might desire concerning Acheson. It is believed this action should be taken to prevent any possible criticism which could be directed at the Bureau for not having afforded Mr. Truman this opportunity in view of his official and close association with Mr. Acheson as his Secretary of State.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. L'Allier

FVG/cge  
(8)

**NOT XE**

REC-9

161-47-10

RECORDED

JAN 18 1961

COPY TO MR. TOLSON

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>BOSTON</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/10/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/9 - 10/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE  <b>DEAN GODDERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <b>SA GEORGE S. WALLACE</b>	Typed By: <b>ari</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

~~SECRET~~

REFERENCE: Bureau teletype dated 12/8/60.  
WFO teletype dated 12/9/60.

### ADMINISTRATIVE

With reference to WFO teletype requesting the interview of WILLARD L. THORP, it is to be noted that SA THOMAS F. SULLIVAN attempted to contact Mr. THORP at his residence and also at Amherst College, Amherst, Mass. One of Mr. THORP's neighbors advised that Mr. THORP frequently takes week end trips and he was not available on the several occasions when effort was made to contact him. Attempts will be made to interview him Monday, December 12, 1960, and results will be furnished to the Bureau by teletype followed by report.

- A\* -

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made:		11/1-47-11	
1 - Bureau 1 - Boston (161-16) <i>1 - [unclear] - p. 1 - list</i>		NOT RECORDED 18 DEC 14 1960	

DEC 14 11 37 AM '60  
 161-1616-2

*[Handwritten initials/signature]*



BS 161-16

CREDIT

On December 9, 1960, Personnel at the Credit Bureau of Greater Boston, Inc., 11 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, advised that their files contained no record in the name of DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON.

ARREST

On December 9, 1960, Personnel of the Office of the Massachusetts Commissioner of Probation, Suffolk County Courthouse, Boston, Massachusetts, a central repository for all traffic and criminal conviction records within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and Miss MARY C. LANNON, Clerk, Bureau of Records, Cambridge, Massachusetts Police Department, advised that the files of their respective agencies contained no record in the name of DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON.

6 11

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office NORFOLK	Office of Origin BUREAU	Date 12/10/60	Investigative Period 12/10/60
TITLE OF CASE  DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON		Report made by SA VERNON E. NIVANS	Typed By: cam
		CHARACTER OF CASE  SPI	

EX-107-262X

REFERENCE: Washington Field teletype to Bureau dated 12/9/60.

-RUC-

*Handwritten notes:*  
H. Mel...  
info.

*Handwritten mark:* ~~~~~

Approved <i>a.s.</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made: <i>WMS</i>		161-47-12	
(1) Bureau 1-Norfolk (161-2)		NOT RECORDED	
		6	

RECEIVED-A#-B I  
COVER PAGE

*Handwritten initials:* [Signature]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## Copy to:

Report of: SA VERNON E. NIVANS Office: NORFOLK, VIRGINIA  
Date: 12/10/60  
Field Office File No.: Norfolk 161-2 Bureau File No.:  
Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON favorably recommended by  
CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE, President of Colonial Williamsburg,  
Williamsburg, Va.

-RUC-

DETAILS:

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE, President of Colonial Williamsburg, Williamsburg, Virginia, advised on December 10, 1960, he has known DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON for eighteen years, having met him during World War II, at a time when ACHESON was in the State Department, and Mr. HUMELSINE was employed under his direct supervision. Mr. HUMELSINE advised that he was closely associated with ACHESON from the beginning of World War II until 1952, at which time ACHESON retired from the government service to return to his law practice. He advised that ACHESON has excellent standards of character, loyalty, and reputation, and has reputable associates. He readily recommended ACHESON without reservation for any position with the United States Government. He said ACHESON at all times in the public service has always had the best interests of this country at heart, and is a man of very high ability, who would be a credit to the government at any time.

-1\*-

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

G

Reporting Office <b>LITTLE ROCK</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/10/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/10/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <b>SA WARREN G. JOHNSON</b>	Typed By: <b>jsb</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

~~XXXXXXXX~~

REFERENCE: Washington Field teletype to Bureau  
12/9/60.

- RUC -

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Newspaper morgues were not reviewed, as Senator MC CLELLAN advised that applicant not known to have resided or been employed in Arkansas.

- A\* -  
COVER PAGE

Approved <i>J. Cooper</i>	Special Agent In Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made: 2 - Bureau (AM)		161-47-13	
1 - Little Rock (161-2)		NOT RECORDED	
		DEC 15 1960	
		RECEIVED FBI	



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA WARREN G. JOHNSON  
Date: December 10, 1960

Office: Little Rock, Arkansas

Field Office File No.: Little Rock 161-2

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis:

Senator JOHN L. MC CLELLAN advised association with ACHESON limited to affairs of Government. Believed applicant capable and intelligent, but an intellectual out of touch with the people. No question as to character or loyalty.

- RUC -

Details: On December 10, 1960, United States Senator JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, Union Life Building, Little Rock, Arkansas, advised that DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON has served in many capacities in the Government of the United States, and was a member of the Commission on Organizing Executive Branch of Government (Hoover Commission), as was Senator MC CLELLAN.

Senator MC CLELLAN stated that he has had no social contact with Mr. ACHESON and his association with him has been limited to affairs of Government. Based upon this association, Senator MC CLELLAN stated that he believed Mr. ACHESON to be capable and intelligent, but felt he was an intellectual who was out of touch with the people.

Senator MC CLELLAN advised that he had no question as to Mr. ACHESON's character or his loyalty to the United States Government.

- 1\* -

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>CINCINNATI</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/10/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/9/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE  <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	Typed By: <b>fba</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

b6  
b7c

~~XXXXXXXX~~

REFERENCE:

Teletype from WFO 12/9/60.

- RUC -

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Cincinnati indices contain no record for DEAN ACHESON.

No mention was made of any particular position for which DEAN ACHESON was being considered. SAWYER was advised only that he was being considered for a high level position in the new administration.

Approved <i>EDM</i> Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below		
Copies made:  ① - Bureau 1 - WFO (Info) 1 - Cincinnati (161-2)	161-	47-	14
	NOT RECORDED 2 DEC 12 1960		

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: 

Office: CINCINNATI

Date: 12/10/60

b6  
b7c

Field Office File No.: 161-2

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis:

CHARLES SAWYER advised he knew ACHESON during HARRY TRUMAN administration when they were both cabinet members. He stated he would not recommend ACHESON for a high level position in the U. S. Government unless he knew position involved as he would not recommend him for the position of Secretary of State.

- R U C -

CI 161-2

CHARLES SAWYER, Dixie Terminal Building, Cincinnati, Ohio, advised on December 9, 1960, that he remembers DEAN ACHESON as Secretary of State when he served as Secretary of Commerce during the HARRY TRUMAN Administration. He stated he has visited the home of ACHESON and associated with him during this period. He stated he considers ACHESON to be a brilliant, loyal, and dedicated man whose character is above reproach. His associations were good during the time he knew him in Washington D. C.

SAWYER stated he would not recommend him for any high level position with the government unless he knew the position being considered. He stated he would not recommend him for the position of Secretary of State as he held that position before, and made decisions which SAWYER thought were wrong. Specifically, SAWYER stated ACHESON's statement not to defend Korea and his decision not to follow Chinese Communist planes beyond the Yalu River were responsible for the present unfortunate situation of the U. S. in Asia. He declined to state he considered these mistakes as poor judgment.

SAWYER was advised the position for which ACHESON was being considered was not known. He again stated he would recommend ACHESON for some positions, but he would not recommend him for the position of Secretary of State.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 10 1960

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. McGuire	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

*Edgus*  
*ES*

*war*

*M. Young*  
*4742*

*JS*

*161-42-15*  
NOT RECORDED

3 JAN 18 1961

TWO COPIES WFO

*12/11/60*  
*EV*  
*RF*  
*DHY*

*ph*

URGENT 12-10-60 2-25 PM CST MEJ  
TO - DIRECTOR AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD 161-23  
FROM - SAC, KANSAS CITY 161-2 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. RE WFO TELETYPE DECEMBER NINE  
LAST. JESSE M. DONALDSON ADVISED ACHESON HAS BROTHER, FIRST  
NAME UNRECALLED, WHO WAS PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGE WASHINGTON  
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C. WFO HANDLE. FORMER PRESIDENT  
TRUMAN WILL BE INTERVIEWED BY SAC DECEMBER TWELVE NEXT.

END ACK PLS  
3-28 PM OK FBI WA JS  
TU

*rel to KC*  
*DHY:llb*  
*10/11/60*

*JS*

*Jan*

12/11/60

PLAIN TEXT

TELETYPE

URGENT

*3*

TO SAC, KANSAS CITY

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REURTEL DECEMBER TEN, LAST.

DO NOT INTERVIEW FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMAN UNTIL FURTHER  
ADVICE IS RECEIVED FROM BUREAU.

*mm*

DHY:ble  
(3) *ble*

*2*

*101-47-16*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

*10-54A*  
TELETYPE

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

*4*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 11 1960

TELETYPE

G

URGENT 12-11-60 10-54 AM RAM

TO SAC, KANSAS CITY

FROM DIRECTOR 1 P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. REURTEL DECEMBER TEN, LAST. DO NOT  
INTERVIEW FORM<sup>E</sup>DR PRESIDENT TRUMAN UNTIL FURTHER ADVICE IS RECEIVED FROM  
BUREAU.

END & ACK PLS

OK FBI KC WGB

TU DISC



F B I

Date: 12/12/60

Transmit the following in

PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via TELETYPE

URGENT

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SACs NEW YORK AND RICHMOND

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (161-23)

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. BUDED DECEMBER THIRTEEN. RUSH

INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, FOR POSITION NOT KNOWN. HE IS EX SECRETARY OF STATE. SEE WHOS WHO FOR BACKGROUND DATA. ASSIGN IMMEDIATELY, AFFORD CONTINUOUS ATTENTION, SET OUT ALL LEADS BY TELETYPE, ASSIGN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BUDED IS MET WITHOUT FAIL. INVESTIGATION AT WASHINGTON, D. C., REFLECTS APPOINTEES BROTHER EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C., RESIDES ROLLING VALLEY FARM, VIENNA, VIRGINIA. RICHMOND CHECK INDICES.

*Mr. [unclear]*  
*4942*  
*[Signature]*  
*JK*

NEW YORK HANDLE.

3-Bureau  
 1-Teletype Unit  
 1-WFO

JWB:res  
 (5)

TELETYPE

161-49-17

NOT RECORDED  
 3 JAN 18 1961

Approved: [Signature]  
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

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 b7c



62

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>Kansas City</b>	Office of Origin <b>Bureau</b>	Date <b>12/12/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/10/60 - 12/12/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE  <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <b>ORSON F. MYERS, JR.</b>	Typed By: <b>aa</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

*fy/af/af/af*

**REFERENCE:**

WFO teletype to Bureau, New York, Kansas City and Cincinnati, dated 12/9/60

Kansas City teletype to Bureau and WFO, dated 12/10/60

Bureau teletype to Kansas City, dated 12/11/60.

RUC

*11/15/60  
12/9/60  
Donation was p. 2*

**A\***  
**(COVER PAGE)**

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent In Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made:  <b>1-Bureau (AMSD)</b>  <b>1-Kansas City (161-2)</b>		<b>161-47-18</b>	
		<b>NOT RECORDED</b> <b>18 DEC 13 1960</b>	

**SIA**

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## Copy to:

Report of: ORSON F. MYERS, JR.  
Date: 12/12/60

Office: Kansas City

File Number: KC 161-2

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis: JESSE M. DONALDSON, former Postmaster General, acquainted with and worked with DEAN ACHESON when they served on Cabinet. Mr. DONALDSON considers Mr. ACHESON the most capable and highly qualified person for any Government position involving foreign affairs. He described Mr. ACHESON as sober, solemn, sedate, possessing great dignity and a man who would be outstanding in representing this country in diplomatic circles. He considers Mr. ACHESON as entirely loyal to this country, knows of no specific organizations to which he belongs and stated that Mr. and Mrs. ACHESON lead an exemplary life in their moral and personal contacts. Former President HARRY S. TRUMAN considers ACHESON as "the finest man in the United States".

RUC

## DETAILS:

On December 10, 1960, Mr. JESSE M. DONALDSON, Apartment 204, 4712 Roanoke Parkway, Kansas City, Missouri, was interviewed by SA ORSON F. MYERS, JR. Mr. DONALDSON advised that he served in the Post Office Department in Washington, D.C. from 1932 through the Truman Administration and that he served as Postmaster General during the Truman Administration. Prior to serving as Postmaster General, he served as Deputy Postmaster General and in both capacities sat in Cabinet meetings. During this time he became acquainted with then Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON. His association was both on official matters and socially.

KC 161-2

Mr. DONALDSON informed that prior to the time Mr. ACHESON assumed the Cabinet position he practiced law. Mr. ACHESON's law firm represented many United States clients whose business involved dealings in other countries. He said that Mr. ACHESON's practice since leaving Government service has also involved this type of work.

Mr. DONALDSON considers Mr. ACHESON the most able man he knows in foreign affairs. He ranks Mr. ACHESON with CORDELL HULL and GEORGE MARSHALL. He considers him to be outstanding in this respect from the standpoint of training, experience, demeanor and ability, and he recommends Mr. ACHESON highly for any position involving foreign relations. He knows of no living person who would be better qualified. He described Mr. ACHESON as sober, solemn, sedate, possessing great dignity and a man who would be outstanding in representing this country in diplomatic circles. He observed that Mr. ACHESON in social contacts possesses a most pleasant sense of humor, is cordial and personable. He said that Mr. ACHESON can "meet with Kings and Queens and do it most effectively."

Mr. DONALDSON advised that he knows of nothing which would indicate that Mr. ACHESON possesses any beliefs contrary to the best interests of this country and believes that Mr. ACHESON's beliefs, personal philosophy, and attitudes are based on the highest loyalty to this country. He knows of no specific organizations to which Mr. ACHESON belongs other than perhaps groups related to his legal profession or connected with Harvard University where he attended school, none of which, in Mr. DONALDSON's opinion, bear significantly on matters of loyalty to this country. He knows of no question which could be raised in this respect concerning legal clients of Mr. ACHESON.

Mr. DONALDSON said that there is no question but what Mr. ACHESON and his wife lead an exemplary life morally and in their personal conduct. He said that Mrs. ACHESON is an avid painter and that Mr. ACHESON has for a hobby making

KC 161-2

furniture. The only member of their immediate family with whom Mr. DONALDSON is acquainted is Mr. ACHESON's brother whom Mr. DONALDSON recalls as being a Professor of Law at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Mr. DONALDSON did not know Mr. ACHESON's brother but very casually. However, he has never heard anything of a derogatory nature concerning him.

In conclusion, Mr. DONALDSON said that if he were President of this country and had to select a person to represent the United States in foreign matters, he could not think of anyone more highly qualified, and able than Mr. ACHESON.

On December 12, 1960, Former President of the United States, The Honorable HARRY S. TRUMAN was interviewed by Special Agent in Charge W. MARK FELT at the Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Mr. TRUMAN said that Mr. DEAN ACHESON is "the finest man in the United States" and could say nothing further which would be more descriptive of Mr. ACHESON.

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Reporting Office <b>CHICAGO</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/12/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/9 - 10/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	Typed By: <b>pat</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

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b7c

*Synopsis:*

**REFERENCE:** Bureau teletype to Washington Field dated 12/8/60.

- RUC -

Approved 	Special Agent In Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made: 1 - Bureau (AM) 1 - Chicago (161-17)		161-47-19	
		DEC 14 1960	

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COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:  
Date:SA [REDACTED]  
12/12/60

Office: Chicago

b6  
b7c

Field Office File No.: 161-17

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis: American Bar Association (ABA) membership files located at Chicago, Illinois, revealed DEAN G. ACHESON, date and place of birth not listed, became a member of the ABA on June 16, 1932, and is at present a member in good standing.

- RUC -

## DETAILS:

Affiliation

On December 9, 1960, Mrs. JOSEPHINE REED, Clerk, American Bar Association (ABA), 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, advised a review of ABA membership files revealed DEAN G. ACHESON, date and place of birth not listed, became an ABA member on June 16, 1932, and is at present a member in good standing. ABA membership files revealed ACHESON claims to have been admitted to legal practice before the District of Columbia Bar during 1921, specific date not recorded.

Mrs. REED advised ABA membership and grievance files do not contain any unfavorable information concerning ACHESON.

- 1\* -

G

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office OKLAHOMA CITY	Office of Origin BUREAU	Date 12/12/60	Investigative Period 12/10/60
TITLE OF CASE  DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON		Report made by SA [REDACTED]	Typed By: eu
		CHARACTER OF CASE  SPECIAL INQUIRY	

b6  
b7c

- REFERENCE -

Washington Field teletype to Director and Oklahoma City dated 12/9/60.

- RUC -

*We'll use p. 2*

*A*

*w*

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent In Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made:  1-Bureau (AM) 1-Oklahoma City (161-2)		161-47-20	
		NOT RECORDED	
		10 DEC 18 1960	
		<i>[Signature]</i>	

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COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:

SA [REDACTED]

Office: OKLAHOMA CITY

Date:

December 12, 1960

Field Office File No.: OC 161-2

Bureau File No.:

Title:

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character:

SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis:

JAMES E. WEBB, former Undersecretary of State, 1949 to 1952 under DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON regards ACHESON as honest, reliable, trustworthy, sincere, brilliant person of sound judgement and unquestioned loyalty and recommends for any trusted position.

- RUC -

Details:

JAMES E. WEBB, former Undersecretary of State, was interviewed at Lake Texhoma Lodge, Kingston, Oklahoma, December 10, 1960. Mr. WEBB stated that he has known DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON former Secretary of State since 1946. Mr. WEBB stated that he was Undersecretary of State under Mr. ACHESON from 1949 to January, 1952, and during this time was closely associated with Mr. ACHESON.

Mr. WEBB stated Mr. ACHESON was a family man who had several grandchildren and who was highly regarded in Washington, D.C.

Mr. WEBB further stated his association with Mr. ACHESON was very good, that Mr. ACHESON was a considerate person of excellent reputation and was a sober, honest, reliable, trustworthy person, who was sincere in all of his undertakings.



OC 161-2

Mr. WEBB said Mr. ACHESON's allegiance to the United States and the constitution was unquestionable and that he was a very brilliant man in every way.

Mr. WEBB stated Mr. ACHESON was very prominent in Washington and he associated with publicly known people in Washington. He knew nothing of a derogatory nature regarding Mr. ACHESON; however, he stated Mr. ACHESON at the time he was Secretary of State was a controversial figure who was accused by the late former Senator McCarthy of "selling the United States to the Communists." Mr. WEBB stated that he saw no basis for this accusation against Mr. ACHESON. Mr. WEBB stated further Mr. ACHESON was a person of sound judgement and there is no question as to his loyalty and associations. He said he would recommend Mr. ACHESON for any trusted position.

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>NEW HAVEN</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/12/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/9-12/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE  <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <b>JOHN J. WARD</b>	Typed By: <b>md</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

**Synopsis:**

**REFERENCE:** Bureau teletype, 12/8/60

- RUC -

ADMINISTRATIVE

The records of the Alumni Records Office at Yale University were reviewed for information as to the appointee's immediate relatives. These records indicate that ACHESON had one sister, MARGARET ACHESON PLATT, who in 1934 was said to be living in New Canaan, Connecticut. Investigation at New Canaan in this connection was conducted by SA JOSEPH F. MCCORRY on December 9, 1960. Mrs. MALCOLM MCGHIE, Brushy Ridge Road, New Canaan, advised that MARGARET ACHESON PLATT (Mrs. GARDINER PLATT) resided in New Canaan in 1934 for one year. This source stated that MARGARET ACHESON PLATT died in August 1960, at Washington, D. C.

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made:  ① - Bureau 1 - New Haven (161-8)		<b>161-47-21</b>	
		NOT RECORDED 23 DEC 14 1960	

NH 161-8

The Yale Alumni records also disclose that the appointee has one brother, EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, Jr. "Who's Who in America" (1960) reflects that this person is a resident of Vienna, Virginia.

A review of the above records indicates no immediate relatives living in Connecticut.

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COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA JOHN J. WARD Office: NEW HAVEN, CONN.  
Date: 12/12/60  
Field Office File No.: NH 161-8 Bureau File No.:  
Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis: Appointee member of class of 1915, Yale College, and a Fellow of Corporation, Yale University, since 1936. A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, President, Yale, described Mr. ACHESON as a man of towering ability who will be regarded by history as the one who rallied the West against communism and a man on the same plane as Churchill and De Gaulle. Described appointee as an exacting critic of everything in life and one whose loyalty to the United States is without condition or reservation. REUBEN HOLDEN, Secretary of the University, Yale, stated appointee is a man of the highest character, intelligence and wisdom. WILMARTH S. LEWIS, Fellow of Corporation, Yale, reiterated remarks made on occasion of appointee's receiving Woodrow Wilson award in October 1953, wherein LEWIS described appointee as a figure "who will be studied in classrooms and be the subject of papers read in learned societies". No effective credit records available, New Haven; no arrest record, New Haven.

- RUC -

Details: At New Haven, Connecticut

Mrs. OLIVIA W. ROSS, Alumni Records Office, Yale University, made available on December 9, 1960, information from the files of that office concerning DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, a

graduate of Yale College, class of 1915, and a Fellow of the Yale Corporation from 1936 to the present. This information reflects that the appointee was born April 11, 1893, at Middletown, Connecticut, the son of EDWARD CAMPION and ELEANOR GOODERHAM ACHESON, both of whom are now deceased. The Right Reverend EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut, died in January 1934, and an obituary which appears in the above records reflects that his surviving children were the appointee, a son, EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, Jr., and a daughter, Mrs. MARGARET ACHESON PLATT. The Alumni records indicate that the appointee has been residing in Washington, D. C., since 1919.

A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, President, Yale University, stated on December 9, 1960, that DEAN ACHESON is one of the ablest and most admirable people it has been his pleasure to know during his lifetime. Mr. ACHESON, President GRISWOLD added, is at times a greatly misunderstood person and this may be ACHESON's fault. President GRISWOLD explained that the appointee is not a man who endures fools cheerfully. He is also a man of intellectual fastidiousness and is afraid of nothing or any person. He is apt to say what he thinks, a quality which has not endeared him to some of his targets.

President GRISWOLD described ACHESON as a man of towering ability, and when the proper perspective is achieved, he will be regarded as the one who rallied the West against communism and without whose help communism might have overrun Western Europe. He described the appointee as a man on the same plane as Churchill and De Gaulle, and one who can represent the United States on the same level with the great Western statesmen. President GRISWOLD remarked that Mr. ACHESON is a supremely competent advocate, a master of the lawyer's skills and techniques. He has devoted himself indefatigably to Yale affairs and is held in highest esteem by his associates on the Yale Corporation, many of whom, President GRISWOLD pointed out, are of opposing political persuasion.

President GRISWOLD stated that Mr. ACHESON is an exacting critic of everything in life and his loyalty to the United States is without condition or reservation.

REUBEN A. HOLDEN, Secretary of the University, Yale University, advised on December 9, 1960, that DEAN ACHESON is, in his opinion, as able a man as can be found and a man who is possessed

NH 161-8

of the highest character, intelligence, and wisdom. Mr. HOLDEN remarked that the appointee has been exceedingly loyal to Yale, has given very freely of his time in the interests of the University, and is held in the highest esteem by the officers of the University.

WILMARTH S. LEWIS, a Fellow of the Yale Corporation, advised on December 9, 1960, that he is an old and good friend of DEAN ACHESON. LEWIS made reference to the Woodrow Wilson Award for distinguished service, which was given to DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON in October 1953. LEWIS said that he (LEWIS) had made an address on the occasion of the presentation of this Award and his remarks are available in a pamphlet printed by the Overbrook Press commemorating the occasion. Mr. LEWIS stated that he reiterates his remarks made at that time.

A review of the foregoing document, available at the Yale University Library, reflects the remarks of Mr. LEWIS, who stated in part:

"It is hard for us to think of our friends in the majestic terms of history - figures who will be studied in classrooms and be the subjects of papers read in learned societies. Yet, this will be the fate of the friend whom we are honoring tonight."

#### Credit and Arrest Records

No effective credit records are available in New Haven dating back to 1915.

IC [redacted] New Haven Police Department, advised on December 12, 1960, that complete records are not available concerning arrests dating back to 1915, but a check of such records as are available revealed no record identifiable with the appointee.

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>SAVANNAH</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/12/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/10/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	Typed By: <b>amt</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

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Synopsis:

REFERENCE: Washington Field teletype to Bureau, 12/9/60.

- R U C -

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made:		161-47-22	
1 - Bureau (AM)		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> NOT RECORDED  DEC 13 1960 </div>	
1 - Savannah (161-3)			

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(Cover Page)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## Copy to:

Report of:

SA 

Office: Savannah, Georgia

Date:

12/12/60

File Number:

Savannah 161-3

Title:

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character:

SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis:

JAMES F. BYRNES, former Secretary of State, now residing at Columbia, S. C., highly recommended DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON for position of trust and confidence with U. S. Government.

- R U C -



SV. 161-3

DETAILS: AT COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA:

ACQUAINTANCES

JAMES F. BYRNES, 12 Heathwood Circle, Columbia, South Carolina, advised on December 10, 1960, that he has known DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON for many years. Mr. BYRNES advised that he served as Secretary of State from July 1945, until January 1947, and Mr. ACHESON served during this period as Undersecretary of State. Mr. BYRNES stated that he also knew Mr. ACHESON prior to the above period when Mr. ACHESON served as Assistant Secretary of State.

Mr. BYRNES advised that he was closely associated with Mr. ACHESON both in the State Department and on a social basis until he, Mr. BYRNES, returned to his home in South Carolina in 1948. In recent years Mr. BYRNES has had few contacts with Mr. ACHESON. Mr. BYRNES advised he has made several trips to Washington to attend gridiron dinners and other functions since his return to South Carolina, and has met Mr. ACHESON several times on the occasion of these visits.

Mr. BYRNES highly recommended Mr. ACHESON for a position of trust and confidence with the United States Government. He described Mr. ACHESON as a very high type person of excellent character, reputation and associates, and stated that his loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

*B*

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>DENVER</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/12/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/9-12/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE  <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	Typed By: <b>mf</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

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~~XXXXXXXX~~

REFERENCE: Washington Field teletype to Bureau, New York, Savannah, Boston, Norfolk and Denver dated 12/9/60

- RUC -

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below		
Copies made:  <b>1 - Bureau (AM) 1 - Denver (161-6)</b>		<b>161-47-23</b>		
		<b>NOT RECORDED 15 DEC 14 1960</b>		

- A\* -  
Cover Page

*[Handwritten signature]*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA [REDACTED]  
Date: December 12, 1960

Office: DENVER

Field Office File No.: 161-6

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis:

CHARLES F. BRANNAN, General Counsel, National Farmers Union, and former U. S. Secretary of Agriculture during time ACHESON was Secretary of State, recommends ACHESON highly as to ability, character, associates, loyalty, and for any top position in U. S. Government.

- RUC -

Details:

On December 12, 1960, CHARLES F. BRANNAN, General Counsel, National Farmers Union, Denver, Colorado, and former U. S. Secretary of Agriculture from 1948 until 1953, advised he has known DEAN ACHESON since about 1946, when ACHESON was the head of a wartime Government agency in Washington, D. C. Mr. BRANNAN advised he became closely associated with DEAN ACHESON when Mr. BRANNAN became the U. S. Secretary of Agriculture and ACHESON subsequently became the U. S. Secretary of State. Mr. BRANNAN advised this relationship existed until about 1953 and he has seen DEAN ACHESON only a few times at political gatherings since.

DN 161-6

Mr. BRANNAN advised he regards DEAN ACHESON as a person of tremendous ability, completely loyal to the Government of the United States, and one who associates with outstanding Americans. He stated that during the time DEAN ACHESON was Secretary of State it was his opinion that he was the most discerning of anyone ever holding that office and, under ACHESON, our foreign policy was very effective in strengthening the hands of the free people.

He stated that Mr. ACHESON is a very pleasant, gracious, thorough gentleman, and has a delightful sense of humor but never loses sight of the serious side of his responsibilities. He stated that ACHESON proved to be a very good administrator and has the capacity to select excellent men for positions under his supervision and control.

He stated he would recommend DEAN ACHESON, without reservation, for any position which would be offered to him in the Government of the United States.

F B I

Date: 12/12/60

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, WFO (161-23)  
DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPI

Investigation at WDC reflects following relatives of ACHESON:


Wife: ALICE STANLEY ACHESON, resides with appointee.

Mother: ELEANOR GOODERHAM ACHESON, deceased. NR

Father: EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, deceased.

Sister: Mrs. MARGARET (MARGOT) ACHESON PLATT, deceased.

Brother: EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, Professor of Economics, George Washington University, resides Rolling Valley Farm, Vienna, Va.



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3-Bureau  
1-WFO

JWB:res  
(4)

AIRTEL

161-47-24  
NOT RECORDED  
25 DEC 12 1960

Approved: **52 FEB 7 1961** *[Signature]*  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

WFO 161-23

For info of Bureau, the New York and Richmond Offices  
have been advised by separate teletype to handle investigation  
re  respectively.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 12 1950

TELETYPE

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

URGENT 12-12-50 3-05 PM

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM, SAC, BOSTON /161-16/

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPECIAL INQUIRY. RE WFO TELETYPE

~~TELETYPE DATED DECEMBER~~ NINE LAST AND REREP SA GEORGE S. WALLACE,

BOSTON, DATED DECEMBER TEN LAST. INQUIRY AT AMHERST COLLEGE

ON THIS DATE REVEALED THAT WILLARD L. THORP IS STRANDED SOMEWHERE

IN NEW YORK CITY AREA DUE TO SNOW STORM, AND ATTEMPTING

TO RETURN TO AMHERST, MASS. AS SOON AS WEATHER CONDITIONS

PERMIT. WILL FOLLOW CLOSELY AND INTERVIEW THROP AS SOON

AS HE IS AVAILABLE.

~~COR LINE 2 FIRST TWO WDS SHOULD BE "DATED DECEMBER"~~

END

50 FEB 1 1951  
507 PM 1951

3-07 PM OK FBI WA MSL

50 FEB 1 1951  
507 PM 1951

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 12 1960

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*mm*  
URGENT 12-12-60 2-40 PM GSL

TO DIRECTOR FBI

FROM SAC RICHMOND 1P

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON, SPI. NO RECORD IN RICHMOND INDICES

RE APPOINTEE OR BROTHER, EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON. RUC.

END AND ACK PLS

2-41 PM OK FBI WA JDS

TU DISC

*Mr. D. A. Young*  
1242

161-477-26

DEC 13 1960

*[Handwritten signature]*



# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*L*

Reporting Office NEW YORK	Office of Origin BUREAU	Date 12/13/60	Investigative Period 12/9 - 12/13/60
TITLE OF CASE  DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON		Report made by JOSEPH P. FINNEGAN	Typed By: sao
		CHARACTER OF CASE  SPECIAL INQUIRY	

~~SYNOPSIS~~  
XXXXXX

REFERENCE:

WFO teletypes, 12/9/60.

- RUC -

ADMINISTRATIVE:

JOHN T. BRAZZEL, Superintendent, 108 East 82nd St., NY, advised SA [redacted] that PHILIP C. JESSUP no longer resides at this address and has moved to the Hague, Netherlands, in connection with his appointment to the World Court.

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DEAN RUSK was not interviewed in accordance with instructions in Bureau letter to NY, 2/21/58.

Senator GEORGE AIKEN departed New York for Washington, D.C., 12/9/60.

*[Handwritten initials]*

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below		
Copies made:		161-47-27		
1-Bureau 1-New York (161-22)		NOT RECORDED 18 DEC 14 1960		

*hansen - p. 1 me  
Lowe - list - p. 2*

*[Handwritten initials]*  
**SEARCHED**

NY 161-22

New York Office files reflect case entitled "DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON - SM-C", Bufile 101-3396, NYfile 100-121548, WFO Origin.

NY 100-17808 contains photostats of material in files of Institute of Pacific Relations, wherein names of individuals prominent in government affairs are mentioned as possible guests or speakers for forthcoming affairs. DEAN ACHESON's name is among those listed, but there is no indication of active participation.

NY 100-7518-1067 reflects DEAN ACHESON addressed rally at Madison Square Garden, New York, 11/14/45, sponsored by the National Council of American - Soviet Friendship, and spoke of cooperation between the nations for peaceful ends. It was not deemed appropriate to include this information in the body of this report.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## Copy to:

Report of: JOSEPH P. FINNEGAN  
Date: 12/13/60

Office: New York, New York

Field Office File No.: New York (161-22)

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis: HERBERT C. HOOVER, former President, and  
ROBERT A. LOVETT, former Secretary of Defense,  
recommend [redacted] No credit or arrest record for  
[redacted] No pertinent information  
"New York Times".

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- RUC -

## DETAILS:

Associates

On December 13, 1960, the Honorable Herbert C. Hoover, ex-President of the United States, Waldorf Towers Hotel, 50th Street and Park Avenue, New York, New York, advised SA VINCENT F. CLANCY that DEAN G. ACHESON, former Secretary of State, served as the Democratic representative for the Commission on Organizing Executive Branch of the Government, from about 1947 to 1950. Mr. Hoover explained that while he did not fully subscribe to Mr. ACHESON's political beliefs, he considered him to be a brilliant and honest individual, of excellent character and reputation, whose associates he considered to be above reproach.

Mr. Hoover added that there is no question in his mind concerning Mr. ACHESON's loyalty to the United States.

NY 161-22

ROBERT A. LOVETT, Locust Valley, Long Island, New York, former Secretary of Defense, advised SA JOSEPH E. FLAHERTY on December 9, 1960, that he has known DEAN ACHESON since 1915, and they both worked in government offices in Washington, D.C. beginning in the early 1940's. He stated that DEAN ACHESON is a man of fine character and conduct, whose father was a minister and Mr. ACHESON is a religious person who frequently quotes the Bible in his conversations. He recommended the appointee for a position of high responsibility commensurate with his extensive knowledge of government and foreign affairs. He pointed out that Mr. ACHESON held the high office of Secretary of State under President TRUMAN. His fitness, ability, reliability, loyalty and associates are above reproach, and Mr. LOVETT endorsed him on the basis of close personal friendship without reservation.

He pointed out that Mr. ACHESON had been criticized for not having condemned ALGER HISS prior to HISS' conviction; however, Mr. LOVETT was of the opinion that this did not in any way compromise Mr. ACHESON's loyalty to the United States or his position as an appointee to a position of high trust and responsibility.

Credit

[redacted] Clerk, Credit Bureau of Greater New York, advised IC [redacted] on December 13, 1960, that her files contained no record identifiable with [redacted] or [redacted].

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Arrest

On December 13, 1960, SA DAVID G. JENKINS caused the records of the New York City Police Department to be checked by Captain [redacted], Bureau of Criminal Identification; Lieutenant [redacted] Information Unit; Lieutenant [redacted] Old Records Room (all of the above of the New York City Police Department); and Mr. [redacted] Fingerprint Bureau, Magistrate's Court, City of New York. No record identifiable with the appointee's [redacted] was located.

NY 161-22

Miscellaneous

[redacted] doorman, [redacted]  
New York, advised SA ROBERT DILLON JONES on December 12, 1960, that  
[redacted] of former Secretary of State  
DEAN ACHESON, has resided in [redacted]  
[redacted] The apartment has been temporarily sublet and  
occupied for the past four months, but the [redacted] plan to  
return to it.

[redacted] Information Bureau, "New York Times",  
New York, New York, made available information in his files which  
was reviewed by SA ALBERT FRANZ on December 13, 1960, No  
information pertinent to this inquiry was located.

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>BOSTON</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/14/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/10/60 - 12/14/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE <b>DEAN WOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <b>SA GEORGE S. WALLACE</b>	Typed By: <b>bmh</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

~~XXXXXXXX~~

### REFERENCE

Report of SA GEORGE S. WALLACE dated December 10, 1960 at Boston.

-RUC-

Approved	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made	① - Bureau 1 - Boston (161-16)	161-47-28	
		NOT RECORDED	
		4 DEC 19 1960	



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No. 161-23

Washington, D. C.  
December 14, 1960

Title            DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character        SPECIAL INQUIRY

Reference        Report of Special Agent [redacted]  
                  [redacted] dated and captioned as  
                  above at Washington, D.C.

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All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office <b>WASHINGTON FIELD</b>	Office of Origin <b>BUREAU</b>	Date <b>12/14/60</b>	Investigative Period <b>12/8-13/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE <b>DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON</b>		Report made by <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	Typed By: <b>cak</b>
		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPI</b>	

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~~SYNOPSIS~~

### REFERENCES

Bureau teletype 12/8/60.  
 St. Louis teletype 12/9/60.  
 Kansas City teletype 12/10/60.

-P-

### ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

HCUA files were not checked because of their unavailability at this time.

WFO file 62-63558, report of SA GEORGE E. DAVIS dated 7/14/50 at Washington, D. C. entitled "DEAN ACHESON, FELIX FRANKFURTER; Information concerning". This report reflects that one ROBERT CAMERON advised on 6/30/50, that circumstantial evidence leads him to believe that ACHESON and FRANKFURTER are the No. 1 and No. 2 communists, respectively, in the U.S.

Approved <i>MWJ/mw</i>	Special Agent In Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
Copies made: <b>1-Bureau</b> <b>1-Washington Field (161-23)</b>		<b>161-47-29</b>	<b>REC-58</b>
		<b>NOT RECORDED</b> <b>3 JAN 18 1961</b>	



WFO 161-23

CAMERON admitted he possessed no admissable proof supporting his belief. Inasmuch as the information furnished by CAMERON was vague, it was not deemed pertinent to reinterview him during this investigation inasmuch as all his comments had been previously obtained.

Serial 12 of the above WFO file (62-6355) reflects a letter from the Baltimore Office dated 3/1/51, reflecting an interview on 2/27/51 of Brigadier General EUGENE S. BIBB, U.S. Army (Retired) by Agents of the Baltimore Office. This interview was conducted regarding a speech by BIBB before a Lions Club meeting in Baltimore, Maryland, on 2/20/51, in which BIBB stated he confronted ACHESON personally and accused him of being America's No. 1 communist. BIBB further reported in the above speech that he could prove his charge. During the interview BIBB was questioned specifically regarding any documentary evidence he possessed relative to the accusations he made against ACHESON. He stated he had no documentary material of any kind and material used in his talks was obtained solely from publications, pamphlets and other writings of public record. It was not deemed pertinent to set forth a lead to reinterview BIBB during this investigation.

WFO file 100-30850-4 is a report by SA JAMES J. MIDDLETON dated 8/23/54 at Philadelphia entitled "DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON: SM-C." This report reflects that ~~DE~~ T-1 (identified as [redacted]) claimed to have attended a CP meeting during 1940 at which a letter discussing ACHESON was exhibited and the comment made, "Some day this man will be working for us 100 per cent." The above report reflects that the informant was reinterviewed on 8/9/54 by the Philadelphia Office and he stated he did not carefully digest the letter but merely glanced at it. It was not deemed pertinent to set forth a lead to reinterview [redacted] during this investigation as the report indicated he could not recall clearly the details regarding the information he had furnished.

WFO indices further reflect that ACHESON in the past has been in contact with various officials of various Governments including the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. These contacts were apparently in connection with his official capacity as Secretary of State and are not being reported.

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WFO 161-23

File 100-1106-6, page 48 is the report of SA T. W. DAWSEY dated 3/8/41 at WDC entitled, "League of Women Shoppers, Washington, D. C." IS-C." According to this report a list of active members of the Washington League of Women Shoppers, as of 1/1/41, was obtained through a highly confidential source. Included in this list was the name Mrs. DEAN ACHESON, 2805 P Street, N.W., telephone number MI 4139. This information is not being reported in the details of this report as there is no original source of same as the bulky exhibits have been destroyed and, of course, the anonymous source is not available for recontact and had no personal knowledge of Mrs. DEAN ACHESON.

The Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, 3/29/44, pages 121 and 181 cite the League of Women Shoppers as "An organization which this committee found to be a communist-controlled front by indisputable documentary evidence obtained from the files of the communist party in Philadelphia."

WFO file 100-2104-2 is the report of SA T. W. DAWSEY dated 5/26/41 entitled "Capital City Forum, IS-C". This report reflects a "highly confidential source" determined that during 1941 there was maintained an index under the label of Capital City Forum at the Headquarters of the Socialist Party in the District of Columbia. Contained in this index, among other names, appeared the following:

ACHESON, Mr. and Mrs. DEAN  
2805 P Street, N.W.  
Mich. 4139.

According to the informant, immediately following the above names were the letters "KOW" which informant indicated meant "Keep Our of War Committee". This information is not being reported in the details of this report as there is no original source of same as the bulky exhibits have been destroyed and since the anonymous source is not available for recontact.

Original information regarding ACHESON's luncheon with Soviet Ambassador MENSHIKOV on 3/28/58 (which information appears in the ~~indices~~<sup>of 10/1/58</sup> of this report) appears in WFO files 105-24305-103 and 104, and in WFO file 100-16591 Sub B 6696.

-C-

COVER PAGE

WFO 161-23

During this investigation it was determined that former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court LOUIS D. BRANDEIS for whom appointee worked during 1919-21 and Mr. MAURICE J. TOBIN, former Secretary of Labor with whom appointee was associated when he was Secretary of State, are both deceased.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

File Where Located

WF T-1 is  
an anonymous source

WF T-2 is



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Careful consideration has been given to the sources concealed and T symbols were utilized in the report only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will upon receipt report the results of the following leads still outstanding.

- a. Foreign Agents Registration file at Department of Justice.
- b. CSC.
- c. CIA re appointee and wife.
- d. Office of Passport, Department of State.
- e. Secret Service.

-D\*-

COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: [REDACTED]

Office: Washington, D. C.

Date: 12/14/60

Field Office File No.: 161-23

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

## Synopsis:

Professional associates, including law partners, former fellow cabinet members and co-workers all recommend ACHESON favorably. Identities of relatives set forth and addresses verified by associate. Credit Bureau negative re appointee, wife, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reflects nothing additional for brother and [REDACTED] reflects satisfactory credit rating for [REDACTED]

Local PDs reflect one arrest for colliding for EDWARD ACHESON and one arrest for no county tags for EDWARD C. ACHESON. No arrest located for appointee or other relatives. Department of State security file reflects requirements of EO 9835 compiled with regarding appointee during 1950. Navy officer service record verified. ONI reflects nothing additional. Appointee's name on Lawyer's Register. Committee on Admissions and Grievances reflects no grievances. Appointee is member of D.C. Bar Association. Federal Bar Association negative. Appointee admitted to practice before Supreme Court. Mrs. DEAN ACHESON's name appeared on index card maintained by Washington Committee for Democratic Action. Appointee observed entering Soviet Embassy during 1958.

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WFO 161-23

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES

The following partners in the law firm of Covington and Burling, Union Trust Building were interviewed on December 9, 1960 by SA

Mr. HOWARD C. WESTWOOD advised he has known the appointee both professionally and socially as a member of that law firm since 1934. He advised he is very well acquainted with the appointee and his family and he described the appointee as a person of excellent character, associates, reputation and loyalty. He stated that the appointee is a brilliant person who has devoted much of his life to his Government. He stated that he has never known anyone who is better qualified for a position of trust and confidence and he highly recommended him for such a position.

Mr. JOHN LORD O'BRIAN advised he has known the appointee as a member of that law firm since 1919. He stated that he is also well acquainted with the appointee and his family on a social basis and he stated the entire family enjoys an excellent reputation and he described the appointee as intelligent, discreet, dependable and reliable. He commented favorably regarding the appointee's character, associates, reputation and loyalty and recommended him without reservation for a position of trust and confidence.

Mr. GERHARD A. GESELL advised he has known the appointee both professionally and socially as a member of that law firm since 1938. He advised he also knows the appointee's family well. He stated that he could only describe the appointee in the "highest of terms" and added he knows of nothing unfavorable regarding him. He commented favorably regarding the appointee's character, associates, reputation and loyalty and highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.

Mr. W. GRAHAM CLAYTOR, JR., advised he has known the appointee since 1937 as a member of that law firm. He added he has also known the appointee and his family on a social basis since then. He described the appointee as an industrious and dependable attorney who is most highly <sup>RECORDED</sup> recommended by his associates. He stated that the appointee is of excellent

excellent character, associates, reputation and loyalty and he highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.

Mr. JOHN G. <sup>LAYLIN</sup>~~LAYLIN~~ advised he has known the appointee and his family both socially and professionally since 1933. He stated that when the appointee was Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933, he, LEYLIN, was his Special Assistant. He described the appointee as a "fine person in every respect" and he commented favorably regarding the appointee's character, associates, reputation and loyalty. He highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.

On December 9, 1960, Mr. OSCAR L. CHAPMAN, Attorney, 923 Pennsylvania Building, 13th and Pennsylvania Avenue, and former Secretary of the Interior, advised SA [redacted] he first met the appointee during the early 1930's when ACHESON was appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury Department. He continued he came to know the appointee better when he was Under Secretary of the Department of State and they became good friends when they were in the Cabinet together. He continued that he saw a great deal of the appointee when he was Secretary of State and they have known each other socially. He stated the appointee has been practicing law since he left the Government in 1953 and he has been doing some lecturing and traveling. He said he has maintained contact with the appointee and considers him a normal, stable, and extremely capable person. He related he did not believe he knew anyone with a higher degree of integrity or honesty. He continued the appointee has a great sense of responsibility toward the Government and to the people. He remarked that some people might disagree with the appointee's policy in the past but there has never been any doubt or disagreement as to his loyalty or integrity. He commented the appointee is a good family man of moderate habits and he is well known by many people. He said the appointee has been associated with the top echelon of the Government and his closest intimate is Supreme Court Justice FELIX FRANKFURTER. He added the appointee's views and beliefs on foreign policy are respected and as he is an intelligent and conscientious person, he is sure the appointee will be of great service to the new administration, the Government and the American people.

On December 9, 1960, Mr. J. HOWARD McGRATH, Attorney, and former Attorney General of the United States, advised SA JOHN F. SULLIVAN that he had known the appointee since 1947 when

he was a senator and the appointee was Under Secretary of State. He advised he was more closely associated with the appointee when both were members of the Cabinet. He advised he lists the appointee as among the finest and ablest citizens he has met in or out of Government. He described the appointee as a very learned man and an extremely hard working individual. He advised that the appointee impressed him as a person who thoroughly understood the work he had on hand and at Cabinet meetings his explanations had been precise and thorough. He stated that he has the utmost respect for his ability and capability as an Attorney and as a public servant.

Mr. McGRATH advised that a warm cordiality exists between them and they are very close friends. He commented favorably regarding the appointee's character, associates, reputation and loyalty and highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.

On December 9, 1960, [redacted] Attorney and former assistant to Mr. McGRATH, advised SA SULLIVAN that he has known the appointee on a professional basis since the late 1940's. He commented favorably regarding the appointee's character, associates, reputation and loyalty and highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.

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On December 10, 1960, Mr. JOHN W. SNYDER, Room 423, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., who is former Secretary of the Treasury, advised he has known the appointee since the early 1940's. He stated that he later came to know the appointee on a very close personal basis when they served on the Cabinet together. He described the appointee as most intelligent and a person who is loyal and patriotic. He stated that he holds the appointee in the highest esteem and he commented favorably regarding his character and associates. He unreservedly recommended the appointee for a position of trust and confidence.

On December 9, 1960, [redacted] Executive Secretary, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, advised SA JOSEPH W. SPEICHER that he has known the appointee quite well both socially and professionally since about 1941. [redacted] explained that the appointee first came to the Department of State in 1941 and [redacted] had worked closely with him during the appointee's subsequent period of employment by the Department of State. He mentioned that he considered the appointee to be "one of the outstanding anti-communists of the world" and a loyal and

devoted citizen of the United States. [redacted] reported that he considered appointee's character, reputation and associations to be above question, and he recommended him for a position of trust and confidence with the government. He could furnish no information concerning the appointee's relatives.

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On December 9, 1960, Mr. BENJAMIN GERIG, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State advised SA SPEICHER that he had known the appointee casually in a professional capacity, off and on since about 1942. He mentioned that he had never known the appointee socially, and had not had very close professional contact with him. Mr. GERIG commented, however, that he had always been a great admirer of the appointee, and considered him to have a "first class intellect" and ~~25~~ unimpeachable character and integrity. He stated that he had never had any reason to doubt the appointee's loyalty to the United States, and he attributed the remark which the appointee is reported to have made concerning ALGER HISS ("I won't turn my back on ALGER HISS") not to any sympathy toward any views which HISS might have held, but rather to ACHESON's sense of justice and fair play which caused him to desire to see HISS get a fair trial. Mr. GERIG described the appointee as "The architect of the NATO and the Marshall Plan" and remarked that the appointee had understood the dangers of communism and was a tough, hard negotiator in fighting communist encroachments. He indicated that nothing had come to his attention concerning the appointee which raised any doubts in his mind concerning appointee's suitability for a government position of trust. Mr. GERIG was unable to furnish any information concerning the appointee's relatives.

On December 12, 1960, Mr. PAUL H. NITZE, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1830 19th Street, N.W., advised SA LEE that his father knew the ACHESON family for many years. He stated that as a result he knew the family also and when he was appointed to a position with the Department of State during 1946 he became fairly well acquainted with the appointee. He remarked that from 1950 until 1953 he was on the Policy Planning Staff and had an adjoining office to the appointee. He said during this period he saw the appointee every day and they became great friends. He remarked he has known the appointee and his family socially and still sees the appointee about once a week. He volunteered he knows the appointee as well as any man and pointed out there is no man more devoted to the United



WFO 161-23

States. He remarked that since the appointee left the Government service during 1953 he has been practicing law and giving lectures and writing articles devoted to the international affairs and position of the United States. He said the appointee is a normal, stable, reliable, trustworthy person and there is no doubt concerning his loyalty to the United States. He added he was not aware of any questionable organizational affiliation on the appointee's part and his friends and associates are reputable and loyal persons.

On December 12, 1960, Mr. DAVID K. E. BRUCE, 1411 34th Street, N.W., advised SA [REDACTED], that he has known the appointee for about 30 years and was professionally associated with him in the Department of State as an Under Secretary and in other Governmental positions. He advised he has also known the appointee and his family socially during the entire period of their acquaintance. He stated the appointee is of impeccable character, associates, reputation and loyalty and he has the highest regard for the appointee and his ability. He recommended the appointee for any position of trust and confidence.

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On December 9, 1960, Mr. FRANCIS P. BRASSOR, 4608 Nottingham Drive, Chevy Chase, Maryland, advised SA JOHN MINNO that he has known the appointee on a professional basis since 1947. He explained that he, BRASSOR, was Secretary on the First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government from September, 1947 to June, 1949, and that ACHESON was also a member during its complete period of existence. He described the appointee as a very intelligent and capable individual who was highly respected by the members of the commission for his ability to grasp the meaning of a complicated problem and then to present to the commission the facts in a simple and direct way. He commented favorably regarding the appointee's character, associates, reputation and loyalty and highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.

CLARENCE J. BROWN, United States Representative, Ohio, on December 9, 1960, advised SA PAUL E. ERTZINGER that he has known Mr. ACHESON some 20 years and in 1947 and 1948 served with him on the Old Hoover Commission which he (BROWN) stated he created. He said ACHESON's character, associates, reputation and loyalty are all good so far as he knows and he considers him to be a very brilliant and able man. However, Congressman BROWN explained that he was a Republican and could not agree politically

with ACHESON, whom he described as an avid internationalist and new dealer. He said he did not wish to infer ACHESON was in any way dishonest or disloyal, but he definitely could not agree with his philosophy of Government.

United States Senator GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont, and also Delegate to the United Nations, on December 10, 1960, advised SA ERTZINGER that he has known ACHESON since before he was Secretary of State and also served with him on the first Hoover Commission. He said he has not known him well socially, but has known him well both professionally and politically. He said he has never had any reason to question his character, reputation, associates and loyalty and he has always considered him to be most competent and capable. He said he has always felt ACHESON has been unjustly accused on his handling of foreign affairs and he has at various times stood up for him when he felt he was right. He indicated he always felt ACHESON has had a desire to do a good job and he knows of no reason why he should not be considered for a position of high trust and responsibility.

RELATIVES

Mr. HOWARD C. WESTWOOD, partner in the law firm of Covington and Burling also advised that he is well acquainted with all of the appointee's immediate family and stated he could vouch for the reputation of each. He identified the appointee's relatives as follows:

Wife, ALICE STANLEY ACHESON, residing with appointee.

Mother, ELEANOR GOODERHAM ACHESON, deceased.

Father, EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON, deceased.

Sister, Mrs. MARGARET (MARGOT) ACHESON PLATT, deceased.



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WFO 161-23

[REDACTED]

Mr. WESTWOOD added that he could personally verify that the appointee's relatives reside at the respective addresses as furnished above.

CREDIT AND POLICE AGENCIES

The files of the Credit Bureau, Inc. were caused to be searched on December 9, 1960, by ICs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and no record was located for the appointee, his wife or his [REDACTED]. These files reflected nothing additional for the appointee's brother EDWARD and reflected a satisfactory credit rating for his [REDACTED] and his [REDACTED].

The files of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., were searched on December 9, 1960, by IC [REDACTED] and reflected that [REDACTED] whose address is listed as [REDACTED] was arrested on October 22, 1957, for colliding. He elected to forfeit \$100. These files reflected no additional information regarding this arrest. These files failed to reflect a record for the appointee or his other above-mentioned relatives; at all times an indefinite number of unidentified records are out of file and not available for review.

The files of the United States Park Police were caused to be searched on December 8, 1960, by IC [REDACTED] and no record was located for the appointee or the above-mentioned relatives.

The files of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department were caused to be searched on December 12, 1960, by SE [REDACTED] and reflected that EDWARD C. ACHESON born September 15, 1902, Connecticut, who resides at Route #1 Vienna, Virginia, was fined \$5 and costs on April 29, 1957, for having no county tags.

The files of the Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department were caused to be searched on December 13, 1960, by SE [REDACTED] and no record was located for the appointee or his wife or brother.

MISCELLANEOUS

The appointee's file as maintained by the Office of Security, Department of State and reviewed on December 9, 1960, by SA [redacted] disclosed a notation to the effect that as of May 15, 1950, the requirements of Executive Order 9835 had been complied with concerning the appointee in connection with his position as Secretary of State. This file further reflected the appointee separated from the Department of State as Secretary of State on January 19, 1953, by resignation. This file reflected no additional pertinent information.

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On December 9, 1960, SE [redacted] reviewed the appointee's Navy Officer service record which indicated he was born on April 11, 1893, Middletown, Connecticut. He enrolled in the United States Naval Reserve Force (USNRF) for a period of four years on July 25, 1918, Navy Serial No. 39081 and was given the <sup>Professional</sup> rank of Ensign in the Naval Auxiliary Reserve. He entered on active duty on the same date and was released from active duty under honorable conditions on December 31, 1918, as an Ensign, USNRF; He was honorably discharged on September 30, 1921, as an Ensign, USNRF. His efficiency ratings were favorable and the file contained no additional pertinent information.

The files of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy were caused to be searched on December 9, 1960, and reflected no additional pertinent information regarding the appointee. (Files reviewed by IC [redacted]).

On December 9, 1960, Mrs. MARIE LEAP, Deputy Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Columbia advised SA [redacted], that the appointee's name was admitted to the Lawyer's Register on October 4, 1921.

On December 9, 1960, Mr. RALPH A. CURTIN, Secretary, Committee on Admissions and Grievances, advised SA NORTON that no files are maintained on persons admitted prior to 1926. He advised that no grievances have been reported regarding the appointee.

On December 9, 1960, Miss ELLEN YOUNG, Secretary to the Executive Director of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, advised SA HOWARD G. J. FISHER that appointee has been a member in good standing since May 1, 1933.

WFO 161-23  
JWB:pam

On December 9, 1960, Miss BETTY BAKER, Executive Secretary of the Federal Bar Association, 1737 H Street, N.W., advised SA FISHER that their files contained no record for the appointee.

On December 9, 1960, Miss AMELIA BECK, Assistant Clerk, Office of the Clerk, United States Supreme Court, advised SA CONRAD L. TRAHERN that she has only an index card reflecting the appointee was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court on November 18, 1924. She stated the file reflected no additional pertinent information.

NAME  
APPENDIX During late 1940, WF T-1 advised that a group of 3"x5" index cards was maintained at that time by the Washington Committee for Democratic Action. One of these cards bore the name and address of "Mrs. DEAN ACHESON, 2805 P Street, N.W." WASHINGTON D.C.

This informant, who has no personal knowledge of the above person, was not available for recontact during this investigation. ALICE STANLEY ACHESON

The Washington Committee for Democratic Action has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

WF T-2 advised on March 20, 1958, that one Mr. ACHESON had been invited to have lunch with Soviet Ambassador MIKHAIL A. MENSHIKOV at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., at 1:00 on March 28, 1958.

This informant, who has no personal knowledge of Mr. ACHESON, was not available for recontact during this investigation.

On March 28, 1958, SAs [redacted] and ALTON D. WILSON of the FBI observed former United States Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON enter the Soviet Embassy at 1:05 p.m. and depart the Soviet Embassy at 3:33 p.m.

b6  
b7c

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA GEORGE S. WALLACE  
Date: December 14, 1960

Office: BOSTON

Field Office File No.: BS 161-16

Bureau File No.:

Title: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY

Synopsis: Associate favorable.

-RUC-

DETAILS:ASSOCIATES

Professor WILLARD L. THORP, Economics Department, Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts, on December 14, 1960 advised SA THOMAS F. SULLIVAN that he first knew DEAN ACHESON in 1933 and that he thereafter met him casually until 1945. He stated that from 1945 to 1952, he had a great deal to do with Mr. ACHESON in the United States Department of State. During that time, he served under him as Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs. Professor THORP stated in this capacity, he was then ranking Assistant Secretary and saw much of Mr. ACHESON at staff meetings and also a great deal more on economic matters during that period.

Professor THORP stated as a result of this association and contacts which he has had since that date, he has absolutely no doubt nor reservation in recommending the character and loyalty of DEAN ACHESON.

\*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. R. O. ~~LALLIER~~ *L* *1/18/61*

DATE: 12-14-60

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

FROM : J. J. O'CONNOR *JJO*

SUBJECT: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPECIAL INQUIRY

In accordance with the recommendation of memorandum C. H. Stanley to Mr. Rosen in captioned matter, Justice Felix Frankfurter, U. S. Supreme Court, upon interview on 12-14-60, advised he has known captioned individual in a social and official capacity for more than twenty years.

Justice Frankfurter stated Acheson's reputation for honesty, trustworthiness and reliability was above reproach and that Acheson was completely loyal to the United States. Justice Frankfurter advised he would recommend Acheson for any position of trust and indicated Acheson would be a distinct credit to the Government in any post which may be offered him.

Justice Frankfurter was extremely lavish in his praise and admiration of captioned individual's abilities, qualifications and high sense of responsibility.

ACTION:

This memorandum should be referred to the Special Inquiry Section for its information.

JOC:sap (5)

- 1-Gardner
- 1-Stanley
- 1-Liaison
- 1-O'Connor

*161-47-30*  
NOT RECORDED

3 JAN 18 1961

*24*  
*[Handwritten signatures]*

*sent*  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*R*

*2/1/61*

*[Handwritten signature]*

F B I

Date: 12/15/60

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

*Handwritten initials/signature*

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, WFO (161-23)  
DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPI

*Handwritten initials/signature*

ReRep SA [redacted], 12/14/60, at Washington,  
D. C.

On 12/13/60, SA OLIVER B. JONES reviewed the Department of Justice Registration File Number 149-3085, re appointee, which disclosed he registered with the Department under Registration Number 320 on 3/31/39, as an adviser to Czecho-Slovakia Minister VLADIMIR HURBAN to the United States on American law. He filed supplemental statements on 12/12/39, 5/8/40, and 12/18/40. By letter dated 1/31/41, he wrote to the Department enclosing a sworn affidavit dated the same date requesting his registrant statement and all supplemental registration statements be withdrawn from the public records as his relationship as legal advisor to the Minister of Czecho-Slovakia had been terminated. On 2/10/41, the Department acknowledged receipt of this letter and complied with his request.

Records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of Justice, further reflect appointee filed a short form registration statement on 3/31/60 as a member of the firm of Covington and Burling, the registrant, under Registration Number 523. Appointee related in connection with his registration he would be engaged in general legal services in connection with proceedings to extradite General (retired) MARCOS PEREZ JILLENNEZ from the U.S. for crimes committed in Venezuela, with

3 - Bureau  
1 - WFO

JWB:llc  
(4)

AIRTEL

161-47-31

DEC 20 1960

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b7c

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge



particular reference to appearance in the Supreme Court of the U.S. as counsel for petitioner in applying for a writ or writs of certioram in aid of such extradition proceedings and there is no indication of record that above services in this connection have been terminated. This file contained no additional pertinent information:

The files of the Investigations Division, CSC, were reviewed on 12/14/60, by SA [redacted] and reflected a letter dated 5/15/50 advising that a record check regarding appointee had been conducted during 1950 under Executive Order 9835 in connection with his appointment as Secretary of State. This check and these files contained no additional pertinent information regarding the appointee.

b6  
b7c

The files of the Passport Office, Department of State, reviewed by SE [redacted] on 5/24/60, disclosed that DEAN ACHESON was issued Diplomatic Passport Number 4678 on 4/25/55, for a pleasure trip to Europe of an unstated duration. This passport included his wife, ALICE STANLEY ACHESON, who was born at Charlevoix, Michigan, on 8/12/95 and to whom he was married on 5/5/17. He listed his birth as 4/11/93 at Middletown, Connecticut. The file also reflected that he was scheduled to travel to England in June, 1958, and this passport was amended to exclude his wife who did not accompany him on this trip.

He was issued Diplomatic Passport Number 1200 on 5/16/49, for travel abroad on official business for the Department of State. The file reflected that as of 12/5/52, he was also Representative of the USA to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council to convene at Paris, France. He was head of the delegation of the USA proceeding to the British Isles and France for the bilateral and trilateral discussions and for the North Atlantic Treaty meeting in 1950. He was also Chairman of the Delegation of the USA to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to convene at Paris, France, in 1951. He was Representative of the USA to the Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council to convene at Brussels, Belgium, late in 1950.

The files reflected that he was issued Passport Number 221701 on 6/28/35 for a two-month pleasure trip to England. This passport included his wife and [redacted]. This passport was amended to exclude him and his wife and was used by their [redacted] for a six weeks' trip to France in 1937, for the purpose of study of the French language. This passport was amended on 7/12/38, to reinclude him and exclude [redacted]

WFO 161-23

He was issued Passport Number 411117 on 6/23/31, for a three-month trip to Sweden and Great Britain for the purpose of business and travel. This passport included his wife.

He was issued Passport Number 379010 on 5/6/27 for travel of two months in France and England.

He was issued Passport Number 197980 on 6/26/22 for a six-month business and pleasure trip to Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and Switzerland.

He was issued Chinese Passport Number 12 on 6/12/15 for a three-month trip to Japan and China for the purpose of education. These files contained no additional pertinent info regarding appointee.

For info of Bureau, checks are still outstanding in this case at Secret Service and at CIA regarding appointee and wife. These checks will be reported immediately upon receipt of same by WFO.

F B I

Date: 12/15/60

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, WFO (161-23)  
DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPI

Remyairtel 12/14/60.

On 12/15/60, [redacted] Clerk,  
Personnel Section, U.S. Secret Service, advised SA MAURICE F.  
DONEGAN that their files failed to reflect a record for  
the appointee.

For info Bureau, checks are still outstanding at CIA  
re appointee and wife. These checks will be reported  
immediately upon receipt by WFO

3-Bureau  
1-WFO

JWB:olg  
(4)

AIRTEL

161-47-32

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Approved: MWJ/no Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

12/21/60

**AIRTEL**

**TO: DIRECTOR, FBI**

**FROM: SAC, WFO (161-23)**

**DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPI**

**Remyairtel 12/15/60.**

**The files of CIA were caused to be searched on 12/20/60  
by SA [redacted] and reflected no pertinent identifiable  
info re appointee's wife.**

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b7c

**Since all leads this case have been covered at WFO, it is  
being considered RUC.**

**3-Bureau  
1-WFO**

**JWB:jeg  
(4)**

**AIRTEL**

12-20-60

**AIRTEL**

**TO: DIRECTOR, FBI**  
**FROM: SAC, WFO (161-23)**

**DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON**  
**SPI**

In connection with the special inquiry investigation of CHESTER BOWLES, Mr. ACHESON was interviewed 12-20-60, by SA [REDACTED]. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. ACHESON volunteered that he had heard the FBI had been conducting a background investigation concerning him which he presumed was for a position with the incoming administration. He stated that as far as he knew he was not being considered for a position with the new administration and had no plans to re-enter the government service.

The above is being furnished to the Bureau for info.

3-Bureau  
1-WFO  
JJO:AJC  
(4)

**AIRTEL**

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F B I

Date: 12/21/60

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (161-23)

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPI

Remyairtel 12/15/60.

The files of CIA were caused to be searched on 12/20/60  
by SA [redacted] and reflected no pertinent identifiable  
info re appointee's wife.

Since all leads this case have been covered at WFO, it is  
being considered RUC.

3-Bureau  
1-WFO

JWB:jeg  
(4)

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AIRTEL

161-47-34

NOT RECORDED

8 JAN 18 1961

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b7c

Approved: [Signature] Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

*1 cc. DAG will photo-copy  
8. encl 3/15/61 in case  
class 8 Acheson  
77-85927  
TW*

~~(S)~~ (U)

December 29, 1960

Mr. Lawrence F. O'Brien  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/31/60 BY 1042R

Dear Mr. O'Brien:

In accordance with the request of December 8,  
1960, an investigation has been conducted concerning  
Mr. Dean Gooderham Acheson.

A previous investigation was conducted concerning  
Mr. Acheson in 1941. The results of that investigation as  
well as the results of current inquiries have been summarized  
in the enclosed memorandum.

Confidential informants\* who have furnished  
reliable information in the past reported that on March 28,  
1958, Mr. Acheson had lunch with Soviet Ambassador  
Mikhail A. Menshikov at the Soviet Embassy in Washington,  
D. C. He spent two hours and twenty-five minutes in the  
Embassy at that time.

DEC 30 4 07 PM '60  
FBI  
FBI-READING ROOM

On December 20, 1960, Mr. Acheson was interviewed in connection with another matter. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Acheson mentioned to the Special Agent that he had heard the Federal Bureau of Investigation was conducting a background investigation concerning him. He said he presumed it was in connection with a possible position with the incoming administration. He told the Special Agent that as far as he knew he was not being considered for any position with the new administration, and that he had no plans to re-enter Government service.

REC-58  
161-47-35  
NOT RECORDED  
JAN 18 1961

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
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- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE  
FVG:cch  
(10)  
10-3-95  
SP12 BK  
340246

Personally delivered by  
Evans  
Date 12/31/60

NOTE: See memo Stanley to Rosen attached.

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT  \*Special Agents  
Alton D. Wilson \*\*

b6  
b7c

Mr. Lawrence F. O'Brien




In addition to the enclosed memorandum, there are enclosed Photostats of pages 23 through 51 of the book entitled, "McCarthyism, The Fight for America," written by the late Senator Joe McCarthy and published in 1952. These pages include all of Chapter Five of Senator McCarthy's book setting forth a compilation of charges against Mr. Acheson made by Senator McCarthy and others. The charges are stated as answers to the various questions posed to Senator McCarthy.

Enclosed also is an Associated Press article which appeared on page 1 of the "Washington Post," a daily newspaper in Washington, D. C., on August 20, 1951. This article stated that Mr. Acheson denounced as "either entirely incorrect or distortions of the truth," twelve accusations made against him by Lieutenant Governor Goodwin J. Knight of California. The article listed charges against Mr. Acheson ranging from his handling of the Formosa policy, through Department of State security questions, to the Alger Hiss case. After each charge there appeared Mr. Acheson's rebuttal.

On June 4, 1951, Mr. Acheson testified before a joint Senate committee then conducting hearings on the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur. Mr. Acheson's statement, which embodied the Department of State's policy in China and at Yalta, was printed on pages A3 and A4 of "The Evening Star," a daily newspaper in Washington, D. C., on June 4, 1951. The newspaper article has been Photostated, clipped, and mounted to twelve pages which are enclosed. Excerpts from Mr. Acheson's statement before the joint Senate committee on June 4, 1951, were read into the Congressional Record on June 27, 1951, and July 26, 1951, by Representative Walter K. Granger of Utah. These excerpts appear on pages A3932 and A4705 of the Congressional Record, Volume 97.



Mr. Lawrence F. O'Brien

  
The investigations of Mr. Acheson covered inquiries as to his character, loyalty, reputation, and ability, but no inquiries were made concerning the sources of his income.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures (4)

*2 copies to Mr. Tolson  
AFJ:my Donahoe's office  
3/2/61*

*1 cc DAG 3/15/61 in  
case of David C. Acheson  
77-85927*

December 29, 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-3-95 BY SP1285

340296

DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

*SUMMARY*

A previous investigation was conducted concerning Mr. Acheson in 1941. The results of that investigation as well as the results of current inquiries have been summarized in this memorandum.

I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Birth, Education, and Employment

Mr. Acheson was born on April 11, 1893, at Middletown, Connecticut. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, in 1915. He received a Bachelor of Laws degree at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1918. He has received honorary degrees from several other universities.

From 1919 to 1921 Mr. Acheson was employed as a private secretary to the late Louis D. Brandeis, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. In 1921 he entered law practice with the firm of Covington, Burling and Rublee in Washington, D. C. He was appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury in May, 1933. On January 1, 1934, he re-entered private law practice as a member of the firm, Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson and Shorb, Washington, D. C. In 1939 Mr. Acheson was appointed Chairman of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.

DEC 30 4 07 PM '60  
REC'D-READING ROOM  
FBI

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
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- McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Ingram \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*2805 P. Street NW  
WASHINGTON, D.C.*

FVG:ejf

*F. V. Gardner  
Room 4742*

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

On January 23, 1941, Mr. Acheson was appointed Assistant Secretary of State. He was later appointed Under Secretary of State on August 27, 1945, in which position he served until July 1, 1947, when he resumed the practice of law with his old firm in Washington, D. C. On January 7, 1949, former President Harry S. Truman appointed Mr. Acheson as Secretary of State. The United States Senate confirmed this appointment and Mr. Acheson was sworn in as Secretary of State on January 21, 1949. He served in this capacity until the end of that administration in January, 1953. Since that time he has continued to practice law with his firm in Washington, D. C.

**Military Service**

Mr. Acheson enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve Force on July 25, 1918. He entered on active duty the same date with the provisional rank of ensign. He was released from active duty under honorable conditions on December 31, 1918, and was honorably discharged from the United States Naval Reserve Force as an ensign on September 30, 1921. His service record is clear.

**Marital Status**

Mr. Acheson is married to Alice Stanley Acheson, who resides with him at 2805 P Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

**Bar Affiliations**

On October 4, 1921, Mr. Acheson was admitted to the practice of law before the District of Columbia Bar, Washington, D. C.

He was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court on November 18, 1924.

On June 6, 1932, Mr. Acheson became a member of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, and at present is a member in good standing of that organization.

Since May 1, 1933, he has been a member in good standing of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia.

Dean Gooderham Acheson

## II. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION S

### Interviews

All of the persons shown in this memorandum as being interviewed were contacted during current inquiries.

Herbert C. Hoover, former President of the United States, Waldorf Towers Hotel, New York, New York, said that Mr. Acheson served from 1947 to 1957 as the representative of the Democratic Party for the Commission on Organizing the Executive Branch of the Government, of which body Mr. Hoover was Chairman. Mr. Hoover said that, while he did not fully subscribe to Mr. Acheson's political beliefs, he considered Mr. Acheson to be a brilliant and honest man of excellent character, reputation, and associates. He said there is no question in his mind concerning Mr. Acheson's loyalty to the United States.

Harry S. Truman, former President of the United States, was interviewed at the Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. He spoke very highly of Mr. Acheson and described him as "the finest man in the United States." He said he could say nothing further which would be more descriptive of Mr. Acheson.

Jesse M. Donaldson, former Postmaster General of the United States, was interviewed in Kansas City, Missouri. He said he came to know Mr. Acheson very well socially and professionally in Washington, D. C., during past years. Mr. Donaldson said he considers Mr. Acheson to be the most able man he knows in foreign affairs. He said Mr. Acheson is outstanding in this field from the standpoint of training, experience, demeanor, and ability. He described Mr. Acheson as a sober, solemn, and sedate man of great dignity and excellent diplomatic techniques. He observed that Mr. Acheson has a most pleasant sense of humor and is cordial and personable in social contacts. He said Mr. Acheson is definitely loyal to the United States, and he recommended him most highly for a position of trust.

**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

Charles Sawyer, former Secretary of Commerce, was interviewed at Cincinnati, Ohio. He said he came to know Mr. Acheson both socially and professionally during the administration of President Truman. He described Mr. Acheson as a brilliant lawyer, and a dedicated man, whose character, reputation, and associates are above reproach. Mr. Sawyer said, however, he would not recommend Mr. Acheson for any high level position indiscriminately. He said, particularly, he would not recommend Mr. Acheson for the position of Secretary of State because, in his opinion, Mr. Acheson, when he held that position previously, made decisions which Mr. Sawyer thought were wrong. Specifically, Mr. Sawyer said that the present unfortunate situation of the United States in Asia is attributable to poor decisions on Mr. Acheson's part in not working toward the defense of Korea and in not attacking the Chinese communists beyond the Yalu River.

A. Whitney Griswold, President of Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, said that Dean Acheson is one of the ablest and most admirable men it has been his pleasure to know during his lifetime. He pointed out that at times Mr. Acheson has been greatly misunderstood, possibly through his own fault, for he is not a man who endures fools cheerfully. He described Mr. Acheson as a man of intellectual fastidiousness, who is not afraid of any person or anything. He said Mr. Acheson is apt to say what he thinks, a quality which has not endeared him to some of his targets. Dr. Griswold described Mr. Acheson as a man of towering ability who will some day be recognized as the one who rallied the West against communism, and without whose help communism might have overrun Western Europe. He said Mr. Acheson is a supremely competent advocate and a master of the lawyer's skills and techniques. He said Mr. Acheson is a man who can represent the United States on the same level with Winston Churchill, Charles DeGaulle, and other statesmen of the world. He said Mr. Acheson is an exacting critic of everything in life, and his loyalty to the United States is without condition or reservation. He recommended Mr. Acheson for a position of trust and responsibility.

**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

**John L. McClellan, United States Senator from Arkansas, was interviewed at Little Rock, Arkansas. He said he served with Mr. Acheson as a member of the Commission on Organizing the Executive Branch of the Government. Based upon this association, Senator McClellan said he believed Mr. Acheson to be a capable and intelligent man. He said, however, that in his opinion Mr. Acheson is an intellectual who is out of touch with the people. Senator McClellan said that Mr. Acheson is a man of good character whose loyalty to the United States is above question.**

**James E. Webb, former Under Secretary of State, was interviewed at Kingston, Oklahoma. He said he served in that capacity from 1949 to 1952, while Mr. Acheson was Secretary of State. He described Mr. Acheson as a considerate person of excellent reputation who was sober, honest, reliable, trustworthy, and sincere in all of his undertakings. He recalled that Mr. Acheson had been a controversial figure as Secretary of State and had been accused by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy of selling the United States to the communists, which accusation Mr. Webb said was without basis. Mr. Webb said Mr. Acheson is a brilliant man of sound judgment. He said Mr. Acheson's character, reputation, and associates are above reproach. He stated that Mr. Acheson is a loyal American, whose allegiance to the United States and to the Constitution is above question. He recommended Mr. Acheson for any trusted position.**

**[REDACTED] Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, said he has known Mr. Acheson quite well, both professionally and socially, since 1941. He described Mr. Acheson as "one of the outstanding anticommunists of the world." He said Mr. Acheson is a loyal and devoted citizen of the United States. He said Mr. Acheson's character, reputation, and associates are above question. He recommended him for a position of trust and confidence.**

**Benjamin Gerig, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State, said he has known Mr. Acheson since 1942. He mentioned that he has not known Mr. Acheson socially, having had only official contacts with him in the Department of State. He described**

**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

Mr. Acheson as a man of high intellect and unimpeachable character and integrity. He said he has never had any reason to doubt Mr. Acheson's loyalty to the United States, and he attributed Mr. Acheson's statement, "..... I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss," not to any sympathy toward the political views of Hiss, but rather to a sense of justice and fair play. Mr. Gerig described Mr. Acheson as "the architect of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Marshall Plan." He said Mr. Acheson has understood the dangers of communism and, while an official of the State Department, proved to be a tough, hard negotiator in fighting the encroachments of communism. Mr. Gerig recommended Mr. Acheson for a position of trust.

Clarence J. Brown, United States Representative from Ohio, was interviewed at Washington, D. C. He said he has known Mr. Acheson for twenty years. He said in 1947 and 1948, he served with Mr. Acheson on the Commission on Organizing the Executive Branch of the Government. Mr. Brown said that Mr. Acheson is a very brilliant and able man of excellent character, associates, reputation, and loyalty. Mr. Brown said as a Republican he could not agree politically with Mr. Acheson, whom he described as an avid internationalist and a "New Dealer." He pointed out, however, that he did not wish to infer that Mr. Acheson is in any way disloyal or dishonest; but he definitely could not agree with his philosophy of government.

George D. Aiken, United States Senator from Vermont, was interviewed at Washington, D. C. Senator Aiken, who is a delegate to the United Nations, said he knew Mr. Acheson before he was Secretary of State, having served with him on the Commission on Organizing the Executive Branch of the Government. He said he has not known Mr. Acheson very well socially, but knows him well both professionally and politically. He said he has never had any reason to question Mr. Acheson's character, reputation, associates, and loyalty. He said he feels that Mr. Acheson has been unjustly accused in the past for his handling of foreign affairs, and for this reason he has defended Mr. Acheson when the occasion arose. He described Mr. Acheson as a most capable man who has strived to do a good job for his country. He said he knows of no reason why Mr. Acheson should not be considered for a position of high trust and responsibility.

Dean Gooderham Acheson

In addition, the following persons were interviewed and commented favorably concerning Mr. Acheson's character, reputation, loyalty, and associates. They recommended him for a position of trust and responsibility:

Felix Frankfurter,  
Associate Justice,  
United States Supreme Court;

Oscar L. Chapman, attorney,  
Washington, D. C.,  
former Secretary of the Interior;

J. Howard McGrath, attorney,  
Washington, D. C.  
former Attorney General of the United States;

Robert A. Lovett,  
Locust Valley, Long Island, New York,  
former Secretary of Defense;

Charles F. Brannan,  
General Counsel, National Farmers Union,  
Denver, Colorado,  
former Secretary of Agriculture;

James F. Byrnes,  
Columbia, South Carolina,  
former Secretary of State.

Twelve other persons, including professional associates, appropriate Government officials, and social acquaintances, were interviewed concerning Mr. Acheson. Those acquainted with his professional reputation described him as an intelligent man, a brilliant attorney, and a former Government official who served well as Secretary of State. All of them spoke very favorably concerning Mr. Acheson's character, reputation, and associates. They said he is a loyal American, and they recommended him for a position of trust.



**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

**Close Relatives**

Mr. Acheson has the following close relatives in addition to his wife:

Son, David Campion Acheson, 3101 Garfield Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.;

Daughter, Jane Acheson Brown, New York City;

Daughter, Mary Acheson Bundy, 3500 Lowell Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.;

Brother, Edward Campion Acheson, professor of economics, The George Washington University, Washington, D. C.  
He resides at Rolling Valley Farm, Vienna, Virginia.

Mr. Acheson's father, Edward Campion Acheson, and his mother, Eleanor Gooderham Acheson, are deceased.

**Credit and Arrest Checks**

Records of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., reveal that Edward Acheson of Vienna, Virginia, was arrested on October 22, 1957, in connection with a collision involving the automobile he was driving. He elected to forfeit \$100.

Records of the Fairfax County Police Department, Fairfax, Virginia, reveal that Edward C. Acheson of Vienna, Virginia, was fined \$5 and costs on April 29, 1957, for driving without Fairfax County license tags.

Information has been received from other appropriate law enforcement agencies and credit reporting agencies indicating that their files contain either no record or no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Acheson or his close relatives.

**Miscellaneous**

In January, 1950, Alger Hiss, a former employee of the Department of State, was convicted in Federal court, New York, New York, on two counts of perjury. It was found that he had falsely testified before a special grand jury when he denied furnishing documents of the Department of State to Whittaker Chambers, a self-admitted

Dean Gooderham Acheson

former member of the Communist Party and courier for a Soviet espionage network. It was found further that he had lied in a statement wherein he contended that he had not been in contact with Chambers subsequent to January 1, 1937. On January 25, 1950, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.

According to press accounts Mr. Acheson issued the following statement to reporters on January 25, 1950, following the above action regarding Alger Hiss:

"It would be highly improper for me to discuss anything to do with the case as long as it is still before the courts.

"I should like to make it clear to you that, whatever the outcome of any appeal which Mr. Hiss or his lawyer may take in this case, I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss.

"I think every person who has known Alger Hiss or who has served with him at any time has upon his conscience the very serious task of deciding what his attitude is and what his conduct should be.

"That must be done by each person in the light of his own standards and his own principles.

"For me there is very little doubt about these standards or these principles.

"They were stated on the Mount of Olives, and if you are interested in seeking them, you will find them in the 25th chapter of the Gospel according to Saint Matthew, beginning at verse 34. -- Dean Acheson."

(74-1333-A, 2/2/50)

Dean Gooderham Acheson

The "Washington Post," a daily newspaper in Washington, D. C., on March 1, 1950, carried a statement issued by Secretary of State Dean Acheson before a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee in which he explained the remarks he made regarding Alger Hiss on January 25, 1950. Mr. Acheson told the Senate Subcommittee that his statement was made on the basis of his heritage and training, taking into consideration his legal, moral, Christian and American background. He ended his remarks with the following statement:

"But for the benefit of those who would create doubt where none existed, I will accept the humiliation of stating what should be obvious, that I did not and do not condone in any way the offenses charged, whether committed by a friend or by a total stranger, and that I would never knowingly tolerate any disloyal person in the Department of State."

(74-1333-A, 3/1/50)

On November 14, 1945, Mr. Acheson, then Under Secretary of State, was a principal speaker at a rally sponsored by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Incorporated, in Madison Square Garden, New York City. The "Daily Worker," a former east coast communist newspaper, reported at that time that the affair was called a "War Freedom Rally," and that Mr. Acheson presented an historical treatise on American-Soviet relations since the Russian Revolution of 1917, closing with a plea for free collaboration between the two nations.

\*

An informant who furnished reliable information in the past, and who has requested anonymity, advised in November, 1945, that the rally scheduled for Madison Square Garden on Tuesday evening, November 14, 1945, was advertised as the "U. S. A. - U. S. S. R. Allies for Peace Rally."

Concerning the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Incorporated, mentioned above, that organization has been cited by the Attorney General of the United States as coming within the purview of Executive Order 10450.

[REDACTED] (100-16847-354)

**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

On February 20, 1951, Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb, United States Army, retired, spoke before a Lions Club meeting in Baltimore, Maryland. In his remarks he referred to Mr. Acheson as the number one communist in the United States. He said at that time that he had documentary proof to back up his charges. He said further that during hearings before the United States Senate regarding the confirmation of Mr. Acheson's appointment as Secretary of State, he offered his services as a witness, but he was not called to testify.

On February 27, 1951, Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He admitted that he had no documentary material giving any information or evidence supporting his allegations of communist affiliation on the part of Mr. Acheson. He said the material he referred to in his remarks before the Lions Club was obtained from publications and from other writings of public record. He said what he intended to convey was that any reasonable person studying the public material he had compiled could reach the same conclusion as he concerning Mr. Acheson.

He related an incident which occurred in General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, in 1946. He said he saw Mr. Acheson there and personally confronted him, accusing him of being a communist. He said Mr. Acheson made no reply to his accusation.

Brigadier General Bibb said he believed Mr. Acheson to be a communist because of the manner in which he discharged his duties as an official of the Department of State. He did not elaborate. He said he intended to give further talks regarding Mr. Acheson, not for publicity or personal glory, but merely to inform the public of his views on communism.

(121-22405-5)

**Dean Gooderham Acheson**

Concerning Brigadier General Bibb, it is noted that on June 6, 1949, he wrote a letter to Tom Clark, then the Attorney General of the United States, with a copy to President Harry S. Truman. The letter attacked Mr. Clark and his handling of the Department of Justice. In his letter he referred to "that lewd Roosevelt woman and her cohorts Acheson and Dulles, all communists and/or socialists or both." (101-3396-36)

Information was received in September, 1951, indicating that Kenneth Goff, a former member of the Communist Party in Wisconsin from 1937 to 1939, was in possession of information showing Mr. Acheson as a member of the Communist Party in Washington, D. C., during the late 1930's. Kenneth Goff was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in September, 1951. He admitted that he was unable to furnish specific information or evidence showing any affiliation of Mr. Acheson with the Communist Party.

He said he was not personally acquainted with Mr. Acheson and had never met him. He said in 1936 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, an official of the Communist Party told a group of members that when the communists were in control of Spain in the 1930's, they had made friendly contacts with influential persons in Washington, D. C., and that Dean Acheson and Eleanor Roosevelt were "our friends." Kenneth Goff stated that, while he had no specific information to support his theory, Dean Acheson, in his opinion, was a member of the Communist Party until 1939 when he, Goff, resigned from that organization. (100-372409-252)

In September, 1951, Kenneth Goff was head of a one-man organization called the "Colorado Anti-Communist League." On February 25, 1948, he was fined \$100 in United States District Court, Washington, D. C., for placing odious signs on the lawn of the Soviet Embassy.

\* [REDACTED] Confidential sources.

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b7D

Dean Gooderham Acheson

Information Concerning Mrs. Dean Acheson

In the Fall of 1940 a confidential informant,\* who furnished reliable information in the past, who was acquainted with the Washington Committee for Democratic Action, and who requested anonymity, reported that the name and address, "Mrs. Dean Acheson, 2805 P Street, Northwest," was recorded on one of a series of index cards maintained in the Office of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action in Washington, D. C. The informant did not know Mrs. Acheson personally and was unable to evaluate the significance of the information appearing on the card. During this investigation the informant was not available for recontact.

Concerning the Washington Committee for Democratic Action, it is noted this organization has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States as coming within the purview of Executive Order 10450.

Passport Record

Records of the Passport Office, Department of State, reveal that since June 12, 1915, when Mr. Acheson was issued a passport to visit Japan and China for a trip of three months in pursuance of education, he has been issued other passports for visits to various parts of the world for business and pleasure. There was no additional pertinent information.

Foreign Agents Registration

Records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of Justice, reveal that Mr. Acheson registered with that agency on March 31, 1939, as an advisor on

\* ANONYMOUS

Dean Gooderham Acheson

American law to Vladimir Hurban, Minister to the United States from Czechoslovakia. After filing three supplemental statements of registration during the next twenty-one months, he notified the Department of Justice on January 31, 1941, that his relationship as legal advisor to Mr. Hurban had been terminated and his registration as a foreign agent was concluded.

The same records reveal that on March 31, 1960, Mr. Acheson filed a statement of registration as a member of the law firm of Covington and Burling. In his statement Mr. Acheson indicated that he would be engaged in general legal services in connection with proceedings to extradite General Marcos Perez Jimenez from the United States for crimes committed in Venezuela. There is no indication on the record that the services of Mr. Acheson in this connection have been terminated. Jimenez is a former President of Venezuela.

#### Agency Checks

Information has been received from the following governmental agencies indicating that their files contain either no record or no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Acheson or his close relatives:

Investigations Division, Civil Service Commission;

Office of Naval Intelligence;

Committee on Admissions and Grievances,  
United States District Court for the  
District of Columbia;

Central Intelligence Agency;

United States Secret Service.

The central files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contain no additional pertinent information.

*Handwritten initials*  
Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 12/29/60

FROM : C. H. Stanley *CHS*

~~SECRET~~ (U)

SUBJECT: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON  
SPECIAL INQUIRY

At the request of the Kennedy Administration on 12/8/60, an investigation has been conducted concerning Dean Gooderham Acheson, former Secretary of State under President Truman.

Acheson was investigated under the Hatch Act in 1941 after information was received indicating that his name appeared on the active indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action (WCDA), Washington, D. C. Determined that it was not his name that appeared in the records of the WCDA, but rather that of his wife.

The information concerning his wife's name appearing records of the WCDA is included in the summary memorandum. The WCDA has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The investigation of Acheson in 1941 was favorable, as were the current inquiries concerning him, except Charles Sawyer, former Secretary of Commerce, who was interviewed currently, would not recommend Acheson for any high-level position indiscriminately. He stated he would not recommend Acheson for the position of Secretary of State because in his opinion, Acheson, when he held that position previously, made decisions which he, Sawyer, thought were wrong. Senator John L. McClellan, Arkansas, stated that he felt Acheson to be capable and intelligent, but to be an intellectual who is out of touch with the people. Other persons interviewed currently, including former President Hoover, although he did not fully subscribe to Acheson's political beliefs, considered him to be a loyal American and a brilliant man of excellent character and reputation.

Others who spoke highly of Mr. Acheson were former President Truman, Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, former Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, and J. Howard McGrath, former Attorney General.

Enclosures *1-3-61*

VG:jzm/jlz  
(9)

(11)

161-47-36  
RECORDED

3 JAN 18 1961

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REG-16  
10-395 340296

*Stamp: ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE*

62 FEB 3 1961

~~SECRET~~ (U)



Memorandum to Mr. Rosen  
RE: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

~~SECRET~~ (U)

INFORMATION INCLUDED IN SUMMARY MEMORANDUM

The attached summary memorandum includes information showing that in November, 1945, Acheson was one of the principal speakers at a rally in Madison Square Garden, New York City, advertised as the "U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Allies for Peace Rally," sponsored by the National Council of American - Soviet Friendship, an organization cited by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Also included is the statement issued to the press by Acheson on January 25, 1950, following the conviction and sentencing of Alger Hiss on two counts of perjury. In his statement Acheson said "...I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss," basing his stand on Christian charity.

In February, 1951, Brigadier General Eugene S. Bibb, United States Army, retired, in speaking before a Lions Club meeting in Baltimore, Maryland, referred to Acheson as the number one communist in the United States, claiming to have documentary proof to back up his charges. Bibb was interviewed several days later by our Agents at which time he admitted not having any information or evidence supporting his allegations, and that the charges were based on his opinion. Bibb is the same person, who, two years previously, wrote a letter to former Attorney General Tom Clark, attacking him and his handling of the Department of Justice, and referring to "that lewd Roosevelt woman and her cohorts, Acheson and Dulles, all communists and/or socialists or both."

In September, 1951, Kenneth Goff, a former member of the Communist Party in Wisconsin from 1937 to 1939, was alleged to have information showing Acheson as a member of the Communist Party in Washington, D. C., during the late 1930's. He said while he was unable to furnish any specific information or evidence supporting his allegation, it was still his opinion that Acheson had been a member of the Communist Party in 1939.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Memorandum to Mr. Rosen  
RE: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Concerning Kenneth Goff, it was noted that in September, 1951, he was head of a one-man organization called the "Colorado Anti-Communist League." In February, 1948, he was fined \$100 in United States District Court, Washington, D. C., for placing odious signs on the lawn of the Soviet Embassy.

INFORMATION NOT INCLUDED IN SUMMARY MEMORANDUM

On December 2, 1948, Edward C. Acheson, Dean Acheson's brother who is a professor of economics at The George Washington University at Washington, D. C., was interviewed in connection with a Loyalty of Government Employees investigation. The interview took place in Professor Acheson's office at the University. On this occasion, Professor Acheson was most uncooperative and obnoxious. He used a good deal of profanity in telling the Agent that he disagreed strongly with the loyalty investigation on his friend, and he threatened to have the Agent fired if the Agent's report cast any aspersions on his friend. The matter was reported to Dr. Marvin, President of the University, and Professor Acheson subsequently called at the Bureau where he apologized to Inspector Hugh H. Clegg and to the Agent who had interviewed him. *Asst. DIR.*

The Director noted "This fellow Acheson is just a 'rotter' who was finally caught up with. Make certain our field office never contacts him again -- also make certain if any inquiries are received re him for government employment that above incident is supplied. H." (65-46765-4)

PHOTOSTATS SUBMITTED AS ENCLOSURES TO COVER LETTER

Three sets of Photostats are included as enclosures to the cover letter for the attached summary memorandum. First are copies of pages 23 through 51 of the late Senator Joe McCarthy's book, "McCarthyism, the Fight for America," published in 1952. These pages set forth a compilation of various charges against Acheson made by Senator McCarthy and others. Second is an Associated Press news article which appeared in the "Washington Post" on August 20, 1951, in which Acheson rebutted

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Memorandum to Mr. Rosen  
RE: DEAN GOODERHAM ACHESON

~~SECRET~~ (U)

twelve charges made against him by Lieutenant Governor Goodwin J. Knight of California. Third is a Photostat record of pages A3 and A4 of "The Evening Star" newspaper of June 4, 1951, setting forth the partial text of Acheson's statement of policy on China which he submitted on June 4, 1951, before the Joint Senate Committee conducting hearings into the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur.

INFORMATION IN COVER LETTER ONLY

On March 28, 1958, Special Agents [redacted] and Alton D. Wilson observed Mr. Acheson enter the Russian Embassy at 1:05 p.m. where, it was learned, he had a luncheon engagement with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov. He was seen to leave the Embassy at 3:30 p.m. the same date. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] this information was not included in the summary memorandum. However, it is included in the cover letter since it is believed to be information the President-elect may want to know. [redacted]

b7E

confidential informants reported that Mr. Acheson had lunch with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov on March 28, 1958, spending two hours and twenty-five minutes in the Embassy at that time. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached summary memorandum and three enclosures be delivered.

V. [signature]  
12/30

[signature] [signature]

OK.  
[signature]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

*M/2*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1961

To: Mr. Courtney Evans

From: Kenneth O'Donnell

*End*  
*to ed 1-2*

Per conversation with your office

today.

~~NOT RECORDED~~

~~17 MAR 27 1961~~

*91*

~~ENCLOSURE~~

*2* ENCLOSURE *B*


*B*

ORIGINAL FILE IN 161-38-

*16* XEROX *94*  
MAR 1961  
*you*

161-47-37  
NOT RECORDED  
149 MAR 29 1961

63 MAR 31 1961

MEMO ROUTE SLIP Form AEC-93 (Rev. May 14, 1947)		See me about this. Note and return.	For concurrence. For signature.	For action. For information.
TO (Name and unit) Robert I. Bouck Special Agent in Charge U. S. Secret Service Rm. 39, Executive Office Bldg. Washington 25, D. C.	INITIALS  DATE	REMARKS Attached is the listing of names of Presidential Appointees for whom we have received requests for AEC clearance from their respective agencies. Per our conversation, we would appreciate it very much if you would arrange for the release of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports.		
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS  DATE	REMARKS Thanks very much.		
FROM (Name and unit) E. L. Ferullo, Actg. Asst. Director for Washington Area Security Operations, Security Division US Atomic Energy Commission	REMARKS			
PHONE NO. 119 x 3186	DATE 3-6-61			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1957-O-422007

161-47-37

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

1

DEAN RUSK.

Department of State

CHESTER BOWLES.

" " "

THOMAS FINLETTER.

" " "

DEAN ACHESON

" " "

ADLAI STEVENSON

" " "

ROGER W. JONES

" " "

BROOKS HAYS

" " "

ABRAM CHAYES

" " "

EDWARD BOLSTER.

" " "

GEORGE W. BALL,

" " "

GEORGE MC GEE

" " "

WILLIAM A. HARRIMAN

" " "

FRANK BURTON ELLIS

Director, OCDM

CARLISLE P. RUNGE

Asst. Secretary of Defense

JOHN L. MOORE

Administrator, GSA

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF

Secretary, HEW

IVAN A. NESTINGEN

Under-Secretary, HEW

*all but  
Stevenson  
furnished AEC 3/14/61  
by Liaison Dept*

*151-47-37*  
ENCLOSURE

*16*  
*vac*

ENCLOSURE

*2*

1 - Mr. Morgan

May 25, 1962

*0*  
DEAN G. ACHESON  
Born: April 11, 1893  
Middletown, Connecticut

MAILED

NAME CHECK

*esa*

An investigation concerning the captioned individual was conducted by this Bureau in 1941, and an applicant-type investigation regarding Mr. Acheson was conducted in 1960. A summary of the results of these investigations was sent to the White House (on December 29, 1960.) At the request of the White House, you are referred to the Office of the (Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President,) should you desire the results of these investigations. (161-47-35)

NOTE: Acheson was investigated under the Hatch Act in 1941 after information was received indicating his name appeared on active indices of Washington Committee for Democratic Action (WCDA), Washington, D.C. It was determined that it was not his name that appeared in the records of WCDA, but rather that of his wife. The 1941 investigation of Acheson was favorable. The 1960 inquiry re Acheson conducted at the request of the Kennedy Administration was favorable with few exceptions. (161-47-36)

ORIGINAL AND ONE - OSI - 4  
Request Red'd 5/18/62

FKM:jld  
(4)

161-47-38

19 MAY 28 1962

EX-100

REC-82

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*209*

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

57 MAY 31 1962  
MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

June 24, 1964

DEAN C. ACHESON  
Born: April 11, 1893  
Middletown, Connecticut

213  
18-1  
An investigation concerning the captioned individual was conducted by this Bureau in 1941, and an applicant-type investigation regarding Mr. Acheson was conducted in 1960. A summary of the results of these investigations was sent to the White House on December 29, 1960. At the request of the White House, you are referred to the Office of the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, should you desire the results of these investigations.

(161-47-38)

Original & 1-CSC  
Request Received-6-23-64

WFW:bss  
(4)

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

REC-45 / 11-4 / 39

JUN 30 1964

A83  
64 JUL 7 1964



UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION  
BUREAU OF PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
"CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION"  
AND REFER TO

FILE

AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

ACHESON, DEAN GOODERHAM - Summary

DOB: April 11, 1893

POB: Middletown, Conn.

Mass, D.C.S. Sweden, Mexico  
Brazil, Cal. N.Y. Eng

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA VOLUME 31 1960 - 1961

Ex-sec. of State; born Middletown, Conn., April 11, 1893; s. Edward Campion and Eleanor (Gooderham) A.; A.B., Yale, 1915, M.A. (honorary), 1936; LL.B., Harvard U., 1918 LL.D. (hon.), 1950; LL.D. (hon.), Wesleyan U., Conn., 1947; D.C.L., Oxford U., 1952; LL.D., Brandeis U., 1956, Cambridge U., 1958; m. Alice Stanley, May 5, 1917; children — Jane (Mrs. Dudley B. W. Brown), David Campion, Mary Eleanor (Mrs. William P. Bundy). Private sec. to Louis D. Brandeis, asso. justice U.S. Supreme Ct., 1919-21; with Covington, Burling and Rublee, 1921-33; apptd. undersec. of treasury, May 19, 1933, resigned Nov. 15 1933; mem Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb, Jan. 1, 1934-Jan. 31, 1941; appointed assistant secretary of State, Feb. 1, 1941; under-sec. of State, 1945-47, sec. of State, 1949-53; pvt. practice law with Covington & Burling, Washington, since 1953. Vice chmn. Commn. on Orgn. Exec Br. of the Govt. Ensign United States Navy, World War I. Awarded Order of Vasa (Swedish); Medal for Merit; Order of Aztec Eagle (Mexico); Grand Master Nat. Order of So. Cross (Brazil); Grand Cross Order of Boyaca (Columbia). Fellow Yale Corp. Mem. Am. Acad. Arts. and Scis., Delta Kappa Epsilon Scroll and Key. Democrat. Episcopalian. Clubs; Metropolitan, Chevy Chase (Washington); Century (N.Y.) Author: A Citizen Looks at Congress, 1957. Publication: A Democrat Looks at His Party, 1955; Power and Diplomacy, 1958.

SII Check

Non-derogatory RC&I, 1950. FBI non-loyalty investigations in 1941 and 1960 for White House. Reports not available.

In response to your request  
there ~~is~~ attached ONE MEMO  
~~report~~ which appears to relate  
to the subject of your inquiry.

ENCLOSURE

161-47-39

MAILED

MAY 6 1965

NAME CHECK

May 4, 1965

**DEAN ACHESON**  
Born: April 11, 1893  
Middletown, Connecticut

In response to your telephonic name check request the files reveal that an investigation concerning the captioned individual was conducted by this Bureau in 1941, and an applicant-type investigation regarding Mr. Acheson was conducted in 1960. A summary of the results of these investigations was sent to the White House and at the request of the White House, you are referred to the office of the Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, attention Mrs. Mildred Stegall.  
(161-47-35)

Original & 1-STATE (Anderson - WF0)  
Request Received-4/27/65

ADS:ded  
(4)

**NOTE:** Acheson was investigated under the Hatch Act in 1941 after information was received indicating his name appeared on active indices of Washington Committee for Democratic Action (WCDA), Washington, D. C. It was determined that it was not his name that appeared in the records of WCDA, but rather that of his wife. The investigations revealed no pertinent derogatory information re Mr. Acheson. Mr. Anderson, State Department Washington Field Office advised of information in memo by phone on 4/29/65.

CC TO: ... CS 7-4 ...  
REQ. REC'D 2/11/66 ...  
FEB 13 1966  
ANS. BY: ... J. J. A. / J. M. A. ...

REC 36

161-47-4068

EX-101

9 MAY 7 1965

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records, request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division.

20 MAY 17 1965

AD 43-221667

25 February 1966

RE DEAN ACHESON  
DOB: 11 April, 1893  
SPECIAL REQUEST

Honorable Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant to the President  
Attention: Mrs. Mildred Stegall  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Watson:

1. A security investigation is being conducted by the Air Force on the above individual. Officials of the FBI have advised that an investigation was conducted regarding Mr. Acheson in 1941 and 1960 and results were furnished to the White House. These officials have referred us to your office for authority to release these reports to the Air Force.

2. Your cooperation in authorizing the FBI to release the reports of investigation to this District Office will be appreciated.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Signed

E. F. SWINT  
Chief, National Agency  
Checks Division

*2/21/66 - 10 A.M.*  
*12/29/60 to*  
*2/2/66*

*161-47-42*

NOT RECORDED

18 MAR 3 1966

50 MAR 23 1966

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*File*